MĪMĀṀSĀ

THE VĀKYA-ŚĀSTRA OF ANCIENT INDIA

BY

DR. G. V. DEVASTHALI,
M.A., B.T., Ph.D.
Zala Vedanta Prizeman.
Professor of Sanskrit, H. P. T. College, Nasik.

BOOKSELLERS' PUBLISHING COMPANY
Mehendale Building, Girgaon Back Road, BOMBAY 4

Price Rs. 17·50

Printed by—R. A. Moramkar, at Shri Laxminarayan Press,
Thakurdwar, Bombay 2.

Published by—D. M. Tilak, for Booksellers' Publishing Co.
Mehendale Building, Bombay 4.

PREFACE

It was when I read the *Vidhi-pāda* with my Honours students that I got interested in the study of the *Mīmāṁsā-śāstra;* and a happy mould was given to this interest of mine by my revered *Guru*, Professor H. D. Velankar, who instructed me to work out the subject '*Mīmāṁsā, the Vākya-śāstra of Ancient India.*' It was at his instance and under his inspiring guidance that I have worked out the whole thesis, investigating in detail the claim of the *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā* to the title of *Vākya-śāstra*. In doing this I have restricted myself mainly to the oldest work on the subject (The *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* of *Jaimini*) and the oldest extant commentary thereon (The *Bhāsya* of *Śabara*). Occasionally, however, I have also referred to some later works on the subject such as the *Śloka-vārtika*, the *Tantra-vārtika*, and the *Ṭupṭīkā* by *Kumārila*, the *Nyāya-mālā-vistāra* of *Mādhava*, the *Mīmāṁsā-nyāya-prakāśa* of *Āpadeva* and the *Artha-saṁgraha* of *Laugākṣi Bhāskara*.

The following pages contain the first volume of my thesis which was accepted by the University of Bombay in 1946. The remaining portion along with an Introduction giving a brief account of Mīmāṁsā literature and tenets will soon appear as volume II. The present work, as even a casual glance through the table of contents will make it clear, is an attempt to set forth systematically the Mīmāṁsā views on *Language*, *Word*, and *Sentence*, particularly as discussed or suggested by Jaimini and Śabara.

For my work I have laid under contribution the enlightening works of the late Dr. Jha, and also that of the late Dr. Keith, a constant reference to which has helped a great deal to solve many a knotty point and given a definite shape to several hazy notions. Thanks are also due to Mahāmahopādhyāya, Dr. Umesha Mishra, M.A., D. Litt., Ex-Director, Mithila Research Institute, Darbhanga, Professor of Sanskrit, Allahabad University, a well-known Mīmāṁsist and disciple of Sir Ganganath Jha, for being kind enough to write a Fore-

word to this work. Nor can I forget here Shri D. M. Tilak who merely out of friendship has undertaken the publication of a work that would perhaps mean more expenditure than gain.

The Lion's Share of credit of whatever may be found to be worthy of it in the present work must, however, go to my revered *Guru* who has been a perpetual guide to me, and but for whose encouraging words, I am afraid, it would never have been possible for me to carry to completion the present work. At the same time, however, I have to claim all responsibility for whatever defects (including the several misprints) have remained and crept into my work inspite of all the care bestowed on it.

H. P. T. College,
June, 1959.

G. V. DEVASTHALI.

FOREWORD

It is a matter of great pleasure to me to have been asked to write a Foreword to this very important work of Indian thought which was supplicated by Dr. G. V. Devasthali, M.A., Ph. D., as a thesis for a doctorate degree to the University of Bombay in 1946 under the title *Mīmāṁsā the Vākyaśāstra*. It is a well-known fact that the proper study of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā has been practically neglected for the last four or five centuries even in Mithilā, its very home of origination. We know what a great popularity the subject had even in the 15th century during the reign of Bhairavendra Siṁha of Mithilā when in course of a *Cātuścaraṇa-Yāga* of a tank 1400 Mīmāṁsakas had been invited to attend and witness the Yāga. But at the same time it is a matter of great satisfaction that the tradition of the study of Mīmāṁsā and also of the per-formance of sacrifices has been preserved in the South by the sincere votaries of the Veda.

It is a fact which does not require any proof that the Veda is the earliest and the most authentic record of human civilization in India and is the source of all our knowledge. It is indeed the *knowledge* itself in all its entirety. It was, therefore, very necessary to lay down rules to preserve the integrity of the Veda along with its correct and authentic interpretation. With this purpose in view the great thinker of the past composed the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-śāstra. So has been said by Bhaṭṭa—

धर्मे प्रमीयमाणे तु वेदेन करणात्मना ।
इतिकर्तव्यताभागं मीमांसा पूरयिष्यति ॥

and also by the great Jarannaiyāyika Jayanta—

विचारमन्तरेणाऽव्यवस्थितवेदवाक्यार्थानवधारणान्मीमांसा वेदवाक्यार्थ-विचारात्मिका वेदाकरस्थेतिकर्तव्यतारूपमनुबिभ्रतीति ।

In fact, Mīmāṁsā-śāstra is as important as the Veda itself; it is, therefore, that it has been said that '*Mīmāṁsā pratyā-sannatvena Vedaikadeśabhūtatvāt.*' Without the help of this Śāstra, proper study of the Veda is not possible. Hence,

they say that *Vicārasahāyo hi śabdaḥ svārthaṁ nirākāṅkṣaṁ prabodhayituṁ kṣamaḥ.*

This is the purpose why Dr. G. V. Devasthali took up the critical study of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and presented his investigations through his thesis *Mimaṁsā, the Vākyaśāstra.* This work is now presented to the scholars in the form of a book. It contains almost all the important philosophical aspects of *Śabda* for the proper understanding of the interpretations of the great writers on the system. Dr. Devasthali is fully qualified to undertake this strenuous and at the same time most responsible task. He is himself brought up in the tradition and has been under the expert guidance of Professor H. D. Velankar of Bombay. Dr. Devasthali imbibes the true and honest spirit of Indian Culture without which it is impossible to understand the lines of thinking of the great Ṛṣis of our country. He approaches the subject and problems connected with it as a *jijñāsu* and puts forth his investigations very honestly. He has supported all his statements with proper quotation from and references to the Ākara texts. This book will really serve the very basic purpose for the proper understanding of the problems of Mīmāṁsā and I am glad that Dr. Devasthali has been able to acquit this task so successfully and has filled up a great desideratum.

Tirabhukti,
1, Allenganj Road,
Allahabad, 2
March 12, 1959.

Mahāmahopādhyāya
UMESHA MISHRA, M.A., D.Litt.
Ex-Director, Mithila Research
Institute, Darbhanga.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I.

LANGUAGE

1. The main aim of JAIMANI in writing his *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* (MS.) was to set forth in a systematic form the idea of *Dharma* as revealed by the oceanic Scriptural Texts when properly interpreted. He has, therefore, himself gone through the laborious task of interpreting all the available texts and set down in clear and precise terms the results of his investigations. It was, however, inevitable that he should also give us glimpses of what principles he has followed in interpreting the texts before him and how he has arrived at the results he has stated. S'ABARA also has followed Jaimini in what he has done. He does not rest satisfied with merely explaining the *Sūtrārtha,* but goes a step further and fully discusses and illustrates not only those principles which have been actually enunciated by JAIMINI, but also those that have been merely suggested by him. Not few again are the principles which, though obviously utilised by JAIMINI, have been enunciated and illustrated for the first time by S'ABARA only.

2. While executing this task of interpreting the Scriptural Texts, therefore, it is but natural that these great propounders of the *Mīmāṁsā S'āstra* should have offered their own views on the language of the Scriptures in general in comparison with that of the common parlance. JAIMINI often refers to this latter in expressions like *lokavat* or *yathā loke*[1] which in almost every place is expounded by S'ABARA by presenting analogous cases from the language of common parlance. S'ABARA even holds, in several places in his *bhāṣya*, pretty long discussions regarding similarity or otherwise between the *laukika vākya* and the *Vaidika vākya* or

[N.B.—References are to the आनंदाश्रम edition of the शाबर भाष्य Poona 1929-34]

1 cf. MS, I.2.20; 29; II.1.12; IV, 1 6; VI.8.26; X.2.23; 3.44; 51; 6.8; 7.66; XI.1.26; 60.

between the language of the Scriptures and that of common parlance. In fact he has begun his *bhāṣya* with a remark[2] on the language, of course, of the *Sūtras*. But we find that what he has said about the language of the *Sūtras* also holds good in the case of the language of the Scriptural Texts. Thus he avers that words in the *Sūtras* must, as far as possible, be understood to convey the same sense as they are used to convey in common parlance. He even warns the reader or the interpreter against any attempt to read additional thoughts in the original *Sūtras* by supplying words from his own pocket, or by attaching imaginary or technical significance to their words. For, he adds, this would involve a laborious process. The *Sūtras* are meant to expound and systematise the teaching of the Scriptural Texts. But before they can achieve their aim they themselves will have to be explained if it is assumed that they are couched in words which are different from those of common parlance and have different significations. But this *gaurava* can be avoided by holding that the words of the *Sūtras* are identical with those that we meet with in common parlance, and as such need no explanation for themselves.

3. This very view is set forth by JAIMINI with reference to the language of the Scriptural Texts at MS. 1-3-30[3] where in no ambiguous terms he states that the sense conveyed by the words of the Scriptural Texts is in no way different from the one that attaches to them when they are used in common parlance. This, he says, is proved by the fact that the texts lay down injunctions regarding the performance of certain acts. Now if these injunctions are to be obeyed they must be understood first. But how can they be comprehended by the people for whom they are meant if they are not couched in a language they can understand?

---

2 लोके येष्वर्थेषु प्रसिद्धानि पदानि तानि सति सम्भवे तदर्थान्येव सूत्रेष्वित्यवगन्तव्यम्। नाध्याहारादिभिरेषां परिकल्पनीयोऽर्थः परिभाषितव्यो वा। एवं वेदवाक्यान्येवैभिर्व्याख्यायन्ते, इतरथा वेदवाक्यानि व्याख्येयानि स्वपदार्थाश्च व्याख्येया इति प्रयत्नगौरवं प्रसज्येत। [SB. on I.1.1, p. 1 f.]

3 प्रयोगचोदनाभावादर्थैकत्वमविभागात्।

This shows that the injunctions must be couched in the words of common parlance which in other words means that the words of the Scriptural Texts must be the same as those in common parlance and also that they must convey the same sense wherever they are used. A stronger ground for such an assumption is supplied by JAIMINI in the expression *avibhāgāt*. They must be accepted as being not different from one another because no difference is noticeable between the two. Thus it is clear that the words in the Scriptural Texts must be accepted as being the same as those in common parlance, and also as conveying the same significations wherever they are used.

4. And what has been asserted about the words is also true of sentences. JAIMINI has clearly stated that the signification of the sentence in the *Veda* is in no way different from that of ordinary parlance[4]. He, therefore, would appear to recognize no distinction between the language of the *Veda* on the one hand and that of common people on the other, both as regards the word as well the sentence, and also as regards the meanings they convey. This by implication means that the Vedic Texts are to be interpreted on the same principles on which we interpret sentences in our common parlance.

5. It is here interesting to note how the *pūrva-pakṣin* tries to show that the words in the Scriptural Texts must be accepted as being different from the words in the common parlance and also as conveying senses which are widely different from what they do there. The very difference of nomenclature shows this difference. The one we call by the name *Vaidika;* while to the other we give the name of *Laukika*. Does this not prove that they are different from each other? Again there is the difference of formation which is only too obvious to deny. And if thus the *Vaidika S'abda* is different from the *Laukika S'abda* does it not naturally follow that there must be a corresponding difference between their *arthas* also? But if this does not suffice there are several Scriptural Texts which will clearly

---

4 अविशिष्टस्तु वाक्यार्थः [Ms. I.2.32]

and conclusively prove that the sense of the words in the *Veda* is quite different from the one that is conveyed by them in common parlance. Take the text like "*Uttānā vai devagavā vahanti*", or "*Etad vai daivyam madhu yad ghṛtam*". The former tells in the *Veda* those that move on their back are called bulls; while the latter shows that honey in the *Veda* is ghee. But we never understand these words as conveying such meanings in our common parlance. This, therefore, is a conclusive evidence to prove that the significations of the words in the *Veda* are different from those in common parlance.[5]

6. All this argumentation on the part of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* can, however, easily be shown to be fallacious. Difference of nomenclature by itself does not prove the difference of the thing named. For we do find one and the same thing also receiving different names with reference to the different characteristics it might possess.[6] It is the presence of such peculiar characteristics in the language that is responsible for the difference of nomenclature. ✓Difference of characteristics

---

5 तत्रान्ये लौकिकाः शब्दा अन्ये वैदिका अन्ये चैषामर्था इति ब्रूमः । कुतः । व्यपदेशभेदाद् रूपभेदाच्च । इमे लौकिका इमे वैदिका इति व्यपदेशभेदः । 'अग्निर्वृत्राणि जङ्घनत्' इत्यन्यदिदं रूपं लौकिकादग्निशब्दात् । शब्दान्यत्वाच्च न त एवार्थाः । अपि च समामनन्ति, 'उत्ताना वै देवगवा वहन्ति' इति । ये देवानां गावस्ते उत्ताना वहन्तीत्युक्ते गम्यत एव य उत्ताना वहन्ति ते गोशब्देनोच्यन्त इति । तस्मादन्यो वैदिकगोशब्दस्यार्थः । तथा......'एतद्वै दैव्यं मधु यद् घृतम्' इति वेदे घृते मधुशब्दः । तस्मादमीषामन्येऽर्थाः । [SB. on I.3.30, p. 290 f.]

6. This argument is put forth by Jaimini and S'abara while discussing the question whether निगदs are different from यजूंषि. The पूर्वपक्षिन् takes his stand on the difference of nomenclature (व्यपदेशभेद) and argues that they are different. But Jaimini refutes the argument by saying 'गुणार्थो व्यपदेशः' [Ms. II.1.43] which S'abara explains in the following words अथ यदुक्तं व्यपदेशभेद इति स चैकत्वेऽपि गुणतो भवति । यथा, इतो ब्राह्मणा भोज्यन्ताम्, इतः परिव्राजका इति । एवमुच्चैस्त्वेन गुणेन तान्येव यजूंषि व्यपदिश्यन्ते निगदा इति । [P. 442]

or difference of formation is merely dialectical and does not warrant the assumption of an essential difference of the language itself. And the very fact that we do perceive the absence of difference between the two is enough to show that there is no difference of language.[7] As regards the texts quoted by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* it must be pointed out that the construction put on them by him is inadmissible. Of the two parts in the first text the latter is, according to him, the *uddes'ya* and the former is, of course, the *vidheya*. But by its very nature we know that a *vidheya* must be something hitherto unknown; and such a matter is to be found not in the former but, in the latter part of the text, which must, therefore, be accepted as the *vidheya*. But if that is accepted as the *vidheya*, then the former can't be accepted as being so at the same time, for such an assumption would mean courting the charge of syntactical split. Thus it is clear that in the text under consideration the former part is the *uddes'ya* while the latter is only the *vidheya*, and not *vice versa* as the *Pūrva-pakṣin* would have it. But the more serious objection against the view of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* is that it involves *ānarthakya*. If the *Vaidika S'abdas* are totally different from the *Laukika S'abdas* and convey totally different significations how can you understand the significations of the words *ye*, *uttānāḥ*, and *vahanti* which together according to you give the *lakṣana* of *go*? And if the sense of these words is not comprehended how can you understand the character of the bull which also is not known? And if the *go-lakṣaṇa* that, according to your interpretation, is the main signification of the text is not understood, does it not follow that the text is rendered nugatory? All this can be avoided by rejecting the interpretation of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* and taking the latter part of the text as the *vidheya*. But, it may be argued, even so the sentence remains as useless as before, since it conveys no sound sense. This objection, however, can be met with the rejoinder that it can be made to serve a useful purpose by construing it as being eulogistic. In the same manner it is

7 न तेषामेषां च विभागमुपलभामहे। अत एवैकशब्दत्वम्। तांस्तांश्चार्थानवगच्छामः। अतो नान्यत्वं च वदामः। [SB. on 1, 3. 30., p. 291 f.]

not difficult to show how in the second text also the *Pūrvapakṣin* has hit upon a wrong construction and how there also the *madhutva* of *ghṛta* is to be understood as being only eulogistic and not literal.[8]

7. Regarding *Vākyārtha* also both JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA declare that there is no difference in the meanings of the words forming sentences used in the *Veda* and those in common parlance; and it is but proper that it should be conveyed in the former in exactly the same way as in the latter.[9]

8. Thus the main view that is held by JAIMINI and S'ABARA regarding the language of the Scriptures may be summed up by saying that it is quite on a par with the language of common parlance not only as regards the words and their significations, but also as regards the *vākya* and the *Vākyārtha*.

9. This very principle again has been very explicitly stated by S'ABARA both positively as well as negatively by declaring that the significations of words are to be determined by common usage and not by Vedic usage. And the truth of this remark he has amply illustrated in his commentary on MS. I. 4. 10. The question[10] is whether *barhiḥ* and other

---

8 यच्चोक्तं य उत्ताना वहन्ति ते देवगवाः, यद् घृतं तन्मधु--इति । नास्ति वचनं यदुत्तानानां वहतां गोत्वं ब्रूयात् । ये गावस्त उत्ताना वहन्तीत्येवं तत् । यदि चानेन वचनेन गोत्वं विधीयते, उत्ताना वहन्तीत्यनुवादः स्यात् । न चोत्ताना वहन्तः प्रसिद्धाः केचित् । ते नियोगतो विधातव्याः । तेषु विधीयमानेषु न शक्यं गोत्वं विधातुम्'। भिद्येत हि तथा वाक्यम् । यदि चान्ये वैदिकास्तत उत्तानादीनामर्थो न गम्येत । तत्र नतरां शक्येताविज्ञातलक्षणं गोत्वं विज्ञातुम् । न चोत्तानवहनवचनमप्यनर्थकं, स्तुत्यर्थेनार्थवद् भविष्यतीति । एवं घृतस्य मधुत्वम्——। तस्मात्त एव शब्दा अर्थाश्च । [SB. on I. 3.30, p. 292]

9. cf. अविशिष्टस्तु वाक्यार्थः । [MS. I. 1.2.32] अविशिष्टस्तु लोके प्रयुज्यमानानां वेदे च पदानामर्थः । स यथैव लोके विवक्षितस्तथैव वेदेऽपि भवितुमर्हति । [SB. on I. 2. 32, p. 150]

10. This point will be fully discussed in the chapter on प्रवृत्तिनिमित्त below.

words are to be accepted as *saṁskāra-s'abdas* on the strength of Vedic usage or as *jāti-s'abdas* on the strength of *Laukika* usage. S'ABARA declares himself in favour of the latter alternative and shows how the former is inadmissible by its very nature. If these words are accepted as being *alaukika* how will you determine their significations? You can't do it merely on the authority of the *Veda*. For even then the assumption of a particular sense as arising from these words shall not be done without taking into consideration the sense conveyed by the ordinary words that precede and follow the words in question. It is only a desire to avoid the *ānarthakya* of the former and the latter *padas* that can justify the assumption of some *alaukika artha;* and if that is so then the popular or the *laukika* and the *asaṁskṛta* significations of the preceding and succeeding words will have to be taken into consideration before one can get an idea of what exactly will save them from being *anarthaka*.[11] This clearly shows that Vedic usage can't help us to determine the significations of words and sentences. The only help in that field is the ordinary usage as found in our common parlance.

10. Both JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA have practised the principle they have preached by constantly referring to the *Laukika* usage of words.[12] They have expressly stated that the relation between *S'abda* and *artha* is not made by *S'āstra*. It is autpattika and has to be known from *loka*

---

11 न चालौकिकानां सतां वेदादेव पूर्वोत्तरपदसम्बन्धमनपेक्ष्य शक्यतेऽर्थोऽध्यवसातुम्। पूर्वोत्तरपदे अनर्थके मा भूतामित्येव स परिकल्प्येत। अशक्यस्त्वनवगम्यमानः परिकल्पयितुम्। अर्थवती च ते पदे पूर्वोत्तरे लौकिकेनासंस्कृतप्रयोगेण भविष्यतः। [SB. on I.4.10, p. 343]

12. cf. समुदितेष्वेषु यजतिशब्दो भवति लोके। [SB. on समुदाये in IV. 2.27, p. 1241]; हुतमनेनेत्येवंजातीयके वक्तारो भवन्ति लोके। [SB. on IV. 2.28, p. 1242]; पर्यासशब्दश्चान्तवचनो लोके दृश्यते। [SB. on IV.3.8, p. 1324]; एवं चाख्यातार्थं लौकिका अपि प्रतिपद्यन्ते। [SB. on VI.2.13]; उभयत्र हि पर्वशब्दो लोके प्रसिद्धः। काले च समुदाये च, आ हिमवतः आ च कुमारीभ्यः। [SB. on IX.2.51, p. 1738]; सर्वत्र चाधिपत्ये पतिशब्दः प्रयुक्त आ हिमवत आ च कुमारीभ्यः। [SB. on IX.3.32, p. 1760]; etc. etc.

only.[13] *Laukika* usage and nothing else is the means of getting acquainted with the sense of any word.[14] Even the *Nāmadheya* words (i.e., the proper names of the sacrifices) are not *pāribhāṣika* or technical like the terms *guṇa* and *vṛddhi.* Even they convey the *laukika artha* if properly analysed.[15] Cases are not rare where JAIMINI and S'ABARA determine the signification of a word by referring to the *laukika* usage. For they both hold that *loka* is the only authority so far as *s'abdārtha* is concerned.[16] The same principle is again observed while interpreting a sentence and we find both JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA either implicitly or explicitly justifying their way of interpreting the text by adducing illustrations from common parlance.[17]

11. But this view of '*Lokavedayoḥ S'abdārthaikyam*' as advocated by JAIMINI and S'ABARA is not easily accepted by

---

13 गुणाद्वाऽप्यभिधानं स्यात् सम्बन्धस्याशास्त्रहेतुत्वात् । [MS. III.2.4]; न हि शास्त्रहेतुकः शब्दार्थयोः संबन्धो भवति । नित्योऽसौ लोकतोऽवगम्यत इत्युक्तम् 'औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः' इति । [SB. on III.2.4, p. 754]

14 सर्वेषामेव शब्दानामर्थज्ञाने लौकिकः प्रयोगोऽभ्युपायः । [SB. on VI, 1-1, p. 1347].

15 तथा हि सर्वेष्वेव कर्मनामधेयेषु अर्थसमन्वयेनानुवादभूतो नामशब्दो वर्तते न लौकिकार्थतिरस्कारेण परिभाषामात्रेण, वृद्धिगुणवत् । यथा अग्निहोत्रं, श्येनः, ज्योतिष्टोम इति । एवं द्वादशाह इति अर्थान्वयेन नामधेयं, नार्थाभावेनेति [SB. on X. 6.41, p. 2006].

16. शब्दार्थश्चापि लोकवत् । [Ms. X. 3.44] लोको हि शब्दार्थावगमे प्रमाणम् । [SB. on IX 3. 13, p. 1751].

17 cf. द्रव्योपदेश इति चेत् । न तदर्थत्वाल्लोकवत् तस्य च शेषभूतत्वात् [Ms II. 1.11-12]; श्रुतितो वा लोकवद्विभागः स्यात् । [MS. X.6.8]; यथा लोके शतं देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोर्दीयतामित्युक्ते समासार्थो विधीयते, यदेतच्छतं तदेतयोर्दीयतामिति । [SB. on X.6.8, p. 1912]; ; लोकेऽप्यवयवधर्मेणावयवी संस्तूयत एवेति । यथा दीर्घैः केशैः शोभनो देवदत्त इति । [SB. on X.6.43, p. 2007]; यथाऽस्मिन्गृहे ये ब्राह्मणास्त आनीयन्तां देवदत्तो, यज्ञदत्तो, विष्णुमित्र इति भवन्तिलोकेऽनुवादमात्रस्य वक्तारः । एवमेतदपीति । [SB. on X.7.24, p. 2034].

the *Pūrva-pakṣin* without any protest. Thus an attempt is made to show that though apparently it is quite true that the words and the sentences and their significations are the same in the *Veda* as well as in the common parlance, yet there is a vital difference between the language of the former and that of the latter. In common parlance language is a means to convey our thoughts to others. ✓There our main purpose is the understanding of the *artha*. In the *Veda*, however, we have to deal with the *devatās* on the one hand and with the *aṅgas* on the other; and the former are *apratyakṣa* while the latter are *acetana*. But what visible purpose can be served by the *saṁlāpa* with these *apratyakṣa devatās* or these *acetana aṅgas*? And if only an unseen purpose is to be served thereby, well, mere recitation of the texts is enough for that purpose, so that there is no necessity of having any *artha-jñāna* from them. Thus the *Pūrva-pakṣin* concludes that language in common parlance is used to convey some *arthas;* and unless those arthas are understood it will be impossible to carry on any transaction. The same, however, is not the case with the Scriptural Texts; for nothing is lost if their significations are not understood. Hence the language of the *Veda* must be understood as being different from that of common parlance.[18] In refutation of this view, however, it has been pointed out by the *Sūrtrakāra* as well as his commentator that the texts do serve a useful purpose by pointing out the *Devatā* and the *aṅgas* without a knowledge of which the performance of the *yāga* itself would be an impossibility. Thus it is not now true to say that in the Vedic Texts *artha-jñāna* is not a very important or an essential matter; for the required know-

18 नैवम् । लोके तैरर्थैरवबुद्धैः संव्यवहारः । इह देवताभिरप्रत्यक्षाभिर्यज्ञाङ्गैश्चाचेतनैः संलापे न कश्चिद्यज्ञस्योपकारः । यद्यदृष्टं परिकल्प्येत, उच्चारणादेव तद् भवितुमर्हति । यद्धि कर्तव्यं तत् प्रयोजनवत् । उच्चारणं च न कथंचित् कर्तव्यं, यद्यपूर्वाय यद्यर्थाय । यद्यर्थो न प्रत्याय्यते न किंचिदनर्थकम् । यदि न प्रयुज्यते समाम्नानानर्थक्यम्। तस्मादुच्चारणादपूर्वम् । [SB. on I.2.32, p. 150]

ledge of the *Devatā* and the *aṅgas* is given to us by the *artha* of these texts only.[19]

12. Another attempt is made to distinguish between the language of the *Veda* and that of the common parlance. It is argued that in common parlance we speak of things already known; while the *Veda* speaks of things hitherto unknown. Thus in ordinary parlance a specific mention of good qualities of some thing does tend to create a liking for that thing; but the same result will not follow if the qualities that are thus spoken of are not already known. Thus the liking can't arise as the natural result of the Vedic texts since they speak of *avidita* things only. How can this liking then be created? Well, if at all it is to be created by the *Veda* it must come from the most authoritative part of the Veda, the *vidhi*. And if the *vidhi* is not able to create this liking, what can poor *arthavāda* do in that direction? The very fact that the *vidhi* has failed to create a liking, shows that it has created a doubt; and when a doubt is once created by the *vidhi* even the strongest terms of praise shouted out by the *artha-vāda* will not have the power to remove the doubt and create the liking that we are speaking of. Thus we find that whereas in common parlance terms of eulogy tend to engender a liking for the thing that is praised, nothing like that can be said to take place in the *Veda*. Hence, the *Pūrva-pakṣin* argues, we must understand the language of the *Veda* as being different from that of common parlance.[20] This point urged by the *Pūrva-pakṣin*, however, can't be accepted. It is true that the *Veda* speaks

---

19 अर्थप्रकाशनार्थमेव यज्ञे मन्त्रोच्चारणम् । यदुक्तं न देवताभिर्यज्ञाङ्गैश्च संलापे प्रयोजनमस्तीति, यज्ञे यज्ञाङ्गप्रकाशनमेव प्रयोजनम् । कथम् । न ह्यप्रकाशिते यज्ञे यज्ञाङ्गे च यागः शक्योऽभिनिर्वर्तयितुम् । तस्मात् तन्निर्वृत्त्यर्थमर्थप्रकाशनं महानुपकारः कर्मणः, तच्च करोतीत्यवगम्यते । तस्मादस्त्यस्य प्रयोजनम् । तच्च दृष्टं न शक्यमपवदितुं नार्थाभिधानं प्रयोजनमिति । [SB. on I.2.32, p. 150 f.].

20. In justification of the अर्थवाद texts in the वेद is set forth the following argument: इति चेत्पश्यसि—स्तुतिरनर्थिका, न च शब्देनावगम्यत इति । लौकिकानि वाक्यानि भवन्तो विदाङ्कुर्वन्तु । तद्यथा—इयं गौः क्रेतव्या देवदत्तीया,

of *avidita* things; but it does not, therefore, follow that these *avidita* things can't be eulogised or that a liking for them can't be created by eulogistic words. For whether we know a thing or not we begin to like it if it is highly talked of. Such is our daily experience. Again it is not true to argue that when a *vidhi* fails to create a liking for a thing it creates a doubt and therefore becomes useless. There are certain injunctive texts which have no *artha-vāda* texts relating to them. Such *vidhis* do the work of not only enjoining a particular act but also that of creating a liking for it. When, however, a *vidhi* has an *artha-vāda* text related to it, it is assumed that the *vidhi-vākya* does the work of only enjoining the act, while the task of creating a liking for the act is said to be done by the *artha-vāda*. The *vidhi* and the *artha-vāda* together form one sentence, so that the *vidhi* has an expectancy for the *artha-vāda*.[21]. Even in common parlance a similar phenomenon may be observed, so that it is not very sound to seek to distinguish the language of the *Veda* from that of common parlance on the strength of this point of distinction which is more apparent than real.

एषा हि बहुक्षीरा, अजपत्या, अनष्टप्रजा चेति । क्रेतव्येत्यप्युक्ते गुणाभिधानात् प्रवर्तन्ते-तरां क्रेतारः । बहुक्षीरेति च गुणाभिधानमवगम्यते । तद्वद् वेदेऽपि भविष्यति । [SB. on I.2.20, p. 134]. It is as a rejoinder to the above argument that the पूर्वपक्षिन् tries to show the distinction between the लौकिक and the वैदिक भाषाऽ in the following words: नैतदेवम् । लोके विदितपूर्वा अर्था उच्यन्ते बहुक्षीरादयः । तेषां विज्ञानमेव न प्रयोजनम् । अतः प्रशंसा गम्यते । अविदितवादे न श्रद्दधीरन् पूर्ववचनादिव । विदितत्वादेव च प्ररोचयन्ते । वैदिकेषु पुनर्यदि विधिशब्देन न प्ररोचयन्ते नतरामर्थवादेन । जाताशङ्को हि विधिशब्दे स तदानीम् । अथ विधिशब्देन प्ररोचितः, किमर्थवादेन । [SB. on I.2.21, p. 134 f.].

21 किमर्था स्तुतिरिति चेत् । कथं रोचेत नोऽनुष्ठीयेतेति । ननु प्राक् स्तुतिवचनाद्-नुष्ठानं भूतिकामान्तात् सिद्धं, स्तुतिवचनमनर्थकम् । न हि यदा स्तुतिपदसंनिधानं तदा पूर्वेणैव विधिः, यदा स्तुतिपदसंबन्धो न तदा भूतिकामस्यालम्भो विधीयते । यथा पटो भवति पट उत्पद्यत इत्यर्थः । निराकाङ्क्षं च पदद्वयम् । यदा च तस्मिन्नेव रक्त इत्यपरं श्रूयते तदा रागसंबन्धो भवतीत्यर्थः । भवति च रक्तं प्रत्याकाङ्क्षा । एवं यदा न स्तुति-पदानि, विधिशब्देनैव तदा प्ररोचना, यदा स्तुतिवचनं तदा स्तवनेन । ननु एवं सति

13. And yet it must be admitted that there are some features which do distinguish the *Vaidika vākya* from the *Laukika vākya,* the most important of these being that while the former is *apauruṣeya* the latter is *pauruṣeya.* Discussing the question in full detials JAIMINI and his commentator have drawn the conclusion that *s'abda, artha,* and the *sambandha* between the two are *nitya;*[22] and that *vākyārtha* is obtained from the *padārthas* only, nay *Vākyārtha* is nothing but the sum total of the *arthas* of the constituent *padas,*[23] so that human hand can have no scope so far as the Vedic texts are concerned. This in other words means that they are *apauraṣeya.* This naturally brings in another point of distinction between the two tpyes of *vākyas* viz. that the *Vedic vākya* is always *pramāṇa* or *tathya,* while the *Laukika vākya* may or may not be so. For in the case of a *Laukika vākya* its connection with a *human agency* provides ample scope for error to creep in. Such is not, however, the case with the *Vedic vākya* where human agency has no scope whatsoever, so that it is the *s'abda* that forms the only means of obtaining an idea of the things dealt with in the Scriptures. And when *s'abda* directly imparts to us the knowledge of anything it can't but be right. For it is contradiction in terms to say *'Mithyā bravīti'* with reference to *s'abda. Bravīti* means *budhyamānasya nimitam bhavati;* and if *s'abda* is thus found to be the *nimitta* of *artha-jñāna* how can you say

---

किं स्तुतिवचनेन यस्मिन् सत्यविधायकम्। मा भूत्तत्। तदभावेऽपि पूर्वविधिनैव प्ररोचयिष्यत इति। सत्यं, विनापि तेन भिद्येत् प्ररोचनम्। अस्ति तु तत्। तस्मिन् विद्यमाने योऽर्थो वाक्यस्य सोऽवगम्यते स्तुतिः प्रयोजनं तयोः। तस्मिन्नविद्यमाने विधिना प्ररोचनमिति। ननु सत्स्वपि स्तुतिपदेषु पूर्वस्य विधिस्वरूपत्वाद्विधिरभिप्रेतः स्यान्न विवक्ष्येत स्तुतिरसंबन्धः। आह—स्तुतिपदानि ह्यनर्थकान्यभविष्यन् साकाङ्क्षाणि। भवन्त्वनर्थकानीति चेत्। न गम्यमानेऽर्थेऽविवक्षितार्थानि भवितुमर्हन्ति। योऽसौ विध्युद्देशः, स शक्नोति निरपेक्षोऽर्थं विधातुं, शक्नोति च स्तुतिपदानां वाक्यशेषी भवितुम्। प्रत्यक्षश्च वाक्यशेषभावः। अतोऽस्माद्विधेः स्तुतिमवगच्छामः। [SB. on I.2.7, p. 117 f.]

22. cf. MS. I.1.5-23, and SB. thereon. Also cf. वृत्तिकारग्रन्थ on pp. 41-58.

23. cf. MS. I. 1. 24-26, and SB. on the same.

it is not its *nimita*, which is *tantamount* to saying that it is not *pramāṇa*? Nor is there any ground like subsequent sublation (*vyabhicāra*) or a defect in the instrument (*duṣṭam karaṇam*) which would compel us to accept its *mithyātva*. And analogy of the *Laukika vākya* is of no use here for the *Laukika vākya* is not the same as the *Vedic vākya*. Hence though the *Laukika vākya* is found to be sometimes *tathya* or *pramāṇa* and sometimes *vitatha* or *apramāṇa*, the same can't be the case with the *Vaidika vākya*[24] which by its very nature must be *pramāṇam eva*. A third point of distinction between the two that has to be noted is that in the *Laukika vākya* the *abhiprāya* or some *dṛṣṭa artha* is more important

---

24 चोदना हि भूतं भवन्तं भविष्यन्तं सूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं विप्रकृष्टमित्येवंजातीयकमर्थं शक्नोत्यवगमयितुं नान्यत् किंचनेन्द्रियम् । नन्वतथाभूतमप्यर्थं ब्रूयाच्चोदना यथा यत्किंचन लौकिकं वचनं नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्तीति । तत्तथ्यमपि भवति वितथमपि भवतीति । उच्यते—विप्रतिषिद्धमिदमुच्यते ब्रवीति वितथं चेति । ब्रवीतीत्युच्यतेऽवबोधयति बुध्यमानस्य निमित्तं भवतीति । यस्मिंश्च निमित्तभूते सत्यवबुद्ध्यते सोऽवबोधयति । यदि च चोदनायां सत्यामग्निहोत्रात्स्वर्गो भवतीति गम्यते कथमुच्यते न तथा भवतीति । अथ न तथा भवतीति कथमवबुध्यते । असन्तमर्थमवबुध्यत इति विप्रतिषिद्धम् । न च 'स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यतो वचनात् संदिग्धमवगम्यते भवति वा स्वर्गो न वा भवतीति । न च निश्चितमवगम्यमानमिदं मिथ्या स्यात् । यो हि जनित्वा प्रध्वंसते नैतदेवमिति स मिथ्या प्रत्ययः । न चैष कालान्तरे पुरुषान्तरेऽवस्थान्तरे देशान्तरे वा विपर्येति । तस्मादवितथः । यत्तु लौकिकं वचनं तच्चेत्प्रत्ययितात्पुरुषादिन्द्रियविषयं वाऽवितथमेव तत् । अथाप्रत्ययितादनिन्द्रियविषयं वा तावत् पुरुषबुद्धिप्रभवमप्रमाणम् । अशक्यं हि तत्पुरुषेण ज्ञातुमृते वचनात् । अपरस्मात्पौरुषेयाद्वचनादवगतमिति चेत्तदपि तनैव तुल्यम् । नैवंजातीयकेष्वर्थेषु पुरुषवचनं प्रामाण्यमुपैति जात्यन्धानामिव वचनं रूपविशेषेषु । नन्वविदुषामुपदेशो नावकल्पते; उपदिष्टवन्तश्च मन्वादयः तस्मात् पुरुषाः सन्तो विदितवन्तश्च यथा चक्षुषा रूपमुपलभ्यत इति दर्शनादेवावगतम् । उच्यते—उपदेशा व्यामोहादपि भवन्ति । असति व्यामोहे वेदादपि भवन्ति । अपि च पौरुषेयाद्वचनादेवमयं पुरुषो वेदेति भवति प्रत्ययो नैवमयमर्थ इति । विप्लवते हि खल्वपि कश्चित् । पुरुषकृताद्वचनात्प्रत्ययः । न तु वेदवचनस्य मिथ्यात्वे किंच प्रमाणमस्ति । ननु सामान्यतोदृष्टं पौरुषेयं वचनं वितथमुपलभ्य वचनसाम्यादिदमपि वितथमवगम्यते । न । अन्यत्वात् । न ह्यन्यस्य वितथभावेऽन्यस्य वैतथ्यं भवितुमर्हति । अन्यत्वादेव । न हि देवदत्तस्य श्यामत्वे यज्ञदत्तस्यापि श्यामत्वं भवितुमर्हति । अपि च पुरुषवचनसाधर्म्याद्वेदवचनं

than the [25] *s'abda*. In fact the *s'abda* is used there only as a means of conveying the artha or the *abhiprāya*.[26] Naturally, therefore, in a *Laukika vākya* the *s'abda* in its *vācyārtha* is not always strictly honoured. Sometimes the *vācyārtha* is set aside and some *lākṣaṇika artha* is accepted so as to suit the *abhiprāya* of the speaker.[27] Sometimes even devices like

---

वितथमित्यनुमानं व्यपदेशादवगम्यते । प्रत्यक्षस्तु वेदवचनेन प्रत्ययः न चानुमानं प्रत्यक्षविरोधी प्रमाणं भवति । तस्माच्चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थः श्रेयस्करः । [SB. on I.1.2, pp. 13-17]. Also cf. the वृत्तिकारग्रन्थ beginning with पौरुषेये हि शब्दे यः प्रत्ययस्तस्य मिथ्याभाव आशङ्क्येत and ending with तस्माच्चोदनालक्षण एव धर्मः । [p. 42].

25 लोके कर्मार्थलक्षणम् । [MS. XI.1.26]; अर्थाल्लोके विधितः प्रतिप्रधानं स्यात् । [MS. XI.1.62]; यच्च लोकवदिति, लोके कर्मार्थप्रधानम् । कार्यवशात्सकृदप्युक्तोऽसकृदाहरति, असकृदप्युक्तः सकृदाहरति, नाहरति वा । अथेह शब्दलक्षणे कर्मणि यथाशब्दार्थं प्रवृत्तिः । तस्माल्लोकवदित्यदृष्टान्तः । [SB. on XI.1.26, p. 2114 f.]; अर्थाल्लोके प्रदीपस्य सकृदसकृद्वा क्रिया । यदि सकृत्कृतः सर्वं प्रकाशयति सकृत् क्रियते, अथ न प्रकाशयति ततोऽसकृत् । ततश्चास्य प्रत्यक्षसामर्थ्यम् । अथेह विधित उपकारोऽनुपकारो वा गम्यते, न प्रत्यक्षेण । [SB. on XI.1.62, p. 2129]; शब्दलक्षणे कर्मणि शब्दाभिहितं गम्यते, न लोकाभिप्रायः । [SB. on X.5.57, p. 1968]; लोके कर्मार्थलक्षणं भवति, न शब्दलक्षणम् । यथाऽर्थस्तथा क्रियते, न यथा शब्दः । वेदे तु शब्देनैवार्थोऽवगम्यते,। तथैवानुष्ठेयमिति । [SB. on VI.8.27, p. 1516]; शब्दप्रमाणका वयम् । यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम् ।———। लोके तु कार्यं दृष्ट्वा चोदितमचोदितमप्यनुष्ठीयत एव । [SB. on III.2.36, p. 793 f.] लोके कर्मार्थलक्षणं, शब्दलक्षणं पुनर्वेद । [SB. on III.1.17, p. 726 f.] लोकेऽर्थलक्षणः संव्यवहारः। येन येनार्थः संसृष्टेन, उक्तोऽनुक्तो वा स संसृज्यतैव । इह तु वेदे शब्दलक्षणः [SB. on III. 1. 16, p. 725]; also cf. SB. on X.8.3, p. 2058 f.]

26 लोकेऽन्यतः प्रवृत्तस्यार्थस्यानुवादभूतः शब्द उच्चार्यमाणः सामान्यक्रियासंबन्धाभिसमीक्षयोच्चरित इति गम्यते ।———। इह तु शब्दपूर्विका क्रियाप्रवृत्तिः । [SB. on X.6.48, p. 2008].

27. cf. e.g. यथा लोके प्रस्थभुग्देवदत्त इत्युच्यते । यद्यपि सूपशाकादिभिरधिकः प्रस्थो भवति तथापि भुञ्जौ प्रस्थो निर्दिश्यते व्यञ्जनान्योदनार्थानि । [SB. on X.8.29, p. 2079].

adhyāhāra, and *vipariṇāma* are resorted to while interpreting a *Laukika vākya*.[28] And all this is admissible because in a *Laukika vākya* it is the *abhiprāya* of the speaker, rather than the *s'abda*, which matters most. Quite different, however, is the case with the *Vaidika vākya* which being *apauruṣeya* can't be said to be based on some *abhiprāya* or *artha* of the speaker. In it *s'abda*, and nothing else but *s'abda*, is *pramāṇa*,[29] so much so that while interpreting a Scriptural Tex we have to accept the direct sense that is conveyed by it. Other devices of interpretation such as *adhyāhāra* and *vipariṇāma*, which find scope in the interpretation of a *Laukika vākya* are evidently, and as a general rule, not admissible in the case of a *Vaidika vākya*. Hence it is that we find S'ABARA often referring to the general rule that *Lakṣaṇā* is not admissible in a *Vidhi-vākya*.[30] Here it may be noted that this point of distinction applies to the *Vidhi-vākyas* only and not to all *vākyas* whatsoever.[31] Thus whenever a human being is laying down an injunction, the *vākya* that he utters, the *Laukika vidhi-vākya*, will be interpreted and obeyed with due respect to the intention of the speaker. This is what is clearly stated by JAIMINI when he writes, *'Loke karma artha-lakṣaṇam,'*[32] or *'Arthāl loke*

---

28 लौकिकेषु तु वाक्येष्वेवं गम्यते। तानि हि विज्ञातेऽर्थे प्रयुज्यमानान्यध्याहार्यपदानि गौणानि विपरिणतव्यवहितार्थानि च प्रयुज्यन्ते। तस्मात्तत्सादृश्याद्वचनावगम्येष्वप्यर्थेषु भवति तत्त्वरूपो मिथ्याप्रत्ययः। यथा मृगतृष्णादिषु। [SB. on IV.3.2, p. 1247]

29. cf. Nos. 25 and 26 above. Also read: न शब्दप्रमाणकाणामन्तरेण शब्दमवगतिर्न्याय्या। [SB. on VI.1.3, p. 1353]; शब्दलक्षणे च कर्मणि शब्दो नः प्रमाणम् [SB. on X.5.44, p. 1962].

30 नन्वनुवादेऽपि लक्षणा। नानुवादपक्षे लक्षणायां दोषः। [SB. on I.4.22 p. 364] अनुवादे हि लक्षणा न्याय्या न विधौ। [SB. on IV.4.19, p. 1278]; यज्ञायुधशब्दश्चानुवादपक्षे न्याय्यो न विधिपक्षे। गौणो हि स आयुधशब्दः स्फ्यादिषु। [SB. on IV.1.8, p. 1201].

31 विधौ हि न परः शब्दार्थः प्रतीयते।

32. MS. XI.1.26.

vidhitaḥ prati-pradhānam syāt'[33]; and S'ABARA also has very well elaborated this point in several places. This importance attaching to *s'abda* in a *Vaidika vākya* gives rise to another point of distinction between a *Laukika vākya* on the one hand and a *Vaidika Vākya* on the other. The former are sometimes found to be *anarthaka.* We do come across such sentences as '*Das'a dāḍimāni ṣaḍ apūpāḥ.*' or '*Jarad-gavo gāyati mattakāni!*' Such *vākyas* are totally *anarthaka.* We also come across some *vākyas* which though not totally *anarthaka* like those quoted above are yet partially *anarthaka* containing some *pada* or *padas* which may be *anarthaka.* Thus *Laukika vākyas* are open to *ānarthakya* in both these aspects.[34] Such, however, is not the case with the *Vaidika vākyas.* For *ānarthakya* of neither of these varieties can find any place therein.[35] Not only the *Vaidika vākya* as a whole, but every part of it i.e., every constituent *pada* thereof, must yield some *artha* of its own. This is what is meant by the general rule '*Arthavatvam nyāyyam*' or negatively '*Ānarthakyam anyāyyam*' which has been time and again referred to by S'ABARA in his *Bhāṣya.* From this naturally springs up another corollary viz., more words, more sense. For if the signification of two words is the same as what is yielded by one, it naturally means that the second word is useless or redundant. But *ānarthakya* is the last thing that can be admitted in the case of a *Vaidika s'abda.* Hence it follows that more sense must be yielded by the other word: or that the greater the number of words, the greater the sense. Thus the interpreter of a *Vaidika vākya* has to take care that he does not leave out any word or

---

33. MS. XI.1.26.

34 लौकिकानि वचनान्युपपन्नार्थान्यनुपपन्नार्थानि च दृश्यन्ते । यथा देवदत्त गाम भ्याज इत्येवमादीनि, दश दाडिमानि षडपूपा इत्येवमादीनि च । [वृत्तिकारग्रन्थ, p. 47].

35. This point has been very well discussed and established by शबरस्वामिन in his commentary on कृते वा विनियोगः स्यात् कर्मणः संबन्धात् । [MS. I.1.32., pp. 103-104]

words uninterpreted, or that he takes into account the signification of each and every word in the text that he is interpreting.

14. The views of JAIMINI and S'ABARA regarding the language of the Scriptural Texts may now be briefly set forth as follows:—There is no difference between the two so far as the word, the sentence and their significations are concerned. The significations of words can't be determined by Vedic usage or by *S'āstra* Ordinary usage of the common parlance is the only means by which to determine the *S'abdārtha*. The Vedic Texts must, therefore, be interpreted always in accordance with the *Laukika* usage, so that every principle that is adopted by the interpreter of the Vedic Texts must be supported by *Laukika* usage. In addition to this every word in the Vedic Texts must be accepted as yielding some special signification of its own, so that no part of the text might be rendered useless or nugatory. And lastly the *Vaidika vidhi* has to be understood in its *vācyārtha* to the exclusion of the other devices of interpretation such as *adhyāhāra* and *vipariṇāma* which are often resorted to in interpreting a *Laukika vākya*. Thus though the language of the Veda is the same as that of common parlance in almost every respect for the purposes of interpretation yet it must be borne in mind that the former must be so interpreted as to derive some significance from each one of its component parts sticking to the *vācyārtha* as far as possible, whereas in the latter this rule may not be so strictly followed.

CHAPTER II.

WHAT IS S'ABDA?

1. Commenting on MS. I. 1. 22 S'ABARA refers to the view of *S'ikṣākārāḥ* on this question and writes, *"S'ikṣā-kāra apy evam āhur vāyur āpadyate s'abdatām iti"*. This view, however, is not accepted as the *Siddhānta* view, for if *s'abda* is accepted as being made up of *vāyu* it would necessarily mean the acceptance of the *anityatva* of *s'abda* which is not acceptable to the *Mīmāṁsaka* who holds *s'abda* to be *nitya*. We are not here much concerned with this side of the problem. What we shall confine ourselves to at present is the question as to what it is that constitutes *s'abda*. In other words our problem is, 'Is *s'abda* to be understood as the sum total of the constituent syllables or are we to postulate the existence of some thing like *sphoṭa* and call it by the name *s'abda*?

2. The question is very well discussed by the *Vṛttikāra* in his commentary on MS. I. 1. 5. The *prima facie* view on this point is that *s'abda* must be accepted as being quite different from the syllables constituting it. It is accepted on all hands that *s'abda* is meant to convey a sense or an idea. Both JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA say that the main purpose of words is to yield sense.[1] The *s'āstra-kāras* also lend their weight to this view when they declare that 'a verb yields an idea which is consituted of a series of successive events which together go to make one complete action.[2]' From all this it is clear that *s'abda* is the direct and primary means of *artha-jñāna*. Now what can this *s'abda* be? It certainly can't be the syllables only. For on that assumption it will not be possible to explain the phenomenon of *artha-jñāna*

---

1 शब्दैस्त्वर्थविधित्वात् etc. [MS. VII.2.1]; शब्दानामर्थविधानं कार्यम् [SB. p. 1542].

2 एवं तस्याख्यातस्यार्थमुपदिशन्ति उपक्रमप्रभृत्यपवर्गपर्यन्तमाहेति । [SB. on VI.2.13, p. 1396]; शास्त्रकारा अप्येवमाहुः 'पूर्वापरीभूतं भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे व्रजति पचतीत्युपक्रमप्रभृत्यपवर्गपर्यन्तम्' । [वृत्तिकारग्रन्थ, p. 4].

arising from *s'abda*. *Artha-jñāna* may be said to arise from the constituent syllables taken singly, or from the same taken together, or from the *smṛti* of the syllables. But all these alternatives are found to be unsatisfactory since none of them can satisfactorily explain the phenomenon of *artha-jñāna* arising from *s'abda*. To assert that we get *artha-jñāna* from the syllables taken singly is contrary to all experience. The combination of these syllables it is impossible to think of, since these syllables are not only successive but also transitory. Nor do we ever perceive anything over and above the syllables that can be termed their combination. The postulation of the *smṛti* of the syllables does not mend matters in any way; for *smṛti* is on par with the syllables themselves i.e., it is transitory and the combination of the *smṛtis* of all the syllables is similarly impossible. It is thus difficult to see how *artha-jñāna* can arise from *s'abda* if the latter is understood as being nothing more than its constituent *syllables*.[3] And even if an attempt is made to explain and justify the phenomenon by saying that the constituent syllables give rise to *artha-jñāna* through the medium of *saṁskāras* or any thing like that, still the fact remains that such an assumption would make *s'abda* only a secondary means of *artha-jñāna*, which, however, is directly contrary to the experience of the *Laukika* and the *S'āstra-kāra vacanas* referred to above. And lastly this view is also open to the charge of having recourse to *adṛṣṭa-kalpanā* which at any rate seems impossible to avoid.[4] The *Pūrva-pakṣin* would not,

---

3 अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः । गकारौकारविसर्जनीया इति भगवानुपवर्षः । श्रोत्रग्रहणे ह्यर्थे लोके शब्दशब्दः प्रसिद्धः । ते च श्रोत्रग्रहणाः । यद्येवमर्थप्रत्ययो नोपपद्यते । कथम् । एकैकाक्षरविज्ञानेऽर्थो नोपलभ्यते । न चाक्षरव्यतिरिक्तोऽन्यः कश्चिदस्ति समुदायो नाम यतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । यदा गकारो न तदौकारविसर्जनीयौ । यदौकारविसर्जनीयौ न तदा गकारः । अतो गकारादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽन्यो गोशब्दोऽस्ति यतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् । अन्तर्हिते शब्दे स्मरणादर्थप्रतिपत्तिश्चेत् । न । स्मृतेरपि क्षणिकत्वादक्षरैस्तुल्यता । [वृत्ति॰ p. 45 f].

4 पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितोऽन्त्यो वर्णः प्रत्यायक इत्यदोषः । नन्वेवं शब्दादर्थं प्रतिपद्यामहे इति लौकिकं वचनमनुपपन्नं स्यात् ।-----ननु च शास्त्रकारा अप्येवमाहुः

therefore, accept the position that a word is nothing more than the syllables constituting it and postulates the idea of a mediate *sphoṭarūpa* which is revealed by sllables and which is associated with meaning.

3. The *Siddhāntin* on his part refutes all these objections and ultimately establishes the conclusion 'AKṢARĀṆY EVA PAADM'. Taking up the question of *artha-jñāna* arising from *s'abda*, he points out that as we utter the constituent syllables one after the other some impressions are left by those syllables that pass away on our mind. Thus we get the impressions of all the syllables belonging to the *S'abda* but the last. Then all these impressions combine with the last syllable; and from this combination it is that we get the resulting *artha-jñāna*. Thus according to the *Siddhāntin* there is no need to postulate the existance of something like *sphoṭa* intervening between the syllables on the one hand and the *artha-jñāna* on the other. It is true that this would apparently make *saṁskāras* the prominent *nimitta* of *artha-jñāna* and leave *s'abda* in the background. But this objection loses all its force by the fact that *s'abda* (i.e., the constituent syllables) does after all remain the important means of *artha-jñāna* even according to *Siddhānta* view. This prominence of *s'abda* for *artha-jñāna* can be shown by pointing out that there is a relation of *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* between the syllables or the *s'abda* on the one hand and the *artha-jñāna* on the other, as is shown by the anvaya and the *vyatireka* i.e. by the fact that the latter can arise only in the presence of the former but never in the absence thereof.[5] Nor would it be right to postulate the existence of some thing like *sphoṭa* the existence of which can't be proved by *pratykṣa* or any other *pramāṇa* simply to avoid *s'abda* being rendered secondary in the process

---

पूर्वापरीभूतं भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे व्रजति पचतीत्युपक्रमप्रभृत्यपवर्ग पर्यन्तम् इति यथा ! ——ननु संस्कारकल्पनायामदृष्टकल्पना । [वृत्ति. pp. 46, 47, 48].

5 अपि च नैतदेवमनुपपन्नार्थम् । अक्षरेभ्यः संस्काराः संस्कारादर्थप्रतिपत्तिरिति संभवत्यर्थ-प्रतिपत्तावक्षराणि निमित्तम् । गौण एवार्थप्रतिपत्तौ शब्द इति चेत् । न गौणोऽक्षरेषु निमित्तभावः । तद्भावे भावात् तदभावे चाभावात् । [वृत्ति. p. 47 f].

of *artha-jñāna.* Will it be wise, asks the *Siddhāntin,* if it is urged that to avoid the word *agni* being rendered secondary in the sentence '*Agnir Māṇavakaḥ*' it should be taken to mean that *Māṇavaka* is fire ?[6] Again the very fact that we do not perceive any distinction between the *s'abda* on the one hand and its constituent syllables on the other, and also the fact that we rather perceive their *abheda,* is enough to show that *s'abda* is nothing besides the syllables constituting it. As for the last objection based on *adṛṣṭa-kalpanā* it may be pointed out that the *prima facie* view involves more of this *adṛṣṭa-kalpanā* inasmuch as it takes for granted not only the *adṛṣṭa saṁskāras* which are required to reveal the *sphoṭa* but also the *adṛṣṭa sphoṭa* itself.[7] Thus it can be seen how all the objections levelled against the *Siddhānta view* regarding the nature of *s'abda* are idle. It is also clear how the constituent syllables, making the *s'abda,* give rise to *artha-jñāna,* which arises from the last syllable aided by the impressions left by the preceding syllables. It may, therefore, be now accepted as the right view regarding the real nature of *s'abda* that, as S'ABARA has put it, 'AKṢARĀṆY EVA PADAM.' And these *akṣaras* which constitute the *S'abda* are, it should be noted all of them nitya; we only reveal them (and not produce them) by our vocal efforts.

---

6 अथापि गौणः स्यात् । नगौणः शब्दो मा भूदिति प्रत्यक्षादिभिरनवगम्यमानोऽर्थः शक्यः परिकल्पयितुम् । न ह्यग्निर्माणवक इत्युक्तेऽग्निशब्दो गौणो मा भूदिति ज्वलन एव माणवक इत्यध्यवसीयते । न च प्रत्यक्षो गकारादिभ्योऽन्यो गोशब्द इति । भेद-दर्शनाभावादभेददर्शनाच्च । गकारादीनि हि प्रत्यक्षाणि । तस्माद्गौरिति गकारादिविसर्जनीयान्तं पदमक्षराण्येव । अतो न तेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तमन्यत् पदं नामेति । [वृत्ति. p. 48].

7 शब्दकल्पनायां सा च शब्दकल्पना च । [वत्ति. p. 48].

CHAPTER III.

S'ABDA & APAS'ABDA.

1. The *Mīmāṁsaka* holds that *s'abda* is *nitya*, that *artha* is *nitya*, and that the relation between the two is also *autpattika*, or natural which is only another expression for *nitya*. Now the question is with reference to the fact that the idea 'cow' we find represented in ordinary language not by one word *'go'* alone, but in addition to it by several other words like *gāvī*, *goṇī*, and *gopotalikā*. Are we to suppose that all these words are *autpattika* as the *mīmāṁsaka* would use the term? Or is it that only one of them viz. *gō* is *autpattika* whereas the rest are not to be regarded as such? Acceptance of this latter view would necessarily mean the acceptance of the view that only one of these words is the right word and that the rest are only *apas'abdas* or *apabhraṁs'a* words. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* makes use of all the arguments which the *Siddhāntin* uses to prove the impossibility of a man-made *saṁketa* and argues that all words must be accepted as being equally *autpattika*.[1] The *Siddhāntin*, however, points out that the utterance of a word is a highly elaborate process; and that the uninitiated often commit mistakes while uttering the words. Does it not happen that in trying to avoid mud by jumping over it we fall into the mud itself? Or does not a man sip water twice though he wants to do it only once? Similar is the case with the utterance of words. It is thus the incapability of the speaker that is at the root of such inaccurate forms of words as *gāvī*, or

---

1 गौर्गावी गोणी गोपोतलिका इत्येवमादयः शब्दा उदाहरणम्। गोशब्दो यथा सास्नादिमति प्रमाणं, किं तथा गाव्यादयोऽप्युत नेति संदेहः। किमत्रैकः शब्दोऽविच्छिन्नपारम्पर्योऽर्थाभिधायी, इतरेऽपभ्रंशाः, उत सर्वेऽनादयः। सर्व इति ब्रूमः। कुतः। प्रत्ययात्। प्रतीयते हि गाव्यादिभ्यः सास्नादिमानर्थः। तस्मादितो वर्षशतेऽप्यस्यार्थस्य संबन्ध आसीदेव। ततः परेण, ततश्च परतरेणेत्यनादिता। कर्ता चास्य संबन्धस्य नास्तीति व्यवस्थितमेव। तस्मात्सर्वे साधवः सर्वैर्भाषितव्यम् सर्वे हि साधयन्त्यर्थम्। यथा हस्तः करः पाणिरिति। अर्थाय ह्येत उच्चार्यन्ते नादृष्टाय। न ह्येषामुच्चारणे शास्त्रमस्ति। तस्मान्न व्यवतिष्ठेत कश्चिदेक एव साधुरितरेऽसाधव इति। [SB. on I/3.24, p. 252 f].

gāvī, and that there is no unbroken tradition supporting them.[2] But it may be asked how is it that they give rise to *artha-jñāna*? The only reply to this question is to be found in the similarity which these wrong forms have to the right word. It is on account of this similarity that the hearer is reminded of the right word; and it is from this remembered form that *artha-jñāna* arises.[3] It will thus be seen that the *apas'abdas* by themselves have no power to convey any sense. They do so only through the medium of the correct forms of words, of which they remind the hearer owing to the resemblance that they have with them. JAIMINI has enunciated this argument in MS. I. 3. 29 where S'ABARA has expounded it by adducing an illustration from common parlance. Just as in a statement like '*As'makair āgacchati*' the word *as makaiḥ* first reminds the hearer of the proper forms viz. *as'makebhyaḥ* and then through this latter presents the real or the intended significance, similarly the wrong forms like *gāvī* when heard, first bring the right word to the mind of the hearer and then through that right word viz. *gauḥ* give rise to *artha-pratīti*. The only difference between these two cases is that in the former the word is the same, but the *vibhaktis* are different, and the wrong *vibhakti* conveys the sense of the correct *vibakhti* by conveying the latter to the mind of the hearer; while in the latter, the form of the word that is uttered is itself different from the right word that is intended to be uttered.[4] Hence we conclude that of the several forms that a word may be found to have in a language

---

2 शब्दे प्रयत्ननिष्पत्तेरपराधस्य भागित्वम् । [MS. I.3.25]: महता प्रयत्नेन शब्दमुच्चरन्ति । – – – – । तत्रापराध्येतापि उच्चारयिता । यथा शुष्के पतिष्यामीति कर्दमे पतति, सकृदुपस्प्रक्ष्यामीति द्विरुपस्पृशति । ततोऽपराधात् प्रवृत्ता गाव्यादयो भवेयुः, न नियोगतोऽविच्छिन्नपारम्पर्या एवेति । [SB. on I.3.25, pp. 275-277].

3 सादृश्यात्साधुशब्देऽप्यवगते प्रत्ययोऽवकल्पते । [SB. on I.3.26, p. 277].

4 एकदेशत्वाच्च विभक्तिव्यत्यये स्यात् । [MS. I. 3.29]; अत एव हि विभक्तिव्यत्ययेऽपि प्रत्ययो भवति । अश्मकैरागच्छामीत्यश्मकशब्दैकदेश उपलब्धे, अश्मकेभ्य इत्येव शब्दः स्मर्यते । ततोऽश्मकेभ्य इत्येषोऽर्थ उपलभ्यत इति । एवं गाव्यादिदर्शनाद् गोशब्दस्मरणं, ततः सास्नादिमानवगम्यते । [SB. p. 289].

only one can be accepted as being right while the rest have to be labelled as *apas'abdas.*

2. The origin of the *apas'abda* will thus be found to be in the incapability for proper pronounciation on the part of the uninitiated speaker. But that by itself does not account for the full vogue which these so-called *apas'bdas* have gained in the language. S'ABARA commenting on MS. I. 3. 28 has shown how the initiated on hearing the wrong forms used by the unitiated try to use them while speaking with them with the idea of making themselves easily intelligible to them. This then explains how wrong forms gain currency in a language.[5]

3. JAIMINI at MS. I. 3. 26 has laid down that it is unjust to think of one sense having many words to convey it. In explaining this *sūtra* S'ABARA remarks that since one word is enough to convey an idea and since the phenomenon of the perception of the intended meaning arising from the other forms of words can be otherwise explained as above there is no ground to hold that the other forms also are the right or the *autpattika* forms.[6]

4. But how are we to know which of these several forms is the right one? In reply to this JAIMINI points out that the sole guide in the matter of words and their correct usage are the *abhiyuktas.* The reason why they are to be accepted as such in this matter is supplied by S'ABARA, who in commenting on MS. I. 3. 27 points out that the *abhiyuk-*

---

5 तदशक्तिश्चानुरूपत्वात्। [MS. I.3.28]; अथ यदुक्तम्—अर्थोऽवगम्यते गाव्यादिभ्यः, अत एषामप्यनादिरर्थेन संबन्ध इति। तदशक्तिरेषां गम्यते। गोशब्दमुच्चारयितुकामेन केनचिदशक्त्या गावीत्युच्चारितम्। अपरेण ज्ञातं सास्नादिमानस्य विवक्षितः तदर्थं गौरित्युच्चारयितुकामो गावीत्युच्चारयति। ततः शिक्षित्वाऽपरेऽपि सास्नादिमति विवक्षिते गावीत्युच्चारयन्ति। तेन गाव्यादिभ्यः सास्नादिमानवगम्यते। अनुरूपो हि गाव्यादिर्गोशब्दस्य। [SB. p. 289].

6 अन्यायश्चानेकशब्दत्वम्। [MS. I.3.26]: न चैष न्यायो यत् सदृशाःशब्दा एकमर्थमभिनिविशमानाः, 'सर्वेऽविच्छिन्नपारम्पर्या एवेति। प्रत्ययमात्रदर्शनादभ्युपगम्यते। सादृश्यात्साधुशब्देऽप्यवगते प्रत्ययोऽवकल्पते। तस्मादेकोऽमीषामनादिरन्येऽपभ्रंशाः। [SB. p. 277 f.]

tas are constantly in touch with the proper usage of words so that it is not possible that they should forget it. Hence the conclusion is that whatever form of a word is accepted by the *abhiyukta* as right is the right form, while the rest are only to be considered as *apas'abdas.*[7] It is here interesting to note that according to S'ABARA the *abhiyuktas* are the inhabitants of *Āryāvarta,* who without any break perform their religious duties, and are thus in constant touch with the correct usage of words.[8]

5. Thus as regards the question of the right form of *s'abda* the following observations may be made:—

(i) It is not right to accept the existence of more forms of a word than one as conveying the same sense (cf. ANYĀVAS'CA ANEKAS'ABDATVAM).

(ii) Hence, of the several forms that a word may be found to have in a language, only one shall be accepted as right, while all the rest shall be regarded as wrong or *apas'abdas.* cf.) TASMĀD EKOṢ'MISAM ANĀDIR ANYE PABHRAMS'HĀ).

(iii) The *apas'abdas* owe their origin to the want of capacity in the speaker to go through the elaborate process of uttering a word without committing any mistake. (cf. MAHATĀ PRAYATNENA S'ABDAM UCCANTI; TATO PARĀDHĀT PRAVRTTA GAVYADAKAH.)

(iv) These *apas'abdas* have no power to convey any sense by themselves but they do so by reminding the hearer of the right form of the word in question to which they bear a close resemblance. (c. TAD-ASAKTIHANURUPATVAT.)

---

7 तत्र तत्त्वमभियोगविशेषात् स्यात् । [MS. I.3.27]; कथं पुनस्तत्र तत्त्वं शक्यं विज्ञातुम् । शक्यमित्याह । अर्थिनो ह्यभियुक्त भवन्ति । दृश्यते चाभियुक्तानां गुणयतामविस्मरणमुपपन्नम् । प्रत्यक्षं चैतद् गुण्यमानं न भ्रश्यत इति । तस्माद् यमभियुक्ता उपदिशन्ति एष एव साधुरिति, स साधुरित्यवगन्तव्यः । [SB. p. 278 f.].

8 के शास्त्रस्थाः । शिष्टाः । तेषामविच्छिन्ना स्मृतिः शब्देषुवेदेषु च । तेन शिष्टा निमित्तं श्रुतिस्मृत्यवधारणे । [SB. on I.3.9, p. 217 f]; आर्यावर्तनिवासिनां शब्दार्थोपायेष्वभियुक्तानामभिव्याहरतां कर्माणि चानुतिष्ठतामन्त्यजनपदवासिभ्यो म्लेच्छेभ्यः समीचीनतर आचारो भवति । [SB. on MS. II.3.3, p. 591].

For this would mean making the word express two senses which is a position that cannot plausibly be allowed to stand. But then how to account for the notion of generality that we get from a word? The *Pūrva-pakṣin* answers the question by saying that *Ākṛti* is the mark (*cihna* or *liṅga*) that leads the hearer on to the *Vyakti*. Just as the idea of *daṇḍa* that we get on hearing the word *daṇḍin* only serves as a mark to perceive the man with the stick which alone is the real sense of the word *daṇḍin*, similarly the *Ākṛti* that is conveyed by a word is only the mark (*liṅga*) to perceive the *Vyakti* which alone must, therefore, be accepted as the real sense expressed by a word.[4]

3. USAGE, also seems to go against *Ākṛti-vāda*. We have such expressions as *'Ṣaḍ deyāḥ'* and *'Caturviṁs'atir deyāḥ'* where numerals are used with reference to words like *gāvaḥ* which seem clearly to signify *Vyaktis* and not *Ākṛtis*. For *Ākṛti* is only one so much so that it is impossible to think of any numeral except one with reference to it.[5]

4. Again the acceptance of the *Ākṛti-vāda* would lead to the futility of the ĀRATINIDHI S'ASTRA; for the substitution will be an impossibility if *Ākṛti* is accepted as the real import of words like *pas'u*. For the word *anya* will have no sense, since any *pas'u* will be the same and not *anya* if *Ākṛti* (i.e. *pas'utva*) were the meaning of the word *pas'u*. It is evident that every *pas'u* is possessed of *pas'utva* so much so that no *pas'u* can be described as being *anya*. To

---

4 व्यक्तिः पदार्थ इति । कुतः । प्रयोगचोदनाभावात् । आलम्भनप्रोक्षणविशसनादीनां प्रयोगचोदना आकृत्यर्थे न सम्भवेयुः । यत्रोच्चारणानर्थक्यं तत्र व्यक्त्यर्थः, अतोऽन्यत्राकृतिवचन इति चेत् । उक्तम्, अन्यायश्चानेकार्थत्वम् इति । कथं सामान्यावगतिरिति चेत् । व्यक्तिपदार्थकस्याकृतिश्चिह्नभूता भविष्यति य एवमाकृतिकः स गौरिती । यथा यस्य दण्डोऽस्ति स दण्डीति । न च दण्डवचनो दण्डिशब्दः । एवमिहापि । [SB. on I.3. 30, pp. 296-301]

5 न तत्र द्रव्याश्रयवचनः शब्दो भवेत् यद्याकृतिः शब्दार्थो भवेत् । षड् देया द्वादश देयाश्चतुर्विंशतिर्देया इति । न ह्याकृतिः षडादिभिः संख्याभिर्युज्यते । तस्मान्नाकृतिवचनः । [SB. on I.3. 31, p. 301f.]

avoid this contingency also, therefore, it is that *Vyakti-vāda* has to be accepted.[6].

5. But this VYAKTI-VADA of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* can't be said to be wholly satisfactory. Take, for example, texts like *'S'yenacitam cinvīta.'* If the word *s'yena* is not *Ākṛti-vācaka* how can you obey the above injunction? For, what is needed for making a *s'yena* is the *sādṛs'ya* of the figure prepared with the bricks with an actual *s'yena.* This *sādṛs'ya* must naturally be with the form which is common to all *s'yenas* i.e. with *s'yenatva jāti.* If it is only with a single *s'yena vyakti* then this will not be possible for all sacrificers of all different places and times to do; for how will they hit upon the same *S'yena vyakti*? And how could the earlier sacrificers have done it and how will the future ones do it? Nor could it be with a *Vyakti* which is devoid of all *sāmānys* and *vis eṣas;* for this absence of all *sāmān-yas* and *vis'eṣas* exists in all *vyaktis* of all classes and not merely in the *s'yena-vyakti,* so that there is no sense in prescribing the *s'yena* in particular. *S'yena ākrti* is, however, possible to make up. Thus it will be seen that *if some texts seem to favour the Vyakti-vāda, there are others which* seem to favour the *Ākṛti-vāda.*[7] Thus so far as the Scriptural Texts are concerned both the views are equally supported by them. For just as the *vyakti-vādin* takes *Ākṛti* only as a mark (*cihna*) leading to the perception of *vyakti* which according to him is the real import of the word, similarly the *ākṛti-vādin* would take *vyakti* only as a mark which would lead on to the perception of the *Ākṛti* which, he would argue, is the real significance of a word. It is, therefore, necessary

---

6 यदि पशुरुपाकृतः पलायेत अन्यं तद्वर्णं तद्वयसमालभेत इति । यद्याकृतिवचनः शब्दो भवेदन्यस्यालम्भो नोपपद्येत । अन्यस्यापि पशुद्रव्यस्य सैवाकृतिः । तस्माद् व्यक्तिवचन इति । [SB. on I.3. 32., p. 302]

7 आकृतिः शब्दार्थः । कुतः । क्रियार्थत्वात् । श्येनचितं चिन्वीत इति वचनमाकृतौ संभवति यद्याकृत्यर्थः श्येनशब्दः । व्यक्तिवचने तु न चयनेन श्येनव्यक्तिरुत्पादयितुं शक्यत इत्यशक्यार्थवचनादनर्थकः । तस्मादाकृतिवचनः । [SB. on Ms. I.3.33,p.302]

to seek some more decisive grounds on which to solve this problem.[8]

6. Such a definite ground we get in the fact, that the same word is used with reference to several individuals, which decides the issue in favour of the *Ākṛti-vāda*. The very fact that two or more *Vyaktis* can be denoted by one and the same word is enough to show that it signifies some thing which is common to them all.[9] For if it is argued that the word go may be applicable to other *go-vyaktis* devoid of all *sāmānya-vis'eṣas,* then we point out that it is on account of this absence of all *sāmānya-vis'eṣas* itself that the word *go* is applied to another *go-vyakti* which is like the first and this absence of all *sāmānya-vis'eṣas* itself is the *sāmānya* which is signified by the word *go.* Nor would it do to argue that what is denoted by the word every time is not the absence of *sāmānya-vis'eṣas* but *Vyakti* which is but the substratum of all these alone. For, thereby the word *go* will be applicable not only to all *go-vyaktis* but to *as'va-vyaktis* as well, since the latter also is a *vyakti* in the sense of the term as explained above.[10] If to avoid this contingency it is argued that the word applies only to those *vyaktis* where its use is

---

8 ननूभयत्र क्रियाया असम्भव एव व्यपदिश्यते ! नाकृतिः शब्दार्थः । कुतः । क्रिया न संभवेदाकृतौ शब्दार्थे, व्रीहीन्प्रोक्षति इति । तथा न व्यक्तिः शब्दार्थः, क्रियैव न संभवेद् व्यक्तेः शब्दार्थत्वे, श्येनचितं चिन्वीत इति । यदप्युच्येत व्रीहीन्प्रोक्षति इति व्यक्तिलक्षणार्थाकृतिरिति, शक्यमन्यत्रापि श्येनचितं चिन्वीत इति वदितुमाकृतिलक्षणार्था व्यक्तिरिति । किं पुनरत्र ज्यायः । [SB. on I.3. 33, p. 303]

9 आकृतिः शब्दार्थ इति । यदि व्यक्तिः शब्दार्थो भवेद् व्यक्त्यन्तरे न प्रयुज्येत । अथ व्यक्त्यन्तरे प्रयुज्यते, न तर्हि व्यक्तिः शब्दार्थः । सर्वसामान्यविशेषविनिर्मुक्ता हि व्यक्तिरित्युच्यते । [SB. on I.3. 33, p. 303]

10 नैष दोषः । व्यक्त्यन्तरे सर्वसामान्यविशेषविनिर्मुक्त एव प्रवर्तिष्यते । यदि व्यक्त्यन्तरे सर्वसामान्यविशेषवियुक्ते प्रवर्तिष्यते, सामान्यमेव तर्हि तत् । नेत्युच्यते । यो ह्यर्थः सामान्यस्य विशेषाणां चाश्रयः, सा व्यक्तिः । व्यक्तिवचनश्च शब्दो न सामान्ये नविशेषे वर्तते, तेषां स्वाश्रयमेवाभिदधाति । तेन व्यक्त्यन्तरे वृत्तिरदोषः । न हि तत्सामान्यम् । यदि व्यक्त्यन्तरेषु अपि भवति, सर्वसामान्यविशेषवियुक्तायामश्वव्यक्तौ गोशब्दः किमिति न वर्तते । [SB. on I.3. 33, p. 303]

known by the *Abhiyuktas* it will be difficult to explain how the word can apply to a new-born cow.[11]. But this is actually observed to happen. And even if the above view is accepted for the sake of argument, it will be found to render class-perception an impossibility. For according to it, this *vyakti* or that *vyakti* for which *Saṁketa* is known by us by usage alone will be recognised as a *govyakti;* but actually we find that any *govyakti* even when so far unseen by us also produces the *go-pratyaya* in us.[12] So the view that the application of a word to a *vyakti* depends on usage has to be rejected.[13] If it is said that the word may be applied to a *vyakti* which possesses certain *s'akti*, we reply that the *s'akti* may not exist in all the *vyaktis* denoted by the word. It is the nature of a *s'akti* that it exists in some *vyakti* but not in others. How then will the word denote the *vyakti* which is not possessed of the *s'akti* ? Again, *gotva* it certainly can't be. For to argue that the word *go* applies to that *vyakti* where *gotva* is found to exist would mean the acceptance of the idea of *vis'iṣṭa-vyakti* i.e. the *pratīti* of the *gotva-vis'iṣṭa-vyakti*. But in such a *pratīti* the qualifying attribute i.e. *gotva* will naturally be perceived first and this means that *Ākṛti* is the first import of *s'abda*.[14] Here it

---

11 आह—येष्वेव प्रयोगो दृष्टस्तेषु वर्तिष्यते न सर्वत्र । न चाश्वव्यक्तौ गोशब्दस्य प्रयोगो दृष्टः । तस्मात्तत्र न वर्तिष्यते । यदि यत्र प्रयोगो दृष्टस्तत्र वृत्तिः, अद्य जातायां गवि प्रथमप्रयोगो न प्राप्नोति तत्रादृष्टत्वात् । [SB. on I 3. 33, p. 303]

12 सामान्यप्रत्ययश्च न प्राप्नोति । इयमपि गौरिति, इयमपि गौरिति, इयं वा गौरिति, इयं वा गौरिति स्यात् । भवति च सामान्यप्रत्ययोऽदृष्टपूर्वायामपि गोव्यक्तौ । [SB. on I.3. 33, p. 303]

13 तस्मान्न प्रयोगापेक्षो गोशब्दो व्यक्तिवचन इति शक्यत आश्रयितुम् । [SB. on I.3. 33, p. 304]

14 एवं तर्हि शक्तेः स्वभाव एषः, यत् कस्यांचिद् व्यक्तौ वर्तते कस्यांचिन्न, यथा अग्निरुष्णः, उदकं शीतम्, एवमेतद् भविष्यतीति । नैवं सिध्यति । न ह्येतद् गम्यते कस्यांचिद् व्यक्तौ वर्तते कस्यांचिन्नेति । सत्यमेतत् । गोत्वं लक्षणं भविष्यतीति । यत्र गोत्वं तस्यां व्यक्ताविति ! एवं तर्हि विशिष्टा व्यक्तिः प्रतीयेत । यदि च विशिष्टा, पूर्वतरं विशेषणमवगम्येत । न ह्यप्रतीते विशेषणे विशिष्टं केचन प्रत्येतुमर्हन्तीति । [SB. on I.3. 33, p. 304]

may be argued that *Ākṛti* is denoted by the word no doubt, but only as a *vis'eṣaṇa* and not as the real import of a word, just as the idea of a *daṇḍa* is conveyed by the word *daṇḍin* not as its real signification but only as a *vis'eṣana* of it. Or it may be even conceded that a word conveys both *Ākṛti* as well as *vyakti* so that in some cases the former is subordinate to the latter while in some other cases the relations are reversed.[15] Such a position, however, is totally unacceptable; for if *Ākṛti* is once admitted as the *artha* of the *s'abda go,* it must be supposed to have exhausted its *abhidhā* power in expressing it. Nor is it necessary to extend the *abhidhā* power of the word so as to perceive the *Vyakti* for *Ākṛti* is invariably associated with *Vyakti,* and it is on account of this invariable association between the two that on the perception of this *Ākṛti* a *Vyakti* can easily be perceived.[16] Where is then the necessity of extending the *abhidhā s'akti* to the *Vyakti*? Besides that the perception of *vyakti* arises not from *S'abda* can be easily seen from the *anvaya-vyatireka* relation existing not between *s'abda* and *vyakti,* but between *Ākṛti* and *vyakti.* For one who perceives the *Ākṛti* is invariably observed to perceive the *Vyakti* also even in the absence of a word. On the other hand if through some mental disturbance one is unable to perceive the *Ākṛti* even on the word being uttered, it is impossible that *Vyakti* will be perceived by such a person. This shows that the presence or the absence of the percption of *Vyakti* on the part of the observer depends on the presence or the absence of the perception of the *Ākṛti* on his part; and that it has

---

15 अस्तु विशेषणत्वेनाकृतिं वक्ष्यति विशेष्यत्वेन व्यक्तिम्। न ह्याकृतिपदार्थकस्य व्यक्तिर्न पदार्थो, व्यक्तिपदार्थकस्य वा नाकृतिः। उभयमुभयस्य पदार्थः। कस्यचित् किंचित् प्राधान्येन विवक्षितम्; भवति, तेन अत्राकृतिर्गुणभावेन व्यक्तिः प्रधानभावेन विवक्ष्यत इति। [SB. on I.3. 33, p. 304]

16 नैतदेवम्। उभयोरुच्यमानयोर्गुणप्रधानभावः स्यात्। यदि चात्राकृतिःप्रतीयते शब्देन, तदा व्यक्तिरपि पदार्थ इति न शक्यते वदितुम्! कुतः। आकृतिर्हि व्यक्त्या नित्यसंबद्धा, संबन्धिन्यां च तस्यामवगतायां संबन्ध्यन्तरमवगम्यते। [SB. on I.3.33, p. 304].

nothing to do with the uttering or hearing of *s'abda.*[17] On the strength of this *anvaya-vyatireka* relation existing between the *Ākṛti* and *Vyakti* we again conclude that it is not necessary to extend the *abhidhā s'akti* of a word to the *Vyakti.*

7. Then why not say that a word conveys the idea of a *vyakti-vis'iṣṭa ākṛti*? Such a view is not acceptable for the simple reason that such an assumption would disqualify a word from being applicable to *vyakty-antara-vis'iṣṭa-ākṛti.*[18]

8. Irresistible, therefore, is the conclusion that a word expresses *Ākṛti* alone, and that this *Ākṛti* in its turn conveys the idea of *Vyakti* by implication.[19]

9. As for the *Pūrva-pakṣin's* argument that *Ākṛti* is conveyed only as being subordinate to *Vyakti,* the *Siddhāntin's* only reply is that to him it does not matter in what capacity *Ākṛti* is conveyed by a word. If it is accepted that *Ākṛti* is conveyed by a word he is satisfied. For the question of the mutual relation between the *Ākṛti* and the *Vyakti* is a matter which can't be decided by the *s'abda-s'akti.* It has to be decided on the strength of some other factor viz. the purpose in view for which the word is employed. If *Ākṛti* is spoken of with reference to itself it shall be *pradhāna;* but if it is spoken of with reference to something else then it will be *guṇa-bhūta.* The word has no power to decide this.[20]

---

17 तदेतदात्मप्रत्यक्षं, यच्छब्द उच्चरिते व्यक्तिः प्रतीयत इति । किं शब्दादुताकृतेरिति विभागो न प्रत्यक्षः । सोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामवगम्यते । अन्तरेणापि शब्दं य आकृतिमवबुध्येत, अवबुध्येतैवासौ व्यक्तिम् । यस्तूच्चरितेऽपि शब्दे मानसादपचारात् कदाचिदाकृतिं नोपलभेत न जातुचिदसाविमां व्यक्तिमवगच्छेत् । [SB. on I.3.33, p. 304 f].

18 ननु व्यक्तिविशिष्टायामाकृतौ वर्तते । व्यक्तिविशिष्टाया चेद्वर्तेत व्यक्त्यन्तरविशिष्टा न प्रतीयेत । [SB. on I. 3. 33, p. 317]

19 तस्माच्छब्द आकृतिप्रत्ययस्य निमित्तम् । आकृतिप्रत्ययो व्यक्तिप्रत्ययस्येति । [SB. on I. 3. 33, p. 317].

20 ननु गुणभूता प्रतीयत इत्युक्तम् । न गुणभावोऽस्मत्पक्षस्य बाधकः । सर्वथा तावत् प्रतीयते । अर्थाद् गुणभावः प्रधानभावो वा । स्वार्थं चेदुच्चार्यते, प्रधानभूता ।

10. But what about the analogy of the word *dāṇḍin* referred to above ? Just as the word *daṇḍin* always signifies a *daṇḍa-vis'iṣṭa* person, but never the *daṇḍa,* though from the word *daṇḍin* itself we do get the ideas of both the *daṇḍa* as well as the *daṇḍa-vis'iṣṭa* person, similarly why not say that a word is really expressive of the *Ākṛti-vis'iṣṭa vyakti* though it also conveys the idea of *Ākṛti*? Here it must be noticed that the analogy of the word *daṇḍin* is not conclusive, since there is a vast difference between the word *daṇḍin* on the one hand and words like *gauḥ* on the other. The former is a composite word made up of two separate parts or words which express two different meanings i.e., *daṇḍa,* and *Deva-datta;* but such is not the case with the latter. For in the word *gauḥ* there is no part of it which conveys *gotva* alone and another which conveys *govyakti* alone. Again the former is never used to convey the idea of the *vis'eṣaṇa* viz. *daṇḍa* alone; while the latter are often used to convey mere *Ākṛti* which is said to be the *vis'eṣaṇa,* as e.g. *S'yenena yajeta.'* The ĀKṚTI-VIS'IṢTA VYAKTI-VĀDA, therefore, has to be rejected as unsatisfactory, particularly because even in the case of the word *daṇḍin* the *vis'eṣaṇa* viz. the idea of *daṇḍa* must come first or else the *vis'iṣṭa-kalpanā* itself will be an impossibility, which shows that the perception of the qualifying attribute must come first. And if *Ākṛti* is thus accepted as being perceived first it is but natural to accept that *Ākṛti* forms the real import of a word, for the reasons discussed in detail above. Thus on the strength of *Anvaya-vyatireka* we must conclude that the real import of *s'abda* is not *vyakti* but *Ākṛti.*[21]

अथ न स्वार्थं, परार्थमेव, ततो गुणभूता । न तत्र शब्दव्यापारोऽस्ति । [SB. on I. 3. 33, p. 317].

21 ननु च दण्डीति, न तावद्दण्डिशब्देन दण्डोऽभिधीयते, अथ दण्डविशिष्टोऽवगम्यते । एवमिहापि न तावदाकृतिरभिधीयते, अथ चाकृतिविशिष्टा व्यक्तिरवगम्यते इति । नैतत् साधु उच्यते । सत्यं दण्डशब्देन दण्डो नाभिधीयते, न त्वप्रतीते दण्डे दण्डिप्रत्ययोऽस्ति । अस्ति तु दण्डिशब्दस्यैकदेशभूतो दण्डशब्दो, येन दण्डः प्रत्यायितः । तस्मात् साध्वेतत् यत् प्रतीते विशेषणे विशिष्टः प्रतीयत इति । न तु गोशब्दावयवः कश्चिदाकृतेः

11. But *Ākrti-vāda* can't be found to be wholly acceptable if the objections levelled by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* against it as stated above are not refuted. This, however, is not very difficult to achieve. The texts enjoining killing and such other acts will not be rendered nugatory even on accepting the *Ākṛti-vāda;* for as has been stated above though *s'abda* expresses *Ākṛti,* this latter in its turn necessarily conveys the *Vyakti* by implication. Thus it may be stated that the *Ākṛti vacana* words in such texts are used to mark out the *vyaktis* which form the substratum of the acts enjoined by them. So what happens in such texts is that the words first convey the idea of *Ākṛti;* but this *Ākṛti* is found to be useless so far as the particular action is concerned. The *Ākṛti,* therefore, by implication conveys the *vyakti* that is connected with it, so that the danger of *ānarthakya* is warded off.[22]

12. The objection on the score of the numerals used in apposition to nouns can also be refuted by pointing out that even there it is the number that is intended to be enjoined and that the *Ākṛti-vacana-s'abda* is used only as a *vis'eṣaka.*[23] The same is the case with the last objection;

प्रत्यायकः, अन्यो व्यक्तेः । यत उच्येत तत आकृतिरवगता, न गोशब्द आकृतिवचन इति । न च यथा दण्डिशब्दो न दण्डे प्रयुक्त एवं गोशब्दो नाकृतौ । तदर्थमेव निदर्शितं केवलाकृत्यभिधानः श्येनशब्द इति । तदेवमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामसति श्येनव्यक्तिसंबन्धे श्येनशब्दोच्चारणादाकृतिवचन इति गम्यते । न तु व्रीह्याकृतिसंबंधमंतरेण व्रीहिव्यक्तौ शब्दस्य प्रयोगो दृष्टः । तस्मादाकृतिवचनः शब्द इत्येतज्ज्यायः । [SB. on I. 3. 33, p. 317 f.]

22 तदर्थत्वात् प्रयोगस्याविभागः । [MS. I. 3. 35;] आकृत्यर्थत्वाच्छब्दस्य यस्या व्यक्तेराकृत्या संबन्धस्तत्र प्रयोगः । प्रोक्षणं हि द्रव्यस्य कर्तव्यतया श्रूयते । कतमस्य । यद् यजतिसाधनम् । अपूर्वप्रयुक्तत्वात्तस्य । नाकृतेः । अशक्यत्वात् । तत्र व्रीहिशब्द आकृतिवचनः प्रयुज्यते प्रोक्षणाश्रयविशेषणाय । स ह्याकृतिं प्रत्याययिष्यति । आकृतिः प्रतीता सती प्रोक्षणाश्रयं विशेक्ष्यतीति । तेनाकृतिवचनं न विरुध्यते । इति । [SB. on I. 3. 35, p. 319]

23 एवं षड् देया गावो दक्षिणा इति दक्षिणाद्रव्ये संख्यायाः प्रयोक्तव्ये गाव इत्याकृतिवचनो विशेषकः । [SB. on I. 3. 35, p. 319]

for the word *anya* there is used with reference to the substitute and is qualified by the *Ākṛti-vacana s'abda.*[24]

13. Thus it may now be stated as a *s'iddhānta* that words like *go* and *as'va* are expressive primarily not of a *Vyakti* but of *Ākṛti* or class.[25]

24 तथा, अन्यमिति विनष्टस्य प्रतिनिधेरन्यत्वसंबन्धः तत्र पशुशब्द आकृतिवचन आकृत्या विशेक्ष्यतीति । [SB. on I, 3. 35, p. 319]

25 तस्माद् गौरश्व इत्येवमादयः शब्दा आकृतेरभिधायका इति सिद्धम् । [SB. on I. 3. 35, p. 319 f.]

The curious reader may also read the वृत्तिकारग्रंथ beginning with 'अथ गौरित्यस्य शब्दस्य कोऽर्थः ' and ending with यथा चाकृतिः शब्दार्थस्तथोपरिष्टान्निपुणतरमुपपादयिष्यामः इति । [pp. 49—52] where the वृत्तिकार has justfied आकृतिवाद against a Buddhistic attack.

CHAPTER V

THE RELATION between S'ABDA and ARTHA

1. Having determined the nature and the accurate form of *s'abda* and also the exact import conveyed by it we now proceed to discuss the question of the mutual relation between the two. But it may be asked whether there is any possibility of there being any connection between them at all. They can't be connected by *saṁs'leṣa* or *saṁyoga.* For had they been so connected the utterance of the words *kṣura* and *modaka* would have resulted in the cutting and the filling of the mouth respectively. Such, however, is not our experience. Nor is it possible to think of any other relation such as the *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* or the *nimitta-naimittika-bhāva* or the *ās'rayās'rayi-bhāva* existing between the two. The first two *sambandhas* are impossible since both *s'abda* as well as *artha* are *nitya.* As for the third it is also rendered impossible by the fact that they have different *ās'rayas;* for *s'abda* is known to reside in *ākās'a* while *artha* is found to reside on *pṛthivī.* What relation can then be found to exist between them?[1]

2. The simple answer to this question given by the *Mīmāṁsaka* is that *s'abda* is *pratyāyaka* and *artha* is *pratyāyya;* and hence it can reasonably be assumed that there subsists between them the *pratyāyaka-pratyāyya-bhāva* or the *saṁjñāsaṁjñilakṣaṇa-sambandha.* But if such a relation exists between *s'abda* and *artha* we should expect *s'abda* to convey its *artha* even on its first hearing. Our experience, however, is that a *prathama-s'ruta s'abda* is not *pratyāyaka.* This means that the *sambandha* between the word and the sense is not of the *pratyāyakapratyāyya* type; for had it been so even the *prathama-s'ruta s'abda* should have been *pratyāyaka.*

---

1 नैव शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्धः । कुतोऽस्य पौरुषेयताऽपौरुषेयता वेति । कथम् । स्याच्चेदर्थेन संबन्धः क्षुरमोदकशब्दोच्चारणे मुखस्य पाटनपूरणे स्याताम् । यदि संश्लेषलक्षणं संबन्धमभिप्रेत्योच्यते । कार्यकारणनिमित्तनैमित्तिकाश्रयाश्रयिभावादयस्तु संबन्धाः शब्दस्यानुपपन्ना एवेति । [वृत्ति. p. 43]

But it is not so. This argument can, however, be refuted by pointing out to our experience. That a *s'abda* is *pratyāyaka* and *artha* is *pratyāyya* is established by experience; for we do find that *s'abda* invariably conveys *artha*. But what about the fact that it does not convey *artha* when *prathamas'ruta*? Well, if we find that the word does not become *pratyāyaka* when it is *prathamas'ruta* we must assume that it becomes *pratyāyaka* when it is heard as many times as it is necessary for it to be *pratyāyaka*. For this is how we can account for our experience. Nor can it be called *apratyāyaka* because it does not convey the sense when it is *prathamas'ruta* just as the eye can't be called *adraṣṭṛ* merely because we find that it can't give us perception of an object unless it is aided by (or in the absence of) light. We never say that the eye is not the seer because it can't see in the absence of light; on the contrary we do accept the eye as the seer and take light as its *sahakāri kāraṇa*. In the present case also then we must take *s'abda* as the *pratyāyaka* and the *bahukṛtvaḥ s'ravaṇa* as the *sahakāri kāraṇa* in the absence of which *s'abda may not be pratyāyaka.*[2]

3. But it may be argued that at any rate this relation i.e. *pratyāyakapratyāyya-sambandha* between *s'abda* and *artha* must be accepted as being man-made and hence *anitya*, if it requires to be grasped by hearing the word more than once. Evidently *s'abda* can have no natural connection with *artha;* for while the former is perceived in the mouth inside the body the latter is perceived on the ground i.e. outside the body. Even in ordinary language we do distinguish the one from the other, saying, 'This is *s'abda* and not *artha*, and *vice versa.*' The same again is shown by their different natures; the former is something to be uttered, while the latter is

---

2 उच्यते । यो ह्यत्र व्यपदेश्यः संबन्धस्तमेकं न व्यपदिशति भवान् प्रत्याय्यस्य प्रत्यायकस्य च यः संज्ञासंज्ञिलक्षण इति । आह यदि प्रत्यायकः शब्दः प्रथमश्रुतः किं न प्रत्याययति । उच्यते । सर्वत्र नो दर्शनं प्रमाणम् । प्रत्यायक इति हि प्रत्ययं दृष्ट्वाऽवगच्छामो न प्रथमश्रुत इति । प्रथमश्रवणे प्रत्ययमदृष्ट्वा यावत्कृत्वः श्रुतेनेयं संज्ञाऽयं संज्ञीत्यवधारितं भवति तावत्कृत्वः श्रुतादर्थावगम इति । यथा चक्षुर्द्रष्टृ न बाह्येन प्रकाशेन विना प्रकाशयतीत्यद्रष्टृ न भवति । [वृत्ति., p. 43 f.]

something to be perceived. If thus *s'abda* and *artha* are two entities separately existing, the only conclusion that can be drawn regarding their mutual relationship is that it must be *kṛtaka*—as *kṛtaka*, for example, as the relation between a rope and a jar which are two separate entities enjoying independent existence. We, therefore, conclude that some human being must have fixed the relation between *s'abda* and *artha* and then must have composed the *Vedas* for *vyavahāra-siddhi*.[3]

4. Such a view of the relation between *s'abda* and *artha* is, however, not acceptable to JAIMINI and his commentator, S'ABARA, who time and again[4] have harped on this point declaring in no ambiguous terms that the relation between *s'abda* and *artha* is *autpattika* or *nitya* or *apauruṣeya*. It is also further pointed out by them that it is on account of this *autpattikatva* of the *s'abdārtha-sambandha* that a word can be expressive of one signification and one only, and that it can't be made to express any signification save the one with which it is naturally connected.[5]

5. As the *prima facie* view it has been stated above that *s'abdārtha-sambandha* is *kṛtaka* and that the *Vedas* have

---

3 यदि प्रथमश्रुतो न प्रत्याययति कृतकस्तर्हि शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः । कुतः । स्वभावतो ह्यसम्बद्धावेतौ शब्दार्थौ । मुखे हि शब्दमुपलभामहे भूमावर्थम् । शब्दोऽयं न त्वर्थोऽर्थोऽयं न शब्द इति च व्यपदिशन्ति । रूपभेदोऽपि भवति । गौरितीमं शब्दमुच्चारयन्ति सास्नादिमन्तमर्थमवबुध्यन्त इति । पृथग्भूतयोश्च यः सम्बन्धः . स कृतको दृष्टः, यथा रज्जुघटयोरिति । [वृत्ति., p. 45]. Also read. अथ कः सम्बन्ध इति । यच्छब्दे विज्ञातेऽर्थो विज्ञायते स तु कृतक इति पूर्वमुपपादितम् । तस्मान्मन्यामहे केनापि पुरुषेण शब्दानामर्थैः सह संबन्धं कृत्वा संव्यवहर्तुं वेदाः प्रणीता इति । [वृत्ति., p. 52 f.]

4 औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्धः [MS. I.1.5]; नाम्नस्तु औत्पत्तिकत्वात् [MS. VII.3.38]; नौत्पत्तिकत्वात् [MS. VII.2, 5]; विकारो नौत्पत्तिकत्वात् । [MS. VI.8.41]; उत्पत्तिनामधेयत्वाद् भक्त्या पृथक्सतीषु स्यात् । [MS. VIII.3.22]; औत्पत्तिको हि नामिनाम्नोः संबन्धः । [SB. on VI.8.41, p. 1522; VII.2.5, p. 1543; and VIII.3.3, p. 1550].

5 औत्पत्तिको हि नामिनाम्नोः संबन्धः । यन्नाम यस्मिन्नर्थे औत्पत्तिकेन संबन्धेन प्रसिद्धं, तस्मिन्नेव सदा विज्ञेयं नान्यत्र च । तथाऽव्यवस्थायां शब्दार्थे विश्वासो न स्यात् । उक्तम्—अन्यायश्चानेकार्थत्वमिति । [SB. on VII.3.3, p. 1550].

been composed by some human being for carrying on *vyavahāra* after fixing the relation between *s'abda* and *artha.* But the main defect of this view is that there is no *puruṣa* whom they can prove to be *sambanddhā*. This existence of this *sambanddhā* can't, for obvious reasons, be proved by *pratyakṣa.* And if *pratyakṣa* falls off, the other *pramāṇas* also, dependent on *pratyakṣa* as they are, are of no use in this matter. It will not do to say that the *sambanddhā* though not *pratyakṣa* to the people of today, must have been so to the people of ancient times; for, had he been so we should certainly have received some traditional information about him. And though there is every possibility of the tradition being broken you must put forth strong reasons to show that it has actually happened like that in this case. The orchards and the tanks on the *Himālayas,* for example, must be the work of some *puruṣa;* and yet we to-day have not the slightest knowledge or tradition about him. But in that case the absence or break of tradition is caused by *des'otsāda* or *kulotsāda* which ultimately results in the separation of the author from them in memory of men. The same can't, however, be said about *s'abda* and *artha* for there is no period imaginable when man was not connected with *s'abdārtha-vyavahāra.*

Thus if there is no break or *viyoga* there is no reason why there should be no *smaraṇa* of the *sambanddhā* if at all there was any. This absence of the *smaraṇa* of the *sambanddhā,* therefore, can be taken as an indication of the absence of *sambanddhā* himself.[6] And the absence of *sambanddhā* thus proved takes away all wind out of the sails of the *prima facie* view.

6. But it may be argued that the *sambanddhā* was dropped from the memory because there was no necessity of remem-

---

6 तदिदानीमुच्यते । अपौरुषेयत्वात् संबंधस्य सिद्धमिति । कथं पुनरवगम्यते अपौरुषेय एष संबंध इति । पुरुषस्य संबन्धुरभावात् । कथं संबन्धा नास्ति । प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रमाणस्याभावात्, तत्पूर्वकत्वाच्चेतरेषाम् । ननु चिरवृत्तत्वात्प्रत्यक्षस्याविषयो भवेदिदानीन्तनानाम् । न हि चिरवृत्तः सन्न स्मर्येत । न च हिमवदादिषु कूपारामादिवदस्मरणं

bering him in the *s'abdārtha-vyavahāra* which could be carried on without remembering him. Do we not brush aside many things from our memory when they are found to be useless for our immediate purpose? Does it mean that they do not exist? Mere non-remembrance can't be a ground strong enough to prove the absence of a *sambanddhā*. We find that we are concerned only with the *sambandha* between *s'abda* and *artha* and not with the *sambanddhā* also. The same was the experience of the ancients also who, therefore, naturally did not care to retain any memory of the *sambandha-kartā* since it was all unnecessary for their immediate purposes. The absence of *sambanddhā*, therefore, is not proved. Such an argument on the part of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* can, however, be easily shown to be fallacious. It is true that people are concerned with the *sambandha* only and not with the *sambandha-kartā* also. But it is not true to argue, therefore, that the remembrance of the *sambanddhā* is futile. For, the remembrance of the *sambanddhā* is a pre-requisite of *vyavahāra-siddhi*. If any *vyavahāra* is to be fruitful there must first of all be full agreement between the *sambandhakartā* and the *vyavahartā*; for if there is no *sampratipatti* or if there is *vipratipatti* (disagreement) between the two there shall be no *artha-siddhi*. The words *vṛddhi* and *makāra*, for example, will not convey the senses of *ai*, and *au* and a *sarva-guru trika* respectively when used by one who does not agree with PĀṆINI and PIṄGALA, or when used in connection with any transaction which has no connection with the *s'āstras* propounded by them. This shows that *artha-siddhi* pre-supposes the *sampratipatti* or agreement between the *kartā* and the *vyavahartā*. But how can there be this *sampratipatti* if there is no *smaraṇa* of the *kartā*? It is, therefore, wrong to argue that *kartṛ-smaraṇa* is not necessary for our immediate purposes. On the contrary it is highly essential to have the *kartṛ-smaraṇa* if at all our *vyavahāras* are to be crowned with success. But as

भवितुमर्हति । पुरुषवियोगो हि तेषु भवति देशोत्सादेन वा कुलोत्सादेन वा । न च शब्दार्थव्यवहारवियोगः पुरुषाणामस्ति । [वृत्ति., p. 53].

there is no *smarana* we conclude that there was no *kartā*.[7]

7. Again there is nothing wrong in arguing that non-remembrance of an existing thing is possible. But the converse of this is not true; and it is wrong to conclude that all non-remembered or non-perceived things do exist because some existing things are not remembered. The mere non-remembrance of a thing can't be taken as ground enough for postulating the existence of a thing as it is done by the *Pūrvapakṣin*. For if such a process is allowed we may as well argue that since non-perception of an existing thing is possible, therefore, hare's horn, because it is *anupalabdha*, must be an existing thing. The point is that the existence of a thing can be admitted only if it is proved by some *pramāṇa*, but never in the absence of any *pramāṇa* at all.[8]

8. But it may be pointed out that the existence of the *sambandha-kartā* can be proved on the strength of the *pramāṇa* called *arthāpatti*. Even today we find that people are not able to grasp the sense of the words which are not connected by some person with an *artha*. For otherwise (i.e., if the *sambandha* had been natural and not man-made) people would have understood the sense of the words on hearing them even for the first time. But we find that the sense of the words which are heard for the first time is not understood by the people. This shows that we have per force

---

7 स्यादेतत् । संबंधमात्रव्यवहारिणे निष्प्रयोजनं कर्तृस्मरणमनाद्रियमाणा विस्मरेयुरिति । तन्न । यदि हि पुरुषः कृत्वा संबंधं व्यवहारयेत् व्यवहारकालेऽवश्यं स्मर्तव्यो भवति । सम्प्रतिपत्तौ हि कर्तृव्यवहर्त्रोरर्थः सिध्यति, न विप्रतिपत्तौ । न हि वृद्धिशब्देन अपाणिनेर्व्यवहारत आदैचः प्रतीयेरन् पाणिनिकृतिमननुमन्यमानस्य वा । तथा मकारेणापिङ्गलस्य न सर्वगुरुस्त्रिकः प्रतीयेत, पिङ्गलकृतिमननुमन्यमानस्य वा । तेन कर्तृव्यवहर्तारौ संप्रतिपद्येते । तेन वेदे व्यवहरद्भिरवश्यं स्मरणीयः संबंधस्य कर्ता स्यात् । व्यवहारस्य च । न हि विस्मृते वृद्धिरादैजित्यस्य सूत्रस्य कर्तरि 'वृद्धिर्यस्याचामादिः' इति किंचित् प्रतीयेत । [वृत्ति., p. 53 f.]

8 यद्यपि च विस्मरणमुपपद्येत, तथापि न प्रमाणमन्तरेण संबंधारं प्रतिपद्येमहि । यथा विद्यमानस्यानुपलम्भनं भवतीति नैतावता विना प्रमाणेन शशविषाणं प्रतिपद्यामहे । [वृत्ति., p. 55].

to accept the *sambandha-kartā* as being absolutely necessary for a successful transaction today. Similarly, therefore, we shall have to accept the existence of the *sambandha-kartā* for the ancient period also. For had there been none such how could people have understood the *s'abdārtha* at all? This argument, however, is not sound. The main flaw in the whole argument arises from the fact that the *Pūrva-pakṣin* has here forgotten the real nature of the *pramāṇa* called *arthāpatti*. With reference to this *pramāṇa* the most important point to remember is that it can find scope only when no other possible explanation of the existing facts can be presented. In *arthāpatti* we try to explain the existing facts which are apparently inexplicable; and for doing this we postulate or presume the existence of some other fact. But the presumption of this fresh fact may be allowed only if it is found impossible to explain the existing facts in any other way. But as soon as such an alternative explanation is made available the *arthāpatti* will lose all scope. Impossibility of any other solution or explanation is, thus, the very foundation or soul of this *pramāṇa;* and before taking one's stand on it one has, therefore, to make sure that this foundation is not slippery. Bearing in mind this peculiar character of *arthāpatti* let us now turn to the question of the presumption of the *sambandha-kartā.*[9]

9. According to the *Pūrva-pakṣin* no word was in the beginning connected with any *artha* at all. Then it was that somebody established the connection between *s'abda* and *artha;* and thus it is that words have come to acquire the significations that they have today. This is, no doubt, one way of explaining how *s'abdārtha-vyavahāra* started and continues. But this is not the only solution. *Vṛddha-*

9 अर्थापत्तिरपि दृष्टः श्रुतो वार्थोऽन्यथा नोपपद्यते इत्यर्थकल्पना। यथा जीवति देवदत्ते गृहाभावदर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पना। [वृत्ति., p. 38]; अदृष्टो योऽश्रुतो वार्थः स नास्तीत्यवगम्यते। तस्मिन्नसति दृष्टश्चेच्छ्रुतो वा न विरुध्यते ॥ विरुध्यमाने कल्प्यः स्याज्जायते तेन सोऽर्थवान्। विशेषश्चेन्न गम्येत ततो नैकोऽपि कल्प्यते ॥ [SB. on II.2.1, p. 462]; तद्धि वचनात् कल्प्यते, यस्मिन्नकल्प्यमाने वचनमनर्थकं भवति। [SB. on VI.6.3, p. 1481]

vyavahāra may give us another possible solution of the whole problem. Even today we find youngesters getting at the *s'abdārtha* by observing the speeches and the consequent transactions of their elders. In the same way the elders of today must have caught *artha-jñāna* from the observation of the transactions of the elders of their times; and these latter again from those of their day. Thus we find that *vṛddha-vyavahāra* can explain very well the phenomenon of *artha-jñāna* from the *S'abd*a so that there are now two possible explanations for the phenmenon under consideration; (1) the knowledge of the *s'abdārtha-sambandha-kartā* as in the case of the word *vṛddhi of Pāṇini* or of the word *makāra* of *Pingala* and (2) the *vṛddha-vyavahāra*. And when *vṛddha-vyavahāra* is actually seen to account for *artha-jñāna* why presume the *kartṛ-jñāna* and the consequent existence of a *sambandha-kartā*? Thus it is clear that there can be no scope for *arthāpatti* in this matter. And it may be added that, of the two explanations suggested above, the latter is all the more strengthened and as such rendered more acceptable by the fact that it is supported by the *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* based on our actual experience.[10]

10. The absence of the *sambandha-kartā* can be proved in another way also. For it is impossible to think of a day on which the *s'abdas* and *arthas* had no connectinon whatsoever with one another, and were for the first time brought into connection with one another by some human agency.

---

10 नन्वर्थापत्त्या संबंधारं प्रतिपद्येमहि न ह्यकृतसंबन्धाच्छब्दादर्थं प्रतिपद्यमानानुपलभामहे। प्रतिपद्येरंश्चेत् प्रथमश्रवणेऽपि प्रतिपद्येरन्। तदनुपलम्भनादवश्यं भवितव्यं संबन्धेति चेन्न सिद्धत्वदुपदेशात्। यदि संबन्धुरभावान्नियोगतो नार्था उपलभ्येरंस्ततोऽर्थापत्त्या संबन्धारमवगच्छामः। अस्ति त्वन्यः प्रकारः। वृद्धानां स्त्रार्थेन व्यवहरमाणानामुपशृण्वन्तो बालाः प्रत्यक्षमर्थं प्रतिपद्यमाना दृश्यन्ते। तेऽपि वृद्धा यदा बाला आसंस्तदान्येभ्यो वृद्धेभ्यस्तेऽप्यन्येभ्य इति नास्त्यादिरित्येवं वा भवेत्। अथवा न कश्चिदेकोऽपि शब्दस्यार्थेन संबन्ध आसीत्। अथ केनचित् संबन्धाः प्रवर्तिता इति। अत्र वृद्धव्यवहारे सति नार्थादापद्येत संबन्धस्य कर्ता। अपि च व्यवहारवादिनः प्रत्यक्षमुपदिशन्ति, कल्पयन्तीतरे संबन्धारं, न च प्रत्यक्षे प्रत्यर्थिनि कल्पना साध्वी। [वृत्ति., p. 55 f.].

Such an assumption necessarily pre-supposes the *sambandha-kartā* and the *sambandha-kriyā*. But how could this *sambandha-kriyā* be carried out? Is it not that the *kartā* will have to catch hold of some existing words with established meanings with which to establish the *sambandha* between the *s'abdas* and the *arthas* which are totally unconnected with each other? But were these existing words connected with *artha*? Well, they could not have been so; for we are talking of a day when there was no *artha-sambandha*. How were these words then connected with their *artha*? For that you will have to assume an ever new series of words that you will be required to accept so that the *sambandha-kriyā* itself will have to be given up as an impossible task. The only course open to your assumed *kartā*, therefore, is to catch hold of some *siddha* words whose connection with *artha* is not a matter to be brought into existence, but must have existed even before the *sambandha-kartā* who must be accepted to have known it from *vrddha-vyavahāra*. Thus ultimately we find that *artha-jñāna* has to be explained on the strength of the *vrddha-vyavahāra*, at every stage and its aid has to be invoked even after postulating the existence of a *sambandha-kartā*.[11]

11. To question as to how youngesters can catch *artha* if they do not know the *sambandha* would be to question a fact of our own every day experience. For we actually find youngsters doing it every day. Never for once do we find them getting at *artha-jñāna* with the help of the memory of a *sambandha-kartā*. Hence the existence of a *sambandha-kartā* for want of any sound proof must be denied.[12].

11 न हि संबन्धव्यतिरिक्तः कश्चित्कालोऽस्ति । यस्मिन् न कश्चिदपि शब्दः केनचिदर्थेन संबद्ध आसीत् । कथम्' । संबन्धक्रियैव हि नोपपद्यते । अवश्यमनेन संबंधं कुर्वता केनचिच्छब्देन कर्तव्यः । येन क्रियेत तस्य केन कृतः । अथान्येन केनचित् कृतः, तस्य केनेति तस्य केनेति नैवावतिष्ठते । तस्मादवश्यमनेन संबंधं कुर्वताऽकृतसंबंधाः केचन शब्दा वृद्धव्यवहारसिद्धा अभ्युपगन्तव्याः । अस्ति चेद् व्यवहारसिद्धिर्न नियोगतः संबंधा भवितव्यमित्यर्थापत्तिरपि नास्ति । ['वृत्ति, p. 57].

12 स्यादेतत् । अप्रसिद्धसंबंधा बालाः कथं वृद्धेभ्यः प्रतिपद्यन्त इति । नास्ति

12. We can now go even a step further and add that the presumption of a *sambandha-kartā* is absurd. *Sambandha-karaṇa* means ultimately giving names to things. But it is not possible to assume that all things having names were in existence on the day on which the naming ceremony took place. Some things at least can reasonably be said to have come into being at a later stage. Then how is it possible to think of this *saṁjñā-karaṇa* taking place in the case of such things as were not present on the day on which this supposed ceremony took place? *Saṁjñā-karaṇa* is for the perception of and with some particular reference to some *vis'eṣas* of existing things. But neither of these is possible in the case of the things of the future or of things not in existence at the time of the *saṁjñā-karaṇa*. This then proves the absolute futility of the assumption of the *sambandha-kartā.*[13] Similarly have JAIMINI and S'ABARA shown that it is impossible to think of any *śambandha-kartā* in the case of the *Veda* also.[14]

13. In conclusion, therefore, it may now be said that *since the existence of the sambandha-kartā can't be proved by any pramāṇa it is but fair to assume that there is no śuch kartā; and hence there is nothing wrong in assuming that the relation between s'abda and artha is not man-made, but autpattika or nitya.*

14. As regards the bearing of this conclusion on the *Mīmāṁsa* theory as a whole it may be pointed out that according to the *mīmāṁsaka, s'abda* is an unquestionable *pramāṇa* since it is not contaminated by *puruṣānupraves'a.* The *laukika s'abda* is found sometimes to be *apramāṇa* because it is so contaminated. Thus if any contact with

---

दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम । दृष्टा बाला वृद्धेभ्यः प्रतिपद्यमानाः न च प्रतिपन्नाः संबंधाः संबन्धस्य कर्तुः । तस्माद् वैषम्यम् । [वृत्ति., p. 58].

13 अनुपलब्धे च देवदत्तादावर्थेऽनर्थकं संज्ञाकरणमशक्यं च । विशेषान् प्रतिपत्तुं हि संज्ञाः क्रियन्ते विशेषांश्चोद्दिश्य । तद्विशेषेष्वज्ञायमानेषूभयमप्यनवकल्पम् । तस्मादपौरुषेयः शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः । [वृत्ति., p. 58]

14. cf. MS. I.1.27-32, and SB. thereon.

human hand be shown in the case of *s'abda* or *artha* or their mutual relationships, the *prāmāṇya* of the *Veda* would certainly suffer. But when all these three are conceived to be *nitya* and therefore *apauruṣeya* the validity of the *s'abda* or the *Veda* remains unchallenged. For *s'abda* in itself is always *pramāṇa.* In *laukika-vyavahāra* it sometimes becomes *apramāṇa* owing to its being employed by an *apramāṇa puruṣa.* But in the case of the *Veda* there is no *puruṣa-sambandha and hence there is no possibility of its being open to aprāmāṇya in any way.*[15]

15 अपौरुषेयः शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः। तस्य अग्निहोत्रादिलक्षणस्य ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षादिभिरनवगम्यमानस्य। तथा च चोदनालक्षणः सम्यक्सम्प्रत्यय इति। पौरुषेये हि शब्दे यः प्रत्ययस्तस्य मिथ्याभाव आशङ्क्येत। परप्रत्ययो हि तदा स्यात्। अथ शब्दे ब्रुवति कथं मिथ्येति। न हि तदानीमन्यतः पुरुषादवगतिमिच्छामः। etc. [वृत्ति., p. 41 f.]; also read: नन्वतथाभूतमप्यर्थं ब्रूयात् चोदना———न तु वेदवचनस्य मिथ्यात्वे किञ्चन प्रमाणमस्ति। [SB on. I.1.2, pp. 13-17].

CHAPTER VI

HOW TO DETERMINE THE S'ABDARTHA ?

1. Though it is now established that *Ākṛti* is the real import of a word and not *Vyakti*, yet the question remains as to what particular *Ākṛti* is denoted by a particular word? And this question is very important so far as *vyavahāra* is concerned. We shall therefore, try to lay down the means and criteria which, according to JAIMINI and S'ABARA, help us to determine the *s'abdārtha.*

2. The simplest way of determining the *s'abdārtha* is given by S'ABARA *in an ariomatic sentence* YAH PRATIYATE SA S'ABDARTH' and the rule appears to be so universal in its application that one really can't imagine that any objection may be levelled against it. But take, for example, the word *pūrva* in the sentence *'Pūrvo dhāvati'*. Here do we not get the idea of *apara* also from the word *pūrva*? But can it be rightly said that *apara* is also the sense of the *word pūrva.* But here it must be remembered that though the idea of *apara* is somehow conveyed by the word *pūrva,* it is not intended to be conveyed.[1] Nor does it serve any immediate useful purpose. Hence the above-mentiond rule regarding *s'abdārtha* may be modified and it may be said that 'Whatever sense is conveyed and is also intended to be conveyed is the real significance of a word'. This rule has been stated by JAIMINI in very simple terms when he writes, 'TADAGAME HI TAD DṚS'YATE' etc. and has been very well explained by S'ABARA in the following words; 'YASYA CĀGAME YAD UPAJĀYATE SA TASYARTHA ITI GAMYATE'. This may be styled the rule of ANVAYAVYATIREKA.[2]

---

1 अशब्दार्थोऽपि हि प्रतीयते । यथा पूर्वो धावतीति । स पूर्व इत्युच्यते यस्यापरोऽस्ति । तेन पूर्व इत्युक्तेऽपरो गम्यते । न त्वपरो धावतीति श्रवणात्प्रतीयते । – – – । यथैव हि पूर्व इत्युक्तेऽपरो गम्यत एव केवलं, न तु स विधीयते कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे एवमिहापि संख्या प्रतीयत एवं केवलं etc. [SB. on IV. 1. 14, p. 1204]

2 शब्दवस्तूपलभ्यते तदागमे हि तद् दृश्यते तस्य ज्ञानं यथान्येषाम् । [SB. on IV. 1. 15]; यस्य चागमे यदुपजायते, स तस्यार्थ इति गम्यते । तस्य ज्ञानं, यथान्येषां

3. The next source of *artha-jñāna* is the ABHIKUYTAS or *the* S'ĀSTRASTHAS. JAIMINI clearly lays down that the S'ĀSTRASTHAS are to be looked upon as the sole authority on the question of *s'abdārtha*;[3] and S'ABARA paraphrases him in the words: 'YAḤ S'ĀSTRASTHĀNĀM SA S'ABDĀRTHAḤ'. Numerous[4] are the places where S'ABARA refers to this source of *s'abdārtha-jñāna* and instead of the word *s'āstrastha* he uses the simpler terms *abhiyukta* or *s'iṣṭas*? But who are these *s'āstrasthas* or the *abhiyuktas* or the *s'iṣṭas*? And why are they *pramāṇa*? S'ABARA answers these questions by pointing out that their tradition and acquaintance with the *Vedas* and the *s āstras* is unbroken; and hence they are to be looked upon as an authority in matters regarding words and their significations.[5]

4. Another source or rather a class of sources is *nigama, nirukta*, and *vyākaraṇa*. In the *Vedas* we get, for example, words like *jarbharī* and *turpharītū*. They apparently convey no sense, so that the first of the above-mentioned rules does not apply in their case. And the words may prove to be unintelligible—nay, they have proved so—to the *abhiyuktas* or the *s'iṣṭas* themselves. With reference to such word S'ABARA lays down that their *artha shall be determined with the help of nigama, nirukta* and *vyākaraṇa*.[6] Thus it will be seen

शब्दानाम् । अश्वमानयेत्युक्तेऽश्वानयनं प्रतीयते । गामनयेति गवानयनम् । तत्राश्वोऽपैति, गौश्चोपजायते । तेन ज्ञायते, अश्वशब्दस्याश्वोऽर्थो गोशब्दस्य गौरितिच ।
[MS. I. 3. 9].

3 शास्त्रस्था वा तन्निमित्तत्वात् । [SB. on VIII. 2. 24, p. 1610];

4 शब्दार्थाधिगमे चाभियुक्तोपदेशः प्रमाणम् [SB. on I. 3. 10, p. 226]; अभियुक्ताः शब्दार्थेषु शिष्टाः [SB. on I. 10, p. 226]; यः शास्त्रस्थानां स शब्दार्थः। [SB. on I. 3. 9, p. 217]; also cf. SB. on MS. I. 3, 27.

5 के शास्त्रस्थाः [See page 25, n. 8 above]; अर्थिनो ह्यभियुक्ताः etc. [See page 25 n. 7 above]; आर्यावर्तनिवासिनां शब्दार्थोपायेष्वभियुक्तानां [etc. See page 25, n. 8 above].

6 विद्यमानोऽप्यर्थः प्रमादालस्यादिभिर्नोपलभ्यते । निगमनिरुक्तव्याकरणवशेन धातुतोऽर्थः कल्पयितव्यः । यथा ऋण्येव जर्भरी तुर्फरीतू इत्येवमादीनि अश्विनोर-

that this source is to be tackled only in the absence of the two sources noticed above and also of the one to be noticed next.[7]

5. The three main sources of *artha-jñāna* noticed up to now help us to determine the artha of words belonging to the language of the *Āryas* only. But how shall we determine the senses of words which do not belong to the language of the *Āryas*, but which we may come across sometimes even in Scriptural texts? This question has been answered by JAIMINI and S'ABARA by laying down that in the case of such borrowed words we must accept their original sense which they are generally used to convey in the language from which they are borrowed. Take, for example, the words *pika, nema, sata,* and *tāmarasa.* No attempt shall be made to determine the sense of these words with the help of *nigama, nirukta* and *vyākaraṇa.* On the other hand we must accept them as conveying the senses of *kokila, ardha, dārumaya pātra* and *padma* which they are used to convey in the original language from which they are borrowed. Thus in the case of borrowed words the rule in 'CODITAM TU PRATĪYETA, AVIRODHĀT PRAMĀṆENA'. But if there are any words whose sense is not understood by the *Mlecchas* also then and then only we may have recourse to *s'iṣṭas* or to *nigama, nirukta.* and *vyākaraṇa.*[8]

भिधानानि द्विवचनान्तानि लक्ष्यन्ते । ......अवयवप्रसिद्धा च लौकिकेनार्थेन विशेष्यन्ते । जर्भरी भर्तारौ, तुर्फरीतू हन्ताराविति । एवं सर्वत्र [SB. on सतः परमविज्ञानम् । MS. I. 2. 41, p. 156]; also cf. SB. on MS. I. 3. 10.

7 यत्तु निगमनिरुक्त व्याकरणानामर्थवत्तेति । तत्रैषामर्थवत्ता भविष्यति न यत्र म्लेच्छैरप्यवगतः शब्दार्थः । अपि च निगमादिभिरर्थे कल्प्यमानेऽव्यवस्थितःशब्दार्थो भवेत् । तत्रानिश्चयः स्यात् [SB. on I. 3. 10; p. 227 f.]

8 चोदितं तु प्रतीयेताविरोधात् प्रमाणेन । [MS. I. 3. 10]; चोदितमशिष्टैरपि शिष्टानवगतं प्रतीयेत । यत् प्रमाणेनाविरुद्धं तदवगम्यमानं न न्याय्यं त्यक्तुम् । यत्तु शिष्टाचारः प्रमाणमिति, तत्प्रत्यक्षानवगतेऽर्थे । यत्त्वभियुक्ताः शब्दार्थेषु शिष्टा इति । तत्रोच्यते । अभियुक्ततराः पक्षिणां पोषणे बन्धने च म्लेच्छाः । यत्तु निगमनिरुक्त etc. See. n. 7 above. [SB. on I. 3, 10, p. 225 ff.]

6. But there might be cases where one and the same word might show different usages among different peoples. Thus there are the words *rājan* and *rājya*.[9] According to one view the former is a *jāti-s'abda* or an *autpattika s'abda* and from it is derived the latter which primarily denotes '*rājnaḥ karma*' and is by usage restricted to *janapada-paripālana.* According to others, however, the latter is the *jāti-s'abda* signifying *janapada-paripālana* and from it we get the word *rājan* which primarily denotes *tasya kartā* and is only by usage applied to *kṣatriya-jāti.* Now which of these views is to be accepted as the right one? S'ABARA declares that the former is the right view of the matter, with the remark that a usage which is less wide is not to be accepted when it conflicts with another wider one, for the simple reason that the wider usage is accepted by even those who have the narrower one.[10] Another criterion that he puts forth in this matter is that what conflicts, of course, with the *s'āstras* is certainly less acceptable than what, though actually not supported by *s'āstra,* at least does not conflict with it. And as the inhabitants of the *Āryāvarta* are constantly in touch with *s'abdārthopāyas,* their view is unquestionably more acceptable than that of the *antyajanapadavāsi mlecchas.*[11] Here it must, how-

---

9 यदि तावज्जातिशब्दो राजेति ततस्य कर्मेतिज्जनपदपरिपालने राज्यशब्दो भविष्यति । तेनार्यावर्तनिवासिनां प्रयोगो न विरोत्स्यते । अथ यदि राज्यशब्दः परिपालने नित्यसंबद्धो भविष्यति ततस्तस्य कर्तेति राजशब्दः क्षत्रियजातौ तन्निमित्तो भविष्यति । तत्रान्ध्राणां प्रयोगो न विरोत्स्यते । तस्मान्न प्रयोगदर्शनादुभावपि राजराज्यशब्दौ जातिपरिपालनाभ्यां नित्यसंबद्धावित्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । को नु खलु निर्णयः । राजजातीयस्य कर्म इत्यतः परिपालनं राज्यशब्देनोच्यते । एवं हि स्मरन्तोऽभियुक्तास्तस्य कर्मेति ष्यञ्प्रत्ययं विदधति । न तु तस्य कर्मेति प्रत्ययलोपं प्रातिपदिकप्रत्यापत्तिं वा समामनन्ति । तस्माद्राज्ञः कर्म राज्यम् । न राज्यस्य कर्ता राजा । [SB. on II. 3. 3, p. 584].

10 ननु जनपदपुरपरिरक्षणवृत्तिमनुपजीवत्यपि क्षत्रिये राजशब्दमान्ध्राः प्रयुञ्जते प्रयोक्तारः । न ब्रूमो न प्रयुञ्जत इति ।......। असार्वलौकिकस्य प्रयोगस्य सार्वलौकिकेन प्रयोगेण विरुध्यमानस्याप्रामाण्यं स्यात् । अभ्युपगच्छन्ति हि ते जनपदिनः सार्वभौमं प्रयोगम । [SB. on II. 3. 3, p. 580].

ever, be noted that whenever there is a conflict between an *anumāna* and *pratyakṣa prayoga* (actual usage) or between *prayoga* and *smṛti*, the latter is to be regarded as stronger in each case. Thus, to take up the words *rājan* and *rājya* again; According to one view *rājya* is *rājñaḥ karma* which means that the word *rājya* is a *yaugika s'abda* derived from the word *rājan* which is the original word. According to the other view on the other hand *rājan* is *rājyasya kartā* which means that *rājan* is a *yaugika ṣ'abda* derived from the word *rājya* which is to be taken as the original word. But here we find that the former view is directly supported by the *sūtra 'Tasya karma'*, while the latter has no such *sūtra* to lend any direct support to it. There the supporting *sūtra* will first of all have to be framed on the strength of usage and then with that *sūtra* the view will have to be justified. This naturally shows the weakness of the latter view, the weak point being that whereas the former is supported by *smṛti* the latter is not so supported.[12] This rule is clearly laid down by S'ABARA when he writes 'PRAYOGĀCCH SMṚTIR BALĪYASĪ, or 'PRAYOGO DURBALAḤ SMṚTEḤ.

---

11 अपि चाविप्रगीता लौकिका अर्था विप्रगीतेभ्यः प्रत्ययिततरा भवन्ति। तथार्यावर्तनिवासिनां शब्दार्थोपायेष्वभियुक्तानामभिव्याहरतां कर्माणि चानुतिष्ठतामन्त्यजनपदवासिभ्यो म्लेच्छेभ्यः समीचीनतर आचारो भवति। [SB. on II. 3. 3, p. 581].

12 यत्तूक्तमनुमानाद्राज्यस्य कर्ता यः स राजा यथौदमेघेः पितोदमेघ इति। उच्यते। अनुमानाद्योगो बलवान्। राज्यस्य कर्तारं राजेत्यनुमिमीमहे। क्षत्रिये तु प्रत्यक्षं प्रयुञ्जानमुपलभामहे। तथा योगमप्यनुमिमीमहे राज्यस्य कर्ता राजेति। राज्ञः कर्म राज्यमिति तु स्मरन्ति। अनुमिमानाश्च स्मृतिमनुमिमते स्म। स्मरन्तस्तु प्रत्यक्षमुपलभन्ते। तेन तत्र स्मृतिर्बलीयसीति। आह। यो यो राज्यं करोति तत्र राजशब्दं प्रयुञ्जते। न यद् राज्ञः कर्म तद्राज्यमिति। तेन मन्यामहे राज्ययोगो राजशब्दप्रवृत्तौ निमित्तम्। न तु राजयोगो राज्यशब्दप्रवृत्ताविति। न ब्रूमो प्रयोगाद्यं राजयोगं राज्यशब्दप्रवृत्तौ निमित्तमवगच्छाम। इति। कथं तर्हि। स्मरणात्। प्रयोगाच्च स्मृतिर्बलीयसी। प्रयोगाद्धि स्मृतिरनुमीयेत।......यत्तूक्तम् आन्ध्रा अपि राज्ययोगाद्राजानमभ्युपगच्छन्तीति। परिहृतमेतत् प्रयोगो दुर्बलः स्मृतेरिति। [SB. on II. 3, 3, pp. 585-587].

7. One more rule we have to remember in this connection. In a short simple sentence S'ABARA has stated this rule as follows:—'LAUKIKAḤ PRAYOGḤ S'ĀBDARTHAPARICCHEDE HETUḤ'. It must be remembered that the words in a *vidhi-s'āstra* like the *Vedas* or the words of law should be understood exactly as we understand them in the ordinary language. This rule S'ABARA has iterated in many places and has emphatically stated it at the very outse also, of course, in conneciton with the method of interpretation of the *Sūtras* of JAIMINI. He clearly warns the reader that the words of the *sūtras* must be understood to convey the senses which they are known to convey in ordinary parlance. And what he says of the *sūtras is* also true of the *Vedas*. As has been already pointed out above we must remember that ANUMANA *is weaker than Prayoga and prayoga is weaker than smṛti and also that an asārvalaukika or a vipragīta prayoga is weaker than a sārvalaukika or an avipragīta prayoga.*

8. The main aximos, therefore, on the strength of which to determine the *artha* of the *autpattikas'abda* may be now stated as follows:—

1. *'Yasyāgame yad upajāyate sa s'abdārthaḥ*/

2. *'Yaḥ s'āstrasthānām sa s ābdārthaḥ* or *'S'abdārthādhigame cābhiyuktopadesah pramanam'*/

3. *'Nigamaniruktavyākaraṇavas'ena dhātuto'rthaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ'*/

4. *'Coditam as'iṣṭair api s'iṣṭānavagatam pratīyeta'*/

5. *'Asārvalaukika-prayogasya sārvalaukikena prayogeṇa virudhyamānsya aprāmāṇyam syāt'*

6. *'Avipragītā laukikā arthā vipragītebhyaḥ pratyayitatarā bhavanti'*/

7. *'Anumānāt prayogo balavān'*/

8. *'Prayogo durbalaḥ smṛteḥ'*/

9. *'Laukikaḥ prayogaḥ s'abdārthaparicchede hetuḥ'*/

CHAPTER VII

THE PRAVṚTTINIMITTA OF S'ABDA

1. Now we look at *S'abda* and its *artha* from a still different point of view. Take, for example, the word *putra*. By itself the word shall denote the *ākṛti* or class; but at the same time we perceive that the word can come into existence only if the particular person to be referred to by the word is related to some other person as his son. This, in other words, means that *sambandha* is the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of the word *putra;* or that the word *putra* is a *sambandhi s'abda.* Take another word, say *yūpa.* This word also does denote the *ākṛti* to which it belongs; but at the same time we know that its existence depends on the particular *saṁskāras* which have to be performed over a pillar before it can be termed *yūpa.* The word *yūpa* may, therefore, be termed a *saṁskāra s'abda.* Similarly the word *rājya* depends for its existence on the connection of the *karman* with *rājan* which shows that *rājya* is a *yaugika* word. In the last two cases it may easily be seen that *saṁskāra* and *yoga* constitute the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of the words *yūpa* and *rājya respectively.* We have now to see the various *pravṛtti-nimittas* which according to S'ABARA and JAIMINI are responsible for the currency of the various words in a language.

2. But before actually taking up the question of the *pravṛtti-nimittas* we must try to find out a way to determine what a *pravṛtti-nimitta* is. And this we find very vididly done by S'ABARA when he says: 'YE NAIMITTIKĀH S'ABDĀH TE NIMITTAM UPALABHYA PRAYUJYANTE YATHA DAṆḌĪ CHATRĪ ITI'. Thus the rule is that of the several factors that can be thought of as lying at the root of the usage of a word only that can be said to be so in the real sense of the term, in the absence of which the term can't be used at all. The word *yūpa,* for example, will not be used at all if the particular *saṁskāras* are not performed over the pillar. *Saṁskāra,* therefore, as has been already remarked above is the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of the word *yūpa* or the word *yūpa* is a *saṁskāra s'abda.*

3. Now while coming to the actual consideration of the *pravṛtti-nimittas* of words it is needless to remark that *jāti* or *ākṛti* is itself the chief one of them, since when there is nothing in particular to be conveyed by a word it conveys *jāti* or *ākṛti*. In such cases, therefore, Ā must be looked upon as the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of that word. Such words are called JATINIMITTĀH SABDĀH OR JATISABDĀH. With reference to these *jātis'abdāḥ*, however, we have to bear in mind one important rule, viz. 'Words which are found to denote *jāti* in one place must be accepted as such in all places'. The word *barhiḥ*, for example, in ordinary parlance is used as a *jāti-s'abda* without any reference to any *saṁskāra* at all. In Vedic texts it appears to denote consecrated grass. Are we then to take the word *barhiḥ*, in the Vedas as a *jātis'abda* or as a *saṁskāras'abda*? This question is to be answered by observing the above-mentioned rule, and hence the conclusion is that the word *barhiḥ* is to be understood as a *jātis'abda* and not as a *saṁskāra s'abda*. Thus it may be stated that whenever *jāti* is found to be the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of a *s'abda*, as a rule in the language, the *s'abda* must be accepted as a *jāti s'abda*, though in some special cases the word might appear to denote something else, *saṁskara*, for *example*.[1] To assume that such words are primarily *saṁskāra s'abdas* and only, owing to similarity, they are secondarily used as the *jāti s'abdas*, would be incorrect as it would involve an *itaretarās'rya;* for the *injunction* of the *saṁskāra* presupposes the existence of the *jāti s'abda* and this latter that of the *saṁskāra s'abda*. But here the *Loka prayoga* is the determinant cause of the nature of the *s'abda*.

4. The next *pravṛtti-nimitta* is now YOGA or connection, and the words having this *nimitta* are called YAUGIKA S'ABDAS. The word *prokṣaṇī* for example, is found used with reference to *saṁskṛta* as well as *asaṁskṛta* articles; and one may, therefore, feel inclined to call it a *jāti s'abda* on the strength of the rule given above. But it must be noted that this word

1 For the whole discussion read MS. I. 4. 10, and SB. thereon.

is neither a *jāti s'abda* nor a *saṁskāra s'abda.* For what is *prokṣaṇī*? We find that the word *prokṣaṇī* is formed by combining *upasarga, dhātu* and *pratyaya* together. Now the *jātinimittatā* of this *samudāya* has to be inferred from usage; while we shall be following the well-known currency (*prasiddhi*) if we take the root-meaning in conjunction with *upasarga* and *pratyaya* and take it to mean *āpaḥ*. And *prasiddhi* which is *pratykṣa* is certainly stronger than *anumānd*. Hence this word is *yaugika.*[2] What is meant by the term yaugika is also incidentally pointed out by S'ABARA when he writes *'Rājas'abdaḥ prasiddher mūlam/Tadyogād rājyas'abdaḥ'.*[3] Thus it is clear that when a word comes into usage not directly for its own *artha* but owing to some connection (*yoga* or *saṁyoga*) with some other word already in usage, such a word is called *yoga-siddha* or *yaugika.* This rule is suggested by JAIMINI also in the *sūtra, 'Prokṣaṇīṣu arthasaṁyogāt'.* The word *nirmanthya* is another example of a word belonging to this class.

5. SAMSKARA (*or karma*) is another *pravṛtti-nimitta* which is responsible for the currency of words like *yūpa.* With reference to this, however, we have to bear in mind the rule already noted above. If a word is somtimes found to be used as a *jātis'abda* it must be always looked upon as being a *jātis'abda,* though in some cases it might appear to be used with reference to consecrated articles or as a *saṁskāra s'abda.* We may, by way of example, take the word *barhiḥ.* Now here it may be interesting to note how S'ABARA jústifies

---

. 2 प्रोक्षणीशब्दं प्रति संदेहः किं संस्कारनिमित्तः, उत जातिनिमित्तः, उत नैमित्तिक इति । तत्र संस्कारेषु सत्सु दर्शनात्संस्कारशब्दतायामवगम्यमानायामसंस्कृते शब्दलाभाज्जातिशब्दः । असंस्कृतास्वेवाप्सु प्रोक्षणीभिरुद्वंजिताः स्म इति कस्मिंश्चिद्देशे भवन्ति वक्तारः । तेन जातिशब्द इति प्राप्ते यौगिक इत्युच्यते । कुतः । अर्थसंयोगात् । प्रोक्षण्य इत्युपसर्गधातुप्रत्ययसमुदायस्य जातिमिनित्तता प्रयोगादनुमीयते । सेचनसंयोगात्तु उपसर्गधातुकरणप्रत्ययसहितोऽप्सु प्रवर्तत इति प्रसिद्धिरनुगृहीता भविष्यति । यदान्यदपि सेचनं प्रोक्षणशब्देनोच्यते तदा तत्संयोगादेवाप्सु भविष्यतीति न समुदायार्थः कल्पयितुं शक्यते । तस्माद्यौगिकः । [SB. on प्रोक्षणीष्वर्थसंयोगात् । MS. I. 4. 11, p. 344].

the rule on logical grounds. If words like *barhiḥ* are accepted as SAṀSKĀRANIMITTAŚABDA setting aside their *laukika* usage we shall be accepting their *alaukikatva.* But how can we determine the signification of such *alaukika* words? Surely it is impossible to determine their signification from the scriptures only without taking into consideration the connection which they have with the preceding and the succeeding words. For the *artha-kalpanā* of such words is actuated by the idea of saving the *pūrvottarapadas* from being rendered nugatory. But it is not possible to assume what is not perceived or conveyed, which in other words only means that we have to accept the *laukika* sense that is conveyed by these words. Again we find that the preceding and the succeeding words gain their significance by this *laukika artha.* This shows that *laukika* usage has to be accepted or in other words that words like *barhiḥ* are to be accepted as *jātis abdāḥ* and not *saṁskāra s'abdāḥ.*[4] This rule regarding the *balābala* of *saṁskāra and jāti as pravṛtti-nimittas is suggested* by JAIMINI in the *sūtra, 'Barhirājyayorasaṁskāre s'abdalābhād atacchabdaḥ.* (I. 4. 10).

6. A fourth *pravṛtti-nimitta* is to be found in SAMBANDHA which must be distinguished from *ygoa. Rājya* as we have seen above is a *yaugika* word and has the word *rājan* as its *prasiddhimūla.* Here it can be seen that the word *rājya* depends for its *prasiddhi* on the word *rājan.* But the same can't be said of the word *rājan* which is independent. Thus it may be said that a *yaugika* word is dependent upon some *jātis'abda* which by its very nature is independent. Now take the word *putra.* We see that the word *putra* depends for its *prasiddhi* on the *sambandha* of the person with another person, his father. Thus the word *putra* can be used with reference to a person only if he is connected with another person as his son. And this very phenomenon we may observe in the case of the word *pitṛ.* Thus we find that between the words *rājan* and *rājya.* the former is a *jātis'abda* and serves as the foundation for

---

3. SB. on MS. II. 3. 3.
4. SB. on MS. I. 4. 10.

the currency (*prasiddhimūla*) of the latter; but between the words *putra* and *pitṛ* neither can be said to be the *prasiddhimūla* of the other. They, so to say, are mutually dependent and are, therefore, SAMBANDHIS'ABDAS. This characteristic feature of the *sambandhis'abdas* is very clearly stated by S'ABARA when he writes: 'SAMBANDHIS'ABDĀS'CA SARVE *sāpekṣā vina padāntareṇa na paripūrnam artham abhivadanti'*.[5] The word *devatā* is another instance of this class of words; for '*Yā yadarthaṁ codyate sā tasyaiva devatā nānyasya*'. Here we must note another important bearing that this view has in the *Mīmāṁsās'āstra.* Ordinarily when a particular ingredient or accessory material required for a sacrificial act is not available, it is laid down in the *Mīmāṁsās'āstra* that the deficiency may be made up by taking the *pratinidhi* of that required material.[6] This device of taking a substitute is possible in some cases, but not in all. Thus if the *pas'u,* for example, is lost he can be substituted by another animal that may be taken as *pas'u*. *But* the same

---

5. For the same idea expressed in different words read: बहुत्वं चापेक्षिकम्। किंचिदपेक्ष्य ततोऽधिकं बहु इत्युच्यते। असत्यामपेक्षायामपरिपूर्णमेतत्। यथा पुत्र इति किंचिदपेक्ष्य भवति, नान्यथा। तत्र प्रकृतं संनिहितं चापेक्ष्य निर्णयः। सहस्त्रं च संनिहितम्। तस्मात्ततोऽधिकमपरिमितमिति। [SB. on अधिकं वा स्यात् बह्वर्थत्वादितरेषां संनिधानात् MS. VI. 7. 24, p. 1500].

Here we may note another rule, that is suggested by Jaimini and explained by S'abara, regarding the interpretation of a संबन्धिशब्द, particularly when there is a doubt regarding the exact sense conveyed by it. The word अपरिमित is, according to the पूर्वपक्षिन्, ambiguous; and no definite limtj can be put to the signification of this word. But the सिद्धान्त view is that such सापेक्ष शब्द convey no sense by themselves. They have to be interpreted with reference to some other word or words which are प्रकृत and संनिहित. Applying this rule अपरिमित is taken to mean अधिक than सहस्त्र which latter is प्रकृत and संनिहित. [cf. MS. VI. 7.23 f.[.

6. This forms the subject of the नित्यकर्मणः प्रारब्धकर्मणश्च श्रुतद्रव्यापचारे प्रतिनिधिना समापनाधिकरणम। [MS. VI. 3. 13-17].

can't be said of a *devatā, for* whoever is taken as the *pratinidhi* can never be the *devatā* with reference to that act. *Putra,* for example, is a term that can apply to a particular person only when we are speaking with reference to a particular man who is his father. There it is impossible to use the word *putra* with reference to any other person so long as the other related person is the same. Similarly so long as we are thinking of a particular act, only a particular being shall be called its *devatā;* and it is impossible that the word may apply to any other being. This stated in technical terms means that *devatā* can have no *pratinidhi.*[7] *Bahu, pūrva* and others may be cited as other examples of *sambandhi s'abdas.*

7. RŪDHI, according to the *Mīmāṁsaka,* is another important *pravṛttinimitta.* The word *kus'ala,* for example, if taken literally means 'one who cuts *kus'a grass',* and by indication may denote all the numerous qualities that such a person is required to possess. But usage has restricted the sense of this word to such an extent that it now signifies nothing more than *nipuṇatā.* This in the process is surely an instance of *lakṣaṇā* and is cited as such by rhotoricians like MAMMAṬA. *S'abara,* however, does not admit of *lakṣaṇā* in such cases. According to him *nipuṇatā* is now the *vācyārtha* of the word *kus'ala;* and this *vācyārtha* has so to say grown upon the word *kus'ala.* Here then the *pravṛttinimitta* behind such words as *kus'ala* and *pravīṇa* is *rūḍhi. Aparimita* is another *rūḍhis'abda* which by usage means *bahu.* With reference to such words a question may be raised. *Aparimita* taken literally means 'not measured or limited'. This is the *vācyārtha;* but the *rūḍhārtha* of this word viz. *bahu* is obtained by *lakṣaṇā* only, which in other words

---

7 देवतायां च तदर्थत्वात्। [MS. VI. 3. 19]; देवता नाम यदर्थं किंचिच्चोद्यते सा। अन्या तस्याः स्थाने प्रतिनिधीयमाना न देवता स्यात्। चोदिता हि देवता भवति। नाचोदिता। संबन्धिशब्दश्चैषः। या यदर्थं चोद्यते सा तस्यैव देवता, नान्यस्य। देवतेति संबन्धिशब्दो न जातिशब्दः। तस्मादपि न देवतायाः प्रतिनिधिरिति। [SB. p. 1419]

means that *bahu* is the *lakṣyārtha* of the word *aparimita*. But as a general rule the *vācyārtha* is stronger than the *lakṣyārtha;* so that we have to accept the *vācyārtha* rather than the *lakṣyārtha*. How is it then that in words like *kus'ala* we set aside the general rule and accept the *lakṣyārtha* setting aside even the *vācyārtha*? In this connection S'ABARA does admit that in such words we do apparently have cases of *lakṣaṇā*. But he argues that here usage is so strong that directly on hearing the word we find that it as it were grows upon us and gives rise to the perception of the *rūḍhārtha*. Hence in such cases *lakṣaṇā* (properly to be called *rūḍhi*) is evidently stronger than the *abhidhā*. Nay, it is to be considered as *abhidhā* itself. Such a phenomenon generally occurs in cases where a word is a composite word so that it yields one signification when taken as a *samudāya* (whole), but another when taken as being composed of several parts. Thus in such cases the sense yielded by the constituent parts of such words is the *vācyārtha,* while the sense given by the words as a whole is the *lakṣyārtha* or the *rūḍhārtha;* and in such cases the rule to remember is that the former is always weaker than the latter. This rule may be stated in the words of S'ABARA by saying that 'AVAYAVAPRASIDDHEḤ SAMUDĀYAPRASIDDHIR BALĪYASĪ'. Another fine illustration of this class of words is *As'vakarṇa.*[8]

---

8 अपरिमिते शिष्टस्य संख्याप्रतिषेधस्तच्छ्रुतित्वात् । कल्पान्तरे वा तुल्यवत्प्रसंख्यानात् । [MS. VI. 7. 21-22]; अपरिमिते श्रूयमाणे ब्रूमः । शिष्टस्यैकादेः संख्येयस्य या संख्या सा प्रतिषिध्यते । कुतः । तच्छ्रुतित्वात् । परिमितशब्दश्रवणाद्गुणितमवगम्यते । तच्चैकोदिकम् । तस्य न शब्देन प्रतिषेधः क्रियते । तत्त श्रुतोऽर्थः कृतो भवति । इतरथा ऽपरिमितशब्दे प्रसिद्धिस्त्यज्येत । लक्षणया बहुत्वमस्यार्थः कल्प्येत । तस्मात् परिमितस्य प्रतिषेध इति । कल्पान्तरं वा स्याद्, अपरो दानकल्पो विधीयते । यथैका देयेति दानविधिकल्पः, एवमेषोऽपि दानविधिकल्पः स्यात् । तेन हि पूर्वेण तुल्यमेनेदं प्रसंख्यायते । काऽस्य पूर्वेण तुल्यता । प्रतिज्ञातस्यार्थस्यावगमिका श्रुतिरस्तीति । पूर्वत्र हि देयशब्दश्रुत्या दानं विधीयत इति । इहापि देयशब्दश्रुतिः । सा श्रूयमाणा शक्नोति दानं निधातुम् । प्रतिषेधे हि विधीयमाने वाक्यस्य व्यापारः । तच्च दुर्बलं श्रुतिं प्रति । तस्मात्कल्पान्तरम् ।

8. All these *pravṛttinimittas*, it may be noted, have reference to the *vācyārtha* of the words and not to their *lakṣyārtha*. Thus words are called *jātis'abdāḥ, saṁskāras'abdāḥ* and so on presumably because they ultimately stand for *jāti* or *saṁskāra* &c. Quite different, however, is the sphere of *lakṣaṇā* which has its foundation in the inapplicability of the literal sense, and which also has different *pravṛttinimittas* (if they can be so termed) which we shall deal with in a subsequent chapter.

यच्चापरिमितशब्दे प्रसिद्धिर्बाध्यत इति, समुदायप्रसिद्धिरवयवप्रसिद्धेर्बाधिकैव समधिगता। ननु नात्र प्रसिद्धिः। लक्षणेयम्। यद् बहु तन्न शक्यं परिमातुम्। तस्मादपरिमितत्वेन लक्ष्यते बहुत्वमिति। तच्च नानेकस्मिन्नशक्यपरिमाणे सति बहुषु रूढः। अपरिमितमस्य धनम्, बहु इत्युच्यते।

यथा कुशलः प्रवीण इति बहुषु कुशानां लातुर्गुणेषु सत्सु निपुणतायामेव कुशलशब्दो रोहाद्रूढिशब्द एव भवति। बहुषु च वीणावादनस्य गुणेषु सत्सु निपुण एव प्रवीणशब्दो वर्तमानो रूढ इत्युच्यते। तस्मात् सत्यपि लक्षणात्वे श्रुतिसामर्थ्याद्रोहति शब्दः। तस्मात्समुदायप्रसिध्याऽपरिमितशब्दे वयवप्रसिद्धिर्बाध्यते। अश्वकर्णशब्दवत्। अतः कल्पान्तरमिति। [SB. on VI. 7. 21-22, pp. 1499—1500].

CHAPTER VIII

THE BARHIRNYĀYA

1. AT MS. III. ii. 1-2 JAIMINI and his commentator have discussed the *balābala* of the two varieties of senses known as *mukhya* and *gauṇa* respectively. But before actually taking up the topic for discussion, the commentator first discusses the question as to whether this division of *arthas* into two classes can reasonably be admitted. With this object in view he first takes up the definitions of the terms *mukhya* and *gauṇa* saying that the *mukhya* or the primary signification is that which is perceived from the word; and is so called because it is as it were the face of the word. On the other hand, that signification which is known from the primarily perceived signification on the strength of some connection is to be termed *jaghanya* since it is as it were the hinder part of the *s'abda*. This latter is also called *gauṇa* owing to its being connected with some *guṇa*. The definitions of *mukhya* and *gauṇa* as stated above are, however, not wholly free from defect. For it may be argued that all *arthas* are perceived from *s'abda* only so that there is no point in trying to distinguish between *arthas* and *arthas* and labelling them as *mukhya* and *gauṇa*. Take, for example, the sentences '*Agnir jvalati*' and '*Agnir māṇavakaḥ*'. Now just as in the former sentence the idea of fire is perceived from the word *agni* similarly it is from the word *agni* alone (and from no other source) that the idea of *Māṇavaka* (i.e. his *paiṅgalya* by which he resembles fire) in the latter; so that according to the definition of the *mukhyārtha* noted above both these senses will have to be counted as being *mukhya*, since both are conveyed by the *s'abda agni*.[2] But

---

1 कः पुनर्मुख्यः को वा गौण इति । उच्यते । यः शब्दादेवावगम्यते, स प्रथमोऽर्थो मुख्यः । मुखमिव भवतीति मुख्य इत्युच्यते । यस्तु खलु प्रतीतादर्थात्केनचित्संबन्धेन गम्यते, स पश्चाद्भावाज्जघनमिव भवतीति जघन्यः । गुणसंबन्धाच्च गौण इति ।

2 यद्येवं सर्व एव मुख्यः । सर्वो हि शब्दादवगम्यते । यथैव ह्यग्निर्ज्वलतीत्युक्ते ज्वलनसंप्रत्ययः, एवमेवाग्निर्माणवक इति शब्द एवोच्चारिते माणवके संप्रत्ययः ।

such a conclusion we can't admit; for we know that only one of these viz. the idea of fire is the *mukhya artha,* while the other is only *gauṇa.*

2. To remedy this defect the above definitions may be revised by saying that *mukhyārtha* is that sense which is perceived from the word independently of any attributive adjunct; while that which is perceived from a word accompanied and aided by a qualifying adjunct is *gauṇa.* But even this does not set matters all right. For a word can't be assumed to convey a sense which it has no power to convey irrespective of the fact of its being or not being accompanied by qualifying adjuncts. Thus if a word conveys a sense when accompanied by any adjunct, we shall have to admit the sense as being conveyed by the word only, and admit the adjunct as only the *sahakāri kāraṇa.* Thus the presence or absence of a qualifying adjunct can't give us ground enough to distinguish one *artha* from the other; for in either case the sense will be perceived from or conveyed by the *s'abda* only. It is the *s'abda* that is the *nimitta* of *artha-jñāna;* and as soon as the *nimitta* comes into being, whether it is accompanied by a qualifying adjunct or not, the *naimittika* viz. the perception of *artha* must come into being. This means that there can be no distinction between a *sopapada s'abda* and a *nirupapada s'abda;* which in the light of the definitions under discussion amounts to saying that there is no distinction between *mukhya* and *gauṇa artha* at all.[3] An attempt to distinguish between the two by pointing out that the idea of fire is obtained from *s'abda,* while the idea of *Māṇavaka* is obtained from the *samudāya* viz. of both the words *agniḥ* and *māṇavakaḥ* would be of no use for the simple reason that *agniḥ* and *māṇavakaḥ* can't be taken as a *samudāya* in the same sense in which

3 अथोच्येत यस्मिन्निरुपपदाच्छब्दात्संप्रत्ययः स मुख्यः, यस्मिन्सोपपदात्स गौण इति । नैतद्युक्तम् । यस्य हि शब्दस्य रूपं कस्यचिदर्थस्य निमित्तं, सोपपदस्यापि तदेव रूपं, निरुपपदस्यापि । न च शक्यं निमित्ते सति नैमित्तिकेन न भवितुम् । किमतो यद्येवम् । इदं शक्यते वदितुमुपपदादृते न सोऽर्थो भवति, उपपदे तु संजाते सोऽर्थः संजनिष्यत इति ।

the word *as'vakarṇa* is called by that name. We do clearly perceive the two words viz. *Agniḥ* and *Māṇavakaḥ* conveying their senses separately, and not conjointly as the words *as'va* and *karṇa* in the term *as'vakarṇa.* Nor can it be a *vākyārtha* and the analogy of the sentence *'nīlam utpalam'* as it can't render any help in this matter; for in a sentence like the above one, both the words viz. *nīlam* and *utpalam* convey the ideas of *nīlatva* and *utpalatva* which both are ultimately the attributes of one and the same individual. Such, however, is not the case with the words *agniḥ* and *māṇavakaḥ* which convey two attributes viz. *agnitva* and *māṇavakatva* which are quite distinct and separate from each other ordinarily abiding in two different individuals. Thus there seems to be no plausible ground on which to distinguish the *mukhyārtha* from the *gauṇārtha;* and the best course seems to be to admit that the *agni* expresses both fire as well as *Māṇavaka,* and that there is no distinction between *mukhya* and *gauṇa artha.*[4]

3. Here perhaps it may be argued that the distinction between the two *arthas* may be based on *prasiddhi,* so that the sense which is well known is the *mukhya artha.* and that which is little known is *gauṇa.* But this argument is only flimsy; for it may be pointed out that *prasiddhi* after all is nothing but *prajñāna,* or knowledge or wellknownness; and it is impossible to distinguish one *prajñāna* from another as wellknownness, whether it exists in few or more places is always the same. For *Prajñāna* is knowledge and whether it is extensive or restricted (*suṣṭhu or manāk*). it does not lose its characters of being knowledge. Nor will it also do to argue that *suṣṭhu prasiddhi* and *Manāk Prasiddhi* are used by us to signify frequency or otherwise of the use of the

---

4 न चासौ समुदायार्थः शक्यते विज्ञातुम् । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां हि विभागो बगम्यते । अथ वाक्यार्थोऽयमित्युच्यते । नैवं शक्यम् । न ह्यनन्वितः पदार्थो भवति वाक्यार्थः । तदेवं दृश्यताम् । अग्निशब्द एवायं ज्वलनवचनः । अग्निशब्द एव माणवकस्याभिधातेति । तस्मान्न मुख्यो गौण इति कश्चिद्विशेषः ।

5 अथोच्यते, यः सुष्ठ प्रसिद्धः स मुख्यः, यो मनागिव सा गौण इति । इदमपि नोपपद्यते । प्रसिद्धिर्नाम प्रज्ञानम् । न च प्रज्ञाने कश्चिद्विशेषोऽस्ति

expressions, so that *prayoga-bāhulya* it is that distinguishes the *mukhyārtha* from the *gauṇārtha* which is characterised by *prayogālaptva.* For even this explanation is not quite satisfactory, since the very fact that a *s'abda* conveys an *artha* is enough to show that it has a *sāmarthya* to convey it; and so long as the *sāmarthya* is there it matters little whether its *prayoga* is *suṣṭhu* or *manāk.* For this *alpatva* or *bahutva* of *prayoga* cannot make any difference between the senses from the point of view of the *sāmarthya* of the *s'abda* by which they are conveyed. For in any case the sense will be yielded by the *s'abda* and will as such have to be labelled as *mukhya* only.[6] Irresistible, therefore, appears to be the conclusion that *artha* is always *mukhya* (i.e. only of one type in so far as its relation with the *s'abda* is concerned); and that it is futile to try to divide *arthas* into two classes as *mukhya* and *gauṇa.*

4. This *prima facie* view can't be declared to be unsatisfactory. For we find that while the idea of fire is conveyed by the word *agni,* the idea of *Māṇavaka* is not conveyed by it. This is obvious from the general rule that one word can reasonably be said to convey one *artha* and one alone; and if the word *agni* is accepted as conveying the idea of fire it is but clear that it can't be accepted as conveying the idea of *Māṇavaka* also. Here perhaps one may ask as to why we should not accept the idea of *Māṇavaka* as being directly conveyed by the word *agni* rather than the idea of fire. The answer to this question is to be found in our own every day experience. For we do find people perceiving idea of fire from the word *agni* even without making any reference to the idea of *Māṇavaka;* but never do we find any one getting the idea of *Māṇavaka* from the word *Agni* without referring to the idea of fire. That this is so is shown by usage. Nor, the word *agni* is popularly used (if it is not used to signify fire) to refer only to a person or thing that

6 अथोच्येत, यस्यबहुशःप्रयोगोऽस्तिः समुख्यः, अल्पशः प्रयुज्यमानो गौण इति । नैतदेवम् । अल्पशोपि प्रयुज्यमानो नासन्ति सामर्थ्यं प्रत्याययेत् । अतः सोऽपि शब्दात्प्रतीयत इति मुख्य एव । [SB. p., 748]

is intended to be described as being similar to fire. This in other words means that the word *agni* is used with reference to such persons or things owing to their similarity with fire. *Agni-sādṛs′ya* is, therefore, the *pravṛtti-nimitta* of this word in such cases. But how can this *sādṛs′ya* be perceived if the thing itself viz. fire is not perceived? We have, therefore, to conclude that the idea of fire is first perceived from the word *agni* and then is perceived the idea of *sādṛs′ya*. This means that the word *agni* is primarily the means of perceiving the idea of fire and not that of *Māṇavaka*. Hence we conclude that the word *agni* primarily applies to fire and not to *Māṇavaka* to which it may apply only secondarily. Similarly the word *Barhiḥ* primarily applies to *tṛṇa* and not to the *tṛṇa-sadṛs′a* things.[7] It is, therefore, not sound or reasonable to say that there can be no distinction between *arthas* and *arthas*.

5. From the foregoing discussion it is now clear that all *arthas* are not alike. Some are *mukhya* while others are *jaghanya* or *gauṇa*. MUKHYA ARTHA is that which is primarily conveyed by a *s′abda;* while the *gauṇa artha* is that which, of course, is conveyed by the word but only through the *mukhyārtha*. Having seen thus the necessity of admitting this twofold division of *arthas* into *mukhya* and *gauṇa* we now proceed to discuss the next question as to which of these *arthas* should be understood as being regularly conveyed by the word. This question is very well discussed by JAIMINI and ŚABARA in an *adhikaraṇa* which is commonly known by the name BARHIR-NYĀYA, from the circumstance

7 अत्रोच्यते । अस्त्यत्र विशेषः । माणवको नाग्निशब्दात्प्रतीयते । कथमवगम्यते । उक्तम्, अन्याय्यश्चानेकार्थत्वमिति । कथं न विपर्ययः । उच्यते । अनादृत्यैव माणवकप्रत्ययं ज्वलनमग्निशब्दात्प्रतियन्तो दृश्यन्ते । न त्वनादृत्य ज्वलनप्रत्ययं माणवकमग्निशब्दात्प्रतियन्ति । कुत एतत् । यो योऽग्निसदृशो विवक्ष्यते, तत्र तत्राग्निशब्दो नियत इति । अत एवाग्निगतसादृश्यादयं तु दृश्यते । अतोऽग्निसादृश्यमस्य प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तम् । न च ज्वलनेऽप्रतीते तत्सादृश्यं प्रतीयते । तस्माज्ज्वलनस्याग्निशब्दो निमित्तम्, न माणवकस्य । तस्माज्ज्वलने मुख्यो न माणवके । एवमेव तृणस्यास्य बर्हिःशब्दो निमित्तं, न तृणसदृशप्रत्ययस्य । [SB., p-748f.].

that the word they have chosen there for consideration is *Barhiḥ* occurring in the *mantra* '*Barhir devasadanaṁ dāmi*'. The question as stated by them is connected with the *mantra* portion of the *Veda*. It has been stated and proved elsewhere that the main purpose of the *mantra* portion of the *Veda* is to bring to mind the enjoined act at the time of the performance. This, of course, it must do only by yielding its *artha*. But as there are two types of *arthas* which can be perceived from words, the question naturally arises as to which of these *arthas* is to be understood as being conveyed by the words of the *mantras*. Are we to take only the *mukhya*, or only the *gauṇa*, or both as being conveyed by them?

6. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* argues that since it is possible to perceive both the *arthas* from the *mantras* there is nothing wrong in concluding that both the *arthas* should be accepted as being conveyed by them; and all the more so because there is nothing to prevent us from doing so. There is no factor which would restrict our perception to only this or that particular *artha* to the exclusion of the other.[8]

7. The *Siddhāntin*, however, demurs and points out that it is not possible to hold that the words of the *mantras* would convey both the *arthas* simultaneously inspite of the assertion of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* to that effect. Since the *mantras* occur in some context, therefore it is but natural that it forms a syntactical unit with the main sentence i.e. the *vidhi vākya* which lays down a particular act, so that ultimately the idea to be derived from the *mantra* comes to be that one should accomplish by the *mantra* whatever one is capable of accomplishing thereby. But for want of any other possibility we have to admit that the mantras help in

---

8 तदेवं द्वैते सति मुख्यपरता शब्दस्य, उत गौणपरतापीति युक्तो विचारः ! किं तावत्प्राप्तम् । मुख्ये गौणे च विनियोगः । कुतः । उभयस्य शक्यत्वादुभयमपि बर्हिःशब्देन शक्यते प्रत्याययितुं तृणं च तृणसदृशं च । तृणं साक्षात्, तृणसदृशं तृणप्रत्ययेन । यच्च नाम दर्शपूर्णमासयोः साधनभूतेन बर्हिःशब्देन शक्यते प्रत्याययितुं तत्सर्वं प्रत्याययितव्यम् । विनिगमनायां हेत्वभावात् । [SB., p. 749].

the performance of an act by bringing to mind its several details which they can do only because they are endowed with an ever-ready power of expressing an *artha.* But because, owing to the context, and *ekavākyatā* with the *Vidhi vākya* it must convey the *Mukhya artha* and because it cannot convey both simultaneously, it is evident that the *mantras* are to be employed in their primary and not their secondary signification.[9]

8. But, it may be argued, that even the *gauṇa artha* is conveyed by the *mantra,* of course, after first conveying the *mukhyārtha;* and hence there would be nothing wrong if a *mantra* is accepted as also conveying its *gauṇa artha* (and is employed in that sense too) which is also connected with it. But when the purpose of the *mantra* is served by conveying its *mukhyārtha,* where is the necessity of going further and perceiving the *gauṇārtha*? *The arthābhidhāna* is for the purpose of avoiding the *mantras* being rendered nugatory; and as this purpose of *ānarthakyaparihāra* is served by conveying the primary signification, there remains no purpose or motive for the secondary before the *Mukhyārtha* and since after the conveyance of the latter there is no motive for the former being conveyed, we must conclude that *Mukhyārtha* alone is conveyed by a *Mantra* and not the *Gauṇārtha* also.[10]

9. Again there are many different means by which the *gauṇārtha* can be conveyed; and if *mantra* is invaribly

---

9 एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः। मुख्य एव विनियोक्तव्यो मन्त्रो न गौण इति। कुतः। उभयस्याशक्यत्वात। प्रकरणे हि समाम्नानात्प्रधाने नैकवाक्यतामुपैति। तत्रैतदापतति, यच्छक्नुयादनेन मन्त्रेण साधयितुं तथा साधयेदिति। स चासावर्थाभिधानसंयोगाच्छक्नोत्युपकर्तुं, न गौणमर्थं शक्नोत्यभिधातुम्। तस्मान्न गौणे विनियोगः। [SB., p. 749f.].

10 ननु मुख्यप्रत्ययाच्छक्यते गौणः प्रत्याययितुम्। सत्यमेतत्। मुख्यप्रत्यायनेनैवास्य प्रयोजनवत्ता निर्वृत्तेति न गौणं प्रति विनियोगे किंचित्प्रमाणमस्ति। मुख्यविनियोगेन ह्यानर्थक्यं परिह्रियते। परिहृत आनर्थक्ये न गौणाभिधानमापतति। न ह्यनभिधाय मुख्यं गौणमभिवदति शब्दः। अतः प्रमाणाभावान्न गौणे विनियुज्येत। [SB., p. 750.]

accepted as one of these it naturally means that the other ways of conveying it have to be dismissed. But where is the ground or *pramāṇa* for doing so? *Mantrāmnāna* could certainly not have the power to exclude the other means of conveying the *gauṇārtha* for fear of a *parisaṁkhyā*, which has no motive. But it may be asked, on what ground or *pramāṇa* do you take the *mantra* as the means of conveying the *mukhyārtha*? Our reply to this question would be that we do so to save the *mantras* from being rendered *anarthaka*. For if the *mantra* is not used even in its *mukhyārtha*, then it would not be able to help the main sacrificial act in any way and would consequently be rendered totally useless. Hence we have to conclude that the mantras are to be employed in their primary significations only.[11]

10. Again, it may be asked, why does the *Mantra* convey its *Mukhyārtha* at all, if its *Gauṇārtha* alone is ultimately to be employed? If it is said that the *Mukhyārtha* has to be conveyed since the *Gauṇārtha* cannot be otherwise understood, we reply, there do exist other means of getting the *Gauṇārtha* such as *Arthāpatti* etc. and *Mukhyārtha* of the *Mantra* is not the only means for it. Again, if it is argued that *Mukhyārtha* is to be accepted as *one* of the several *alternative* remedies for getting the *Gauṇārtha*, we reply that in this case, *Mantrāmnāna* does not become compulsory, for, it is the conveying of the *Gauṇārtha* with which we are concerned and not necessarily with the *Mantra*, so that *Mantra* may be easily neglected. This, however, is against practice. On the other hand, if once the *Mantra* is admitted as necessary for conveying the *Gauṇārtha* by acce-

---

11 अपि च। गौणस्य प्रत्यायने सामर्थ्याद् बहवोऽभ्युपायाः प्राप्नुवन्ति। सामर्थ्यं च शब्दैकदेश इत्युक्तम्। अर्थाद्वा कल्पनैकदेशत्वादिति। तत्र मन्त्रे नियोगतो गौणं प्रति विनियुज्यमान उपायान्तरं विना प्रमाणेन बाध्येत। मन्त्राम्नानं प्रमाणमिति चेत्। न तस्योपायान्तरनिवृत्तौ सामर्थ्यमस्ति। ननु मुख्येऽपि विनियुज्यमानस्यैष एव दोषः। नेत्युच्यते। यदि मुख्येऽपि न विनियुज्येत नैव प्रधानस्योपकुर्यात्। तत्र तस्योत्पत्तिरनर्थिकैव स्यात्। तस्मादस्ति गौणे मुख्ये च विशेषः। [SB., p. 750.].

pting a *Niyama*, then there remains no purpose for the *Mantra* to convey the *Gauṇārtha*, after it has once conveyed its *Mukhyārtha*, its purpose, namely *ānarthakyaparihāra* being served by the *Mukhyārtha* itself as said above.[12]

11. The general conclusion or the principle to be deduced from the whole discussion, therefore, is that *of the senses viz. mukhya and gauṇa it is only the mukhya which is to be accepted as being conveyed by the Mantra and it alone has to be connected with the enjoined act*,[13] which when applied to similar case means that words, as far as possible, must be understood as conveying their *mukhyārtha* alone, which, as will be noticed later on, supplies us with one of the prerequisites of *lakṣaṇā* to be discussed in the next Chapter.

---

12 अपि च यो गौणे मन्त्रं विनियुङ्क्ते स वक्तव्यः। किमर्थं मुख्यं प्रत्यायसीति। स चेद् ब्रूयाद्, नान्यथा गौणप्रत्ययोऽस्तीति। प्रतिब्रूयादेनमन्येऽपि गौणप्रत्ययस्याभ्युपायाः सन्तीति। अथ स एवमभियुक्तः प्रतिब्रूयात् मुख्यप्रत्ययोऽपि पाक्षिकोऽभ्युपाय इति। ब्रूयादेनं, न तर्हि नियोगतो गौणे विनियोजनीयः। यदा गौणप्रत्ययाय मुख्यमुपादत्ते, तदैतदापतितं भवति मुख्य एव विनियोग इति। अर्थेन च प्रतीतेन प्रयोजनं, न प्रत्यायकेन मन्त्रेण। अतोऽन्येनाप्युपायेन गौणः प्रत्याययितव्यः। न स एव मन्त्र आदर्तव्यः। अथापि मन्त्रेण प्रत्यायकेन प्रयोजनं स्यात्तथापि मुख्यप्रत्यायनेनैव निर्वृत्तं प्रयोजनमिति नतरां गौणे विनियुज्येत। [SB., p. 750f.].

13 तस्मान्मुख्यगौणयोर्मुख्ये कार्यसम्प्रत्यय इति सिद्धम्। [SB., p. 751].

CHAPTER IX

ABHIDHĀ AND LAKṢAṆĀ

1. We have seen in the last chapter how and why we have to use the *mantra* in its *mukhyārtha* rather than *gauṇārtha* or *lakṣyārtha.* We have also seen in one of the preceding chapters how we can determine the signification of a word. Now we shall proceed to consider what the rhetoricians describe as the powers of words. Here at the outset we may note that according to the *mīmāṁsaka* there are only two *s'abda-vṛttis* or *s'aktis* viz. ABHIDHĀ and LAKṢAṆĀ. In fact the *mīmāṁsaka* means *abhidhā* only when he uses the term *s'abda-s'akti;* but there are cases where even he finds that the sense that a word yields by *abhidhā* is useless and has as such to be set aside. And then he adopts what he calls the GAUṆĪ VṚTTI or BHAKTI which is the same as *lakṣaṇā.*

2. Now as regards the *mukhyārtha* we have already noted the various means of determining it: and it has also been noted that as a rule, it is not right to assume one word as having more senses than one. This principle is generally accepted by the *mīmāṁsaka* who holds that where words appear to have two or more significations only one is their *mukhyārtha* while the others are conveyed only through *sādṛs'ya* or other relations by *lakṣaṇā.* Thus the word *barhiḥ* primarily means *grass' in general* and is applied to the sanctified grass only secondarily through *sādṛs'ya.* Another instance we get in the word *parvan* which is found used in the sense of *kāla* as well as of the *samudāya* (i.e. of the two sacrifices called *Dars'a* & *Paurṇamāsa*). But the right view of the matter, based on context and derivation, is that the word primarily denotes the *samudāya* and is only secondarily used in the sense of *kāla* owing to the *samudāya-sambandha.*[1] Similar is the case with the word *caru* which

---

1 नायमुभयत्र पर्वशब्दो वर्तते । यदि कालवचनस्तत्सम्बन्धात्समुदाये गम्यते । यदि वा समुदायवचनस्तत्संबन्धात्काले । अन्यतरवचनो नोभयवचनः । तत्र समुदायवचने कल्प्यमाने प्रकरणमनुगृहीतं भवति । अपि च पृणातेः पर्वशब्दः । पृणाति श्च

on the strength of *smṛti* texts is declared to denote primarily the *odana* and the *sthālī* only secondarily.[2] But the word *mātā* presents a different case altogether. It means 'mother' and also 'one who measures (corn)'. And both these are the *vācyārthas* of the word *mātā*.[3] In such cases it is the context that helps us to determine the exact signification of the words in a particular passage.[4] As a matter of fact though such a word appears to be one, it is not one but two. For we find that the word *mātā* meaning the mother is not the same as the word *mātā* meaning one who measures corn.

3. But when we use a word or hear it used what does our first perception refer to? Do we perceive the form of the word or the sense conveyed by it? This question crops up while the sense of the text '*Rathantaram uttarayor gāyati*' is being discussed. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* suggests that the *mukhyārtha* of a word is the form only and not the sense that it conveys. And it is only because the form is found to be unfit for the action that is spoken of in the text that we set it aside and take up the *artha*. Hence, he argues, as long as we can do by taking to the form only it is needless for us to go further and take the word as conveying any *artha* at all. Thus in the text under consideration we stick to *s'abda* i.e. its form alone and take the text to mean 'He applies the word *Rathantara* to *Kavatīs*'. This view, however, is summarily dismissed as being the worse, for *s'abdā-*

दाने प्रसिद्धः । दानानि च समदाया: । तस्मात्समुदायाभीज्या । एवं शब्दावयवप्रसिद्धिरनुगृहीता भवति । [SB., on IX. 2. 53, p. 1739.].

2. cf. X. 1. 34-43, and SB. thereon.

3 अनेकस्याप्येकः शब्दो भवति वाचकः । तद्यथा मातेति मातरमपि वदति मातारमपि । माता च परमं दैवतं समा च पुत्रेष्वित्येतैरुपबद्धमानो जननीवचनोऽवगम्यते । माता समःक्षिप्रश्चेत्येभिरनुबध्यमानो धान्यस्य मातुर्वाचकः । [SB. on X. 1-14, p. 1810.]

4 छागोपकरणमस्योपदंशितम् । यदुपदंशने पशुशब्दश्छागाभिप्राय इति गम्यते । यथा युगवस्त्र उपदंशित ईषाचक्रादिसंनिधाने चेदक्षमानयेत्युच्यते तदा यानाक्षमधिकृत्य ब्रूत इति गम्यते, न तु विदेवनाक्षमिति । [SB. on VI. 8. 35, p. 1519.].

rtha-sambandha being autpattika it is inadmissible to apply any word to any thing which it has no power to denote.[5] *

---

*But it must be remembered that this principle holds good only if the actionexpressed by the text under consideration is menat to refer to the signification of the word that is used in connection with it. If, however, the action has reference to *s'abda* i.e. the form only, then the word will have to be understood to stand for its from alone and not for its *artha*. Thus, for example, if *agni* is enjoined as the *devatā* of a particular *havih* it won't do if we use any synonym of the word *agni* to mention the deity. For *devatā* is something which is stated and enjoined by *s'abda* only so that it is the *s'abda* or its form that is primarily conveyed in this case, and not the *artha*[6]. Here one may be reminded of a *sūtra* of *Pānini* wherein he lays down that in grammar a word stands for its form only and not forits *artha* except when it is a *samjñā*.[7] The reason for framing such a rule is obvious. For grammar, we know, is a *s'bda-s'āstra*; and gives us rules for making the correct forms of words. The rules, therefore, have reference to the form of the words rather than to the senses that are conveyed by them. It is, therefore, but proper that words in grammar stand for the form not for the *artha*.

---

5 शब्द उच्चरिते तत्र तावन्मुख्या प्रतिपत्तिः । शब्दे कार्यस्यासम्भवादर्थे कार्यं विज्ञायते । यथा गामानयेति । इह तु शब्द एव कार्यं सम्भवति, नार्थे । अतोऽत्र शब्दं विज्ञास्यामः । पूर्वस्मादेष वादः पापीयान् । कस्मात् । औत्पत्तिकत्वात् । औत्पत्तिको हि नामिनाम्नोः संबन्धः । यो हि शब्दो यस्मिन्नर्थे औत्पत्तिकेन संबन्धेन प्रसिद्धो न ततोऽन्यं प्रत्याययितुं शक्नोति । न हि गोशब्देनाश्वोऽभिधातुं शक्यते । [SB. on शब्दमात्रमिति चेन्नौत्पत्तिकत्वात् । [MS. VII. 2. 4-5, p. 1542f.].

6 यत्र ह्यर्थे कार्यमासाद्यते तत्र शब्दोऽर्थप्रत्यायनार्थो भवति यत्रार्थेन प्रयोजनम् । यत्र पुनः शब्द एव कार्यं तत्र कार्यसंबन्धार्थः शब्द एव प्रत्यापयितव्यः । देवतायाश्च यज्ञसाधनभावो न रूपेण भवति । केन तर्हि । संबन्धिना शब्देन ।...... तस्मान्न शब्दः अर्थप्रत्यायनार्थमुच्चरितः स चार्थः पुनः शब्दं प्रत्याययेदिति । लक्षितलक्षणा हि तथा स्यात् । किं तर्हि । शब्द एव हविषा संबध्यते । तत्सम्बन्धादर्थोऽपि देवता भविष्यति । यस्य हि शब्दो हविषा तादर्थ्येन संबध्यते सा देवता । शब्दे कार्यस्यासंभवादर्थे कार्यं विज्ञायते । इह तु शब्दे एव कार्यं सम्भवति । तस्मान्नार्थप्रत्यायनार्थः शब्द इति । तदुक्तं वृत्तिकारेण, न वा शब्दपूर्वको ह्यर्थसंप्रत्ययस्तस्मादर्थनिष्पत्तिरिति । [SB., on X. 4 23, p. 1928.].

7 स्वं रूपं शब्दस्याशब्दसंज्ञा [अष्टाध्यायी I. 1. 68.].

4. It is thus evident that words are meant to convey primarily their significations and not their forms only. We have also observed that words primarily denote the *jāti* and that the *vyakti* is conveyed only by implication when it is found that the action spoken of in a sentence can't refer to *jāti* at all.[8] But sometimes we come across certain words which seem to convey two *arthas*. Such, for example, are the words *as'vakarṇa, kus'ala* or *pravīṇa*. The word *as'va-karṇa* seems to be made up of two words viz. *as'va* and *karṇa* and thus seems to mean *'horse's ear'*. Similarly the word *kus'ala* would seem to signify *'one who plucks the kus'a grass'*; while the word *pravīṇa* would mean *'one who skilfully plays on the lute'*. But we find that these words convey quite different significations in actual usage. Thus the word *as'va-karṇa* is used to signify the tree called *sāla*, while the other two words are used in the sense of 'clever' only, without any reference whatsoever to the act of plucking the *kus'a* grass or that of playing on the lute. In such cases the question naturally arises as to which of these two significations are we to accept as being primarily denoted by these words. Between the two sets of meaning noticed above we find one main point of distinction. One set of meanings is given us by *etymology* while the other is based upon and backed up by usage. Hence it is that these *arthas* are generally called the *yaugikārtha* and the *rūḍhārtha* respectively. Now which of these is to be taken as the primary denotation? One may be tempted to argue that the *yaugikārtha* is the *artha* that is obtained directly from the constituent elements of the respective words, and must, therefore, be accepted as being the primary signification of these words. The *rūḍhārtha*, on the other hand, sets aside totally the senses conveyed by the constituent elements and must, as such, be considered as being *gauṇa*. This, however, is far from being the right view of the matter. We have already noticed above that usage or *prasiddhi* is one of the

8 यत्तु सत्त्ववदिति । अत्र गवाकृतौ धर्मः श्रूयते । आकृतेः पदार्थत्वात् । नच तत्र संभवति । अतोऽसावाकृतिः सहचारिपिण्डलक्षणार्था विज्ञायते । [SB., on VII. 1. 4, p. 1530]*

most important means of knowing the significations of words. Now in the case of words like *as'va-karṇa* we find that they by this very *prasiddhi* convey what we have termed the *rūḍhārtha,* which, therefore, must be accepted as being the *mukhyārtha* conveyed by them. But, it may be argued, that the *yaugikārtha* also is conveyed and backed up by *prasiddhi* and that there is no reason why it may not be accepted as being the *mukhyārtha* of the words from which we perceive them. Such an argument is true to a certain extent, for the *yaugikārtha* also is backed up by *prasiddhi* as much as the *rūḍhārtha.* But there is one main point of distinction between the two. For while the former is backed by *avayava-prasidhi* the latter is backed up by *samudāya-prasiddhi.* To get at the *yaugikārtha* is a lengthier process; for therein we have first of all to think of the several parts and their denotation and then by bringing together the *avayavārthas* finally to coin the *artha* of the whole. But before this can be done the *samudāya-prasiddhi* finishes the whole business and yields the *rūḍhārtha,* thus leaving no ground for the *yaugikārtha* to occupy. It will thus be observed that the *samūdāya-prasiddhi* works more quickly than the *avayava-prasiddhi,* and is, as such, to be preferred. This leads us to conclude that the *rūḍhārtha is to be preferred to the yaugikārtha.*[9] This rule has been expressly stated by S'ABARA in more places than one and in different words. This very rule again is laid down by JAIMINI while discussing the signification of the word *rathakāra* in the *adhikaraṇa* where he has discussed the text '*Varṣāsu rathakāra ādadhīta*'. Here though the *pūrva-pakṣin* is in favour of adopting the *yaugikārtha* of the term *rathakāra,* JAIMINI points out that it is wrong to do so, and ultimately concludes that the term *rathakāra* in the text under consideration must be taken to signify 'A person of the mixed caste called the *rathakāra*'. This rule is, therefore, very often referred to as the *rathakāra-nyāya.*[10]

---

9. See paras 2 and 3 of n. 8 on page 21 above.
10. cf. MS. VI. I. 44-50.

5. In addition to the several points regarding the *vācyārtha* that have been noticed up to now we have to note one more important point in the same connection. *Ānarthakya,* as we know, is the last thing that is admissible in the case a Scriptural text. But will it do if an attempt is made to avoid this *ānarthakya* by giving any *artha* to any *s'abda*? The answer to such a question is a definite no. We have already seen that the relation between *s'abda* and its *artha* is *autpattika* so that it is impossible to attach any sense to any word save the one with which it is naturally connected. Thus *ānarthakya-prasaṅga* can't be ground strong enough to father any signification upon any *s'abda* even when it has no power to convey it. This point is stated by S'ABARA while discussing the signification of the expression *'caturthe caturthe' hani'* in the text *'Cathurthe caturthé hany ahīnasya gṛhyate'*. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* holds that we must take the expression to mean 'every fourth day'; for it is thus only that the repetition of the word *caturthe* would be properly interpreted. Otherwise the repetition would be redundant. But the *Siddhāntin* argues that it is not wise to try to save the *vīpsā* from *ānarthakya* by assuming an *artha* which the words have no power to convey. For *ahīna* has only one day which can be called the *caturtham ahaḥ* in the real sense of the term. Hence by 'every fourth day' we shall have to understand 'the fourth, the eighth and such other days'. But that is not the sense that is conveyed by the words *'caturthe caturthe' hani.'*[11] For the word *caturtha* can never mean the eighth or the twelfth and so on. Thus we must remember that just as it is incumbent on the interpreter of the Scriptural texts that he renders no part of the texts *anarthaka, similarly* it is equally incumbent on him to see that no word is made to yield any sense which it has no power to convey. [12] Violation of this rule results in the *doṣa* called *abhidhāna-vipratipatti* which has been explained by S'ABARA as incongruity between the words uttered and the sense intended to be conveyed. Thus, for example, there

11. cf. MS. X 5. 55-56, and SB. thereon.

12 नानर्थक्यमापततीति अशब्दार्थः कल्पनीयः। [SB., on X. 5. 56, p. 1967.].

would be *abhidhāna-vipratipatti* if a word in the plural is used to express one thing; for the *artha* of the *bahu-vacana* is *bahutva* and not *ekatva* which is intended to be conveyed. Thus when the sense actually conveyed by a word does not agree or tally with the sense intended to be expressed there springs up this *abhidhāna-vipratipatti*.[13] It would thus be clear that words must be so construed as to convey only their natural signification and not any signification that the interpreter may find it necessary to assign to them. This very rule gives us the corollary that has been stated by S'ABARA when he declares that a *sāmānya-vācī s'abda* can't denote *vis'eṣas*, at least not by *abhidhā*.[14]

6. Now before we pass on to consider *lakṣaṇā*, let us see how JAIMINI and S'ABARA interpret the text '*Saptadas'aratnir vai vājapeyasya yūpo bhavati*'. Here the *Pūrva-pakṣin* is in favour of resorting to *lakṣaṇā* on the word *yūpa* and taking it to signify the *ṣoḍas'i-pātra*. For, he argues, that *Vājapeya* has no *yūpa* at all. But the *Siddhāntin* points out that even if the *Vājapeya* has no *yūpa* in it directly, yet it may be said to have *yūpa* as its *aṅga* from the fact that it is an *aṅga* of *pas'u-yāga* which itself is an *aṅga* of *Vājapeya*. Thus just as a man can be said to be related with his grand-son because he is related to his son who is related with his son, similarly the *Vājapeya-yāga* can be said to be related to the *yūpa* because it is related to the *Pas'u-yāga* which in its turn is related to the *yūpa*. The genitive ending applied to the *Vājapeya* in the text under discussion signifies only the *sambandha* of the *Vājapeya* with the *yūpa;* and since this *sambandha* can be easily understood without resorting, to *lakṣaṇā* as shown above it would be certainly wrong to set aside the

13 केयमभिधानविप्रतिपत्तिर्नाम । यदन्यथाभिधानमन्यथाभिधेयम् [SB. on X. I. 3. 14.].

14 न हि सामान्यवाची शब्दो विशेषानभिवदति । यदि चाभिवदेदयजाते गवि नावकल्पेत । पूर्वदर्शनाभावात् । सामान्ये च दृष्टपूर्वत्वादवकल्पते । तस्मान्न सामान्यं विशेषानभिवदति————। अभिवदन्वा न मुख्यया वृत्त्याऽभिवदेत् । कथं तर्हि । लक्षणया । लक्षणा च श्रुत्या बाध्यते [SB. on X. 8. 16, p. 2073.].

vācyārtha and resort to *lakṣaṇā*. For *lakṣaṇā* after all is a *doṣa* inasmuch as by resorting to it we set aside the direct and natural signification of a word or words and take up the indirect one. It is, therefore, only as the last resort that recourse can be had to *lakṣaṇā;* but not so long as it is possible to find out any way out of it.[15] (SAPTADAŚĀRATM̄ NAYĀYA).

7. But sometimes it happens that the literal sense of words obtained by the various means noticed above is found to be inapplicable in the context. This ultimately is found sometimes to lead to the *ānarthakya* of some word or words or even the whole text. Now in ordinary parlance such a state of things may be allowed. For we often find that in ordinary parlance there are many words or groups of words which are really *anarthaka*. *Laukika vākyas* are, in fact, soemtimes *anarthaka* also. But the same can't be said about the Vedic texts. Veda is never *apramāṇa*, as the *Mīmāṁsakas* would have it; and as such it is impossible to accept the *ānarthakya* of even a word, nay even a syllable, in a vedic text. JAIMINI and his BHĀṢYAKĀRA have time and again emphasized this fact both positively as well negatively laying down that ĀNARTHAKYA is ANYĀYYA and that ARTHAVATTVA *is* NYĀYYA. Hence it is that close adherence to the literal sense is not always advisable. In such cases the secondary or the figurative sense of a word or an expression has to be accepted. Thus, for instance, in the sentence '*Siṁham ālabheta*' it is not necessary to adopt the secondary sense of the word *siṁha,* for even with its direct signification it can very well fit in with the context and thus allow the sentence to make good sense. But in sentences like '*siṁho Devadattaḥ*' or '*Agnau tiṣṭhati*', or *Chatriṇo gacchanti*' we find that they make little sense if we

15 आनर्थक्यात्तदङ्गेषु । [MS. III. I. 18]; यश्च यस्योपकारिण उपकरोति भवति स तस्य सम्बद्धो मुख्येनैव संबन्धेन । न चैकान्तरितमिति कृत्वाऽसम्बद्धो भवति । यथा देवदत्तस्य नप्तेति पुत्रेण चासावन्तरितः । अथ देवदत्तेन मुख्येनैव संबन्धेन संबध्यते । तस्मादेष एव पक्ष आश्रयणीयः । न ह्येतस्मिन्पक्षे कश्चिदपि लक्षणाशब्दो भवतीति । [SB., on III. 1. 18, p. 728f.].

stick up to the *vācyārtha* of the words *siṁhaḥ, agnau* and *chatriṇaḥ* respectively. Hence we, in our attempt to avoid the *ānarthakya-doṣa,* try to find some other sense which will suit the context and at the same time can be, of course indirectly, conveyed by these words. Thus it is clear that LAKṢAṆĀ *is resorted to only as a means to avoid* ĀNARTKYA-DOṢA; *and that it can be resorted to only if the literal sense is found to be unsuitable in the context; and that too only as the last resort.*[16]

8. The first and the foremost principle to be borne in mind in this connection is that *between the two powers of a word viz.* S'RUTI (*or* ABHIDHA) *and* LAKSANA, *the former being more conventional or direct is certainly stronger and hence preferable.* This principle has been repeatedly stressed by S'ABARA in his commentary in different places in slightly varying expressions.[17] Thus though *lakṣaṇā* has no scope against *S'ruti* or *abhidhā* it does not mean that it has no scope at all. All

16 cf. यदाञ्जस्येन शब्दार्थो नावकल्पते तदा लक्षणयापि कल्प्यमानः साधुर्भवति । यथा अग्नौ तिष्ठति, अवटे तिष्ठति अग्निसमीपे तिष्ठत्यवटसमीपे तिष्ठतीति भवति संव्यवहारः । लक्षणापि हि लौकिक्येव [SB., p. 488]; श्रुत्यसम्भवे लक्षणयापि व्यवहारो भवति । यथाग्नौ तिष्ठत्यवटे तिष्ठतीति । [SB., p. 1485]; श्रुत्यसम्भवे लक्षणापि न्याय्यैव । [SB., p. 1280]; असति श्रुत्यर्थे लक्षणार्थो ग्राह्यः । [SB., p. 1551]; मुख्याभावे गौणो गृह्यते [SB., p. 1437]; संभवति श्रुत्यर्थे लक्षणार्थोऽग्राह्यः । [SB., p. 1560]; भवति लक्षणयापि शब्दार्थः [SB., p. 1230]; अगतिश्चैषा यल्लक्षणापरिग्रहः । [SB., p. 1545]; त्रित्वं हि चतुष्ट्वादीनि साहचर्याच्छक्नोति लक्षयितुम् । लक्षणा त्वाश्रिता भवति । किं क्रियताम् ? अगत्याश्रीयते । सत्यां गतौ नाश्रयितव्या । [SB., p. 2021.].

* व्रीहीन्प्रोक्षतीति व्रीहिजातिर्निर्दिश्यते । व्रीहिद्रव्यलक्षणार्था वा अपूर्वसाधनविशेषलक्षणार्था वा । [SB. on IX. 1. 13, p. 1660].

17 श्रुतिश्च लक्षणाया ज्यायसी । [SB., p. 131]; श्रुतिलक्षणाविशये श्रुतिर्ज्यायसी । [SB., p. 324]; श्रुतिलक्षणाविशये च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या न लक्षणा । [SB., pp. 565, 1244, 1262.]. श्रुतिलक्षणाविशये च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या । [SB., p. 1210, 1222]; श्रुतिश्च लक्षणाया गरीयसी । [SB., p. 1260]; श्रुतिश्च लक्षणाया बलीयसी । [SB., p. 1279]; श्रुतिलक्षणयोश्च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या । [SB., p. 1556]; श्रुतिश्च लक्षणातो न्याय्या । [SB., p. 2243].

cases of *s'ruty-asambhava* are sure to lead us into the domain of *ānarthakya* unless we resort to *lakṣaṇā*. *Lakṣaṇā* or the power to indicate is, therefore, a great weapon against *ānarthakya* which is sure to arise in some cases out of the unsuitability of the *vācyārtha* to the context. S'RUTY-ASAMBHAVA or MUKHYĀBHĀVA *is, therefore, often laid down as the most important pre-requisite of* LAKṢAṆĀ.

9. But the inapplicability of the *vācyārtha* is not the only basis for *lakṣaṇa*. Take, for example, the text '*Vedam adhītya snāyāt*' which if literally interpreted would mean 'After studying the *Veda* one should take bath'. But if one takes bath immediately on the completion of his Vedic studies what visible purpose can be served by *snāna*? In fact we shall have to suppose that *snāna* serves only an unseen purpose. But as far as possible one must avoid assuming an *adṛṣṭa artha* where a seen purpose is possible. *It is for avoiding this adṛṣṭārthatā that in the text under consideration we resort to lakṣaṇā* and take it to mean 'As soon as one finishes his Vedic studies one should relinquish the vows of *asnāna* and others but remain with his guru and prosecute the *dharma-jijñsā*,[18] *Dṛṣṭe sati adṛṣṭa-kalpanā* is certainly a more serious drawback than *lakṣaṇā;* for whereas the former involves an assumption not warranted by our experience in any way, the latter is a matter of every day experience and has been sanctioned by usage.[19] *Avoidance of conflict or contradiction between the several words of the text itself or between several texts of the Scriptures affords yet another basis for resorting to lakṣaṇā, as is seen in the case of the teRt like 'Aditir dyaur*

---

18 न वा इदं स्नानमदृष्टार्थं विधीयते । किंतु लक्षणया अस्नानादिनियमस्य पर्यवसानं वेदाध्ययनसमकालमाहुः । वेदमधीत्य स्नायाद्गुरुकुलान्मा समावर्तिष्टेति, अदृष्टार्थतापरिहारायैव । [SB., on I. 1-1, p. 7].

19 लक्षणेति चेद्दूरं लक्षणा कल्पिता न यागाभिधानम् । लौकिकी हि लक्षणा, हठोऽप्रसिद्धकल्पना । [SB., p. 321]; लक्षणा ह्यदृष्टकल्पनाया ज्यायसी । प्रमाणाद्धि सा भवति and लक्षणा चादृष्टकल्पनाया ज्यायसी ।

aditir antarikṣam' or *'Tvam eva mātā tvam eva pitā'*.[20] *And* lastly it may be found necessary *to adopt* LAKṢAṆĀ *in view of the context*. Thus, for example, the word *sarva* in texts like 'Pūrṇāhutyā sarvān kāmān *avāpnoti*' has to be understood by *lakṣaṇā* to stand for only those *kāmas* that are intended at the time when the sacrifice is started.[21] We thus see that it becomes necessary to resort to *lakṣaṇā* under four different circumstances which make it impossible to avoid *lakṣaṇā*. We have to set aside the *vācyārtha* and take to *lakṣaṇā* if by sticking to *vācyārtha* we find that (1) *a text or any part thereof is rendered useless or meaningless*, *or* (2) *yields a sense which is incongruous with the sense conveyed by the other parts, or* (3) *is found to serve no visible purpose and hence requires us to assume some invisible purpose, or lastly* (4) *it if is so required by the preamble, if we may so translate the word* ĀDHIKĀRA.

10. Having thus seen the circumstances under which lakṣaṇā has to be resorted to in the case of a word or words we are now confronted with the questions as to (1) what sense or senses are conveyed by *lakṣaṇā* and (2) how. The latter of these namely the manner in which the *lakṣyārtha* is conveyed, has been fully answered and discussed by S'ABARA in more places than one. While commenting on MS. VIII.3.34 S'ABARA lays down that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to the context, the word can't yet abandon it for good. For if the *vācyārtha* is entirely abandoned how can the *lakṣyārtha* be conveyed at all?[22] Hence even this *lakṣyārtha* is bound to be *s'abadārtha*, for a word even by *lakṣaṇā* has no power to convey *as'abdārtha* i.e. some sense, with which it can't have any connection

---

20 गुणादविप्रतिषेधः स्यात् । [MS. I. 2. 39] and SB. thereon.

21 सर्वत्वमाधिकारिकम् । [MS. I. 2. 16]; सर्वकामाप्तिवचनं गौणम् । असर्वेषु सर्ववचनमधिकृतापेक्षम् । [SB., p. 129].

22 स्वार्थे वर्तमानः सादृश्यं गमयति । स्वार्थं जहत्कथं गमयेत् । [SB., on VIII. 3. 34.].

by any stretch of imagination.[23] And if a word is to have any connection with the *lakṣyārtha* it can have it only through its *vācyārtha.* Thus if the word does not convey the *vācyārtha* first there is no possibility of its going further and conveying the *lakṣyārtha.* All this in simple terms means that *the lakṣyārtha must be connected in one way or the other with the* MUKHYĀRTHA; *or to put it in one word as given by* MAMMAṬA *there must be* TAD-YOGA. This very principle has again been very well explained by S'ABARA under MS. I.4.23.[24]

11. Now we come to the question of the exact nature of the secondary sense that we arrive at with the help of *lakṣaṇā;* or in other words the *different kinds of* TADYOGA which makes the *lakṣaṇā* possible. In this connection it may be noted in general that a word figuratively may be found to convey (i) the sense of the possessive suffix (MATVARTHA LAKṢAṆĀ. (ii) the place (DESA-LAKṢAṆĀ), (iii) the *dharma or guṇa* (DHARMA-LAKṢAṆĀ *or* GUṆA-VĀDA), (iv) the time (KĀLA LAKṢAṆĀ), (v) the action (KARMA-LAKṢAṆĀ), (vi) the KĀRYA or the SĀDHYA (vii) the KARAṆA or the SĀDHANA, (viii) some SAJĀTĪYA. or (ix) the LIṄGIN. But which of these is conveyed in any particular example depends upon the will of the speaker, though some general indications regarding these can be given with some degree of certainty.

12. Thus '*Udbhidā yajeta*' is according to the *pūrvapakṣin* an illustration of the MATVARTHA-LAKṢAṆĀ. In other words the sentence can be put as '*Udbhidā yāgena svargam*

---

23 न च लक्षणया प्रयोगेऽशब्दार्थः परिच्छिद्यते । यत्कारणं स्वार्थे वर्तमानोऽर्थान्तरं लक्षयति । स्वार्थं जहन्नैव लक्षयेत् । [SB. on VIII. 3. 24, p. 1622.].

24 कथं नु स्वार्थाभिधानेन प्रत्ययव्यवस्थेति चेत् । अर्थसंबन्धात् । सिंह इति निर्ज्ञाते प्रसह्यकारिता तत्र प्रायेणेति प्रसह्यकारीति गम्यते । अर्थप्रत्ययसामर्थ्यात् । यो हि मन्यते प्रसह्यकारिणं प्रत्याययेयमिति स यदि सिंहशब्दमुच्चारयति सिध्यत्यस्याभिप्रेतम् । सिंहार्थः प्रतीतः संबन्धादितरमर्थं प्रत्याययति । एवं स्वार्थाभिधाने तद्गुणसंबन्धः प्रतीयते । [SB. on I. 4. 22, pp. 357-360.].

bhāvayet'. But how can this apposition between *udbhidā* and *yāgena* be explained? The *pūrva-pakṣin* does it by adopting the *matvartha-lakṣaṇā* and paraphrasing the word *udbhidā* as *udbhidvatā;* for he argues *lakṣaṇā* being *laukikī* is certainly to be preferred to *aprasiddha-kalpanā* which is involved in taking the word *udbhid* as the name of a sacrifice. The *Siddāntin,* however, points out that the word *udbhid* on the strength of etymology can signify the *yāga,* so that there is no question of the so-called *aprasiddha-kalpanā* being involved in such an interpretation; and the apposition can be easily explained by the *vācyārtha* (or rather the *yaugikārtha*) *only*. Hence concludes the *Siddhāntin* there is no scope for *lakṣaṇā* in the text in question.[25] Here, however, it may be noted that though the conclusion of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* is wrong, yet the principle voiced by him viz. that *lakṣaṇā* is to be preferred to *adṛṣṭa-kalpanā* is certainly very sound. With reference to this first kind of *lakṣaṇā* it may be stated as a general rule that it may mainly be used in explaining the appositional use of words in such cases where the *yaugikārtha* or the *vācyārtha* may not be competent to do so. Thus, for example, the text *'Somena yajeta'* is to be explained as *'Somavatā yāgena iṣṭam bhāvayet'* by resorting to *matvartha lakṣaṇā* since it is impossible to explain the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between *Somena* and *Yāgena in any other way.*

13. *Des'a-lakṣaṇā* is very well illustrated in the popular expressions like *'Agnau tiṣṭhati'* or *'Avaṭe tiṣṭhati'*. A

---

25 यागेन कुर्यादिति यजेतेत्यस्यार्थः। करणं हि यागः। उद्भिदाद्यपि हि तृतीयानिर्देशात् करणम्। तत्रोद्भिदा यागेनेति कर्मनामधेयत्वेन सामानाधिकरण्यासामञ्जस्यम्। द्रव्यवचनत्वे मत्वर्थलक्षणया सामानाधिकरण्यं स्यात्। .... । लक्षणेति चेद् वरं लक्षणा कल्पिता न यागाभिधानम्। लौकिकी हि लक्षणा, हठोऽप्रसिद्धकल्पनेति। ....अनुवादा ह्युद्भिदादयः। कुतः प्राप्तिरिति चेत्। ततोऽभिधीयते। उच्छब्दसामर्थ्याद्भिच्छब्दसामर्थ्याच्च उद्भिच्छब्दः क्रियावचनः। उद्भेदनं प्रकाशनं पशूनामनेन क्रियत इत्युद्भिद् यागः।.........एवं सर्वत्र। [SB., on I. 4. 2, p. 323ff.].

26 बाढं देशलक्षणा भविष्यति। कवतीषु रथन्तरं गायतीत्युच्यते। न च शक्यते कवतीषु रथन्तरं गातुम्। तत्र देशलक्षणा भवति कवतीदेश इति। [SB. on VII. 2.12, p. 1545]

Vedic example of this type of *lakṣaṇā* is found in the text *'Kavatīṣu rathantaram gāyati'* where the direct sense of the word *kavatīṣu* does not fit in with the context. Hence naturally we have to resort to *lakṣaṇā;* and it is proposed by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* that the word *kavatīṣu* should be understood to stand for *kavatī-des'e.* This, of course, is not accepted by the *Siddhāntin* who points out that *rathantara* is not a *saṁskāra s'abda* so that there is no difficulty even if we accept the literal sense of the word *kavatīṣu.* Hence for want of *mukhyārtha-bādha* there is no occasion for *lakṣaṇā* at all in the text under discussion.[27] What we have to note here is the particular type of *lakṣaṇā* that is proposed by the *Pūrva-pakṣin.* By way of curiosity it may also be pointed out here that S'ABARA has given us another example of this *lakṣaṇā* in the expression *'Gaṅgāyāṁ gāvaḥ'*[28] Which corresponds to *'Gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣaḥ'* which is generally given by the rhetoricians as an illustration of what they call the ŚUDDHĀ LAKṢAṆA LAKṢAṆĀ.

14. The text discussed in the last paragraph can also be interpreted by making the word *rathantara* yield a different sense by *lakṣaṇā.* Thus the *Pūrva-pakṣin,* proposing an alternative construction, suggests that the word *rathantara* in the text should be understood to signify *rathantara-dharmāḥ.*[29] This proposal of DHARMA LAKSAṆĀ is also rejected by the *Siddhāntin* who refuses to admit any *lakṣaṇā* at all in the text as shown above. Sentences[30] like *'Siṁho*

---

27 अगतिश्चैषा यल्लक्षणापरिग्रहः । किं तर्हि । कर्मशब्दः स्यात् । रथन्तरादिर्गानाख्यस्य संस्कारकर्मणो वाचकः । कुतः । उक्तो न्यायो गीतिषु समाख्येत्यत्र । तत्र गीतिविशिष्टायामृच्येष शब्दो दृष्टः । [SB. on VII. 2.13, p. 1545].

28 cf. SB. on VII. 1.4, 1530.

29 धर्मलक्षणा वा स्यात् । रथन्तरधर्मा वा कवतीषु रथन्तरशब्देनातिदिश्यन्ते । यथा रथन्तरे प्रस्तूयमाने पृथिवीं मनसा ध्यायेदित्येवमादयः । यथा आचार्ये प्रोषिते आचार्यानी भवतामाचार्य इति आचार्यशुश्रूषाचार्यान्यामतिदिश्यते ।[SB., p. 1545].

30 गुणाद्वाप्यभिधानं स्यात् etc. [MS III. 2. 4]; गुणसंयोगाद्गौणमिदमभिधानं भविष्यति । भवति हि गुणादप्यभिधानम् । यथा सिंहो देवदत्तः, अग्निर्माणवक इति । [SB: p. 755].

Devadattaḥ' and *'Agnir māṇavakaḥ'* are given as popular examples of this type of *lakṣaṇā*. In such sentences words like *siṁha* and *agni* have to be understood as signifying not lion and fire (which is their literal signification), but their qualities. This type of *lakṣaṇā* corresponds to the GAUṆĪ SĀROPĀ LAKṢAṆĀ of the rhetoricians usually illustrated, by the example *Gaur vāhīkaḥ'*. with this difference that according to rhetoricians the *Lakṣyārtha* is the *vyakti*, while according to *Mīmāṁsakas* it is the *dharmas*. This roughly agrees with the first of the three views about the taking effect of the *gauṇī lakṣaṇā*. The general condition paving the path for this type of *lakṣaṇā* is very well noticed by S'ABARA in the words: 'PARA-S'ABDAḤ PARATRA PRAYUKTAS SAN DHARMĀNATI-DIŚATI'[31] and 'S'RUTYARTHĀSAMBHAVĀC CALAKṢAṆAYĀ DHARMĀṆĀM GRĀHAKA UCYATE'[32] It would appear as if this *dharma-lakṣaṇā* is called *guṇa-vāda* by JAIMINI at MS. I.2.10.[33] Thus *'Stenam manaḥ* is given as an example of GUṆA VĀDA and S'ABARA explains the sentence in the words *'Yathā stenaḥ pracchannarūpa evam ca mana iti gauṇaḥ s'abdaḥ'*. But it may be noted that the term *guṇa-vāda* has been used by JAIMINI and S'ABARA in a sense much wider than *dharma-lakṣaṇā*. It means according to them *upacāra* or secondary application in general, as is evident from the fact that *anṛtavādinī vāk* is given as another example of *guṇa-vāda* where *lakṣaṇā* conveys not *dharma* or *guṇa*, but *bāhulya or prās'astya*.[34] Hence we find JAIMINI laying down RŪPA and PRĀYA as *two possible grounds for* GUṆA-VĀDA *among others*.[35]

---

31 cf. SB. on MS. VII. 4.8

32 cf S. on MS. VII. 3.17.

33 गुणवादस्तु । गौण एष वादो भवति यत्संबन्धिनि स्तोतव्ये संबन्ध्यन्तरं स्तूयते । [SB., p. 213]

34 गुणवादस्तु रूपात् । यथा स्तेनाः प्रच्छन्नरूपा एवं च मन इति गौणः शब्दः । प्रायाच्च अमृतवादिनी वागिति [SB. on I. 2.11, p. 127]

35 रूपायत् प्रायात् । [MS. I. 2.11].

15. Next in order comes what may be called KĀLA-LAKṢAṆĀ Very often time is indicated by referring to some particular incident usually taking place at that hour. Thus our popular expression *'goraja muhūrta'* is nothing but a simple example of this type of *lakṣaṇā.* For in cities like Bombay there is no possibility of dust being raised by the hoofs of cows returning to their pens; and yet we do use the term to signify the hour of the evening when the incident—wherever it happens at all—happens. This idea is very well expressed by S'ABARA by taking another example while commenting on MS. VI.4.42. A person invites a friend (say for dinner) saying *'s'aṅkha-velāyām āgantavyaṁ'*, though as a matter of fact no conch may be blown in the village where they are staying. Will it be right on the part of the friend not to go to the person at all arguing that as no conch is blown in that village there is no hour that can be designated as the *s'aṅkha-velā*? Certainly it can't be so. For in such cases what is intended to be expressed is not the actual blowing of the conch (or any other incident like that), but the hour at which it is known usually to take place.[36]

16. KARMA LAKṢAṆĀ presents a phenomenon which is just the opposite of the one that is involved in the *kāla-lakṣaṇā* explained in the last pragraph. The latter occurs when a word expressive of an incident or an act is used to indicate the hour; while the former requires that a word expressive of time primarily be used to indicate an act or an incident. Thus in the text *'Amāvāsyāyām piṇḍa-pitṛyajñena caranti'* or in the expression *'Amāvāsyāyāṁ nis'i'* the word *amāvāsyā* primarily denoting time is proposed to be understood as secondarily indicating the sacrifice called *dars'a.*[37]

---

36 यथा शङ्खवेलायामागन्तव्यमिति । यस्मिन्नपि ग्रामे शङ्खो नाध्मायते तस्मिन्नपि स तथा कालोऽस्तीति नागमनं परिहास्यते । [SB. on VI. 4.42, p. 1454].

37 नामावास्याशब्दः कर्मवचनः । किं तर्हि । कालवचनः । काले श्रुतिः कर्मणि लक्षणा । [SB. on XII. 2.14, p. 2243]; अत्र काल एवायं मुख्यः शब्दो न कर्मणि, कर्मणि लक्षणा । [SB. on IV. 4.19, p. 1278].

17. Now we come to *a type of* LAKṢAṆĀ *where a word expressive of the* SĀDHYA *or the* KĀRYA *is used to indicate the* SĀDHANA *or the* KĀRAṆA, *and vice versa.* In the text *'Pṛṣṭhair upatiṣṭhate'*, for example, the word *pṛṣṭha* is to be understood to signify, not the sacrificial act called *pṛṣṭha,* but the mantras which are used during the performance of that act.[38] Similarly in the text *'Atha yat triṣṭubhā paridadhāti nāntam gacchati'* the word *triṣṭubh* stands for *uṣṇik-kakubhau,* on which S'ABARA remarks 'KĀRAṆE KĀRYAVAD UPACĀRAḤ KṚTAḤ.'[39]

18. Somewhat similar is the type of *lakṣaṇā* that we meet with in texts like *'Yajamānaḥ prastarḥ, yajamāna ekādas'akapālaḥ'.* It is obvious that this apposition of the two words *yajamāna* and *prastara* or *yajamāna* and *ekādas'akapāla can't* be adequately explained by sticking to the *vācyārtha* of these words. Hence by *lakṣaṇā* the word *yajamāna* has to be understood as being equivalent to *yajamāna-siddhikara.* Thus the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between two words can be explained by adopting what may be called the SIDDHI KARATVA-LAKṢAṆĀ which is illustrated by S'ABARA *by the popular illustration 'Rājā pattigaṇakaḥ'.*[40]

19. One more principle underlying *lakṣanā* as noted by JAIMANI is BHŪMĀ or BĀHULYA. There is a text *'Sṛṣṭir upa-*

---

38 अभिधानोपदेशाद्वा विप्रतिषेधाद् द्रव्येषु पृष्ठशब्दः स्यात् । [MS. VII. 3.36]. and SB. there on

39 त्रिष्टुभमेवायमुष्णिक्ककुभाविति ब्रूते । कथम् । त्रिष्टुभो वीर्यमित्येवमन्ते संस्तुतेः । त्रिष्टुभो वा एतद्वीर्यं यदुष्णिक्ककुभाविति । कारणे कार्यवदुपचारः कृतः । [SB. on V. 3.6, p. 1323].

40 तत्सिद्धिः । [MS. I. 4.]; इह तु यजमानः प्रस्तर यजमान एककपाल इति कीदृशो गुणसंबन्धः प्रतीयते । तत्सिद्धिकर इति । सर्वो ह्यात्मनः कार्यसिद्धिं करोति । अन्योऽपि यस्तस्य कार्यसिद्धिं करोति स तस्मिन्नुच्चरिते हृदयमागच्छति । यथा राजा पत्तिगणक इति । पत्तिगणको राज्ञः कार्यं साधयति । स राजशब्द उच्चरिते प्रतीयते । एवमिहापि यजमानकार्यं प्रस्तरैककपालौ साधयतः । तस्मात्तौ यजमानशब्देन प्रख्याप्येते [SB., p. 360f].

dahāti' which interpreted literally means *'Sṛṣṭimantrakā upadadhāti iṣṭakāḥ'*. Now all the *Mantras* which are required for the *iṣṭakācayana* are given beforehand and the text must be understood as referring to them only. However, some of these *Mantras* are *asṛṣṭiliṅga* (not containing word *sṛṣṭi or root sṛj*. Yet they are to be in the *sṛṣṭimantras* by the AJAHALLAKṢAṆĀ based on *Bhūmā*.[41]

20. Widely different, however, is the process involved in the type of *lakṣaṇā* which JAIMINI has noted in the *sūtra* 'LIṄGA SAMAVĀYĀT'. The text in question here is *'Prāṇabhṛta upadadhāti'* which like the one noted above if taken literally would mean *'Prāṇabhṛnmantrakā upadadhāti iṣṭakāḥ'* which thus would not include the *aprāṇabhṛnmantras* and lead to their *ānarthakya*. The word *prāṇabhṛt* must, therefore, be taken to mean not only one *mantra* or two having the word *prāṇabhṛt* in them, but a whole group of mantras in the first of which the word *prāṇabhṛt* is prominently found to occur. This case is analogous to what is known as the CHATRI NYĀYA. Thus in the sentence *'chatriṇo gacchanti'* the word *chatriṇah* taken literally stands for persons holding umbrellas. But in the sentence quoted above this direct sense is not meant to be expressed. What is meant to be expressed by the word *chatriṇah* is a group of persons among whom one or more persons are seen to hold an umbrella. Here the underlying principle is not *bhūmā* or *bāhulya*, but the PRĀDHĀNYA of the expressed. The basis for *lakṣaṇā* in such cases is some peculiar or prominent characteristic (*Linga*)[42] which is notificeable in any part or

---

41 भूमा । [MS. I. 4.]; कथं तु असृष्टिषु च सृष्टिशब्द इति । भूम्ना । बहवस्तत्र सृष्टिलिङ्गा मन्त्रा अल्पशो विलिङ्गा । [SB, p. 363f].

42 लिङ्गसमवायात् । [MS. I. 4.]; लिङ्गसमवायात्परः शब्दः परत्र वर्तते । यथा छत्रिणो गच्छन्तीत्येकेनच्छत्रिणा सर्वे लक्ष्यन्ते । न चायं प्राणभृच्छब्दः सृष्टिशब्दश्च जहत्स्वार्थं मन्त्रगणं लक्षयेत् । यद्गणे च सृष्टिप्राणभृच्छब्दौ समवेतौ तावपि परिगृह्येते । यथा छत्रिशब्देन स्वार्थलक्षणार्थेन सोऽपिच्छत्री गृह्यते । [SB, p. 365]; also cf. SB. on III. 8.44.

portion of what is to be indicated.

21. Lastly may be noted the principle of euphemism (PRAŚAṀSĀ) which gives us one more variety of *lakṣaṇā*. Take, for example, the text *'Apas'avo vā anye go-as'vebhyaḥ pas'avo go-as'vāḥ'*. It is not literally true to say that all animals other than cow or the bull and the horse are *apas'us* i.e. no *pas'us* at all. Then why are they so described? The simple answer to this question is given by S'ABARA in the words *'Go-as'vān pras'aṁsitum anyeṣām pas'ūnāṁ nindā'*.[43] In this connection it may be observed that this basis for *lakṣaṇā* is sometimes akin to the one noticed under the name *dharma-lakṣaṇā* above. For after all what else can be intended by *pras'aṁsā*? JAIMINI at MS. VIII. 2. 6 clearly states that the word *soma* is used for *pras'aṁsā;* and S'ABARA explains the same by taking the additional illustration of *'Yathā siṁho Devadattaḥ iti'* and rounds up the whole discussion with the remark 'TASMĀN NĀMĀYAṀ DHARMĀTIDEŚAḤ'.

22. Having thus noticed the various senses conveyed by *lakṣaṇā in* different sentences we may now note one circumstance which is common to all these illustrations. Just as *lakṣaṇā* requires that there should be *mukhyārtha-bādha* and that the *lakṣyārtha* must be conveyed by the *s'abda* through its *vācyārtha,* similarly does it require that the *lakṣyārtha* adopted must satisfy the need of the case. It will not do to take up any *artha* in any case. Thus, for example, in the example *'Gaṇgāyāṁ ghoṣah'* it is possible to take the word *gaṇgāyām* to stand for a number of things besides the *gaṅgā-taṭa* which is the sense that we accept. But all the others we reject and accept only the *gaṅgā-taṭa* as the *lakṣyārtha* because the former are not useful for our purpose which is served by the latter alone. Thus the general rule is, as S'ABARA has very nicely put it, 'YENA CA TATRA PRAYOJANAṀ SA LAKṢYATE'. This shows how all the three condi-

43 प्रशंसा [MS. I. 4.]; and SB. thereon.

44 प्रशंसा सोमशब्दः [MS. VIII. 2.6] ; and SB. thereon.

tions of *lakṣaṇā* as laid down by the rhetoricians have been noticed by *mīmāṁsakas* also when they hold that before *lakṣaṇā* can be resorted to there must be *'S'rutyasambhava'* and that the *lakṣyārtha* must be conveyed through the *vācyārtha* only, and that it must serve the need of the case. It must, however, be noted that PRAYOJANA (*the 3rd condition) spoken of by the Mimāṁsakas is not the same as the* PRAYOJANA *of the rhetoricians mentioned in connection with lakṣaṇā.* For the latter is *vyaṅgya* i.e. conveyed by *vyañjanā* which certainly can't find any place in the *mīmāṁsā* view which refuses to accept *vyañjanā* as a *s'abda-s'akti* at all. Thus *prayojana* as spoken of by the *Mīmāṁsakas* as a condition for *lakṣaṇā* is not a technical term, but has the ordinary sense viz. the purpose in view. It is but natural, therefore, that the MĪMĀṀSAKA *does not recognize* RŪḌHI *as one of the pre-requisites of* LAKṢAṆĀ *as the rhetoricians do* it as an alternative for *prayojana;* for he does not accept RŪḌHI-LAKṢAṆĀ at all. As we have already seen above *'Kus'ala'* and *'Pravīṇa'* which are given as *illustrations of* RŪḌHI-LAKṢAṆĀ *by the rhetoricians are only cases of abhidhā according to the mīmāṁsaka.*[46]

23. This circumstance about *lakṣaṇā* gives us another fact about it viz. that it would be wrong if after taking up *a lakṣyārtha* we are again required to resort to *lakṣaṇā* for a second time in the case of one and the same word. This subsquent *lakṣaṇā* is termed *lakṣita—lakṣaṇā*. *Lakṣaṇā* once adopted must yield a sense which would satisfy the need of the case, so that there would be no question of resorting to *lakṣaṇā* for a second time. S'ABARA in his *bhāṣya* has given us two examples of this LAKṢITALAKṢAṆĀ while commenting on MS.X.4.23 and MS.X.5.58. In the former place[47] the question is as to what is indicated by the

45 SB. on MS. VI. 4.42.

46 SB. on VI. 7. 22, see n. 9. above.

47 see n. 6 above.

word *agni* when it is used to enjoin the *devatā* (of a *haviḥ*). If the word is taken to stand for the *artha* i.e. fire and not for the *s'abda* i.e. its form only, we find that the purpose of the passage is not served. For as we know it is by its verbal form, rather than its physical form, that a deity serves the purpose of the sacrifice. Hence if the word *agni* is accepted to stand for the *artha* i.e., fire we shall have to set that sense aside as being irrelevant for our purposes and by *lakṣaṇā* adopt the verbal form as being the sense indicated. Thus we first of all go from *s'abda* to *artha* and then come back again from *artha* to *s'abda*. But is it not better to avoid this lengthy process by taking the form as being denoted by the word in the very beginning and avoid any *lakṣaṇā* at all?' The other instance given by S'ABARA is exactly of the same type as can be judged from the following remark of S'ABARA in that connection: '*Anyathā rathantarasāmāni adhyavasiyamanerea padam lakṣyate padena sāma saiṣā lakṣitalakṣaṇā syāt*'.[48]

24. One more circumstance we have to notice about *lakṣaṇā*; and this again is the natural outcome of the fact that *lakṣaṇā* is *laukikī*. Thus we find that before we hit upon the *lakṣyārtha* we are already acquainted with the requirement of the sentence in question. This shows that the *lakṣyārtha* is something that is already known. Now we know that what is already known can't be the province of a *vidhi*. It must be *anuvāda*. Hence we come to the conclusion that *lakṣaṇā* is possible in an *anuvāda* only and that it may never be allowed in a *vidhi*. This very fact is sometimes differently stated by saying that a sentence where we are required to resort to *lakṣaṇā* shall not be construed as a *vidhi*;[49] it must be taken as an *anuvāda* only. Several

48 cf. SB. on X. 5.58, द्वितीयवर्णकम्

49 अनुवादे हि लक्षणा न्याय्या न विधौ । [SB, p. 1278] ; नानुवादपक्षे लक्षणायां दोषः । [SB, p. 364] ; यज्ञायुधशब्दश्चानुवादपक्षे न्याय्यो न विधिपक्षे । गौणो हि स आयुधशब्दः स्फ्यादिषु । [SB., p. 1201] ; विधौ हि न परः शब्दार्थः प्रतीयते । [SB, p. 141].

indeed are the places in which S'ABARA in his *bhāṣya* has referred explicitly to this fact about *lakṣaṇā;* but in one place (MS.X.2.47) he has very clearly explained the truth behind this rule. The question is with regard to the sense of the word *yājayet* in the text *'Tataḥ saṁvatsare asthīni yājayet'* where it is pointed out that because this is a *vidhi*, therefore, it is not allowed to resort to *lakṣaṇā* and take the term *yājayet* to indicate something else. It is here that S'ABARA remarks that a figurative signification is not perceived from a *vidhi-s'abda.* He then goes on to justify his statement by pointing out that a figurative word is connected with a sense which is determined on the strength of some other i.e. *laukika pramāṇa.*[50] What is meant is that *vidhi* is *svataḥ-pramāṇa* so that the sense to be perceived from a vidhi will have to be perceived from the words of the text only and from nowhere else. But the figurative sense is known from some *pramāṇa* other than *s'abda* or the words of the text. This shows that the *lakṣyārtha* can't be the purport of a *vidhi vākya.* This in other words means that LAKṢAṆĀ *is not admissible in an injunctive statement.* It must, however, be remembered that this rule does not hold good in the case of sentences of ordinary parlance where we speak of things already known from other sources. Thus in common parlance it is quite possible to lay down an injunction in figurative words. The truth of this remark can be very well realised when we find injunctive sentences like *Amī piṣṭapiṇḍāḥ siṁhāḥ kriyantām'* where the word *siṁhāḥ* is evidently used in a figurative sense.

25. Now before we bring this section to a close let us see why LAKṢAṆĀ *is after all to be looked upon as* DOṢA, and try *to value it in comparison with some other doṣas. Here it* must be noted that setting aside the natural and direct mode

---

50 न च गौणोऽर्थो विधिशब्दादवगम्यते । अन्येन हि प्रमाणेन परिच्छिन्नेऽर्थे गौणः शब्दः संबध्यते। यथा गोरनुबन्ध्य इति गोजातिविशिष्टः पशुरनुबध्यते न वाहीकः । गौरयं वाहीक इति तु संवादे वाहीके गौणः शब्दः प्रवर्तते ।[SB. on MS. X. 2. 47, p. 1847]

of interpretation and adopting an unnatural or an indirect one is a *doṣa,* for the simple reason that the latter involves *gaurava* and is, as such, slow in its working. Any mode or construction which yields us the required sense in a shorter span of time and with less trouble is certainly what we should like to prefer; and hence the other we reject as being more elaborate and hence faulty. Looking at *lakṣaṇā* from this point of view we find that it obviously involves a lengthier process than *abhidhā* and is consequently to be looked upon as a *doṣa.* But as we have already seen above we have sometimes to accept it to avoid some evils which are still worse.

26. Thus, for example, ĀNṚTHAKAYA *is a greater evil.* Is it not wrong to lose a whole text for the sake of one word or phrase? Would it not be wise to do some injustice to one word or expression and thereby save the whole text from being rendered nugatory? Now a text may become nugatory or *anarthaka* if it yields no good sense or if it yields some sense which is contradicted by our experience or by some other Scriptural text or texts. Whenever we are led to such circumstances we have to resort to *lakṣaṇā.* Thus we see that LAKṢAṆĀ *is preferrable to* ĀNARTHAKYA *per se or* ĀNARTHAKYA *caused by* VIPRATIṢEDHA. ADṚṢṬA KALPANĀ *is another evil which must be accepted as being greater than* LAKṢAṆĀ. For *lakṣaṇā* is, after all, *laukikī* and sanctioned by usage; while *adṛṣṭa-kalpanā or aprasiddha-kalpanā* has no such sanction behind it. S'ABARA points out VYAVADHĀṆA *and* VĀYKABHEDA *as two other evils as being worse than lakṣaṇā* and hence to be discarded in favour of the latter. In the text '*Khalevālī yūpo bhavati*' there is a question regarding the construction of the word *khalevālī.* Is it to be construed with *yūpa* or with *bhavati*? If it is constructed with the word *yūpa*

51 खलेवाल्या युक्ता विधीयते न यूपस्य खलेवालीता । तथाऽव्यवहितेन भवतिना संबन्धात्प्रत्यक्षं वाक्यम् । इतरथा व्यवहितेन परोक्षं स्यात् । खलेवालीशब्दश्च यः खले वारणे प्रवर्तते तस्य वाचकः । तथाभूतश्च यूपकार्ये विनियुज्यते । यः खलेवाली स यूप इति । शक्यते च यूपकार्ये विनियोक्तुम् । यस्तु यूपशब्दः कार्यलक्षणार्थ इति । व्यवधानाल्लक्षणापि ज्यायसी । प्रत्यक्षं हि लक्षणायां, परोक्षं व्यवधाने वाक्यम । [SB. on X. 2.69, p. 1861 f.].

we shall have to take the word *yūpa* as indicating *yūpa-kārya* by what we have called the KĀRYA LAKṢAṆĀ; while the construction of the word with the word *bhavati* is vitiated by *vyavadhāna*. *Thus* we are confronted with two evils one of which per force we have to accept. Naturally, therefore, we accept the lesser evil and resort to the former construction. But how is *Lakṣaṇā a lesser evil*? This question has been answered by S'ABARA by pointing out that *vākya* is *pratyakṣa* in *lakṣaṇā* while it is *parokṣa* in *vyavadhāna*. What he means to say is that in the former though we have to resort to *lakṣaṇā* yet the *ekavākyatā* that we arrive at thereby is direct and does not involve any reshuffling of the constituent words. In the latter case, however, there can be no *ekavākyatā* if we do not re-arrange the words in a different manner. Thus the *ekavākyatā* in the latter case is only indirect or *parokṣa*, whereas in the former it is direct or *pratyakṣa*. That *lakṣanā* is to be preferred to *vākyabheda* has been shown by S'ABARA while commenting on MS.XI.2.2 where while discussing the signification of the text '*Same darṣa-pūrṇamāsābhyām yajeta* &c' he points out that the word *darśa-pūrṇamāsābhyām* in the text must be understood as indicating the whole group of sacrifices like the *āgneya* so that the text may be construed as one *vākya*. Otherwise we shall have to admit the text as being *anekārtha* and thus admit *vākya-bheda*. Here again we ore confronted with two evils, of which we have to choose one. And we choose the former viz. *lakṣaṇā*. For *lakṣaṇā* after all is *laukikī* and can ultimately yield us good sense. But *anekārthatva*, of what obviously is one *vākya*, is sure to lead to confusion.[52] This shows that *anekārthatva or vākyabheda* is a *doṣa* of a more serious type than *lakṣāṇā*. This fact can be demonstrated in another way also. For *lakṣaṇa* as is evident is only *pada-doṣa* i.e., it has reference to the *pada* or *s'abda* only to which it does some injustice by setting aside its literal sense. *But anekārthatva* or *vākya-bheda* is *doṣa* of a *vākya*, since we find that in it we

52 नन्वेवमपि लक्षणाश्रिता भवति । वरं लक्षणा नैकवाक्यस्यानेकार्थत्वम् । अनेकार्थत्वेऽगमकत्वम् । लक्षणानुगमिका, लौकिकत्वात् । [SB. on XI. 2.2, p. 2136].

are doing injustice not only to this or that *pada* in a sentence but to the sentence as a whole. This shows that *vākya-bheda is a doṣa of greater magnitude than lakṣaṇā,* and must, on that account, be considered as being the worse of the two.

27. It is thus quite clear that *lakṣaṇā* is a *doṣa* and we accept it only if we are forced to do so as the last resort for saving ourselves from some greater evils. Hence it is that *every case of lakṣaṇā will have to be justified by itself.* It won't be right to think that because a word is used figuratively in one text therefore, it must be so everywhere. A word shall be understood as being figurative only in that case where the conditions for *lakṣaṇā* are satisfied. But in cases where they are not satisfied *lakṣaṇā* would be inadmissible. Thus we do accept the word *siṁha* as being *lākṣaṇika* in a sentence like *'Siṁho Devadattaḥ'*; but we may never do it in texts like *'Siṁhamālabheta'*.[53] Another natural *corollary of this,* that we must note, is what has been very accurately though concisely stated in the words *'Guṇe tu anyāyakalpanā'*. Whenever *lakṣaṇā* becomes unavoidable it shall be adopted in the case of only such parts of sentences or words as are *guṇabhūta* i.e. of minor importance.

---

53 तस्मिन्नेव वाक्ये स तत्र संप्रयुक्त इति गम्यते प्रमाणान्तरेण, न शब्देन । यत्र तु तत्प्रमाणान्तरं नास्ति न तत्र वर्तितुमर्हति । यथा सिंहो देवदत्त इति देवदत्त-वचनः प्रमाणान्तरेण, न तु सिंहमालभेत इति यत्र । तत्र तु तत् प्रमाणान्तरं नास्ति [SB. on II. 2.22, p. 531].

Chapter X

CLASSIFICATION OF WORDS

1. Having fully dealt with the several problems connected with *S'abda* and *artha* in general we now take up the question of the classification of words into what we call the parts of speech. Here we find S'ABARA giving us mainly two classes of words only and to all appearances JAIMINI also has done the same.

2. In the very first few *sūtras* of the second chapter of his work JAIMINI defines *karma-s'abdāḥ* and *nāmāni;* but he does not seem to have defined any other class of words in so very plain terms. Apparently, therefore, it would seem as if JAIMINI admitted only two classes of words viz. *nāmāni* and *karma-s'abdāḥ* which latter only means verbs. S'ABARA on the other hand, goes a step further. In illustrating the *nāmāni* or *nāmikyaḥ vibhaktayaḥ* he gives us the inflections of the words *vṛkṣa* and *s'ukla.* This shows that according to S'ABARA the term *nāma,* as used by JAIMINI, stands for both the noun proper and also the adjective, the latter being included under the term *nāma* possibly on account of its taking the case terminations like the nouns. Besides these two, S'ABARA has also given us one more class of words namely the *sarvanāma* which JAIMINI does not seem to have expressly mentioned in his work, but which like the *vis'eṣaṇa,* is evidently to be included under the term *nāmāni* for the same reason for which adjectives are. Thus we may now say that according to JAIMINI and his commentator there are *four different classes* of words viz. *nāma, sarvanāma, vis'eṣaṇa,* and *ākhyāta* or the *karma-s'abda.* A mention is, no doubt, made by S'ABARA in several places of the *upasargas, the pratyvas,* and the *karma-pravacanīyas*; but they are not considered by him as independent words, that is such as can be used by themselves unless they are combined with some other word or words. We leave them out of the question and take up only the four above-mentioned classes for consideration.

3. JAIMINI defines NĀMĀNI as words on the utterance of which the forms of the objects denoted by them become apprehended. In simpler terms this means that *nāmāni* are the names of some accomplished objects or things as opposed to *karma-s'abdāḥ* which denote something which is yet to be accomplished.[1] In short the former are *bhūtārtha* while the latter are *bhvyārtha.* As already noted above this term *nāmāni, and* consequently the definition also, is to be applied to *vis'eṣaṇas or guṇa-s'abdas* and *sarvanāmas* as well.[2]

4. In a more restricted sense, however, the term *nāma* applies to *dravya-s'abdas* and *Jātis'abdas* only. The *nāmāni* again are not all of one type. Take the nouns *Devadatta* and *puruṣa,* for example. Though both these are nouns according to the definition given above, yet they differ from one another in this that while the application of the former is restricted to one person only, that of the latter is universal. In ordinary language of grammer we show this distinction by giving them the names of the proper and the common noun respectively, [or SAṀJÑĀ or DRAVYA-S'ABDAS and JĀTI S'ABDAS.]

5. Here it is interesting to note the various circumstances which according to JAIMINI would necessitate the assumption that a particular word is a *karma-nāmadheya* or a proper noun denoting a particular act or sacrifice. These we are given in the fourth *pāda* of the first *adhyāya.* The first of these is stated in the *sūtra* 'API VĀ NĀMADHEYAṀ YADUTPATTĀV

---

1 भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दाः etc. [MS. II. 1.1]; येषामुत्पत्तौ स्वे प्रयोगे रूपोपलब्धिस्तानि नामानि etc. [II. 1.3]; येषां तूत्पत्तावर्थे स्वे प्रयोगो न विद्यते तान्याख्यातानि etc. [MS. II. 1.4].

2 S'abara clearly paraphrases word नामानि by द्रव्यगुणशब्दाः। cf. तानि नामानि ते द्रव्यगुणशब्दाः। ईदृशो द्रव्यगुणशब्दानामर्थः। ते द्रव्यगुणशब्दा इति वक्तव्ये तानि नामानीति सूत्रितम्। यतो नामानीत्येषां पर्यायशब्दः। [SB, p. 387 f].

3 MS. II. 1.3

APŪRVAM AVIDHĀYAKATVĀT'.[4] A word which when first used is *apūrva* i.e. quite new and yet is not mandatory or *vidhāyaka*, is to be looked upon as *karma-nāmadheya* i.e. the name of a sacrifice. The word *udbhid* is an illustration in point. In texts like *'Udbhidā yajeta'* what are we to understand by the term *udbhid*? In paraphrase the text would run as *'Udbhidā yāgena iṣṭaṁ bhāvayet'*. But how are we to explain the *sāmānādhikaraṇya between udbhidā* and *yāgena*? If *udbhid* were to mean some *karaṇa* with which to perform the act then the *sāmānādhi-karaṇya* can't be construed literally. This per force brings in *lakṣaṇā* and we shall have to paraphrase the text as *'Udbhidvatā yāgena iṣṭam bhāvayet'*. But a resort to *lakṣaṇā* is admissible only when there is *mukhyārtha-bādha*. Again as a rule *lakṣaṇā* is to be avoided in a mandatory text as far as possible. An attempt must, therefore, be made here to avoid *lakṣaṇā*. And it is for avoiding *lakṣaṇā* that we take *udbhid* as a proper noun i.e. the name of an act, an assumption which directly accounts for the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* of *udbhidā* with *yāgena*. Thus the main principle in such cases is that *a word is to be taken as a nāmadheya or proper noun for avoiding the* MATVARTHA-LAKṢAṆĀ *in a mandatory text.*[5]

6. In the very next *sūtra* is given the second ground for taking a word as a *karma-nāmadheya*. The *sūtra* is *'Yasmin guṇopadeśaḥ pradhānatobhisambandhaḥ'*. In texts like *'Citrayā yajeta paśukāmaḥ* the word *citrā* may be looked upon as *guṇa-vidhi* or a *karma-nāmadheya*. But if it is accepted as containing a *guṇa-vidhi* there would arise the *vākyabheda doṣa;* for it is impossible that the fruit viz. *paśus* and the *guṇa* viz. *citrā* be both enjoined simultaneously by one text alone. To avoid this *vākyabheda doṣa*, therefore, it is that the word *citrā* has to be accepted as a *karma-nāmadheya*. In this text we find

4 MS. I. 4.2.

5 Read SB. on MS. I. 4.2.

that the word *pas'ukāmaḥ* enjoins one accessory detail; and we have a doubt as to whether the word *citrā* contains a *guṇa-vidhi* or a *nāmadheya.* When such is the case we have to take the word as a *nāmadheya;* for if that also were to be construed as containing a *guṇa-vidhi* there would actually be two *vidhis* in one sentence, which is inadmissible. Hence it is said that *the word in such cases is to be construed as a* KARMA-NĀMADHEYA *lest there should arise the* VĀKYABHEDA DOṢA.

7. The third ground covers what is well-known as the TAT-PRAKHYA NYĀYA, so called after the *sūtra* 'TATPRAKHYAM CĀNYAŚĀSTRAM' given by JAIMINI.[7] *'Agnihotraṁ juhoti svargakāmaḥ'* is a sacrificial text where there is a doubt regarding the exact nature of the word *agnihotra.* It is possible to explain it as a *guṇa-vidhi* or as a *nāmadheya.* In the former alternative now there is no danger of the *matvartha-lakṣaṇā,* or *vākyabheda* it is true. But the greatest drawback here is that by its very nature it can't be a *vidhi* at all. For this word speaks of or enjoins, according to this view, either *Agni* or the *devatā* of the *homa* or *āhavanīya agni* as the *dravya* for *homa.* But both these are enjoined by other sentences and this sentence is not expected to do that. Thus the point is that *whenever a particular word appears to convey some details which are already conveyed by some other word or words such a word shall be considered a karma-nāmadheya.*

8. TADVYAPADES'A givs us the last ground for the construction of a word as *karma-nāmadheya.*[8] In texts like 'S'yenenābhicaran yajeta' how are we to construe words like

---

6 MS. I. 4.3. Also cf. यस्मिन्गुणविधिर्नामधेयमिति संदिग्धे गुणोऽपर उपदिश्यते प्रधानेन कर्मणा तस्य संबन्धः । कर्मनामधेयमित्यर्थः । गुणविधौ हि सति वाक्यं भिद्येत ।[SB, p. 329].

7 MS. I. 4.4, and SB. Thereon.

8 तद्व्यपदेशं च । [MS. I. 4.5]. This is the wellknown तद्व्यपदेशन्याय.

s′yenena? The answer to this question is that we should construe them as *karma-nāmadheya.* But why is there no vidhi of *s′yena* as a *guṇa*? Because of the *tadvyapades′a* i.e. because the *yāga* is described with the help of it i.e. with *s′yena* as the *upamāna*, so that *s′yena,* being *upamāna,* is external to the *yāga,* and cannot be a *guṇa* or *aṅga* of it. the *tadvyapades′a* which clearly occurs in the sequel viz. '*Yathā vai s′yeno nipatya ādatte evam ayaṁ bhrātṛvyaṁ nipatya ādatte yam abhicarati s′yenena*'. Thus whenever *we find* TAD-VYAPADES′SA, *the word is to be construed as not a* GUNAVIDHI *but as* KARMA-NĀMADHEYA.

9. Thus the main grounds justifying the construction of a word as *karma-nāmadheya* detailed upto now can be briefly stated in the words of *Laugākṣi Bhāskara*[9] as follows:—'NĀMADHEYATVAṀ CA NIMITTACATUṢṬAYĀT MATVARTHALAKṢAṆĀBHAYĀT, VĀKYA-BHEDABHAYĀT, TATPRAKHYAŚĀSTRĀT, TADVYAPADEŚĀC CA ITI'.

To these may be added one more viz. that which is given by JAIMINI[10] in connection with the expression *darvihoma.* This expression is a compound word with the word *homa* as principal member and with the word *darvi* as only an *upasarjana.* Thus the whole compound denotes a particular act and is, therefore, to be regarded as a *karma-nāmadheya.* From this it would appear that *when a compond expression has for its principal member a word denoting an act, the expression is to be understood as a proper noun denoting a particular act.*

10. Now we come to the next class of words, the *pronoun.* Though JAIMINI has little to say regarding this class of words, we find that S′ABARA has noticed its peculiar characteristic in

9 cf. अर्थसंग्रह, p. 100 [NSP. edition, 1915].

10 दर्विहोमो ऽयज्ञाभिधानं होमसंयोगात् । [MS. VIII. 4.1]; होमशब्दोऽत्र श्रूयते । तत्प्रधानश्चायं समासः । दर्विशब्द उपसर्जनं, होमश्च कर्म । अथवा जुहुयादिति कर्मोच्यते । तेन समुच्चितो, यदेकया जुहुयादिति । तस्मात् कर्मनामधेयं स्थितं तावत । [SB, p. 1626].

two places[11] in his *bhāṣya.* The *sarva-nāma,* he observes, *always refers to the thing or the object that is previously mentioned; and must, therefore, be construed in accordance with the* PŪRVOKTA *word.*

11. The next class of words that we consider is the *vis'eṣaṇa.* In this connection it must be noted that though neither JAIMINI nor S'ABARA have expressly drawn any distinction between the two classes of adjective, viz. the qualitative and the quantitative, yet from the several observations made by them regarding this class of words in several places it would appear that they recognized both these distinct types of adjectives and that they were very well aware of the peculiar characteristics of each. JAIMINI in several places uses the words *guṇa* and *saṁkhyā* to denote the two types. Even S'ABARA repeatedly uses the terms GUṆAŚABDA and SAṀKHYĀŚABDA. This would shew that both JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA did recognize these as two different types of adjectives. Thus adjectives are of two kinds: the qualitative or the GUṆA-VIŚEṢAṆAS, and the quantitative or the SAṀKHYĀ VIŚEṢAṆAS.

12. About *vis'eṣaṇas* in general and the *guṇa-vis'eṣaṇas* in particular S'ABARA *has given us a few general rules.* That an adjective modifies the sense of its *vis'eṣya* is too obvious to be mentioned. But what is important to notice is that in some cases *an adjective used with or without a* VIŚEṢYA *signifies a* TAD GUṆA-YUKTA VIŚEṢYA Thus, for example, in the sentence *'S'oṇam ānaya'* what is meant by the word *s'oṇam* is *'rakta-guṇa-sambaddham as'vam'.* Here the adjective *s'oṇa* does not merely convey the idea of *raktatva,* but rather it conveys the idea of *raktatva* as belonging to a horse.[12] This in other words means that the word *s'oṇa*

11 Read: प्रकृतवाचीनि सर्वनामानि भवन्ति । [SB, p. 1332]; सर्वनाम च पूर्वोक्तेन शब्देनैकवाक्यतां याति । [SB, p. 1210].

12 शोणमानयेति रक्तगुणसंबद्धोऽश्वः शब्देनैवानयतो विधीयते इति न वाक्यभेदो भवति ।[SB. on MS. II. 2.27, p. 558 f.]; Also read यत्र हि शुक्ल इति वा कृष्ण इति वा etc. [SB. on I. 1.25, p. 96 f.]; and SB. on X. 2.68, p. 1858.

here stands for *s'oṇa as'va.* In thus interpreting the above sentence there is no *vākya-bheda;* for all the words together convey one *artha,* and at the same time they are found to be *sākāṅkṣa* when separated, which shows that they form one sentence.[13] Thus from this peculiar characteristic of the *guṇa-vis'eṣaṇas* we get one more important rule of interpretation viz. *that a* GUṆA-VIDHI-PARA VĀKYA *enjoining some* GUṆA-VĀCAKA *pada alone without a* VIŚEŚYA *can be understood as laying down both the* GUṆA *as well as the* GUṆIN *without exposing itself to* VĀKYA-BHEDA. *But if the* VIŚEṢYA *is used along with the* GUṆAVĀCAKA PADA *then the construction is sure to be viciated by* VĀKYA-BHEDA. Similar is the the case with the text *'Revatīṣu vāravantīyam sāma kṛtvā pas'ukāmo yajeta'* which must be understood as enjoining the *yāga* as qualified by all these qualifying adjuncts. Here it may be argued that unless the *vis'eṣaṇa* is enjoined it is impossible to enjoin the *vis'eṣya;* for, how can you know the *vis'eṣya* unless the *vis'eṣaṇa* is known? And if such is the case then in such sentences as the one discussed above there is clear *vākya-bheda,* since in them both the *vis'eṣaṇa* as well as the *vis'eṣya* will have thus to be understood as being enjoined. But this objection can be refuted by pointing out that these words all of them form only one sentence since they are *ekārtha* i.e. they serve only one purpose and are at the same time *vibhāge sākāṅkṣa,* so that the *vākya-bheda doṣa* pointed out by the objector is more apparent than real.[15]

---

13 एकार्थत्वं विभागे च साकाङ्क्षत्वमित्येकवाक्यत्वमुपपद्यते । [SB. on II. 2.27, p. 587].

14 यदा गुणविधिपरं वाक्यं भवति तदा द्वाभ्यां वाक्याभ्यां प्रयोजनं गुणद्वय-विधाने । अथ शोणमानयेत्युच्यते तत्र गुणविधिपरेऽपि वाक्ये पर्यवसित एव गुणद्वय-विधानम् । श्रुत्यैव विशिष्टद्रव्यस्य प्रतीतत्वात् । न भवत्येकवाक्यस्यातिभारः । संबन्धश्च बहुभिः पदैर्विशिष्ट एक एवोच्यते इत्येकार्थत्वम् । विभज्यमानानि च पदानि साकाङ्क्षाणीत्येकवाक्यत्वम् । [SB. on MS. II. 3.14, p. 601].

15 ननु रेवत्यो विधीयन्ते वारवन्तीयमपि । यदि नैव विधीयेरन् नैव तद्विशिष्टो यागः प्रतीयेत । न ह्यविधाय विशेषणं शक्यते विशिष्टो विधातुम् तस्माद् बहुषु विधीय-

S'ABARA (and even JAIMINI himself) here goes even a step further and declares that the word *s'oṇa* is an adjective primarily denoting colour, no doubt; yet in the case under consideration it denotes colour in connection with the *as'va-jāti* alone and none else, so much so that it must be considered a *jāti-s'abda*? JAIMINI has answered this question in the *sutra* it may now be stated that an *adjective when used alone usually denotes the* TAD GUṆA VIŚIṢYA VIŚEṢYA *and in some cases sanctioned by usage it may even be taken to be a* JATI-S'ABADA. But when is such an adjective to be looked upon as a *jāti-s'abda*? JAIMINI has answered this question in the *sutra* 'GUṆAD VĀ DRAVYA-ṢABDA ŚYĀD ASARVA-VIŚAYATVĀT', where he daclares that the word *gāyatrī* can't be understood to be a *saṁkhyā-s'abda* because it is not universal in its application, i.e., it does not apply to all things that are twenty-four in number. Thus he suggests that adjectives are universal in their application and will be used with reference to any and every *dravya* which is possessed of the particular quality or the quantity denoted by them. When, therefore, we find that an adjective used without any *vis'eṣya* is universal in its application we should take it as signifying a *tad-guṇa-vis'iṣṭa vis'eṣya*. When, on the other hand, such an adjective is found by usage to be restricted to this or that particular substance and is, as such, not universal in its application it will have

---

मानेषु नैकार्थ्यम । अत्रोच्यते—अर्थ इति प्रयोजनमभिधीयते । यावन्ति पदान्येकं प्रयोजनमभिनिर्वर्तयन्ति तावन्त्येकं वाक्यम् । न चात्र बहूनि प्रयोजनानि । न ह्यत्रानेकस्याभिप्रेतस्यानेकं पदं विधायकमस्ति । रेवतीष्वित्येतत् न केवलं रेवतीनां विधायकं रेवतीषु वारवन्तीयमिति । अत्रापि पदद्वये वारवन्तीयशब्दो द्वितीयान्तः । नास्मात् संबन्धोऽभिप्रेतो गम्यते । प्रातिपदिकार्थस्याव्यतिरेकात् । कृत्वेत्यपि करोतिर्न संबन्धमात्रे पर्यवसितः परप्रयोजनसंबन्धमाह । एवंविशिष्टस्तु यजतिर्न परार्थः । तस्मादेकमेषां पदार्थानां प्रयोजनम् । तस्मादेकवाक्यत्वम् । [SB. on II. 2.27, p. 559 f.].

16 रूपान्यत्वाच्च जातिशब्दः । [MS. VI. 8.49]; यथा शोण इति वर्णवचनोऽश्वजातिगतं वर्णं वदति नान्यम् । तस्माद्रूपान्यत्वाच्च वयोमात्रवचनः किंतु जातिशब्दः स्यात् । जात्याश्रयं वयो वदेत् । [SB, p. 1521 f]; Also cf. गुणाद्वा द्रव्यशब्दः स्यादसर्वविषयत्वात् । [MS. VIII. 3.16].

to be looked as a *jāti-s'abda.*[17] And it is with the help of these adjectives that both the *vis'eṣaṇa* as well as the *vis'esya* can be enjoined without incurring the *vākya-bheda doṣa.*

13. Another important rule noted by S'ABARA is that *where both* VIŚEṢYA *as well as the* VIŚEṢAṆA *are used the latter is more prominent than the former with the result that whatever* KĀRYA *is enjoined or mentioned in that connection will be referred to the* VIŚEṢYA *and not to the* VIŚEṢAṆA. In the sentence *'Rājapuruṣaḥ pūjyate'*, for example, the word *puruṣa* is the *vis'eṣya* which is modified by the qualifying adjunct *rājan* and the word *pūjyate* enjoins the act of doing honour. But who is to be honoured? Certainly not the king, but the man. This clearly shows the truth of the rule VIŚEṢYE KĀRYAṀ PRATĪYATE. NA VIŚEṢAṆE.' What the *vis'eṣaṇa* does is only the function of qualifying the *vis'eṣya;* and when this is done the *vis'eṣaṇa* retires. The rule, therefore, is that a *vis'eṣaṇa* when used along with its *vis'eṣya* serves the purpose of only qualifying the *vis'eṣya;* and is, therefore, always subservient to the latter. It is the *vis'eṣya,* and not the *vis'eṣaṇa,* that is prominently before the mind's eye; and it is the *vis'eṣya* again (*and not the vis'eṣaṇa*) that is connected with the act enjoined or spoken of in that connection.[18]

14. The next rule that we have to notice is in connection with words like *daṇḍin* where the *vis'eṣaṇa* is not only directly mentioned but is included in the *vis'eṣya* itself. In the word *daṇḍin* it is the *daṇḍa* that is the *vis'eṣaṇa* and the whole word itself is the *vis'eṣya,* as is clear from the fact

---

17 cf. MS. VIII. 3.16, and SB. Thereon.

18 विशेष्यं च बुद्धौ संनिहितं भवति, न विशेषणम् । तद्विशेष्यं विशेष्य निवर्तते । कथं ज्ञायते । विशेष्यानुबन्धसंयोगात् । यथा राजपुरुषः पूज्य इत्युक्ते पुरुषः पूज्यते, न राजा । [SB, p. 1602]; विशेष्ये एव कार्यं प्रतीयते न विशेषणें । यथा राजपुरुष आनीयतामित्युक्ते पुरुष आनीयते, न राजा । यथा मृष्टं भुङ्क्ते देवदत्त इत्युक्ते न शाकं सूपो वा प्रतीयते । यदेव प्रधानं तत्प्रतीयते [SB, . 5p77]; न ह्यप्रतीते विशेषणें विशिष्टं केचन प्रत्येतुमर्हन्ति [SB, p. 304]; प्रतीते विशेषणे विशिष्टः प्रतीयते । [SB. p. 318].

that we have to paraphrase the word *daṇḍin* as *daṇḍa-vis iṣṭa puruṣa.* Now in such cases what is the exact sense that is conveyed by these words? It may be argued that since it is impossible to speak of the *vis′eṣya* before speaking of the *vis′eṣaṇa,* therefore, words like *daṇḍin* must be understood as denoting the *vis′eṣaṇa* first and the *vis′eṣya* afterwards. But such a view is not admissible. For our experience is that what is intended to be conveyed by the word *daṇḍin* is never the *daṇḍa* but always the *daṇḍa-vis′iṣṭa puruṣa.* Thus the *vācyārtha* of the word *daṇḍin* must be accepted to be the *vis′eṣya* and not the *vis′eṣaṇa.* This rule is expressly stated by S′ABARA in the words 'YAD VIŚEṢAṆAṀ NA TAC CHABDENOCYATE'.[19]

15. Before we now pass on to the other type of adjectives we must note *two more rules* about *vis′eṣaṇas* in general as we find them stated by S′ABARA. It is clear that *guṇa-vacana s′abdas* are dependent upon their *vis′eṣya* and that if the *vis′eṣya* is not actually mentioned it is implied in the *vis′eṣaṇa* itself. From this it follows that the *vis′eṣaṇa* will receive the *liṅga* and the *vacana* of its *vis′eṣya* only, so that *in the case of a guṇa-vacana s′abda it is the* GUṆA *alone that is important i.e.* VIVAKṢITA *and not the* VACANA *or the* LIṄGA[20] The next thing to note is that a *guṇa* being *amūrta* has no capacity for being directly connected with a verb.

---

19 यद्विशेषणं न तच्छब्देनोच्यते । तद्यथा–दण्डीति दण्डनिमित्तः पुरुषवचनः । दण्डोऽस्य निमित्तं, नाभिधेयः । [SB. on VI. 1.1, p. 1347]; न तावद्दण्डिशब्देन दण्डोऽभिधीयते । अथ च दण्डविशिष्टो ऽवगम्यते । [SB. on I. 3.33, p. 317].

20 गुणवचनानां हि शब्दानामाश्रयतो लिङ्गवचनानि भवन्ति इत्यविशिष्य माणायामपि व्यक्तौ यदवश्यं प्राप्तं लिङ्गं तदाश्रयभूतं गुणस्य भवति । अविधित्सितेऽपि तस्मिँल्लिङ्गविशेषनिर्देशोऽनुवादो भवत्येव । यथा शुक्लः पुमान्, शुक्ला स्त्री, शुक्लं नपुंसकम् । शुक्ल एवः, शुक्लौ द्वौ, शुक्ला बहव इति । शुक्लां शाटीमानयेति यद्यपि शाटयानयनं न विधीयते, शुक्लमात्रविधित्सा भवति न तत्र लिङ्गेन विशेषणं क्रियते तथाप्यनुवादभूतः स्त्रीलिङ्गनिर्देशो भवत्येव । शुक्लामानयेति । अनुवादभूतत्वाच्च न वाक्यभेदो भविष्यति । [SB. on IX. 1.33, p. 1675].

It can be so connected through the medium of some *dravya* only so that *where a* DRAVYA *and a* GUṆA *are mentioned in connection with an act, the* GUṆA *shall be taken as qualifying that* DRAVYA *only and thus being connected with the* KRIYĀ, *only through the medium of the accompanying* DRAVYA *and not independently of it.*[21] *But if no* DRAVYA *is mentioned at all side by side with the* GUṆA *then the* VIŚEṢAṆA *shall imply a* DRAVYA *and through it alone shall be connected with the* KRIYA.[22] Lastly it may be noted that though the function of a *vis'eṣaṇa* is to qualify its *vis'eṣya*, yet it won't be able to do it unless it has got the *samarthya* to do so which it possesses only when it is *vivakṣita. An adjective that has no* SĀMARTHYA *cannot qualify its* VIŚESYA *in its functions* i.e., the *vis'eṣaṇa* is not definitive but only descriptive like the *liṅga* and *vacana* of a candidate or of '*graham*' in the text '*Grahaṁ sammārṣṭi*'.[23]

16. Now we come to *the other type of* VIŚEṢANAS the SAṀKHYA-VIŚESAṆAS. And the first thing that we may notice regarding them is the discussion as to whether the word *gāyatrī* is a *saṁkhyā-s'abda*, and the conclusion arrived tt by S'ABARA in that connection. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* is favourable to the proposition of taking this word as a *saṁkhyā-s'abda* several reasons. The foremost of these is the constant association of the word *gāyatrī* with the number twenty-

---

21 अर्थैकत्वे द्रव्यगुणयोरैककर्म्यान्नियमः स्यात् । [MS.. III. 1.12] ; यत्रार्थैकत्वं श्रूयते द्रव्यगुणयोस्तत्र द्रव्यगुणावेकस्मिन्पदार्थे नियम्येयाताम् । कुतः । ऐककर्म्यात् एककार्यत्वात् । एकं हि कार्यं द्रव्यगुणयोः श्रूयते क्रयसंबन्धः । कथमेतदवगम्यते । एकवाक्यत्वात् । [SB, p. 691].

22 साक्षाद्धि द्रव्यं क्रियां प्रत्युपकरोति । गुणस्तु विशिनष्टि साधनम् ।...... । गुणस्य क्रियामभिनिर्वर्तयत एतदेव सामर्थ्यं यत्साधनं विशिंष्यात् । आकाङ्क्षति च क्रिया साधनविशेषणम् । चिह्नभूतो हि गुणः साधनं लक्षयति ।[SB. on III. 1.12, p. 695].

23 अपि च विशेषणे सत्यपि यदि ददातिरविशिष्टः पदान्तरे संबध्यतेऽविशिष्ट एव कार्ये प्राप्नोति । प्रयुज्यमानमपि हि विशेषणमशक्तं न विशेष्यं विशिनष्टि । [SB. on X. 3.63, p. 1898 f.]

four.[24] He also supports his view by pointing out the text '*Ye hi dve gāyatryau sā ekā jagatī.*' Now this statement can be understood only if the word *gāyatrī* signifies the number twenty-four; for we know that *jagatī* has forty-eight syllables which is equal to twice twenty-four. But if the word *gāyatrī* means only a *ṛc*, then the above statement will carry no sense. for *jagatī*, to be sure, does not contain two *ṛks*.[25] It is. therefore, proper to hold that *gāyatrī* is a *saṁkhyā-s'abda*. This view of the *Pūrva-pakṣin*, however, has been rejected both by JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA who first point out that there is no truth in arguing that the word *gāyatrī* is always associated with the number twenty-four. Had it been so the word ought to have been found to be applicable to any group of twenty-four dravyas or things. Such, however, is not our exprience. Thus there is *vyabhicāra;* and the concomitance, therefore, being uncertain can't establish the word *gāyatrī* as a *saṁkhyā-s'abda*.[26] But the positive reason in support of the opposite i.e. the *siddhānta* view is found in the existence of a separate word to denote the number twenty-four. Now as we have already seen above it is inadmissible, as far as possible, that one sense be conveyed by more than one word, for the simple reason that words after all are nothing but *saṁjñās* meant for the establishment of *vyavahāra;* and as one *saṁjñā* is enough for *vyavahāra-siddhi* there is no necessity for coining another *saṁ-*

---

24 अयं गायत्रीशब्दः संख्यावाचकः । कथं ज्ञायते अव्यतिरेकात् । चतुर्विंशतिसंख्यामेष न व्यभिचरति । न क्वचिच्चतुर्विंशतिसंख्यया विना दृष्टः । चतुर्विंशतिसंख्याहीनासु त्रिष्टुब्जगतीषु न कदाचिद भवति । [SB. on अव्यतिरेकात् तदाख्यत्वम् MS. VIII. 3.12, p. 1619].

25 यदि संख्यायां गायत्रीशब्दस्ततो जगत्यां द्वे चतुर्विंशतिसंख्ये इत्येतद्वचनमुपपद्यते । अथ ऋचस्ततो द्वे ऋचौ जगत्यां न स्त इत्येतद्वचनमनुपपन्नं स्यात् । [SB. on MS. VIII. 3.13, p. 1619].

26 गुणाद्वा द्रव्यशब्दः स्यादसर्वविषयत्वात् [MS. VIII. 3.16]; गुणाद् द्रव्यशब्दः स्यात् । चतुर्विंशत्यक्षरयुक्तस्य द्रव्यस्य वाचकः । कस्मात् । असर्वविषयत्वात् । यदि संख्याशब्दः स्यात्सर्वस्मिंश्चतुर्विंशतिसंख्येये वर्तेत गोयूथादौ । न च वर्तते । तस्मान्न संख्याशब्दः । [SB., p. 1620].

jñā for the same thing.[27] Finally it is pointed out that *gāyatrī is an autpattika nāmadheya* for *ṛk*, so that if it is used to convey any other sense but that of a *ṛk*, with which it is permanently connected, it can be done only by resorting to *lakṣaṇā on the basis parimāṇasāmānya*.[28] Thus it is proved that *gāyatrī* is not a *saṁkhyā-s'abda*. If we can generalise from this, we may state the rule by saying that *'a word which directly is not a numercial adjective shall not be looked upon as a* SAṀKHYĀ ŚABDA *even though it might be found to be used as such in some cases'*.

17. Another rule to be remembered in connection with the *saṁkhyā-vis'eṣaṇas* is what is well-known in the form of the maxim 'ŚATE PAÑCĀŚ AT.' JAIMINI in one of his *sūtras*[29] takes the numbers ten and twenty and discusses this very principle. According to the *Pūrva-pakṣin* it is wrong to say that ten are included in twenty.[30] What are ten and twenty? Well, they are *guṇas* both of them; and we know that a *guṇa* can't subsist on another *guṇa*. Hence logically it is impossible to have ten included in twenty. But this objection can be refuted by pointing out that by 'ten being included in twenty' we do not mean that *'Viṁs'atisaṁkhyāyām das'a saṁkhyā vartate'*. What we mean by the expression is only that in a group of twenty things

---

27 संख्यायाश्च शब्दवत्त्वात् [MS. VIII. 3.18]; चतुर्विंशतिसंख्यावाचकः शब्दोऽस्तिचतुर्विंशतिरिति । नास्त्यापरेण गायत्रीशब्देनार्थः । सञ्ज्ञाया व्यवहारार्थत्वादेकेन व्यवहारसिद्धेः । [SB, p. 1621].

28 उत्पत्तिनामधेयत्वाद्भक्त्या पृथक्सतीषु स्यात् । [MS. VIII. 3.22]; औत्पत्तिकमेतद्वचो नामधेयमित्येतदुक्तम् । अत उत्पत्तिनामधेयत्वाद्योऽयं जगत्यवयवे चतुर्विंशत्यक्षरे पदसञ्चये प्रयोगः स भक्त्या विज्ञेयः । न ह्येकस्य शब्दस्यानेकार्थता सत्यां गतौ न्याय्या । अत एतदुक्तम् ये हि द्वे गायत्र्यौ सैका जगतीति । यथा यौद्धौ कौरवौ स एको वाहीक इति । [SB, p. 1621 f.].

29 न विंशतौ दशेति चेत् । [MS. VIII. 3.14].

30 न विंशतौ दशसंख्यास्ति । न संख्या संख्यान्तरे वर्तते । गुणो हि संख्या । न च गुणा गुणेषु वर्तन्ते । एवमष्टाचत्वारिंशत्संख्यायां चतुर्विंशतिसंख्या नास्ति । [SB, p. 1619].

ten things do stand as a part of that group.[31] Thus though the numerals are used alone without the *saṁkhyeya, they* denote the *saṁkhyā* together with the *saṁkhyeya* and not merely the *saṁkhyā*. Thus we can now state the rule that *'A larger number (i.e. a* SAMUDĀYA *of so many things) contains within itself a smaller number (i.e. a group of so many things) as forming its part'.*

18. One more important characteristic of the numeral adjectives emerges out of this discussion. Just as a *guṇa-vis'eṣaṇa* when used alone stands for the *tad-guṇa-vis'iṣṭa vis'eṣya* similarly a SAṀKHYĀ VIŚEṢAṆA *also when used alone without any saṁkhyeya denotes not merely the saṁkhyā but the saṁkhyā-vis'iṣṭa saṁkhyeya.* And as a corollary to this rule it may further be stated that a SAṀKHYĀ *can be subservient to an act only by qualifying the* SĀDHANA *of the act.*[32] Thus again just as a *guṇa-vis'eṣaṇa* can't be connected with the *kārya* directly but only through the *vis'eṣya* similarly *the* SAṀKHYĀ-VIŚEṢAṆA *also can be connected with the kārya only through the saṁkhyeya and not directly without any medium.*

19. From the objection detailed above against the maxim 'S'ATE PAÑCĀŚAT' there emerges one more point for discussion regarding *saṁkhyā*. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* has argued that GUṆĀ GUṆEṢU NA VARTANTE' and hence that *'Na viṁs'atau das'a'*. It would appear as if he is arguing that one number can't give scope to another number. This is other words means that one number necessarily excludes another. Such a view, however, would not be right. For, if that were so then there would remain only one *saṁkhyā* viz. the *parārdha* which is the last or the highest number that

---

31 न ब्रूमः संख्यायां संख्या वर्तत इति । किं तर्हि । अष्टचत्वारिंशत्संख्यापरिच्छिन्नेष्वक्षरेष्ववयवभूते द्वे चतुर्विंशतिसंख्ये, न तु द्वे ऋचाविति । [SB. on VIII. 3.15, p. 1619].

32 साधनं परिच्छिन्दन्ती संख्या कर्मण्यङ्गीभवति । [SB. on VIII. 3.15, p. 1620].

we count. But such is not the case, for we do find all *saṁkhyās* being mentioned in the texts. Moreover we say '*Yasya das'a gāvas santi tasya dvau pañchakau gavām*'. Such statements will be impossible if the view of one number excluding another were right. Hence the conclusion that we arrive at in this connection is that 'SAṀKHYA SAṀKHYĀNTARAM NA NIAVARTAYATI'.[33]

20. *Another pecularity of the* SAṀKHYĀVIŚEṢAṆA *that is noticed by* S'ABARA *is that it is* PṚTHAKTVA-NIVEŚINĪ i.e. it subsists on so many different or separate units; and it must be remembered that this it does simultaneously.[34] From this it necessarily follows that a *saṁkhyā* can subserve the purpose of several things belonging to a group simultaneously.[35] In fact it is dependent on these things; and unless and until they come up to the required number the *saṁkhyā* cannot serve them at all. The general principle, that can be deduced from these characteristics of *saṁkhyā*, is that whenever a particular number is enjoined with reference to a particular thing—say the *prayājas*, for example—if that group consists of the required number of things then there is no difficulty; but if the group is deficient

---

33 न संख्या संख्यान्तरं निवर्तयति । यदि निवर्तयेदेकसंख्यमेव स्यात् । यस्य दश गावस्तस्य द्वौ पञ्चकौ गवामित्येतद्वचनं न स्यात् । भवति च तत् । तस्मान्न संख्या संख्यान्तरं निवर्तयति । [SB. on VIII. 3.15, p. 1619]; Also read: न चोत्तरस्यां संख्यायामुपात्तायां पूर्वाः संख्या उपात्ता भवन्ति इति । यदयं एका च दश च शतं च सहस्रं च परार्द्धं चेति सर्वसंख्या अनुक्रामति । यदि चोत्तरस्यां संख्यायामुपात्तायां पूर्वाः संख्या उपात्ता भवन्ति ऐकसंख्यमेव स्यात् । एकैव परार्द्धसंख्या भवेत् । सा हि सर्वाभ्य उत्तरा । यतस्त्वेकाद्या अनुक्रान्ता अतो विज्ञायते नोत्तरस्यां संख्यायामुपात्तायां पूर्वाः संख्या उपात्ता भवन्तीति । [SB. on VIII. 3.15, p. 1620].

34 एकस्मिन्पशौ पृथक्त्वनिवेशिनी संख्या नावकल्पते । [SB. on II. 2.21, p. 525]; पृथक्त्वनिवेशिनी हि चत्वारीति संख्या पृथक्त्वेनार्हा भवतीति । [SB. on VIII. 3.4, 35 p. 1614].

35 तन्त्रेण तूपकरोति संख्या । [SB. on V. 3.2, p. 1321]; संख्यायाश्च पृथक्त्वनिवेशात् । [MS. X. 5.17].

i.e. if the things constituting that group do not come up to the required number, then the deficiency is to be made up by repeating some one or more individuals of the group. Here it must be remembered that in such cases the required number refers not to the individuals of that group separately, but to the group as a whole, and hence it is wrong to repeat each individual of the group as many times. Again the *pṛthaktva-niveśinītva* of *saṁkhyā,* as far as possible, is not to be violated so that we have to take up all the individuals that are available. But if even after doing so some deficiency is found to remain, it is to be made up by repeating some individual or individuals of the group as many times as it is absolutely necessary for making up the required number.[36] Thus PṚTHAKTVA-NIVEŚINĪTVA *and* TANTREṆA UPAKĀRITVA *may be remembered as two important characteristics belonging to the* SAṀKHYĀ-VIŚEṢAṆAS *alone; while the other characteristics* noted above, of course, they will be found to possess in common with the other type of VIŚEṢAṆAS. Regarding this characteristic of the *saṁkhyā-viśeṣaṇa* we may also note that it is on account of this characteristic only that a SAṀKHYĀ *is said to denote* KARMA-BHEDA. This is clearly stated by JAIMINI in the sutra 'PṚTHAKTVA-NIVEŚĀT SAṀKHYAYĀ KARMA-BHEDAḤ SYĀT'.[37]

21. Another observation that may be made with regard to the *numerical adjectives* is that they *can be used with reference to things forming a group on account of some common*

---

36 अपि वा सर्वसंख्यत्वाद्विकारः प्रतीयेत । [MS. V. 3.2]; सर्वसंपाद्या संख्या कल्प्येत । कुतः । पृथक्त्वनिवेशिनी हि संख्या असति पृथक्त्वेऽभ्यासेन कल्प्येत । यावत्यसंभवो भेदस्य तावत्येवाभ्यस्येत । यावति संभवति तावति पृथक्त्वनिवेश एव न्याय्यः । तस्मात्संपाद्यैव संख्या । यत्तु पृषदाज्यवदिति । न पृषत्त्वैकस्य न संभवति । नासौ पृथक्त्वनिवेशिनी । न चैकस्य क्रियमाणा सर्वेषां तन्त्रेणोपकरोति । तस्मादवश्यं भेत्तव्या । तन्त्रेण तूपकरोति संख्या । इतरापेक्षा हि सा भवति ।
संख्यायाश्च पृथक्त्वनिवेशात् । [MS. X. 5. 17]; पृथक्त्वनिवेशिनी हि संख्या । यथा अष्टौ घटा इति । अभ्यासेनापृथक्त्वस्यात् । तस्मादागमेन पूरयितव्येति ।

37 MS. II. 2.21; and also cf. SB. on MS. X, 4.6.

factor bringing them together, or they may also be used with reference to things which by themselves do not form a group as such, but simply make up the number when counted together.[38] Thus, for example, when we say 'Four walls make a house', the walls referred to here must be the walls of one and the same house and not walls belonging to different houses. Thus here the walls form a group by themselves owing to the circumstance that they all belong to the same house. But when we say 'Four trees' the case is quite different. Here the trees may be any four trees and not necessarily belonging to any particular place or of any particular variety. Thus here the number four is used with reference to the number that is made up by the trees when counted together. The main point of difference between the two classes is this that in the former the *saṁkhyā* can't be used if the walls do not belong to one and the same house, while in the latter there is no such difficulty; for there the *saṁkhyā* refers merely to the number that is made up by the individuals when counted together. This rule is evolved in regard to the text *'Das'a yajñāyudhāni'* which is disscussed by S'ABARA where the *Pūrva-pakṣin* points out that the number ten can be predicated with reference to those several things viz. *sphya* and others only if they are construed or held as being the *āyudhas* of *yajña* in the literal

---

38 एकार्थसंबन्धेनैव संख्यावकल्पते, नानार्थसंबन्धात्सा नावकल्पते ।[SB. on IV. 1.7, p. 1201]; समाने हि कस्मिंश्चिदाश्रीयमाणे संख्याव्यवहारो भवति [SB. on IX. 2.21, प्रथमवर्णकम्, p. 1710]; विशेषे हि कस्मिंश्चित्संख्या भवति, इतरथा हि सर्वत्र सर्वसंख्या भवेयुः । [SB. on IX. 2.24, p. 1712]; लोके हि निर्विशेषिते संख्याशब्द उच्चरिते एकजातीयेप्रत्ययो भवति । कुतः । अन्यथा व्यवहारानुपपत्तेः । असत्येकस्मिन् जातिविशेषे सर्वत्रान्यैः सह परार्धसंख्या निविष्टा । परार्धस्य चावान्तरसंख्याभिः संव्यवहारः क्रियते । येषामेकेन केनचित्संबन्धस्तेषां तमेकं संबन्धिनमपेक्ष्य संख्या निविशते । स तत्रैकः संबन्धी वक्तव्यः । प्रकृतो वा ग्रहीतव्यः । अर्थाद्वा य आपद्येत स उपादेयः ।————। यथा शतमाभ्यां दीयतामिति एकजातीयानां शतं न भिन्नजातीयानाम् । [SB. on शब्दार्थश्चापि लोकवत् MS. X. 3.44, p. 1886]; संख्यापि पाठाभिप्राया भविष्यति [SB. on IV. 1.8, p. 1201].

sense of the term; and hence we must interpret this text as a mandatory text enjoining the act of giving away the *das'a yajñāyudhas.* This argument of the *pūrva-pakṣin* is based on the assumption that 'EKĀRTHASAMBANDHENAIVA SAṀKHYĀ AVAKALPATE NĀNĀRTHA-SAMBANDHĀT SĀ NĀVAKALPATE'. *But as has been already explained above such is not the invariable rule regarding the usage of* SAṀKHYĀ *which can be used* PĀṬHĀBHIPRĀYEṆA *also.* S'ABARA points out this and argues that it is, therefore, not necessary to connect the *āyudhas* with *yajña* in its literal sense. These are called *yajñāyudhas* only by *lakṣaṇā* owing to similarity. And the very fact that the word *yajñāyudha* in this text is *lākṣaṇika* again shows that the text has to be construed as an *anuvāda vākya* rather than a *vidhi;* for, as has been already noticed before, a text involving *lakṣaṇā* should, as far as possible, be construed as an *anuvāda* rather than a *vidhi.*[39]

22. And the last thing to note about the *numerical adjective* is that it may denote *paryāya* as well as *yaugapadya,* as in *Caturṣ-gṛheṣu devadatto bhuktavān'* and *'Triṣu nāgadantakeṣu ghaṭo' vasthāpyaḥ'.* The point to be remembered in this connection is that when a SAṀKHYĀ ŚABDA *is construed with the* KRIYĀ *we have to take it as denoting* YAUGAPADYA; *but if it is not construed with the* KRIYĀ *then it shall denote* PARYĀY *or* ABHYĀSA *only.*[40]

---

39 cf. MS. IV. 1.7-8, and SB. on the same.

40 एवं श्रूयते एकं साम तृचे क्रियते इति। साम्नि क्रियमाणे निर्वृत्तौ गुणभूता त्रिसंख्या ऋग्गता श्रूयते। तत्र यद्येकस्यामृच्युपक्रम्य तस्यां चैतत्परिसमापयेयुर्न त्रिसंख्यया साधनमस्य परिच्छिन्द्युः। एकसंख्यापरिच्छिन्नमस्य क्रियमाणं स्यात्। तत्र श्रुतिर्बाध्येत। तद्यथायं घटः त्रिषु नागदन्तकेषु स्थाप्यतामित्युक्ते व्यासज्य स्थाप्यते, न पर्यायेण। एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम्। ननु पर्यायेऽप्येवंजातीयकः शब्दो भवति। यथा त्रिषु कुलेषु देवदत्तो भुङ्क्ते इत्युक्ते न यौगपद्यमवगम्यते। पर्यायेणापि भुञ्जाने भवत्येष वादः। एवमिहापि पर्यायेण प्राप्नोति। इति। अत्रोच्यते। न तु त्रिसंख्या भुजिं प्रत्युपदिश्यते। येनैतदेवं भवति। तत्र कुलशब्देन संबध्यते। त्रिषु कुलेषु न द्वयोरेकस्मिन्वेति। यदा भुजिनिर्वृत्तिं प्रत्युपदिश्यते तदा यौगपद्येनैव

23. The next class of words that we have now to think of is the verb or ĀKHYĀTA. In the beginning[41] of the second *adhyāya* of his work, JAIMINI has defined the *ākhyāta* in the following words: 'YEṢĀMTŪTPATTĀV ARTHE SVE PRAYOGO NA VIDYATE TĀNY ĀKHYĀTĀNI' Verbs, according to him, are those words which on their origination i.e., utterance have no object (to be connected with). Thus, in short, verbs are words which speak of something which is yet to be accomplished or *bhavya.* The same idea is generally expressed by saying *that* NĀMAS *are* BHŪTARTHA *while* AKHYĀTAS *are* BHAVYĀRTH In other words *ākhyātas* have been described as 'words denoting an action in the process of becoming(BHĀVĀRTHĀḤ KARMAŚABDĀḤ).

24. In two places S'ABARA has discussed as to what is the main signification of the verb. According to the *Pūrvapakṣin* the main point that is denoted by the verb is the agent. He in his support quotes the view of the grammarians to the effect that the idea that is perceived from a word is as a whole conveyed by the *prakṛti* and the *pratyaya* together. He also notes another view of theirs according to which the s'gnification of the *pratyaya* is either the agent or the object. Then he argues that since the *pratyaya* is the principal part of the verb, *prakṛti* being only subord'nate to it, it is but natural to conclude that *pratyayārtha* is *pradhāna or that kartā* or

---

भोजयितव्यः । इह तु त्रिसंख्या क्रियते इत्यनेन संबध्यते । एवं सति क्रियायां त्रिसंख्या विहिता भवति । तत्र स्वपदगतस्य किंचिद् विधायकेन विहितं भवति । इतरथा ऋचः संख्यायाश्च संबन्धस्य पदान्तरगतेन शब्देन भावनोच्येत । तत्रार्थविप्रकर्षः स्यात् । तस्मात् सामनिर्वृत्तिं प्रति त्रिसंख्योच्यते । [SB. on IX. 2.14, p. 1706f]. न ह्यत्र ऋक् सामनिर्वृत्त्यर्थमुपादीयते । तस्मान्न शक्यमिदं वक्तुं सामनिर्वृत्तिसाधनभूतामृचं त्रिशब्दः परिच्छेत्स्यतीति । साम स्तोत्रस्य गुणभूतं निर्दिश्यते——————। तत्र प्रत्यृचं न्यायेन गानं प्राप्तम् । न सामनिर्वृत्त्या संबध्यते । किं तर्हि । ऋग्भिः । तत्रान्यथा नावकल्पत इत्यभ्यासो लक्ष्यते । तिसृष्वभ्यसितव्यं सामेति । यथा त्रिषु कुलेषु देवदत्तो भोजयितव्य इति । यदा त्रिसंख्याकुलैः संबध्यते तदाभ्यासो लक्ष्यते । एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम् । [SB. on IX. 2.20, p. 1710].

41 cf. MS. II. 1.4.

karma is the main point in the signification of a verb. This in other words means that the ĀKHYĀTA *is* KARTṚ PRADHĀNA (*even* KARMA-PRADHĀNA) *rather than* KRIYĀ-PRADHĀNA. This view, however, has been refuted by *S'abara* who points out that the views of the gramarians referred to by the *pūrva-pakṣin are right in so far as they pertain to verbal nouns i.e. nouns of agency derived from roots such as* PĀCAKA *and* LĀAAKA. In such cases it is that *kriyā* is subordinate to the *kartā*. *But such is not the case with the verbs.* For *the verb, as we know, is bhāva-pradhāna.* This *bhāvapradhānatva* of a verb can be proved in another way also. When we say *yajeta* there at once arise the *ākāṅkṣās* of the *sādhana*, the *sādhya* and the *itikartavyatā*. Had the verb been *kartṛ-pradhāna* no such *ākāṅkṣās* would arise; for we never ask *kena, kimartham and katham* when we hear the word *pācaka*. Hence we must conclude that *the verb is* BHĀVA-PRADHĀNA *and not* KARTṚPRADHĀNA. It is on the basis of this *bhāvapradhānatva* of the verb that S'ABARA and JAIMINI arrive at the conclusion that the *kāmya karmans shall be* repeated for *phalādhikya.*[42] S'ABARA in his connection goes

---

42 इह यजेत जुहुयादिति धातुना क्रियोच्यते, प्रत्ययेन कर्ता। तयोः कर्ता प्रधानभूतः उपसर्जनभूता क्रिया। प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सहार्थं ब्रूतः। अनुप्रयोगश्च कर्तृ-प्राधान्य एव भवति। पचति देवदत्त इति। तेन होतुर्यष्टुश्च फलमुच्यते। सकृद्धुतेन सकृदिष्टेन वाऽसौ होता यष्टा च जातः। तत्र द्वितीयादिप्रयोगोऽनर्थकः स्यात् कृतार्थ-त्वादङ्गवत्। ... ...। नात्र होतुर्यष्टुश्च फलं श्रूयते। यत्तु प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ सहार्थं ब्रूत इति। तत् कर्मनिमित्तेषु नामपदेषु पाचको लावक इत्येवमादिषु। आख्याते तु न कर्ता क्रिया प्रधानतः। किं तर्हि। भावप्रधानमाख्यातम्। भावना च न कस्यचिच्छ्रूयते। भावनाप्रयुक्तस्य साधनग्रामस्यापेक्षितत्वाद्, यजेत केन किमर्थं कथमिति। कर्तृप्राधान्ये कार्याभावात् न साधनाकाङ्क्षया भवितव्यम्। न हि भवति पाचकः केन कथं किमर्थमिति। भावना च फलस्योच्यते, न क्रियायाः। यच्च भाव्यते तद् व्यक्तमसत्। सतो हि भावो नोपपद्यते। असच्चेत्कर्मणा भाव्यते पुनः पुनरपि कर्मणा भावयिष्यते। कृषिवत्। तस्मात् फलार्थिना काम्यं यावदिच्छमभ्य-सितव्यम्। [SB. on MS. XI. 1.22 and 24, p. 2013 f.]

even further and points out that the *Pūrva-pakṣin* has misunderstood the views of the grammrians.[43] When from a verb we get the perception of an act to be performed, we may also get some about the *kartā* and other *kārakas*. But these latter we get from the *ākhyāta s'abda* not directly but only by implication; and what is got at by implication is not *s'abdārtha*. This shows that *bhāva* is the real *artha* of an *ākhyāta,* and not *kartā* or *karma.* But what do the grammarians mean when they declare *'Kartari s'ap'* or *'Karmaṇi yak'*? S'ABARA answers this quest'on by pointing out that these *sūtras* are to be read in the light of another *sūtra* that we find there to the effect that singular number shall be used to denote one *padārtha*, dual for two and plural for many. The *sūtras* in question thus mean that if the *kar*tā is one then the verb shall be in the singular number, and so on. It is thus that we must interpret the *sūtras* if at all we want to get at the right signification of the same. Thus ultimately we see that ĀKHYĀTA *is* BHĀVAPRADHĀNA and not KARTṚ-

---

43 सर्वेष्वाख्यातेषु क्रियानुष्ठानं श्रूयते न कारकं किंचित्। कथमेतद्गम्यते। प्रत्ययात्। यतः क्रियामनुष्ठेयां प्रतीमः। ननु कर्तारमपि प्रतियन्ति। सत्यं प्रतियन्ति न तु शब्दात्। कुतस्तर्हि। अर्थात्। यदा क्रियानुष्ठातव्या विधीयते तदार्थात्कारकव्यापारो गम्यते। यश्चार्थाद्गम्यते न स श्रोतः। यश्च न श्रौतो न स वाक्याद्गम्यते। कथमसौ प्रकरणं बाधिष्यते। आह। प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूत इत्याचार्योपदेशात्कर्ता शब्दार्थः कर्म चेत्यवगम्यते। कर्तरि शप् कर्मणि यगिति प्रत्ययार्थं कर्तारं कर्म च समामनन्त्याचार्याः। तस्माच्छब्दार्थः कर्ता कर्म चेति। उच्यते। नाचार्यवचनात्सूत्रकारवचनाद्वा शब्दार्थो भवति। प्रत्ययादसौ गम्यते। अनुष्ठेया क्रिया प्रतीता सती कारकाणि प्रत्याययतीत्यवगतमेतत्। अपि च नैव कर्ता प्रत्ययार्थः कर्म वेत्याचार्या आहुः। ननु कर्तरि कर्मणि च लकारः श्रूयते। नासौ कर्मणि कर्तरि वा श्रूयते। किन्त्वेकस्मिन्नेकवचनं, द्वयोर्द्विवचनं, बहुषु बहुवचनमिति तत्रापरं वचनम्। तत्रैवमभिसंबन्धः क्रियते। एकस्मिन्कर्तरि द्वयोः कर्त्रोः बहुषु कर्तृषु इति। एवं कर्मण्येकत्वादिसंबन्धः। तत्र नैवं भवति, कर्तरि भवत्येकस्मिंश्चेति। कथं तर्हि। कर्तर्येकस्मिन्नेकवचनं कर्तुरेकत्व इत्यर्थः एवं द्वित्वे, बहुत्वे कर्मणि च। एवं वर्ण्यमाने लौकिकन्यायानुगतः सूत्रार्थो वर्णितो भवति। सूत्राक्षराणि च न्यायानुगतानि भवन्ति etc. [SB. on III. 4.13, pp. 913-26].

PRADHĀNA *or* KARMAPRADHĀNA *as the* PŪRVA-PAKṢIN *would have it.*

25. This very idea has been repeatedly referred[44] to by S'ABARA in his *bhāṣya* while speaking about the *ākhyātas* in general. Thus in one place he writes, 'The sense conveyed by the *ākhyāta* is (the process of an action) from the beginning right up to the end'. And this is not only sanctioned by the *s'āstrakāras* but is also actually accepted in our ordinary parlance. Hence it is that words like *pāka* and *yāga* which denote mere *sattā* and not the whole process are not *ākhyātas*. The implication of this view regarding the *ākhyāta-s'abdas* is clearly brought out by S'ABARA in his commentary on MS. VI. 2. 13 where the point of discussion is whether it is incumbent on a person to carry to completion an act that has been commenced by him. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* argues that texts like '*prajākāmo yajeta*' only point out the way of fulfilling one's desires, but they lay down neither the *upakrama* nor the *samāpana* of the *upāyas*. Hence he concludes that it is not incumbent on man to finish the act that he might commence. S'ABARA, however, points out that *an* ĀKHYĀTA *denotes an act from the beginning up to the end; and that when an act is enjoined by means of an* ĀKHYĀTA *it means that the act is to be carried to completion if the injunction is to be obeyed.* Thus the main point to be noted is that of the whole process of becoming it is the *parisamāpti* that forms the main point of the *ākhyātārtha* (*the ārambha* being obtained by implication).[45] A similar discussion is raised round the question whether an act begun

44 एष ह्याख्यातार्थः स ह्युपक्रमप्रभृत्यपवर्गपर्यन्तमाह । [SB. on VI . 3.24] and also cf. SB. on VI. 2.13.

45 एवं तस्याख्यातस्यार्थमुपदिशन्ति, उपक्रमप्रभृत्यपवर्गपर्यन्तमाहेति उपक्रमादारभ्य यावत्परिसमाप्तिरित्येतावान्व्यापारविशेषस्तस्यार्थो न यथा पाकस्याग इति । तत्र हि पाकसत्तामात्रं निर्दिश्यते । नारभ्य परिसमापितव्यमिति । एवं चाख्यातार्थं लौकिका अपि प्रतिपद्यन्ते । तत्र नारंभे पुरुषप्रयत्नश्चोद्यत इति गम्यते । यतश्चोदितं न नियोगत आरभन्ते । नियोगतः पुनः परिसमापयन्ति तेन नोभे आरम्भपरिसमाप्ती शब्दार्थः । परिसमाप्त्यामर्थप्राप्तत्वादारम्भस्य । [SB. on VI. 2.13, p. 1396].

by a man is to be carried to completion even after his death. And an affirmative answer is given to this question on the strength of this very characteristic of the *ākhyātas'abdas.*[46] It may, however, be noted that when the action in question is *laukika* and not *s'āstrokta* there is no question of obeying the injunction of the *Veda;* and it is not incumbent upon man to carry it to completion.[47]

26. Nor can we remain blind to the *other implication of this* MĪMĀṀSĀ *view of an* ĀKHYĀTA. The general rule 'BHŪTABHAVYAYOS SAMUCCĀRAṆE BHŪTĀNĀṀ BHAVYĀRTHATA NYĀYYĀ' is based on the general principle that as far as possible *adṛṣṭārthatā* of things or actions is to be avoided.[48] Now, as we have seen already, *nāma* and other types of words are *bhūtārtha* while the *ākhyāta-s'abdas* are *bhavyārtha,* which naturally leads us to the conclusion that the *nāma* and the other types of *S'abdas* are for the *ākhyāta-S'abda.* This in other words means that the verb is the principal word in a sentence; and that the other *s'abdas* are subordinate to it. A sentence as we know is nothing but putting together of the *bhūtārtha s'abdas* in combination with some *bhavyārtha s'abda*[49] so that the *ākhyāta* naturally gains a preponderance over the rest of the words. It is on the strength of this very principle that JAIMINI declares that ĀKHYĀTA-S'ABDAS *are* APŪRVASYA VĀCAKAḤ.[50] This, however,

---

46 मरणकामो ह्येतेन यजेतेति आरभ्य परिसमापितव्यमित्याख्यातार्थः । तेन समाप्तिराख्यातेनैवोक्ता [SB. on स्याद्वोभयोः प्रत्यक्षशिष्टत्वात् । MS. X. 2.57, p. 1853].

47 Read MS. VI. 2.16-18 ; यद्यन्तरेण शास्त्रं न प्राप्येत ततः शास्त्रमर्थवदिति प्रकल्प्येत तस्मान्नेदं (लौकिकं कर्म) शास्त्रोक्तम् शास्त्रोक्तं च सामिकृते त्यक्तेऽत्यन्तं शिष्टा गर्हन्ते देवताश्रये च । [SB. on VI. 2.18, p. 1399].

48 भव्यार्थास्ते भूतार्थैः समुच्चारिताः । भूतस्य भव्यार्थतायां दृष्टार्थता । भव्यार्थस्य प्रयोजनवत उत्पत्तिरर्थवती । सा च भूतेन क्रियत इति दृष्टोऽर्थः । भव्यस्य पुनर्भूतार्थतायां न किंचिद् दृश्यते । कल्प्यते चादृष्टम् तस्मान्न यागो द्रव्यार्थः । [SB. on II. 1.4, p. 388]; also cf. SB. on VI. 1.1 ; and XI. 2.66.

49 MS. II. 1.25.

50 MS. II. 1.4.

does not mean that all acts i.e. the *arthas* denoted by the *ākhyātas* are *pradhāna.* In fact acts may be *apradhāna* as well as *pradhāna,* according as they serve to produce some *dravya* or some *saṁskāra* on some *dravya* or not. It is, therefore, wrong to argue that because a certain act is denoted by an *ākhyāta-s'abda,* therefore it must be *pradhāna.* The *prādhānya* or otherwise of an act depends not upon the type of word that is used to express it, but on the purpose it serves, so that if it serves an *adṛṣṭa* purpose it may be *pradhāna* while if it serves some *dṛṣṭa* purpose then it is, of course, *apradhāna,* being subservient to that purpose. Hence it is that JAIMINI and S'ABARA admit *yāga, homa,* and others as being *pradhāna* or independent (i.e. bhinna) *karmas.*[51] Another illustration of this principle namely that an act is sometimes *apradhāna* is to be found in texts like '*Svarga-kāmo yajeta*'. Here *svarga* is a *dravya-s'abda* and *yajeta* is an *ākhyāta-s'abda,* so that according to the *Pūrva-pakṣin svarga* is subservient to *yāga.* But the fact is just the opposite of this. For in such cases it is the *kāma* that is to be accomplished or *bhavya* and is more desired by the man; while the *kriyā,* though *bhavya,* is desired by the man only as a means of accomplishing his *kāma* or desire. This, therefore, shows that in the *phala-vidhis* or rather the *adhikāra-vidhis* it is the *phala* that is more important, while the *kriyā* is only subordinate to the *phala* since it represents only the *sādhana* of accomplishing it.[52]

27. • Now the most important thing that we have to

---

51 MS. II. 1.7-8 ; also cf. II. 2.1 and SB. thereon. Also read : न ह्याख्यातशब्दाभिधानेन प्रधानभूतो गुणभूतो वार्थो भवति यः स्वभावतो गुणभूतोऽर्थः नासावाख्याताभिधानेन प्रधानभूतो भवति । तथाभूतेन संयोगे सत्याख्यातशब्दभूतेन यथार्थविधयो भवेयुः यत्प्रधानं तत्प्रधानमेव यद्गुणभूतं तद्गुणभूतमेव 'इति । [SB. on X. 3.10, p. 1869] ; and MS. VI. 1.1 ; and भूतं द्रव्यं भव्यं कर्म । भूतस्य च भव्यार्थता न्याय्या दृष्टार्थत्वात् नतु भव्यस्य भूतार्थता । तत्र दृष्ट उपकारस्त्यज्येत [SB. p. 1348].

52 cf. MS. VI. 1.1-3 ; अतः स्वर्गः प्रधानतः कर्म गुणतः इति स्वर्गकाममधिकृत्य यजेतेति वचनमित्यधिकारलक्षणमिदं सिद्धं भवति । [SB., p. 1354]

notice about the *ākhyāta-s'abdas* is that it is these ĀKHYĀTAS *alone that have got the power of conveying the sense of and hence enjoining an action.* No other word can do so. This fact about the *ākhyāta-s'abdas* has been stated by JAIMINI in one of his *sūtras* and has been very well explained by S'ABARA who writes that the *ākhyāta-s'abdas* alone have the capacity to lay down an injunction.[53]

28. At MS. I. 4. 25[54] JAIMINI has suggested another peculiarity of this class of words in the words: 'ARTHĀD VĀ KALPANA EKADES'ATVĀT'. This pecularity has been very clearly set forth by S'ABARA who points out that when a verb denotes an action the potency or capacity of things is always helpful (in determining the exact form of the action denoted). Thus when we say *'Kaṭe bhuṅkte'* we really mean *'Kaṭe samāsīnaḥ kāṁsyapātryām odanam nidhāya bhuṅkte'.* Similarly the text *'Sruveṇāvadyati, svadhitaināvadyati, hastenāvadyati'* must be understood as enjoining the different *sādhanas* for the *avadāna-kriyā* (of the different things) according to their capacity e.g. *sruva* for liquids, *svadhiti* for flesh, hand for collected things etc., and not all of them as *sādhanas* for the *avadāna-kriyās* of all objects. The same rule is rather differently stated by S'ABARA in simpler and less technical terms when he writes, 'ĀKHYĀTENA HI YORTHAḤ KARTAVYA ITY UCYATE TATRAITAD ANUBADHAṀ BHAVATI YATHĀ ŚAKYAṀ TATHĀ ITI'. The question which S'ABARA is discussing here is with reference to the *prāyas'citta* when there are several *appacchedas* one after the other. There according to the *Pūrvapakṣin* the first *apaccheda* is known first and hence a *prāyas'citta* for it must necessarily be taken; and if there are

---

53 चोदनाप्रभुत्वाच्च [MS. X. 3.3]; अस्त्येषां चोदनाप्रभुत्वं सामर्थ्यम् । प्रभवन्त्येते कर्म चोदयितुम् । कुतः । आख्यातशब्दा ह्येते । आख्यातशब्दाश्च कर्मणश्चोदकाः समधिगताः भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दा इति । त एत सगुणं कर्म चोदयिष्यन्ति । [SB., p. 1866]; Also read न ह्याख्यातमन्तरेण [SB. on I. 4.8, p. 339]

54 This सूत्र by itself from the सामर्थ्यानुसारेणाव्यवस्थितानां व्यवस्थाधिकरणम् ।

other successive *apacchedas, prāyhs'cittas* for them may be taken without causing a clash with the first. But such a view of the matter is not right; for the idea of the first *prāyas'citta* must be set aside by the second or any subsequent *prāyas'cittas* if the latter is to rise at all. Thus there will remain the idea of the *uttara* i.e., the last *prāyas'citta* only to the exclusion of the idea of all the preceding *prāyas'cittas.* Hence the conclusion is that only the *uttarāpacchedanimitta prāyas'citta shall* be performed, and not the *prāyas'cittas* for all the preceding *apacchedas also.*[55] It must be, however, remembered that this rule should not be utilized for bringing in any idea, that we may think of, within the range of the denoting power of the *ākhyātas'abda.* What is meant is *that any circumstance or circumstances that may be ansolutely necessary for the performance of an action canbe implied and sanctioned. But this is done just to avoid impossibility of the performance of an action.* This has been clearly stated by S'ABARA in his commentary on MS. X. 8. 16.[56]

29. *The idea of number is always to be accepted as being subservient to an* ĀKHYĀTA This is another rule that is discussed and evolved by JAIMINI and S'ABARA in connection with texts like '*Pas'um ālabhate*' and *Anaḍvāhau yunakti*'. Here the question is whether the *ekatva* (of the *pas'u* in the former text) and the *dvitva* (of the *anaḍuh in the latter* text are *vivakṣita.* The *Pūrva-pakṣin* points out that *saṁkhyā* is directly perceived as being connected with the *prātipadikārtha;* and hence it is not possible to take it as being directly

---

55 पौर्वापर्ये पूर्वदौर्बल्यम् । कुतः । आख्यातेन हि योऽर्थः कर्तव्य इत्युच्यते तत्रैतदनुबद्धं भवति यथा शक्यं तथेति । तत्पूर्वविज्ञानबाधेन शक्यते, नान्यथा । तेन पूर्वविज्ञानं बाधित्वा इदं कर्तव्यमिति भवति शब्दार्थः । [SB. on VI. 5.54, p. 1476 f]

56 यथा शक्यते तथा कर्तव्यमित्याख्यातार्थो भविष्यतीति । उच्यते । स्यादेतदेवं यदि वर्त्माधिबाधामन्तरेणाहवनीयोपदशो नावकल्पेत । द्वेधा हि शक्यते कर्तुं वर्त्माधि बाधित्वा परिहृत्य वा । अत्र बाधायां वर्त्मनीति प्रत्ययोऽनुग्रहीतव्यो भवति । तस्मात्परिहारः श्रेयान् । [SB. on X. 8.16, p. 2072]

connected with the *yajña* as its *aṅga.*[57] Nor can it be argued that usage shows number as being *ākhyātvacanasyāṅga-bhūta.*[58] For very often what is perceived from a word is not its direct signification. For example, the word *apara* gives us a perception of *para also.* But this does not mean that it is the direct sense of the word *apara.* Hence according to the *pūrva-pakṣin* the conclussion is that *saṁkhyā* is not *prayojavatī* and hence it is not *vivakṣit.*[59] In reply to all this it has been pointed out that the usual rule for determining the signification of a word is *'Yasyāgame yad upajāyate sa tasyārthaḥ'.*[60] Following this rule we find that number is perceived always along with the *ākhyātārtha;* and hence we must conclude that *saṁkhyā* is *aṅgabhūta to ākhyātārtha.*[61] The same fact again is shown by the circumstance that if number, as argued by the *Pūrva-pakṣin,* were to be connected with the *prātipadikārtha* and not with the *ākhvātārtha,* then the *ākhyāta* will have to accomplish two things. First it will have to yield its own signification; and secondly it will at the same time have to do the additional duty of bringing about the connection between the *saṁkhyā* and the *saṁkhyeya.* But this is more than what one *ākhyāta-s'abda* can accomplish. If, on

---

57 विभक्तिर्हि श्रुत्या प्रातिपदिकार्थगत संख्यार्थं ब्रूते । वाक्येन सा यज्ञाङ्गं ब्रूयात् । वाक्याच्च श्रूतिर्बलीयसी । तस्मान्न यज्ञाङ्गं विवक्षितम् । [SB. on IV. 1.11, p. 1203].

58 प्रतीयत इति चेत् । [MS. IV. 1.3];; प्रतीयते हि संख्यातवंचनस्याङ्गभूता । यथा पशुमानयेत्युक्ते एक आनीयते, पशू इति द्वौ, पशूनिति बहव आनीयन्ते । यश्च प्रतीयते स शब्दार्थः । तस्माद्यज्ञस्याङ्गभूता संख्येति । [SB. p. 1204].

59 अशब्दार्थोऽपि हि प्रतीयते । यथा [see page 18, n. 1].

60 SB. on MS. IV. 1.15.

61 आख्यातवाच्ये ह्यर्थे उपलभ्यते लोके पशुमानयेत्येकवचने सति एकत्वपशुत्वविशिष्टमानयनं प्रतीयते । पशू आनयति द्वित्वविशिष्टं गम्यते । तत्र ह्येकत्वमपैति द्वित्वमुपजायते । यस्य चागमे यदुपजायते स तस्यार्थ इति गम्यते । [SB. on IV. 1.15, p. 1205]

the other hand, the number is accepted as being *ākhyāta-vacanasya aṅgabhūta,* both the *prātipadikārtha* as well as the *vibhaktyartha* being connected with the *ākhyāta,* the latter will yield the sense of a *vis'iṣṭa kriyā* i.e. the act as characterised by the *vibhaktyartha* and the *prātipadikārtha.* Hence ultimately we arrive at the rule that SAṀKHYA *is* ĀKHYĀTA-VACANASYA AṄGABHŪTA. This principle is very often referred to as the PAS'VEKATVA NYĀYA.[62]

30. *And what is true of the number is also true of the gender,* so that gender also is to be understood as being connected with the *ākhyātārtha* or in other words it means that *liṅga* like *saṁkhyā* is also *vivakṣita.*[63] The implication of these two rules is that the text *'anaḍvāhau yunakti'* is to be understood as enjoining the act of *yoking two bulls'* and the text *'Pas'um ālabhate'* is to be understood as enjoining the act of sacrificing one male *pas'u.* If, however, the number and the gender were not *vivakṣita* then the texts will have to be taken as enjoining merely the acts of yoking and sacrificing respectively so that it would be immaterial whether the number of animals yoked or sacrified is one or two or more and whether they are males or females.

31. Here by way of contrast we may take the text *'Grahaṁ samārṣṭi'.* In this text the *ekatva* of *graha is not vivakṣita,* for *graha* is meant to serve as a *lakṣaṇa* of what is to be cleansed, so that the sense of the text is 'One cleanses what is characterised by *grathatva'.* Thus there is no question as to how many things are to be cleansed, because the texts enjoins the cleansing of all things that are characterised

---

62 यदुक्तं श्रुत्या वाक्यार्थो बाध्यत इति । उच्यते । न श्रुतिर्ब्रूते वाक्यार्थो नास्तीति । केवलं तु प्रातिपदिकार्थगतां संख्यामहि । तादृशी संख्या वाक्येन यज्ञे विधीयते । प्रातिपदिकार्थो ह्याख्यातवाच्येन संबध्यते विभक्त्यर्थोऽपि । तथाहि तद्विशेषणविशिष्ट आलम्भो गम्यते । तत्रैकार्थत्वादेकवाक्यमवकल्पते । पशौ हि संख्यायां विधीयमानायां एक आख्यातशब्दो न शक्नुयादाख्यातार्थं विधातुं संख्यासंख्येयसंबंधं च । तस्माद्यज्ञे विवक्षिता संख्या । [SB. on IV. 1.15, p. 1205]

63 तथा च लिङ्गम् । [MS. IV. 1.17];

by *grahatva.* Hence it is that in such texts the *vacana* i.e., *saṁkhyā* (and *liṅga*) is not *vivakṣita.* In texts like '*Pas'unā-yajeta*', on the other hand, a question arises as to with how many *pas'us* the sacrifice is to be performed and the answer to that question is to be found in the *vacana* (*saṁkhyā*) of the word *pas'unā.* Hence it is that in such texts *vacana* is *vivakṣita.* Thus we may now say that the *vacana* is *vivakṣita* if it belongs to a word which is not *uddes'ya* i.e. if the word is *vidhigata* or *upādeya.* This very conclusion, it must be remembered, holds good in the case of *liṅga,* so that the *liṅga* of a *s'abda* will be *vivakṣita* only if that word is *upādeya;* but it shall be *avivakṣita* if the word to which it belongs is *uddes'ya.* The second principle that we have noted in this paragraph in contrast with the one noted in the last two paragraphs is commonly known as and referred to by the name GRAHAIKATVA-NYĀYA.[64]

32. One more important rule regarding the construction of the *ākhyāta-s'abdas* has been evolved by S'ABARA in a discussion regarding the text '*Yasyobhayaṁ havir ārtim ṛcched aindram pañcas'arāvam odanam nirvapet*'. Here the main point of contest is whether the *ārti that* is spoken in it is qualified by *havis* only or by both *havis* as well as *ubhaya.* In simpler terms the question is whether this expiation is enjoined with reference to the *ubhaya-hivarārti* or merely the *havirārti,* which latter would mean that the expiation is enjoined with reference to *anyatara-havirārti.* Here there can be no doubt that *havis* is to be connected with *ārti;* for otherwise there would be no sense in the condition as would appear to be laid down by the words '*Yasya ārtim ṛcchet*' which is too general astatment to serve as a contingency.[65] The same, however, is not the case with the word *ubhaya* so that the point to be discussed is whether

---

64 MS. III. 1. 13-15, and SB. thereon.

65 मृष्यामहे हविषा विशेषणम्। अविशेष्यमाणेऽनर्थं स्यात्। यस्यार्तिमा- च्छेदित्यविशेषे यत्किंचिदिति गम्यते। तत्र सर्वस्यैव किंचिदार्त्तिमृच्छति। अन्तश्चरितं, निमिषितं, चिन्तितमिति। तत्र यस्येति निमित्तवचनं निश्यमनुपपन्नं गम्यते। तस्माद-

the word *ubhaya* together with the word *havis* is to be connected with the word *ārti* or whether the word *ubhaya* goes with *havis* only and can't be connected with the word *ārti* at all. The *pūrva-pakṣin* takes the former view and argues as follows:—(1) Since a *vis'iṣṭārtha* viz. *ubhayaṁ haviḥ* is spoken of in the vicinity of *ārti*, therefore, *ārti* shall be connected with the *visiṣṭārtha only*[66] (2) Again the word *ubhaya* may be said to be connected with the word *havis* which in its turn is connected with *ārti*. This also shows that *ārti* is qualified by both *ubhaya* as well as *havi*[67] (3) And the connection of the word *ubhaya* with the word *havis* can be established on the analogy of sentences like *'S'uklā gaur ānīyatām'* on hearing which what the servant does is the bringing of a *s'uklatva-vis'iṣṭa go*, a fact which shows that in that sentence the *ānayana kriyā* is connected with *s'uklatva* as well as *go*. Similarly in the case under consideration *ārti* may be connected with both *ubhaya* as well as *haviḥ*.[68] All these arguments of the *pūrva-pakṣin*, however, are fallacious. As regards the first it may simply be pointed out that though *vis'iṣṭārtha* is *sannihita* to the *ārti*, it does not mean that the *avis'iṣṭārtha* is set aside or prevented from being connected with it. For what is there to show that the *avis'iṣṭārtha* also may not be the *nimitta* of the *prāyas'tta*?[69] The second argument is vitiated by the fact that

---

वश्यमार्तिर्विशेष्टव्या । सा च हविषा विशिष्यते । तथा हविरार्तिसम्बन्धनिर्वृत्तिर्निमित्तं पञ्चशरावस्य । शक्नोति च श्रुत्या तं संबन्धं वक्तुम् । हविरुभयसंबन्धं तु वाक्येन ब्रूयात् ।°दुर्बलं च वाक्यं श्रुतेः । [SB. on VI. 4.23, p. 1439 f].

66 विशिष्टार्थस्य संनिधानाद्विशिष्टोऽर्थ आर्तिसंनिहितः। किं पुनः स्याद्यद्येवं भवेत् । तत उभयविशिष्टार्तिर्निमित्तमिति गम्यते । [SB., p. 1441].

67 ननूभयशब्दो हविर्विशेक्ष्यति । [SB., p. 1441].

68 विशेषवचनात्तन्निवर्तको भविष्यति । यथा शुक्ला गौरानीयतामिति नैवमभिहिते कृष्णामानयन्ति । शुक्लशब्द एनां गां कृष्णादिभ्यो निवर्तयति ।[SB., p. 1441].

69 इदं तावद्देवानाम्प्रियः प्रष्टव्यः । यस्यापि विशिष्टोऽर्थ आर्तिसंनिहितो भवति किं तस्याविशिष्टो दण्डैः पराणुद्यते । किमतो यन्न पराणुद्यते । एतदतो भवति । अविशिष्टगताप्यार्तिर्निमित्तं पञ्चशरावस्य भवति । [SB, p. 1441] .

it is impossible to establish any connection between even *ubhaya* and *haviḥ*. For the word *ubhaya* can't exclude the idea of *anyatara*, since such power is not given to words. And a word that does not serve to exclude others can't be *said to be vis'eṣaka*.[70] The attempt to support the view on the analogy of sentences like '*S'uklā gaur ānīyatām*' is equally unsatisfactory; for the illustration stands on quite a different footing. There the main point of the order or injunction is the bringing or *ānayana*. If it had been otherwise i.e., if the main point had been the *gauḥ* i.e., an individual belonging to class of *go*, then certainly the word *s'ukla would not have been able to qualify it*.[71] Thus the principle that emerges out of the whole discussion is that when the *ākhyārtha* is principal the sentence must be understood as yielding the sense of the *ākhyāta* as characterised by the several qualifying adjuncts; but when the *ākhyātārtha* is only subordinate the accompanying factors in the sentence can't be connected with it, so that only the *ākhyātārtha* will be understood as being enjoined.[72]

33. The rule thus deduced from the above discussion is also substantiated by S'ABARA in a different manner.[73] The *ākarti or guṇa* are spoken of only for being connected with

---

70 हविःशब्देनासंबध्यमानो न शक्नोति विशेष्टुम्। आनन्तर्यात्सम्भन्त्स्यते तर्हि। तथापि न समर्थः। न ह्यसौ निवृत्तिं प्रयोजयति।[SB, p. 1441].

71 विषम उपन्यासः। न तत्र गवाकृत्या द्रव्यं लक्षयित्वा तस्यानयनमुच्यते। तत्रापि चेदेवमभविष्यत् नैवैनां शुक्लशब्दो व्यशेक्ष्यत। उभयविशेषणविशिष्टं तु तत्रानयनं प्रधानमुच्यते। इह पुनरार्त्तिहविष्ट्वलक्षिते द्रव्ये पञ्चशरावः। [SB., p. 1441]

72 प्रधानभूते आख्यातार्थे संहृत्य विशेषणं भवति परार्थे पुनर्वियुज्येति [SB., p. 1441].

73 प्रधानभूते आकृतिर्गुणो वा तत्संबधार्थमुच्यते। तथोभयविशेषणविशिष्ट एकस्माद्वाक्यादवगम्यते। तद्विशिष्टं च कृत्वा कृती भवति। अन्यतरविशिष्टं कुर्वन्नकृतं कुर्यात्। यत्र पुनराकृतिलक्षिते द्रव्ये आख्यातार्थः कीर्त्यते तत्र सर्वेष्वेव तज्जातीयेषूक्तो भवति। न तत्रैकस्मिन्निर्वृत्ते कृती मन्येत। अपरस्मिन्नपि ह्याकृतिलक्षिते तदुक्तमेव। तत्रोक्तमप्रतिषिद्धं किमिति न क्रियेत। आख्यातार्थे पुनः प्रधाने न तस्याकृतिलक्षितेन संबन्धः। तत्र तदाकृतिकान्तरेऽनुपसंह्रियमाणेऽपि कृतमेव प्रधानम्। सगुणं च

the *ākhyātārtha* when it is *pradhāna*, so much so that on listening to such texts one gets the idea of *ubhaya-vis'eṣaṇa-vis'ṣṭa ākhyātārtha*, and acts accordingly. But if he brings into action only the *anyatara-vis'iṣṭa ākhyātārtha* he would be doing something that is not enjoined by *s'ruti*. When, however, the *ākhyātārtha* is spoken of with reference to a *dravya* mentioned by a *jāti-s'abda* i.e., when the *ākhyātārtha* is not *pradhāna*, it is but natural that it should apply to all *dravyas* of that class, so much so that one can't feel satisfied by performing the act with reference to any one or the other of the *dravyas* characterised by that *ākṛti*. Thus it is that we arrive at the truth of the rule 'PRADHĀNABHŪTE ĀKHYĀTARTHE SAṀHATYA VIŚEṢṆAṀ BHAVATI PARĀRTHE PUNAR VIYUJYA ITI'.

34. Having thus seen what JAIMINI and S'ABARA have to say regarding the main parts of speech we may now take up two more classes of words (not parts of speech in the real sense of the term), the TADDHITA and the SAMĀSA. And the first thing that we have to note about the former is that *a* TADDHITĀNTA *formation is possible in the case of those words only that are* SAMARTHA. The same idea is negatively put by saying that *the* TADDHITA *formation is not possible in the case of words which are* SĀPEKṢĀ *or* SĀKĀṄKṢA. There is a discussion regarding the word *māhendra*. It is clear that this is a *taddhita* formation from the word *mahendra*. But the real question is whether this word *mahendra* is an indepehdent word or whether it is only a *samāsa* constituted of the two members *mahat and Indra*. The *pūrva-pakṣin* would like to take it an only a *samāsa* and thus take the word *māhendra* as applying to all ṛks or things which are sacred to not *mahendra* but to *Indra* only, so that according to him *Indra* and *Mahendra* are not to be looked upon as two separate *devatās*. But the *siddhāntin* points out that

---

प्रधानं भवति । न किंचिच्छ्रुतं हीयेतेति । तस्मात्तत्र विशेषणं युक्तम् । न त्विह तथा । इह हि हविराकृतिकस्य द्रव्यस्यार्त्तौ पञ्चशराव इत्युक्तम् । तन्न शक्यं विशेषणवचनेन प्रतिषेधवाचकेन निवर्तयितुम् । [SB, p. 1441 f.].

acceptance of such a view would render the epithet *mahat* nugatory, and also would lead us to accept the *ādimattva* of the *Veda*. He, therefore, holds that *Mahendra* must be accepted as being different from *Indra*. This he proves on the strength of grammar also by pointing out the above-mentioned characteristic of *taddhita* formation. According to this rule the base of a *taddhita* formation must be an independent word and should have no *ākāṅkṣā* or *apekṣā* for any other word or *pratyaya*. Now if the *pūrva-pakṣa* view of the word *Mahendra* is accepted it will be found that the word *Indra* is rendered *sāpekṣa*, for the term *mahat;* and hence it is impossible that it should take the *taddhita* affix also. But why should this be so? What is wrong if we make the *taddhita* formation out of a *sāpekṣa* word? This question can be easily answered by pointing out how in such cases one and the same word is made to serve two different purposes which are quite incompatible with each other. When it is to be connected with the word *mahat*, the word *Indra* is obviously an *anuvāda* being something *prasiddha*. But when it is to be connected with the *taddhita* affix the same word has to be accepted as being something which is not *prasiddha*, and hence enjoined. But how can one and the same word signify simultaneously a thing as being *prasiddha* as well as *aprasiddha*? It is not possible to construe a word as being *vihita* and at the same time *avihita* i.e., of the nature of an *anuvāda* in one and the same *prayōga*. *This shows the futility of any attempt to prove that* TADDHITA *formations can be had from* SĀPEKṢA *words also.* From this it follows that *the base of a* TADDHITA *formation must be looked upon as an independent word; and that when a deity is enjoined by the* TADDHITĀNTA S'ABDA *the entire base of the* TADDHITĀNTA *form must be accepted as being the deity intended to be enjoined; and that no attempt should be made to split up the base into any further component parts and take any section of the same as the deity enjoined.*[74]

---

74 इन्द्रोऽस्य महस्य देवतेति तद्धितसंयोगो विज्ञायते। नच महत्त्वमपेक्षमाणस्य तद्धितसंयोग उपपद्यते। तद्धितसंयोगापेक्षस्य वा महत्त्वसंबन्धात् समासकल्पना।

35. As a corollary to this rule discussed above we have to note the other fact viz. that *the base of a* TADDHITĀNTA *formation can have no* VIS'EṢAṆA. This is naturally so; for if it is to have any *vis'eṣaṇa* it would necessarily be *sākāṅkṣa* or *sāpekṣa;* and would as such have no capacity to be the base of any *taddhita* formation.[75]

36. The next point we note about the base of a *taddhita* formation is that *its number is not directly conveyed to us by any portion thereof. Its number is indefinite, and has to be fixed on the strength of* VĀKYAS'EṢA *alone.*[76]

37. We have already seen that a *taddhita* form is used for mentioning or even enjoining the *devatā.* This can

---

न च तद्धितार्थे वृत्तस्य महत्त्वसंबन्धः। न च समासार्थे वृत्तस्य तद्धितसंबन्धः। न च तस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे समासार्थे वृत्तिरिष्यते एतस्मिन्नेव तद्धितार्थे। न चायमिन्द्रशब्दोऽविहितवत्स्वार्थं तद्धितार्थेन संबध्येत, विहितवच्च परार्थं महत्त्वेन संबद्धमनूद्येत। विस्पष्टश्चायमन्योऽर्थो महेन्द्रो भवति। महानिन्द्रो भवतीति महेन्द्रः। अन्यश्चेन्द्रो हविषो देवता भवतीति सकृदुच्चारणे नोभयं शक्येत। तस्मान्नेन्द्रो देवता महत्त्वविशिष्टः। महेन्द्रात्तु तद्धित उत्पन्नः। तस्मात्प्रातिपदिकमर्थवदिति गम्यते। न त्ववयवसंबन्धेन। तस्माद्देवतान्तरमिन्द्रान्महेन्द्रः। अतः पर्युदसितव्य एष पक्षः। यदप्युच्यते इन्द्रस्य वृत्रवधोत्तरकालं महेन्द्रत्वं दर्शयति, महान्वायमभूद्यो वृत्रमवधीदिति। तथा वेदस्यादिमत्तादोषः प्रसज्ज्येत। अतोऽन्य इन्द्रो महेन्द्रात्। [SB. on II. 1.16, pp. 417-419]; Also cf. न हि सापेक्षः पत्नीवच्छब्दः। तद्धितार्थेन संलक्ष्यते। तस्मात्केवलः पत्नीवान्देवतेति। [SB. on MS III. 2.39, p.796]; नह्यत्रशब्दादयं तद्धित उत्पन्नः। समर्थानां हि तद्धित उत्पद्यते। न चात्रशब्दस्य सामर्थ्यमस्ति। [SB. on VI. 1.9, p. 1359]: तद्धितः साकाङ्क्षमन्नोत्पद्यत इति। आग्नेय इत्यैन्द्राग्नो न शक्यते वदितुम्। [SB. on V. 4.21, p 1342]

75 अथाग्निर्बुधन्वान् क्रियते तत्र बुधन्वानग्निर्देवता स्यात्। तत्राग्नेय इति सापेक्षे तद्धितनिर्देशो न स्यात्। न हि सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्भवति। न खल्वपि वृत्तस्य विशेषणं प्रयुज्यते। तस्मान्नाग्नेर्विशेषणं बुधन्वत्ता। [SB. on X. 4.31, p. 1932]

76 तद्धितेनायं निर्देशः सौर्यमिति। तथाग्नेयमिति। तत्र वचनव्यक्तिर्न ज्ञायते किं सूर्यो देवता अस्य, उत सूर्यौ च सूर्याश्चेति। तथाग्नेयेऽपि। स्याद् व्यवस्थितिरेकत्वस्य। कुतः। लिङ्गभावात्। लिङ्गमत्रास्ति। किम्। वाक्यशेषे एकत्वं श्रूयते। [SB. on VIII. 1.29-30, p. 1600]

also be done by the dative.[77] But of these two ways of *devatā-nirdes'a* or *devatā-vidhāna* the former is more direct and hence stronger than the latter. In a *taddhita* formation we find that the *devatā* is conveyed by *s'ruti,* while in a *caturthī-saṁyoga* it is conveyed by *vākya.* And *s'ruti* being stronger than *vākya* it is but natural that a *taddhita* form is stronger than *caturthī-saṁyoga* so far as *devatā-nirdes'a* or *devatā-vidhāna* is concerned.[78] But is this *devatā,* conveyed by the *taddhita* form, enjoined or is it merely mentioned? The question in other words is whether the base of a taddhita form should be looked upon as being *pradhāna* and hence *vihita;* or *apradhāna* and hence only an *anuvāda*? Usage shows that both these alternatives are possible. If the *devatā* is intended to be enjoined then the base may be *pradhāna;* but if the *devatā* is already known and a *mantra* is to be specified then the base would be *apradhāna.*[79] Thus the *taddhita* formation may contain *devatā-vidhāna* or it may be merely *devatā-nirdes'a* or

---

77 तद्धितनिर्देशेन वा देवता चोद्यते चतुर्थीनिर्देशेन वा। तत्र हि तादर्थ्यं गम्यते। तादर्थ्ये च सति देवता भवति। न देवता नाम जात्या काचित्। द्वितीया ह्रीप्सिततमे कारके भवति। [SB. on X. 2.26, p. 1741]; तद्धितेन वा देवता-संयोगो विज्ञायते चतुर्थ्यन्तेन वा। न चेह तद्धितो न चतुर्थी। अतो न देवताविधिः [SB. on IX. 1.14,, p. 1910]; तद्धितशब्देन चतुर्थ्या वा संयुक्तस्य देवतार्थस्य वाक्यादभिप्रेतता गम्यते। फलसंयोगस्तु वाक्यादेव यजत्यर्थस्य। [SB. on IX. 1.9, p. 1652]; किन्तु तद्धितनिर्देशोऽयम्। तत्र देवतया मन्त्रो लक्ष्यते [SB. on III. 2.21]

78 इह विश्वेषां देवानां देवतात्वं क्वचिच्छ्रुत्या क्वचिद्वाक्येन। तद्धितनिर्देशे श्रुत्या चतुर्थीनिर्देशे वाक्येन। यत्र श्रुत्या देवतात्वं तत्रामिक्षया सहैकवाक्यत्वम्। यत्र चतुर्थी तत्र वाजिनेन। तदिह देवतात्वं प्रति श्रुतिवाक्ययोर्विरोधः। विरोधे च श्रुतिर्बलीयसी। इत्यामिक्षावाक्ये देवतात्वं विश्वेषां देवानां न वाजिनवाक्ये इत्यध्यवसीयते। [SB. on II. 2.23, p. 533 f.]

79 यदुक्तम् – गुणभूतदेवतावचनेन तद्धितशब्देन निर्देश इति। प्रधानभूत-देवताकेनाप्येवञ्जातीयकेन संबन्धे विधीयमाने निर्देशो भवति। [SB. on X. 1.23, p. 1815]; किन्तु तद्धितनिर्देशोऽयम्। तत्र देवतया मन्त्रो लक्ष्यते। [SB. on III. 2.21, p. 776].

anuvāda for specifying a *mantra.* Thus it is evident that a TADDHITĀNTA *denotes* TĀDARTHYA *or* SAMBANDHA. *But it must be noted that the sambandha that is thus conveyed by the* TADDHITĀNTA *need not necessarily be* KṚTSNA-SAMBANDHA. *A* TADDHITĀNTA *formation can be used to denote even the* AKṚTSNA-SAMBANDHA.[80]

38. From the capacity of a *taddhitānta* formation to denote *sambandha* there springs up another pecularity about the *taddhitas.* It is obvious that *sambandha* can't exist in the absence on the *sambandhins.* Thus it would appear that unless the *sambandhins* are enjoined it is impossible to enjoin the *sambandha* between them. This, in other words, means that wherever the *sambandha* is enjoined we must take the *sambandhins* also as being enjoined; for in the absence of these latter the *sambandha-vidhāna* is bound to be *anarthaka.* Thus *if a* TADDHITA *formation is used for the purposes of an injunction and thus lays down the* SAMBANDHA, *it automatically follows that before it can lay down the* SAMBANDHA *it must also lay down the* SAMBANDHINS. This, in other words means, that a *taddhitānta* can lay down simultaneously both the *sambandha* and the *sambandhins.* Thus with the help of a *taddhitaśabda* it is possible to lay down both the *devatā* as well as *karma* simultaneously without incurring the *vākya-bheda doṣa.*[81] It must however, be remembered here that such a construction should as far as possible be

---

80 यत्तूक्तमाग्नेयं हविरिति वचनात्सर्वं होतव्यमिति गम्यते। तत्रानुमानिको होमसंबन्धः। इह तु प्रत्यक्षो द्विरवदाने। अपि चाकृत्स्नसंबन्धेऽपि तद्धितस्योपपत्तिः। ततो ग्रहीतव्यम्। इति। [SB. on III. 4.40, p. 977]

81 तच्च कर्म गुणाश्च विधीयेरन्। अविभक्ता हि ते कर्मणो विधानार्थे तद्धितान्ते शब्दे। तत्र ह्यष्टाकपालस्याग्नेयता विधीयते। स एष एवमाग्नेयो भवति यद्यग्नये संकल्प्य दीयते। तेनायमनेन प्रकारेण यागो विहितो भवति। स एवं विधीयमानो न शक्योऽग्निमष्टाकपालं चाविधाय विधातुम्। संबन्धो हि विधीयमानो न शक्यते संबन्धिनावविधाय विहित इति वक्तुम्। तस्माद् गुणविधयः। [SB. on I. 4.9, p. 340 f.]

avoided, because after all it does suffer from the defect of *gaurava* at any rate.

39. Coming now to SAMĀSA we may note first of all four or five general observations that S'ABARA has to make *on compounds* in general. Like the *taddhita* formations a SAMĀSA *also is not allowable if its constituent members are* SĀKĀṄKṢA *or* SADVITĪYA.[82] The reason for this is obvious. As a general rule a word is to be connected with only one word at a time. Now if a member of a *samāsa* is *sākāṅkṣa* or *sadvitīya* it will naturally have to be connected with the other word which accompanies it or for which it has got the *ākāṅkṣā*. And if by being thus connected it becomes *nirākāṅkṣa* there is no reason why it should be connected with any other word, nay it is impossible to connect it with any other word or expression. If, on the other hand, it is not connected with the word for which it is *sākāṅkṣa* and is only compounded with some other word, it is bound to remain *sākāṅkṣa* and hence become *anarthaka;* for, as we know, *what is sākāṅkṣa is apūurṇa and hence* ANARTHAKA. This very rule is positively stated by saying that only SMARTHA PADAS *can combine into a* SAMĀSA; and if it is asked as to what is meant by *padas* being *samartha* S'ABARA is ready with his reply that *padas* may be said to be *samartha* if they are related to one another as *vis'eṣaṇa* and *vis'eṣya.*[83] This

---

82 यथैव च साकाङ्क्षस्य तद्धितार्थेनासंबन्धः, एवं समास्तेऽपि इन्द्रपीतस्येति साकांक्षस्य नोपपद्यते ।[SB. on III. 2.41, p. 800]; अत्रापि हि गायत्रीच्छन्दस इति सविशेषणस्य समासो नावकल्पते । [SB., p. 801]; तत्र हि तद्धितो निरपेक्षस्य भवति, न सद्वितीयस्यैन्द्रपीत इति । समासोऽपि निरपेक्षस्य न सद्वितीयस्य । [SB cn III. 3. 41, p. 835]; न चात्र पर्युदासोऽवकल्पते । न हि नशब्दस्य जतिलयवाग्वा गवेधुकयवाग्वा सामर्थ्यमस्ति । आहुतिशब्देन समस्तत्वात् । [SB. on X. 8.7, p.. 2064]

83 अपि चासत्यां त्र्याणामङ्गानामेकस्यां साधारण्यां क्रियायामेकस्मिन्वा साधारणे गुणे त्रिशब्दस्याङ्गशब्देन विशेषणविशेष्यसंबन्धाभावात् सामर्थ्यं न विद्यते । यानि त्रीण्यङ्गानि त्रित्वसंबद्धानि तान्यङ्गानीति । असति विशेषे व्यवहाराभावात् साकांक्षं भवति । [SB. on X. 7.11, p. 2027]; ननु त्रिसंख्या ऋक्पादेनैवात्र

rule, however, it must be noted, does not hold good in the case of the DVANDVA SAMĀSA where evidently there is no question of *vis'eṣaṇa-vis'eṣya-bhāva* subsisting between the various constituent members. It will also be noted below that the DVANDVA *compound is possible to have even from* PADAS *that are* SAKĀṄKṢA *since all its members are* PRADHĀNA, *and have as such capacity to combine into a* SAMĀSA *with other members inspite of* SĀKĀṄKṢATVA. As a natural corollary of what has gone before may now be noticed another fact viz. that TADDHITA *formation and* SAMĀSA *both of them may not be admitted in one and the same expression.*[84] This means that though the word *māhendra* has to be admitted as a *taddhita* formation from the base *mahendra;* yet this latter can't, however, be admitted as a *samāsa. Māhendra,* as the base of a *taddhitānta* formation, must be taken as an independent word as has been already shown above. One more general observation that S'ABARA has to make in this connection is that as with *taddhita* formation so *with a* SAMĀSA *it is possible to make* ANEKA-VIDHĀNA. *Ordinarily* ANEKA-GUṆA-VIDHĀN *is open to* VĀKYA-BHEDA DOṢA *But if a compound expression is used for doing it, it is not impossible to make* ANEKA-GUṆA VIDHĀNA *and at the same time be free from the* VĀKYA BHEDA DOṢA.[85]

40. We may here note how S'ABARA refers to the views of PĀṆINI as well as KĀTYĀYANA on the *nañ-samāsa.* He

---

संबध्यते । अन्यथा असति सामर्थ्ये समास एव न स्यात् । इति ।[SB. on IX. 2.14 p. 1707]; समर्थानां हि पदानां समासो भवति । सामर्थ्यं च भवति विशेषण-विशेष्यभावे । असाधारणं च भवति विशेषणम् । [SB. on II. 3.1, p. 572]

84 न चास्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे समासार्थे वृत्तिरिष्यत एतस्मिन्नेव तद्धितार्थे । [SB, p. 419].

85 न मन्तव्यमनेकगुणविधानादविवक्षितं प्राथम्यमिति । अप्राप्तत्वात्प्राथम्यस्य नानुवादः । विधिरेव । समासेन च विदधतो नानेकगुणविधानं दुष्करम् । [SB. on III. 5.38, p. 1011]; शताग्निष्टोममित्यपि समास उभयविशेषणविशिष्टं गणमाह । स एक एवार्थः । यथा लोहितोष्णीषा ऋत्विजः प्रचरन्तीति । [SB. on VIII. 3.9, p. 1617].

makes the *pūrvapakṣin* take his stand on the view of *kātyāyana* that *samāsa* is *nitya* and that the laying down of the option with reference to it is futile. Then in reply he points out that PĀṆINI, the great, has laid down the option and adds that PĀṆINI being a *sadvādin* is more authentic than KĀTYĀYANA who is an *asadvādin*. *Sadvādin* is one who maintains the existence of a thing, while *asadvādin* is one who maintains the non-existence of a thing. Of these the *asadvādin* is relatively unreliable, because it is quite possible that he may not have noticed what actually exists. This, in other words, means that a positive statement is more reliable than a negative one. These viwes of PĀṆINI and KĀTYĀYANA have been referred to by S'ABARA in two places where he has dealt with them in almost the same way. It is remarkable in this connection that he does not care to refer to the views of PATAÑJALI on this point at all.[86]

41. Now we come to the various kinds of *samāsas* in particular; and we note that S'ABARA has to say something about almost every variety of compounds except the *avyayībhāva*.

---

86 किं द्वन्द्वगर्भो बहुव्रीहिरयं बृहद्रथन्तरे सामनी यस्येति, उतानेकपदो बहुव्रीहिः बृहदस्य रथन्तरमस्येति ।——द्वन्द्वगर्भो बहुव्रीहिरिति । कुतः । बृहद्रथन्तरशब्दयोरानन्तर्यात् । वृत्तिपक्षस्याश्रितत्वात् । वृत्तिपक्षे च समासस्य नित्यत्वम् । द्वन्द्वे च स्वार्थाभिधानाच्छ्रुत्यनुग्रहोऽन्तरङ्गता च । इतरथा चोभयमपि बाध्येत । अतो द्वन्द्वगर्भो बहुव्रीहिः । ——। अपि च वृत्तिपक्षाश्रये सुतरां द्वन्द्वपदेनासामर्थ्यम् । न चैष नियोगो वृत्तिपक्षे नित्यः समास इति । विभाषा हि स्म भगवान्पाणिनिरधीते । सामशब्दश्रुतिश्च बृहद्रथन्तरयोर्लक्षणतामाचष्टे । तस्मादसमस्ते सामनी स्यातामिति । [SB. on X. 6., p. 1988 ff]; आह । नन्वनुयाजसंबन्धे नशब्दस्य समासः प्राप्नोति । नित्यो ह्यस्य न शब्दस्य सुबन्तसंबन्धेन समास इति वार्तिककारो भगवान्कात्यायनो मन्यते स्म । वावचनानर्थक्यं च स्वभावसिद्धत्वादिति । नेति भगवान्पाणिनिः । स हि विभाषेति प्रकृत्येदृशं समासमुक्तवान् । सद्वादित्वाच्च पाणिनेर्वचनं प्रमाणमसद्वादित्वान्न कात्यायनस्य । असद्वादी हि विद्यमानमप्यनुपलभ्य ब्रूयात् । तस्मात्पर्युदास इति । [SB. on X. 8.4, p. 2060 f.]

42. Of the TATPURUSA SAMĀSA he has to say something *about the* NAÑ-TATPURUṢA as well as the VIBHAKTI-TATPURUṢA, in addition to the general observations that he has to make about the *tatpuruṣa* as such. About the NAÑ-TATPURUṢA he has noted that such a *samāsa shall be* ĀDYUDĀTTA so that if a word is not *ādyudātta* it can't be *admitted* as a *nañ-samāsa* though there is a possibility of its being understood like one. It is on this score that the word *ahīna* is not admitted by him as a *nañ-samāsa.*[87] As for the expression *sthāṇvāhuti* he dissolves as a *ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa samāsa* and declares that it can't be dissolved as a *saptamī-tatpuruṣa* since it is against all rules to do so.[88] Discussing the word *darvi-homa* he notices that in such *samāsas* the first member is *upasarjana* while the second is *pradhāna.* Hence it is *that texts, where such compounds occur, must be so construed as to keep in with the prādhānya of their second member.* Hence words like *darvi-homa,* i.e., words having a word signifying an act for the second member, have to be accepted as *nāmadheya s'abdas;*[89] while in expressions like *ratha-ghoṣa* words like *ratha* have to be understood as being subservient to words like *ghoṣa* i.e., to the second member of the compound which alone shall be connected with *kriyā* spoken of in connection with the compound expression.[90]

43. It is while discussing the word *ratha-ghoṣa* that S'ABARA has made some observations regarding the BALA-

---

87 ननु ज्योतिष्टोमे एव गौणोऽहीनः । नेत्युच्यते । न हि मुख्यसंभवे गौणग्रहणमर्हति । ननु नञ्समासो भविष्यति । तथा सति आद्युदात्तोऽहीनशब्दोऽभविष्यत् । मध्योदात्तस्त्वयम् । [SB. on III. 3.16, p. 863 f.]

88 स्थाण्वाहुतिरिति समाख्यानं च स्थाणुप्रधानाया इवाहुतेर्भवति । इति । कथम् । षष्ठीसमासोऽयम् । कर्मणि षष्ठी । ईप्सिततमं च कर्म । सप्तमीसमासो लक्षणापेत इति कृत्वा नादर्तव्यो भवति । [SB. on X. 1.12, p. 1809]

89 See page 31, n. 10 above.

90 रथघोषेणेति श्रूयते न रथेन घोषेण चेति । रथविशिष्टो घोषो लक्षणं स्तोत्रोपकरणस्य । [SB. on X. 4.2, द्वितीयवर्णकम्, p. 1911]

BALA *of the* TATPURUṢA *with the* SĀMĀHĀRA-DVANDVA. In *tatpuruṣa* only the first member is subordinate or *gauṇa* while the second remains *pradhāna*; but in *samāhāra-dvandva* the idea of *samāhāra* is so prominent that both the members become *gauṇa* to it. Thus it would be seen that though in both the *samāsas* it is impossible to avoid *gauṇatva* yet we have less of it in *tatpuruṣa* than in *samāhāra-dvandva*. Hence the rule that wherever possible TATPURUṢA *shall be preferred to* SAMĀHĀRA[91] It must, however, be noted, that TATPURUṢA is certainly to be set aside in favour of *both the other types of the* DVANDVA *and even the* KARMA-DHĀRAYA.

44. Let us take the case of *karma-dhāraya* first, and see why it is preferrable to the *tatpuruṣa*. There is a text '*Etayā niṣādasthapatiṁ yājayet*' where the question is with regard to the interpretation of the expression *niṣāda-sthapati*. There are two alternatives. The exprssion may be taken as *ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa* or as a *karma-dhāraya* compound, The *pūrva-pakṣin* is in favour of taking it as a *ṣāṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa*. But S'ABARA rejects that alternative for three reasons. If the word is dissolved as a *ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa* we shall have to accept *lakṣaṇā* on the word *niṣāda* to yield the sense of a *ṣaṣṭhī*; secondly, we shall have to set aside the *dvitiyā-s'ruti* which becomes connected with both *niṣāda* and *sthapati*, and lastly assume a *ṣaṣṭhī* which is *as'ruta*. But if it is taken as a *karma-dhāraya samāsa* all *these doṣas* can be avoided. Hence it is that it is always better to take a *samāsa* as a *karma-dhāraya* rather than as a *tatpuruṣa*. This principle is generally known as the NIṢĀDA-STHAPATI NYĀYA.[92]

---

91 ननु तत्पुरुषनिर्देशोऽयम्। तेन परार्थेन रथस्य घोषविशेषणत्वेनोच्चारणं न स्वकार्येण निर्देशः। अत्रोच्यते। द्वन्द्वनिर्देशोऽपीदृशो भवति।———नैतदेवम्। द्विवचनं हि तथा स्यात्। एकवचनेन च निर्देशः। तेनैको लक्षणं, सच घोषः।...ननु समुदायेन समभिव्याहारो भविष्यति। न हि समुदायस्याशब्दार्थत्वात्। [SB. on X. 4.1-2, p. 1910 f.]

92 शब्दसामर्थ्यान्निषाद एव स्थपतिर्भवितुमर्हति। कस्मात्। शब्दसामर्थ्यात्। निषादं हि निषादशब्दः शक्नोति वदितुं श्रवणेनैव। निषादानां स्थपतिं तु लक्षणया

45. *When the first member of a* SĀMĀNĀDHIKARAṆA SAMĀSA *i.e., a* KARMDHĀRAYA *compound is a* SAṀKHYĀ, *the* SAMĀSĀ *shall always have the idea of* SAMĀHĀRA *prominent in it.* This phenomenon has been not only noticed but also very well explained by S'ABARA. The *saṁkhyā,* in such compounds being the first member, is by its very position subordinate to the second member. But as has been already noticed above SAṀKHYĀ *is not only* PṚATHAKTVA-NIVEŚINĪ *but also* TANTREṆA UPAKĀRIṆĪ. It is on account of these two peculiar characteristics that a *saṁkhyā,* if it is to qualify the second member, must have some *sādhāraṇa* circumstance, *kriyā* or *guṇa* or at least *astitva* as a group, on the strength of which it may be so *samartha.* This in other words means that there shall always be *samāhāra* in such *samāsas.* These *samāsas* are generally given the name of DVIGU though S'ABARA has not stated the name as such.[93]

46. Now we come to the *dvandva* which has been noticed by S'ABARA in all its three varieties. As for *samāhāra* we have already seen above that in it the members are both of them subordinate to the idea of *samāhāra;* and that *hence the* SAMĀHĀRA DVANDVA *is less powerful than the* TAT-

---

ब्रूयात् । श्रुतिलक्षणाविशये च श्रुतिर्न्याय्या, न लक्षणा । अथोच्यते नैष दोषः । निषादशब्दो निषादवचन एव । षष्ठी संबन्धस्य वाचिकेति । तन्न । षष्ठ्यश्रवणात् । नात्र षष्ठीं शृणुमः । आह । लोपसामर्थ्यात् षष्ठ्यर्थोऽवगत इति । सत्यमवगम्यते । न तु लोपेन । केन तर्हि । निषादशब्दलक्षणया । तस्याश्च दौर्बल्यमित्युक्तम् । समानाधिकरणसमासस्तु बलीयान् । तत्र स्वार्थे शब्दौ वृत्तौ भवतः । द्वितीया च विभक्तिस्तन्त्रेणोभाभ्यां संबध्यते । तेन द्वितीयानिर्दिष्टो निषादो गम्यते । तत्र षष्ठ्यर्थं कल्पयन्नश्रुतं गृह्णीयात् । तस्मान्निषाद एव स्थपतिः स्यात् । [SB. on VI. 1.51, p. 1386 f.].

93 यदि त्रित्वार्थं विधानं स्यात् त्रिभिरिज्येतेति तत्र त्रिशब्दोऽङ्गशब्देनासमर्थ एव स्यात् । असामर्थ्ये समासो नोपपद्येत । अपि चासत्यां त्रयाणामङ्गानां साधारण्यां क्रियायां... [see page 132, n. 83] साकाङ्क्षं भवति । कतमान्यङ्गानीति । स्वपक्षेऽपि कथम् । तदुच्यते । समाहार एष समासः । येषां समाहार उक्तः, एकक्रियागुणसंबन्धो वा तानि त्र्यङ्गानि । एषां च समाहार उच्यते । [SB, p. 2`27].

PURUṢA where at least one of the members remains *pradhāna. The* ITARETARA-YOGA *type of* DVANDVA, however, represents the other extreme in this that therein both the members remain *pradhāna.* Hence we find that this compound *is to be preferred to the* TATPURUṢA where at least one of the members has to be accepted as being *gauṇa.* There is, for example, the text *'Rājapurohitau sāyujyakāmau yajeyātām'.* There the expression *rājapurohitau* can be taken as an *itaretara dvandva* or *ekas'eṣa dvandva* or *ṣaṣṭhī-tatpurṣa* and hence there arises the question as to which of these alternatives should be accepted. It is here that S'ABARA *has shown that* ITARETARA DVANDVA *is to be preferred to the* TATPURUṢA *as also to the* EKAŚEṢA DVANDVA. For, if we take it as *ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa* and dissolve it as *rājñaḥ purohitau* the sense thus obtained will be contradictory to the injunction *'Purohitam vṛṇīte'* which enjoins the *varaṇa* of only one *purohita.*[94] Again if we dissolve it as *rājapurohitas' ca rājapurohitas' ca* and take it as an *ekās'eṣa* even so we find that the sense yielded by the *samāsa* is not compatible with the expression *sāyujyakāmau* which appears in the text; for a *purohita* can't have a desire for *sāyujya* with another *purohita.*[95] Thus we find that both these alternatives are vitiated by *vipratiṣedha.* Hence we accept the last alternative and take the expression as an *itaretara dvandva samāsa.* Even in doing so we have to resort to *lakṣaṇā* on the word *rājan.* But this *doṣa* is far more insignificant than the *doṣas* involved in the other alternatives.

47. One more important fact about the *itaretara dvandva* has been noticed by S'ABARA while commenting on MS. X.

---

94 नैवायमर्थोऽस्ति द्वौ पुरोहिताविति । एकस्य राज्ञ एक एव पुरोहित उपादेयत्वेन हि श्रूयते । पुरोहितं करोतीत्येकत्वं विवक्षितम् । [SB. on VI. 6.13, p. 1484]

95 ननु तत्र राजपुरोहितश्च राजपुरोहितश्च राजपुरोहितौ यजेयातामिति । उच्यते । न तौ सायुज्यकामौ भवतः । स राजा पुरोहितेन सहैककार्यो भवति । न तु पुरोहितः पुरोहितेन । उभावपि तौ राजानमभिचरन्तौ राजपुरोहिताविल्युच्येते । न हि तावित्च्छन्तौ । [SB. on VI. 6.15, p. 1485]

6. 8. There the question is regarding the exact sense of the text *'Ekādas'inān prāyaṇīyodayanīyayor atiratrayor ālabheta'*. Does it enjoin the sacrificing of one set of eleven *pas'us* at the *prāyaṇīya* and another set of eleven *pas'us* at the *udayanīya*? Or does it enjoin the sacrificing of the eleven *pas'us* together at the *prāyaṇīya* and *udayanīya*? The latter of these alternatives is the right one. For the *dvitvas'ruti* in the expression *prāyaṇīyodayanīyayoh* is *upādeya* and as such *vivakṣita*. And if it is to be looked upon as being *upādeya*, our answer is that it is so because it is at the end of a *dvandva samāsa*. The important characteristic of an *itaretara-yoga dvandva samāsa* is that it can occur only if both its members are *pradhāna* which they can be only if they are both of them *vihita* or *upādeya*. A *samāsa* in general, as we have noted above, is not possible if its *padas* are *sākāṅkṣa*; but just opposite is the case with the *itaretara dvandva samāsa* where the *samāsa* can take place only if the members are *sākāṅkṣa*. Thus we find that in an ITARETARA DVANDVA SAMĀSA *both the members are* VIHITA*; or in other words, as* S'ABARA *puts it, whenever we have an* ITARETARA-DVANDVA SAMĀSA *it is the* SAMĀSĀRTHA *that is* VIHITA *or enjoined.* The truth of this conclusion can also be seen from the fact that when a person is ordered *'S'atam Devadattayajñadattayor dīyatam'* he distributes that *s'ata* between both *Devadatta* as well as *Yajñadatta*.[96] When, however, two

96 द्वित्वश्रुतिर्हि भवति प्रायणीयोदयनीययोरिति। सा चेदानीमुपादेयत्वेन न लक्षणया। कुतः एकादशिनीविधौ संनिहिते वचनादेकादशिनीं विधाय पुनः श्रुत्या तां लक्षयित्वा प्रयोजनविधित्सयैतदभिधीयते। प्रायणीयोदयनीययोरिति। तत्र द्वन्द्वभाविनोः प्राधान्यात् सत्यामपेक्षायां भवति समासः। समासे चेतरेतरयोगान्नैकादशिनी केवले प्रायणीये। सा उदयनीययुक्ते भवितुमर्हति। तद्वदुदयनीयेऽपि। तस्मात्समुदायेऽपि वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः। यदि पुनर्नोपादेयत्वेनाश्रोष्यता तत्र द्वन्द्वभाविनोऽप्राधान्यम्। अप्राधान्येऽसत्यामाकाङ्क्षायां न समासो भविष्यति। तत्र प्रत्येकं वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः स्यात्। उपादेयत्वं त्वेतच्छ्रूयते। तस्माद्विभाग इति। लोकवत्। यथा लोके शतं देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोर्दीयतामित्युक्ते समासार्थो विधीयते। यदेतच्छतं तदेतयोर्दीयतामिति। द्वन्द्वश्रुतिविधानसामर्थ्याच्छतं विभज्यते। एवमेकादशिन्यपि विभज्येत। इति। [SB. on X. 6.8, p. 1991 f.]

such words enter into a *bahuvrīhi* compound with another word to which they are *samānādhikaraṇa* they shall not be admitted as being *upādeya* or *vihita.* Such words shall be looked upon as *lakṣaṇā* and hence the whole compound shall be dissolved as an *aneka-pada-bahuvrīhi* rather than a *dvandva-garbha-bahuvrīhi.* Hence it is that text *'Pṛṣṭhyaḥ ṣaḍaho bṛhadrathantarasāma'* is interpreted as enjoining the use of the *bṛhat-sāma* on some days and the *rathanatarasāma* on the rest. This principle is also seen from the fact that when a man is asked *'Māsam ghṛta-tailābhyām Devadatto bhojayitavyaḥ'* what he does is the feeding of *Devadatta* with *taila* for half month and with *ghṛta* for the remaining half.[97]

48. Much discussion is held round the *ekas'eṣa dvandva* and its exact signification; and it is resolved that the *ekas'eṣa* primarily denotes *puṁstva* and *dvitva, and hence* is *puṁsor vācakaḥ* only. But by *lakṣaṇā* it may denote *pumān* and *strī* if the *s'abda* is not a *vidhi* but only an *anuvāda.* For by its very nature *lakṣaṇā* is inadmissible in a *vidhi.* There is the text *'Kṣaume vasānāv ādadhīyātām,.* Now the question is with reference to the word *vasānau.* Does it signify two *puruṣas,* or one *strī* and one *puruṣa'?* By *abhidhā* it can convey only two *puruṣas;* while the sense of one man and one woman can be conveyed by it only through *lakṣaṇā.* Now *ādhāna* and *sadvitīyaḥ pumān* are *s'abdāntareṇa vihita* so that in the text under consideration the *vidhāna* refers to kṣauma only; while the *ādhāna kriyā* and *vasānau* are naturally *anuvāda.* There is no harm, therefore, if we resort to *lakṣaṇā* and take *vasānau* as indicating a *sadvitīyaḥ pumān.*[98] When, however, the

---

97 सामशब्दश्रुतिश्च बृहद्रथन्तरयोर्लक्षणतामाचष्टे। तस्मादसमस्ते सामनी स्याताम् । एतच्चोक्तमेव। विभागेऽपि साम्नोरविप्रतिषिद्धो बृहद्रथन्तरसामशब्द इति । यथा, मासं घृततैलाभ्यां देवदत्तो भोजयितव्य इत्युक्तेऽर्धं मासं घृतेनार्धं मासं तैलेन। एवमिहापि शब्दोऽवकल्पते । [SB. on X. 6.8, p. 1990].

98 शब्दान्तरेण विहितत्वादाधानस्य न विधायकं, विहितत्वाच्च पुंसः सद्वितीयस्य तस्यापि न विधायकम् । अतस्तदसंभवात् क्षौमस्य विधायिका लिङ् भविष्यति ।

s'abda is *vidhāyaka,* or there is some particular context to the effect that such expressions shall be taken in their literal sense as signifying two *puruṣas* as in the sentence *'Dvāvānaya'* or *'Etena dvau rājapurohitau sāyujyakāmau yajeyātām'* or in *'Yuvaṁ hi sthaḥ svaḥ-patī'.* The general rule, therefore, regarding the *ekas'eṣa samāsa* can be very well stated in the words of S'ABARA 'YATRA NA ARTHAḤ PRAKARAṆAṀ VĀ VIŚEṢAKAM, VIDHĀYAKAŚ CA ŚABDAḤ, NĀSTY ANUVĀDAḤ TATRA DVAU PUMĀṀSAU GAMYETE.'[99] The *au* ending primarily denotes *puruṣa-dvaya* only. So what PĀṆINI means by writing the *sūtra 'Pumān striyā'* is not that the *au* ending denotes a *strī* and a *pumān,* but that whenever a *strī* and a *pumān* are spoken of by one word, it is the word of the masculine gender that shall be retained and have its natural *au* ending.[100] Thus it is evident that we can't get the idea of *strīpuṁsau* from the *ekas'eṣa-samāsa* unless we resort to *lakṣaṇā.* And if *Lakṣaṇā* is to be resorted to we can do it only in an *anuvāda-vākya,* but never in a *vidhi vākya.*

49. Coming to the BAHUVRĪHI we find that S'ABARA describes it as ANYA-PADĀRTHA, while discussing the expression

---

वाक्यसामर्थ्यात्। यत्त्वस्मिन्पक्षेऽत्यन्ताय स्वार्थं जहातीति। नात्यन्ताय हास्यति। आधाने वासः क्षौमं कुर्यादिति। अस्मिन्पक्षे पुंशब्दः स्त्रीपुंसयोर्वृत्त इति गम्यते। अस्ति हि तत्र तस्य निमित्तं पुमान् सद्वितीयः। एवमादि च दृष्ट्वा भगवता पाणिनिना सूत्रं प्रणीतं पुमान् स्त्रिया इति। तस्य विषयः पुमान् शिष्यमाणः साधुर्भवति न स्त्रीशब्द इति। तस्मादेकः पुमानाधादधीत, न द्वाविति। [SB. on VI. 1.23, p 1639]

99 SB. on MS. VI. 2.2.

100 ननु स्त्रीपुंसोर्वाचकमौकारान्तं द्विवचनं स्मरन्ति। नैषा स्मृतिरस्तीति ब्रूमः। आह। भगवतः पाणिनेर्वचनात् स्मृतिमनुमास्यामहे पुमान् स्त्रिया इति। उच्यते। न पाणिनेर्वचनं कुक्कुटावित्यौकारः स्त्रीपुंसोर्वाचक इति। कथं तर्हि। यत्र स्त्रीपुंसोः सह वचनं तत्र सद्वितीयो वा पुमानिति कृत्वा अकारान्तस्यौकारः प्राप्नोति, स द्वितीया वा स्त्रीति कृत्वा एकारः। पुंशब्दस्तत्र साधुर्न स्त्रीशब्द इति पाणिनेर्वचनम्। पुमान् शिष्यत इति च ब्रूते। तेन सुतरां गम्यते पुंसोर्वाचक औकार इति।[SB. on VI. 1.22, p. 1367]

prapiṣṭa-bhāga.[101] Even like the other *samāsas* this *samāsa* can take place if its members are *samartha,* but not otherwise. At another place discussing the expression *bṛhad-rathantarasāma* S'ABARA suggests that such *bahuvrīhi* can be dissolved as *dvandva-garbha* or as *aneka-pada-bahuvrīhi.* If *bṛhat* and *rathantara* are both *upādeya* or *pradhāna* then they will form a *dvandva samāsa,* and then the *samāsa* as a whole would be *dvandva-garbha-bahuvrīhi.* But if they are not *upādeya* or *pradhāna* and are only *lakṣaṇa-bhūta* then the *samāsa* shall have to be taken as an *aneka-pada-bahuvrīhi.* In the case under consideration it is found that they are *lakṣaṇa-bhūta,* and hence it is that S'ABARA takes the expression as an *anekapada-bahuvrīhi.*[102]

50. The last thing that we have to note now is the rule that S'ABARA has stated in the words, 'DVIVACANABAHUVACANĀNTĀNAṀ ASAMĀSAḤ. The question is regarding the word *s'atāyuḥ* in the text *'S'atāyur vai puruṣaḥ'.* Will it do if the expression is dissolved as *'S'atāny āyur asya iti'*? The answer, of ocurse, is no, on the strength of the rule quoted above. It must be remembered that particularly when the first member of a *samāsa* is *saṁkhyā* it must be understood as being in the singular and never in the dual or in the plural.[103] Hence it is concluded that man can never live longer than a hundred years; and hence the word *saṁvatsara* in the expressions *like 'Sahasra-saṁvatsara'* must be taken to denote not the year but only the day.

51. We have thus seen how S'ABARA (and even JAIMINI) have noticed the different types of words and how they have also noticed their various characteristics which every interpreter of any text will do well to bear in mind. In

---

101 इह तु प्रपिष्टशब्दस्य भागशब्देन सहान्यपदार्थो बहुव्रीहिः। सोऽपि समर्थयोरेव। [SB. on III. 3.41, p. 88९]

102 Read SB. on MS. X. 6.4-5

103 अत्रोच्यते। शतान्यायुरस्येति विग्रहीष्यामः। नैवं संख्याशब्दानां समास इष्यते। नच गमकानि भवन्ति। द्विवचनबहुवचनान्तानामसमासः इति चाभियुक्तवचनात्। [SB. on MS. VI. 7.33, p. 1503]

the next section we shall see what observations they have to make regarding *liṅga, vacana, vibhakti,* and such other factors without a knowledge of which our equipment regarding the mode of interpreting a *s'abda* is bound to remain inadequate and incomplete.

CHAPTER XI.

LIṄGA, VACANA, VIBHAKTI ETC. ETC.

1. Words as they are used in sentences are always in their inflected forms, so that every *pada* that we come across in any sentence will be found to have some *pratyaya* appended to it to convey the gender, the number, and the case, or the person, the tense or the mood, and the number respectively. Our survey of the *mīmāṁsā* rules of interpretation regarding the *pada* or *s'abda* is bound to remain incomplete unless we take into account what JAIMINI and S'ABARA have to say as regards these other factors. This, therefore, we proceed to do in what follows.

2. Taking up *liṅga* first we find that S'ABARA has to give us two or three important rules in connection with it. That there are three *liṅgas* needs no mention. Nor is it quite necessary to note that a word of the masculine gender shall never denote a female and *vice versa*. But this has been very clearly stated by S'ABARA in his commentary on MS. IX. 1. 45[1] It may, however, be remembered here that it is possible that a word of the masculine gender should indicate a female as we have already noticed while discussing in the last section the exact signification of the *Eka-s'eṣa-dvandva samāsa*. Nouns have fixed genders; but not so the adjectives, which take up the gender (and also the number) of the nouns they qualify. Hence the *liṅga* of a *vis'eṣaṇa* can't be said to be *vidhitsita*. It is only *nirdes'a-bhūta*.[2] Another thing to be noted about *liṅga* is that it is a *vis'eṣaṇa* of the *prātipadika*, from which it follows that it can't be the *vis'eṣaṇa* of any other *pada*. For as we have already seen, one and the same *pada* in one and the same *prayoga* can't have more connections

---

1 न च पुंवचनः स्त्रियमभिवदितुमलं भवति शब्दः । [SB. on IX. 1.45, p.1692]

2 See p. 32 f., n.20 above. ..

than one.[3] But when is *linga vivakṣita*? And when is it *avivakṣita*? S'ABARA has given very definite answers to both these questions while commenting on the *sūtra* 'TATHĀ CA LIṄGAM' (MS. IV. 1. 17) and also on MS. VI. 1. 8. In disscussing the texts '*Agnīṣomīyaṁ pas'um ālabhate*', '*Anadvāhau yunakti*' and '*Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhate*. S'ABARA points out that the number as well the gender of the words *pas'um, anadvāhau*, and *kapiñjalān* are *vivakṣita* because they are *upādeya*. In these texts we see that the *ākhyātārtha* is *pradhāna*; and as scuh the texts convey the sense of the *ākhyāta* as characterized by all the accompanying adjuncts. *When, on the other hand, the* AKHYĀTĀRTHA *is not* PRADHĀNA, *or when a word is only* LAKṢAṆABHŪTA *or* JĀTYARTHA, *then, of course, the* LINGA *and the* VACANA *are not* VIVAKṢITA.[5] This principle has been stated in clear terms by S'ABARA while discussing the text '*Dars'apūrṇamāsābhyām svraga-kāmo yajeta*' where the *pūrvapakṣin* argues that only man has the *adhikāra* to perform the *yāgas*, since we find the word *svarga-kāmaḥ* in the mas-

---

3 प्रातिपदिकविशेषणं हि स्त्रीशब्दः । स्त्रियां यत्प्रातिपदिकं ततष्टाबादय इति । न विशेषणस्य पदान्तरेण संबन्धो भवति । यथा राजपुरुषो गच्छतीति ।——— गुणवचनानां च शब्दानामाश्रयतो लिङ्गवचनानि भवन्तीत्यविशेषितायामप्यूचि स्त्रीलिङ्गं भविष्यति । इति । [SB. on MS. IX. 1.33, p. 1676]

4 प्रातिपदिकार्थो ह्याख्यातवाच्येन संबध्यते, विभक्त्यर्थोऽपि । तथाहि तद्विशेषणविशिष्ट आलम्भो गम्यते । तत्रैकार्थत्वादेकवाक्यमवकल्पते । [SB. on IV. I. 15, p. 1205] (नात्र i. e. पशुमालभेतेत्यत्र) जातिर्द्रव्यस्य लक्षणत्वेन श्रूयते । यदि लक्षणत्वेन श्रूयेत ततःस्त्रिया अपि याग उक्तो न पुंवचनेन निवर्त्येत । इदं तु पशुत्वं यागस्य विशेषणत्वेन श्रूयते । तत्र पशुत्वस्य यागस्य च संबन्धो न द्रव्ययागयोः । यथा पशुत्वं यागसंबद्धमेवमेकत्वं पुंस्त्वं च । सोऽयमनेकविशेषणविशिष्टो यागः श्रूयते । स यथाश्रुत्येव कर्तव्यः । उपादेयत्वेन चोदितत्वात् । [SB. on VI. 1.9, p. 1359]

5 See p. 39 n. 72 above; प्रधानभूते आकृतिर्गुणो वा तत्संबन्धार्थमुच्यते । तत्रोभयविशेषणविशिष्ट एकस्माद्वाक्यादवगम्यते । [SB. on VI. 4.23, p. 1441]

culine gender.[6] S'ABARA, however, points out that *the word* there is only LAKṢAṆĀRTHA, *so that its* LIṄGA *is* AVIVAKṢITA and hence there is nothing wrong if we conclude that a *strī* also has as much right to perform the *yāgas* in question as a *puruṣa.*[7]

3. And what is true of *liṅga* also holds good in the case of *vacana.* In several places has S'ABARA noticed the rule that the number of a *pada* which is *uddis'yamāna* is not *vivakṣita.* There is a text: *'Das'ā-pavitreṇa grahaṁ sammārṣṭi'.* The question there is whether the number of the word *graham is vivakṣita or not.* The conclusion in this case is that the number viz. *ekatva* in that text is not *vivakṣita* since the word *graham* is not *vidhi-gata.* It is used only as *lakṣaṇa;* and a term that is used as a *lakṣaṇa* is too general to be restricted by *vacana* or *linga.* From another point of view it may be seen that here *the* ĀKHYĀTĀRTHA *is* APRADHĀNA;

---

6 MS. VI. 1.6.

7 न विवक्षितं पुंलिङ्गमिति । कुतः । अविशेषात् । न हि शक्नोत्येषा विभक्तिः स्वर्गकामं लिङ्गेन विशेष्टुम् । कथम् । लक्षणत्वेन श्रवणात् । स्वर्गे कामो यस्य तमेष लक्षयति शब्दः । तेन लक्षणेनाधिकृतो यजेतेति शब्देनोच्यते । तत्र लक्षणमविशिष्टं स्त्रियां पुंसि च । तस्माच्छब्देनोभावपि स्त्रीपुंसावधिकृताविति गम्यते । तत्र केनाधिकारः स्त्रिया निवर्तते । विभक्त्येति चेत् । तन्न । कस्मात् । पुंस्त्ववचनात्स्त्रीनिवृत्तावशक्तिः ।—नचानर्थक्यम् । निर्देशार्थत्वात् । [SB. on Ms. VI. 1.8, p. 1359]

8 नैतदस्ति ग्रहादिष्वेकत्वयुक्तेष्वमी पदार्थाः कर्तव्या इति । कुतः । ग्रहजात्या द्रव्यं लक्षयित्वा संमार्गादि विधीयते । अविशिष्टं च लक्षणं सर्वद्रव्येषु । तत्र न गम्यते विशेषः, को ग्रहः संमार्ष्टव्यः को नेति । सामान्यावगमाद्विशेषानवगमाच्च सर्वप्रत्ययः । [SB. on सर्वेषां वा लक्षणत्वादविशिष्टं हि लक्षणम् MS. III. 1.14, p. 705 f.]; इह पुनर्यदेकवचनं श्रूयते तच्छ्रूयमाणमप्यविधीयमानत्वेन न निवर्तकं भवितुमर्हति । यथा कश्चिदोदनं निर्दिश्य ब्रूयाद एनं भक्षयेत्कश्चित् श्वा मार्जारो वा स निवारयितव्य इति । तत्र यदि भक्षणं निमित्तत्वेन विधीयते न श्वमार्जारसंबन्धस्ततः काकोऽप्यागच्छन्निवार्यते, श्रूयमाणेऽपि शुनि मार्जारे वा श्वमार्जारसंबन्धस्य निमित्तत्वेनाविधीयमानत्वात् । एवमिहाप्येकत्वसंबन्धस्याविधीयमानत्वाच्छ्रूयमाणेऽप्येकत्वे ग्रहमात्रं संमृज्येतेति । [SB, p. 713].

and hence it will convey the ĀKHYĀTĀRTHA *as not being characterized by the accompanying adjunts.* This in other words means that the text will convey only the simple *ākhyātārtha,* so that it is only the *jāti* of the word *graham* that is *vivakṣita,* but neither its *liṅga* nor its *vacana.* But in texts like *'Pas'um ālabhate'* we see that the *ākhyātārtha* is *pradhānà* so that the sentence in such cases has to be taken as yielding the SARVA-VIŚEṢAṆA-VIŚIṬA ĀKHYĀTĀRTHA. The cogency of these rules can be easily demonstrated as follows: In the text *'Grahaṁ sammārṣṭi'* the *sammārjana kriyā* though *adṛṣṭārtha is yet gauṇa or apradhāna.* It is, therefore, naturally meant to be subservient to *graham.* Hence no question arises as to how many *grahas* are to be cleansed, for we know that the *sammārjana kriyā* is meant for the *graha* i.e., any thing that is characterized by the *grahatva jāti.* This means that it is not to be performed in the case of one *graha* only which in other words means that the *ekatva* (i.e., the *vacana*) of *graham* in such cases is not *vivakṣita.* Matters are, however, quite different in texts like *'Pas'um ālabhate'.* There the *ālabhana-kriyā* being *adṛṣṭārtha* must be accepted as being *pradhāna*;[10] and hence the question arises as to with how many *pas'us* is that *kriyā* to be performed. The answer to this question is to be found in the *vacana* of the word *pas'um,* which shows that the *vacana* of words like *pas'um in such texts is vivakṣita.*[11] This rule regarding the *vivakṣitatva* of the *vacana* has been very briefly but explicitly stated

---

9 cf. MS. II. 1.9-12.

10 cf. MS. II.1.7

11 ग्रहमिति द्वितीयया ग्रहस्योद्देश्यतया प्रयोजनवत्तया च प्राधान्यं गम्यते । ग्रहं प्रति गुणः सम्मार्गः प्रतिप्रधानं च गुण आवर्तनीय इति न्यायेन यावन्तो ग्रहाः सन्ति ते संमार्जनीयाः एवं निश्चये सति संमार्जयितव्य ग्रहेयत्ताया अबुभुत्सितत्वाद्देश्यगतमेकत्वं श्रूयमाणमप्यविवक्षितम् । ....पशुना यजेतेत्यत्र तु यागं प्रति गुणभूतः पशुः । न हि प्रतिगुणं प्रधानस्यावृत्तिरिति कश्चिन्न्यायोऽस्ति । नत इयत्ताया बुभुत्सितत्वाच्छ्रूयमाणमेकत्वं विवक्ष्यत इति वैषम्यम् । [जैमिनीयन्यायमालाविस्तरः on MS. III. 1.13-15]; Also cf. प्रधानसंनिधौ च गुणः शिष्यमाणः प्रति प्रधानं भिद्येतेति । [SB. on X. 3.39, 1882].

by KUMĀRILA BHAṬṬA while commenting on S'ABARA'S *Bhāṣya* on MS. IV. 1. 15f. in the following statement. KRIYĀ SĀDHYĀ SĀDHANAM TAT-PARICCHEDAKĀNI CA LIṄGA-SAṀKHYĀDĪN APEKṢATE/ATAḤ SARVA VIŚEṢAṆA-VIŚIṢṬĀ KRIYAIVA VIDHĪYATE. These two rules regarding the *avivakṣitatva* or otherwise of the *vacana* (*or saṁkhyā*) are well-known by the names of the GRĀHIKATVA-NYĀYA and the PAŚVEKATVA-NYĀYA respectively.

4. Another text to be noted in this connection is '*Dars'apūrṇa-māsābhyām svarga-kāmo yajeta*' where the question is whether the *ekatva* of *svargakāmaḥ* is or is not *vivakṣita*. And the conclusion is that it is *vivakṣita*. The *pūrva-pakṣin* argues that *puruṣa* is no *aṅga* either of the *yāga* or even of the *phala-nirvṛtti*. Hence *puruṣa* can be connected with the *kriyā* only as a *lakṣaṇa* and not as being *upādeya*, so that its *vacana* can't but be *avivakṣita*. The *Siddhāntin*, however, points out that the *kartā* is stated in such texts for *prayoga* and not for himself, so that he becomes *aṅgabhūta* to the *kriyā* and also to *phala*; for though it is not expressly stated, yet by the force of facts *phala-kāma* is always the *kāma* of one's own desired *phala* and never of some one else. The *puruṣa* being thus *guṇa-bhūta* it follows that its *vacana* is *vivakṣita*.[12] Thus it would appear that the VACANA (*or* SAṀKHYĀ) *of a word is* VIVAKṢITA *if the word is* AṄGABHŪTA *to a* KRIYĀ *while it is* AVIVAKṢITA *if it is not so* AṄGABHŪTA

5. The next point that we have to note in connection with *vacana* is that *between* VACANA *and the* PRĀTIPADI-

---

12 प्रयोगायोपदिश्येत कर्ता, न स्वार्थेन । कथम् । यजेतेत्यस्यार्थो यागं कुर्याद्यागेन वा कुर्यादिति । सत्ताभिव्यक्तिमात्रं गम्यते, न फलस्य कर्ता धाता वा । स्वर्गकामशब्दश्च स्वर्गकाममात्रे वर्तते, न विशेषमवलम्बते आत्मनः परस्य वेति । शब्दप्रमाणकाश्च वयमीदृशेष्वर्थेषु । कथं तर्हि कामस्यात्मसंबन्धोऽवगम्यते । संबन्धात् फलकामोऽनुक्तेऽपि शब्देनात्मन एव फलं कामयते, न परस्य। ....गुणभूतस्तु पुरुषः श्रूयते भावयेदिति ।.........अतो गुणभूतस्य पुरुषस्य संख्या विवक्षितेति । [SB. on अपि वा कामयोगे संबन्धात् प्रयोगायोपदिश्येत प्रत्यर्थं हि विधिश्रुतिर्विषाणावत् । MS. VI.2.6, p. 139-94]

KĀRTHA *the former is stronger than the latter,* so that if by sticking to the *rūḍārtha* of the *prātipadika* we are led to take the *vacana* of a word as being *avivakṣita* we should set aside the *rūḍhārtha* and find out some other sense for it on the strength of etymology, which would be in keeping with the *vacana.* This rule is arrived at by S'ABARA while discussing the text *'Praitu hotuś camasaḥ pra brahmaṇaḥ, prodgā-tṛṇām'.* Here the *pūrva-pakṣin* argues that as *udgātā* is only one, therefore, the *bahu-vacana* is *avivakṣita.* But S'ABARA points out that *udgātā* can be understood to mean *audgatrasya kartā* just as *audameghi* can be understood to mean *Udameghasya putraḥ.* Thus the word *udgātṛ* owing to *audgatra-sambandha* shall signify not only *udgātā* but *prastotā, pratihartā,* and *subrahmaṇya* as weyy. And thus the *bahu-vacana* also can be very well explained.[13]

6. Passingly it may be noted here that the VACANA of a GUṆA ŚABDA *like* LIṄGA *is dependent upon its* ĀŚRAYA *or* DRAVYA-ŚABDA; *and hence can't be taken as* VIHITA *or enjoined.*[14] Coming now to the signification of the three *vacanas* we may note that ordinarily DVI-VACANA *denotes duality only and can never be used to denote ekatva or* BAHUTVA.[15] Conversely also it may be noted that *ekavacana*

---

13 वेदसंयोगात् । औद्गात्रं नाम प्रवचनम् । तथौद्गात्रापि कर्माणि । औद्गात्रस्य कर्ता वाध्येता वोद्गातेत्युच्यते । कथम् । उद्गातुः कर्मौद्गात्रमिति प्रसिद्धम । एवं चेदं व्यक्त मौद्गात्रस्य कर्तोद्गातेति गम्यते । यस्योद्गाता प्रसिद्धस्तद्विशिष्टं कर्मानाख्यातमप्यौद्गात्रमिति वदति । शब्दश्च यस्यौद्गात्रं प्रसिद्धं स तस्य कर्तारमुद्गातेति वदत्यनाख्यातमपि यथा यस्योदमेघः प्रसिद्धः स तस्यानाख्यातमप्यपत्य मौदमेधिरिति ब्रूते । यस्यौदमेधिः स तस्य पितरमनाख्यातमप्युदमे प्रतिपद्यते । एवमौद्गात्रसंबन्धादुपपद्यत उद्गातृशब्दः, प्रस्तोताप्युद्गातापि प्रतिहर्तापि सुब्रह्मण्योऽपि । एवं बहुवचनमुद्गातृशब्दश्चोभयमप्युपपन्नं भविष्यति । न चान्यः कश्चिद्दोषः । [SB. on III. 5.26, p. 1004]

14 See n. 2 on page 45 above.

15 लक्षणत्वेऽप्युच्यमाने ब्राह्मणजातीयो न हन्तव्य इति न द्विवचनान्तेन निर्देशो भवति, ब्राह्मणौ न हन्तव्याविति । आह--जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन्बहुवचनं भवति, बहुषु वैकवचनं भवति । न त्वेकस्मिन्बहुषु च द्विवचनं भवति । [SB. on X. 3.40, p. 1883].

and BAHU-VACANA *can never denote* DVITVA.[16] And if at all in any case *dvi-vacana* is made to denote *ekatva* or *bahutva,* such an interpretation is open to the *doṣa* called the *abhidhāna-vipratipatti.* This point has been clearly explained by S'ABARA while commenting on MS. IX. 3. 14.[17] The EKA-VACANA, *as a general rule, denotes* EKATVA; *but there are certain circumstances under which it may denote* BAHUTVA *also.* Thus we find words like *'Kula'*, *'Yūtha'*, and *'vana'* which, though singular in form, are found to convey the idea of plurality. In such cases[18] the *ekavacana* is used with reference to the *samudāya* as constituted of the several individuals. *Ekavacana* may denote *bahutva* again if the word in the singular has reference to the *jāti* i.e., is used as a *lakṣaṇa.*[19] Thus in sentence l'ke 'Man is mortal' the word man stands for all mankind. This fact about the *ekavacana* signifying plurality is also otherwise stated by saying that *ekavacana* in such cases is *avivakṣita* because the word having that number is not *upādeya* but only *lakṣaṇabhūta.*

---

16 लोको हि शब्दार्थावगमे प्रमाणम् । न च लोके द्वयोरर्थयोर्बहुवचनान्त एकवचनान्तो वा प्रवर्तमानो दृश्यते । [SB. on IX. 3.13, p. 1751].

17 न हि चोदकोऽन्याय्यमभिधानविप्रतिपत्तिमभिप्रापयति । किं कारणम् । प्रकृतावेकत्वात् पाशस्य प्रकृतत्वाच्च बहुवचनान्तस्य प्रत्यक्षाभिधानविप्रतिपत्तिः । केयमभिधानविप्रतिपत्तिर्नाम । यदन्यथाभिधानमन्यथाभिधेयम् । न च प्रकृतावेकस्मिन् बहुवचनान्तं प्रयुक्तमभिधानविप्रतिपत्तिं कर्तुम् । किं तर्हि । यद्येन शक्यते तत्कर्तुम् । किं चानेन शक्यते । अस्य सिद्धे प्रयोगेऽर्थमन्विच्छन्तो यदवगम्यते तदर्थः शब्द इत्यवधारयामः ।———इह तु———प्रयोगेऽस्मदायत्ते किमित्यवाचकं प्रयोक्ष्यामहे विद्यमाने वाचके । न चायं द्वयोश्छन्दसि दृष्टो बहुवचनान्तः ।----न च बहुवच° द्वित्वप्रत्ययार्थं लभ्यते लौकिके वैदिके च । न चाभिधित्सिते द्वित्वे द्वयोर्बहुवचनं भवति । तद्यथा देवदत्तयज्ञदत्ताभ्यां कर्तव्यमिति देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तशब्दद्वयादेव द्वित्वं प्राप्तम्, न विभक्त्या विधित्स्यते । तथापि द्विवचनमेव भवति न बहुवचनम् । [SB. on IX. 3.14, p. 1751 f.]

18 भवति हि बहूनामेकवचनान्तः शब्दः समुदायापेक्षो यथा यूथं कुलं वनं परिषदिति । [SB. on II. 2.3, p. 480]

19 जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन्बहुवचनं भवति बहुषु वैकवचनं भवति । [SB, p. 1883]; सूक्तवाकसामान्यस्यैकत्वात् सूक्तवाको वर्तत इत्येकवचनं भवति । [SB. on II. 3.19, p. 769]

Hence it is that the text *'Grahaṁ sammārṣṭi'* has to be understood as meaning *'Grahān sammārṣṭ'*. It must, however, be noted that there are certain ideas which have to be expressed in the singular only. Take, for example, the ideas of *pānīya, taila,* and *ghṛta.* We find that these substances do not admit of any *saṁkhyā* being predicated of them. We can speak of one, two or more mangoes, but not of one, two or more *pānīyas* or *tailas* or *ghṛtas.* The reason for this is that mangoes, though put together, retain their individuality; while the quantities of *pānīya, taila* or *ghṛta* when put together merge into one whole losing all individuality. *These padārthas,* to use the expression used by S'ABARA, (or rather JAIMINI) are *saṁsargi.* Hence we come to the rule that SAṀSARGIṆAḤ ARTHĀḤ *shall always be denoted by* EKAVACANA only.[20]

7. Coming to the *bahuvacana* we find that just as *ekavacana* denotes plurality similarly sometimes *bahuvacana* also denotes singularity or unity when *pūjā* or *ādara* is intended to be conveyed thereby. Thus discussing the text *'Rakṣohaṇo balagahano vaiṣṇavān khanāmi'* the *pūrvapakṣin* argues that this *mantra* is not to be repeated with every *uparava;* for if thus repeated the *bahuvacana* in *vaiṣṇavān* would not be compatible with the number of the *uparava* which is *eka.*[21] But the *siddhāntin* points out that because of *karma-sannipāta* the *mantras* have to be repeated with every *uparava* and that the *bahuvacana* can be explained by saying that it conveys the idea of *pūja* or honour.[22] Thus we see that the *bahuvacana* may be used to

20 संसर्गिषु चार्थस्यास्थितपरिमाणत्वात् । [MS. IX. 3.27]; संसर्गिष्वर्थेषु यद्यपि पशुभेदस्तथापि रश्मीनां संसर्ग एव । एकीभूतास्तेषां रश्मयः । यथा पानीयस्य तैलस्य वा स्तस्काः नानादेशेषु भिन्नाः समानदेशे एकीभूता भवन्ति तद्वद्रश्मयः । तस्मादेकवचनान्तस्तेषां वाचक इत्यनूहः स्यात् । [SB., p. 1738]

21 यदि प्रत्युपरवं प्रयुज्येत एकस्मिन्बहुवचनान्ताभिधानं न प्रयुज्यते । अपि च सकृदुक्तः शक्नोति सर्वोपरवानभिधातुम । शक्नोति चेदावृत्तिरनर्थिका । [SB. on XI. 4.52, p. 2212].

22 यत्तु बहुवचनान्त एकस्याभिधायक इति । प्रातिपदिकार्थोऽभिहितो विभक्त्यर्थश्च कर्मत्वम् । वचनार्थः केवलो नाभिहितः । स च नैवाभिधानमर्हति ।

convey the idea of singularity or unity, if the idea of *pūjā* also is to be conveyed. The other circumstance under which *bahuvacana* may denote *ekatva* is 'reference to *jāti*'. Thus S'ABARA writes, *'Jātyākhyāyām ekasmin bahuvacanaṁ bahuṣu vā ekavacanaṁ bhavati'.*[23]

8. But the most important point that we have to notice about *bahuvacana* is what is generally known as the 'KAPIÑJALA NYĀYA' *There is a text 'Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabheta'*. The main question there is as to what is the exact number that is conveyed by the word *kapiñjalān.* The *pūrva pakṣin* holds that any number from two onwards can be denoted by that word; for generally we find that the *bahuvacana* is used when we want to convey the idea of any number above two. It is true that *anekārthatva* is *anyāyya;* but there is no other alternative when we find that usage gives sentences like *'catvāro brāhmaṇāḥ'*. Here if *tritva* alone were the signification of *bahuvacana* we shall get an absurd sense amounting to *catvāraḥ trayaḥ.* This shows that *tritva* alone can't be the signification of *bahuvacana.* But can we not resort to *lakṣaṇā* and say that *bahuvacana* by *abhidhā* denotes *tritva,* and that it is only through *lakṣaṇā* that it indicates all the other higher numbers?[23] The *pūrva-*

अभिधायकस्य शब्दस्याभावात् । एकस्यैव वा पूजार्थे बहुवचनम् । तस्मादविरोधः । [SB. on XI. 4.23, p. 2213]

23 See n. 15 and n. 19 on page 47 above.

23 (A) बहुवचनेन सर्वप्राप्तेर्विकल्पः स्यात् । [MS. XI. 1.38]; सर्वे एते संख्याविशेषा बहुवचनेन प्राप्यन्ते । सर्वे तस्य वाच्याः, सर्वत्र प्रयोगात् । तस्माद्विकल्पः नन्वेवं सत्येकस्य शब्दस्यानेकार्थताश्रिता भवति । न चैष न्यायः । उच्यते । सत्यमेवमगत्याश्रीयते । सत्यां गतौ नाश्रयितव्यः । अस्ति त्वियं गतिर्यत् त्रित्वं बहुवचनस्यार्थः स्यात् तद्योगाच्चतुरादिष्वपि वर्तते, सर्वेषु तेषु त्रित्वमस्तीति । नैतदस्ति यदि बहुवचनस्य त्रित्वमर्थः स्यात् ततश्चत्वारो ब्राह्मणाइति सामानाधिकरण्यं नोपपद्यते । ब्राह्मणा इत्यस्य त्रयोऽर्थः, चत्वार इत्यस्य चत्वारः तयोः सामानाधिकरण्यं च प्राप्नोति । न हि भवति चत्वारस्त्रय इति । एवं सर्वत्र लक्षणया भविष्यति । यथा न्यग्रोधः क्षेत्रमिति । त्रित्वं हि चतुष्ट्वादीनि साहचर्याच्छक्नोति लक्षयितुम् । सिध्यति । लक्षणा त्वाश्रिता भवति । किं क्रियताम्, अगत्याश्रीयते, सत्यां गतौ नाश्रयितव्या । [SB, p. 2120 f.].

pakṣin does not accept this proposal. For he takes his stand on *samākhyā* and points out that the word *bahu* means *vṛddha* or *adhika* so that there is no *anekārthatva;* and usage shows that though *bahutva* is *sāpekṣa,* yet *bahutva* as denoted by the *bahuvacana* is *niyata-sāpekṣa,* so that only *tri* and the subsequent numbers are called *bahu* as compared with *dvi;* and hence it is that they are never called *abahu,* just the *Uttara Kurus* are always *Uttara Kurus* and never otherwise, being *Dakṣina-kuru-sāpekṣa.* Hence it is that PANINI writes the *sūtra* as '*Bahuṣu bahuvacanam*' and not as '*Triṣu bahuvacanam*' as he ought to have written if the *bahuvacana* meant three only. Thus the *pūrva-pakṣin* concludes that *bahu* means *adhika* and that this term may apply to all numbers from three onwards by *abhidhā* only, so that there is neither *anekārthatva* nor *lakṣaṇā.*[24] Nor would it do, he adds, to argue that the *bāhuvacana* shows *tritva* only, when it is *nirupapada,* but it would denote the higher numbers when it is attended by some *upapada.* For we do find sentences like '*Trayo lokās trayo vedāḥ*'. And again if the *nirupapada bahuvacana* were to denote *tritva* only, there would have been no doubt what-so-ever as regards the exact number denoted by the word *kapiñjalān,* and as such there would have been no necessity to have this dis-

---

24 अस्ति चेयं गतिर्यद्बहुत्वं बहुवचनस्यार्थः स्यात् । सर्वेऽपि ते बहव इति श्रुत्यैव सामानाधिकरण्यम् । यदि बहुत्वं विज्ञायते, किं तद्बहुत्वम् । उच्यते । बहुत्वं वृद्धिरुपचयः आधिक्यमित्यर्थः । कथं कृत्वा । बंहतिरयं वृद्ध्यर्थः । तस्यौणादिक उकारः प्रत्ययो बंहेर्नलोपश्चेति । तस्य रूपं बह्विति । वृद्धमधिकमित्यर्थः । सर्वे चैते त्र्यादयोऽधिकाः । तस्मात्सर्वे बहुशब्दवाच्याः । नन्वापेक्षिकमेतद् बह्वधिकमिति । यदेव हि बहु तदेवान्यापेक्षया ऽबहु भवति । सत्यमेवम् । यत्तु यदपेक्ष्य बहु न तत्तदेवापेक्ष्याबहु । तद्यथोत्तराः कुरवो दक्षिणान कुरूनपेक्ष्योत्तरा इत्युच्यन्ते । न च ततोऽन्य उत्तरा देशा न सन्ति । अथ च नियतापेक्षत्वादुत्तरत्वं न जहति । एवं त्रिप्रभृतयो द्वित्वमपेक्ष्य बहुत्वं लभन्ते । न च ते कदाचिदबहवः ।———एवं बहुवचनमिति समाख्याऽन्वर्था भवति अभियुक्तवचनं च बहुवचनमिति । यदि त्रित्वं बहुवचनस्यार्थः स्यात् त्रिषु वचनमित्येव तद् ब्रूयात् । लाघवादसन्देहात् । तस्माद् द्वित्वमपेक्ष्यैते बहवः ।' अतोऽवस्थितं त्र्यादीनां बहुत्वम् । एवं च सति नैकः शब्दोऽनेकार्थो भवति । सर्वेषां च बहुत्वान्न कश्चिल्लक्षणया प्रयोगः । [SB. on XI. 1.38, p. 2121 f.]

cussion at all. We, for example, never raise any discussion regarding the *jāti* that is conveyed by this very word *kapiñjalān.*[25] Thus the conclusion that the *pūrva-pakṣin* arrives at in this connection is *'Sarve tryādayaḥ parārdhaparyantaḥ bahuvacanasya arthaḥ'.*[26] The *siddāntin*, however, is not agreeable to this conclusion and points out that in such cases the sense of *bahu* shall be restricted to the least number i.e., three. Her the text enjoins the sacrificing of *bahu kapiñjalas;* and this is accomplished when we sacrifice three of them. Now if the injunction is thus obeyed fully by sacrificing three only, where is the necessity of going further and sacrificing more *kapiñjalas*? It can't be argued that sacrificing a greater number would yield *phala-bhūyastva;* for *phala- bhūyastva* accrues from a *prayoga* which is *guru.* But this means that there must be more *kalpas* than one, before we can say that some *prayoga* is *laghu* and that some other one is *guru.* But in the present case there is only one *kalpa* so that the question of comparative *gurutva* or *laghutva* of the *kalpa*, or the *alpatva* or *bhūyastva* of the *phala* does not crop up at all.[27] On the contrary, if

---

25 अथोच्यते त्रिषु निरुपपदं प्रयुज्यते चतुरादिषु त सोपपदम् । चत्वारो ब्राह्मणा इति । तच्च मिथ्या । त्रिष्वपि सोपपदं प्रयुज्यते । यथा त्रयो लोकास्त्रयो वेदा इति । यदि च निरुपपदं च त्रित्वं प्रत्याययेत् ततो वसन्ताय कपिञ्जलानित्युक्ते विचार एवायं न प्रवर्तेत । यथा अत्रैव न विचार्यते किं कपिञ्जला आलब्धव्या उत मयूराः कपोता वेति । कस्य हेतोः । यतः कपिञ्जलशब्दस्य न मयूराः कपोता वा वाच्याः । इहापि यदि बहुवचनस्य त्रित्वमेव वाच्यं स्यात् नेतरा संख्या पूर्ववद्विचार एवायं स्यात् । [SB. on XI. 1.38, p. 2122].

26 cf. SB. on MS. XI. 1.41

27 प्रथमं वा नियम्येत कारणादतिक्रमः स्यात् । [MS. XI. 1.43]; प्रथमं वा बहुत्वं नियम्येत । किं कारणम् । न हि कश्चिच्चतुर उपाददानो न त्रीनुपादत्ते । यत्कारणमनुगतास्त्र्यादयश्चतुर्षु उपात्तेषु कृतः शब्दार्थो, बहूनालभेतेति श्रुतमालब्ध-व्याश्च बहवः । एवं सति कारणादतिक्रमः स्यात् । यदि च यथाश्रुतानुपादाने किंचि-दन्यत् कारणं त्रित्वातिक्रमे स्यात्ततोऽतिक्रमः । न तदस्ति । तस्मात् त्रित्वं नियम्येत । ननु फलभूयस्त्वं कारणं भविष्यतीति । नैतदस्ति । यत्र बहवः कल्पाः श्रूयन्ते तेषां कश्चिल्लघुः कश्चिद्गुरुः, तत्र गुरोः कल्पस्यानुष्ठानाम्नान सामर्थ्यात् तदनुष्ठानात्फल-भूयस्त्वमनुमीयते । यथा एका देया षड् देया द्वादश देयाः चतुर्विंशतिर्देया इति ।

one sacrifices more *kapiñjalas* than three that are enjoined by *S'ruti*, one is liable to incur sin or at least *siṣṭa-vigarhaṇam.*[28] That *bahu-vacana* denotes the number three only is also shown by the text *'Kṛṣṇā yāmyā avaliptā raudrā nabho-rūpāḥ parjanyāḥ, teṣām aindrāgno das'amaḥ'*. For it is then only that the *aindrāgna* will be the tenth as we find the three plurals used before it, would thus make nine. [29] The same again is shown by usage when we find that the word *madhya* is used without any specific *upapada* when the total number is greater we do get *sopapada* expression as *pañcānām madhyamaḥ* and *aṣṭnāṁ madhyamaḥ.*[30] We must, therefore, conclude that the *bahu-vacana,* unless otherwise specified, shall denote the number three only.

9. Now we come to the *vibhaktis* and *kārakas* about which also S'ABARA has much to say. The PRATHAMĀ *denotes prāti-padikārthamātra*[31] by S'RUTI, though by *lakṣaṇā* it may be conveyed something else. This very idea may be negatively put by saying that *an aprathamānta pada* shall never denote *prātipadikārtha-mātra.*[32] In a SAṀKHYĀ-PRADHĀNA NIRDEŚA,

---

इह त्वेक एव कल्पो बहूनामालम्भः। स त्रिभिश्चतुरादिभिस्तुल्यः । अतस्तत्र यो लघुमुत्सृज्य गुरुकल्पमातिष्ठेत तस्य फलभूयस्त्वं न भवितुमर्हति [SB., p. 2123].

28 यथा पशुमालभेतेति श्रुतये महान्तं महार्घं वा पशुमालभेत न तस्य फल-भूयस्त्वं भवति। यस्तु मांसीयन् शिष्टमतिक्रामेत् स यदि तावद्वैदिकीषु हिंसासु प्रत्य-वायस्ततः प्रत्यवेयात् । अथाप्रत्यवायस्तथापि शिष्टविगर्हणं च लभेत । कृते श्रुत्यर्थे मांसीयन् पशून् हन्तीति । तस्मात् त्रयः कपिञ्जला आलब्धव्याः । [SB. on XI. 1. 44, p. 2124]

29 यदि च त्रय एते त्रिका एवं नियोगत एन्द्राग्नो दशमः संपद्यते। [SB. on XI. 1.45, p. 2124].

30 ओदनानुद्धरतीति । तत्र मध्यमस्येति त्रयाणां निरुपपदं भवति । अन्यत्र सोपपदं पञ्चानां मध्यमः, अष्टानां मध्यम इति । [SB. on XI. 1.46, p. 2124].

31 यदि कारकाभिधानमविवक्षितमिति गुणशब्देनैतेन द्रव्यमभिधातुमिष्यते तदा प्रातिपदिकार्थस्याव्यतिरेक इति प्रथमा विभक्तिः प्राप्नोति । [SB. on III. 1.12, p. 866].

32 अप्रथमान्तः शब्दो न कथंचिदव्यतिरिक्ते प्रातिपदिकार्थे भवितुमर्हतीति । [SB, p. 866 f.]

however, where the *vis'eṣya* is for the *vis'eṣaṇa* of the *saṁkhyā* we find that the former stands in the *prathamā*. Generally the *saṁkhyeya* stands in the genitive as in *'S'adviṁs'atī vaṅkrīṇām'*. But if the *nirdes'a* is *saṁkhyā-pradhāna* then the *saṁkhyeya* may also stand in the *prathamā*. An illustration of this point may be found in the sentence *'Devadatta-Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitrāḥ Parṣad'*.[33]

10. The most important point to note about the DVITIYĀ is what PĀṆINI has stated in his *sūtra 'Kartur īpsitatamaṁ karma'* which shows that *whatever is spoken of by the* DVITĪYĀ *is* PRADHĀNA. This point viz.the *prādhānya* of what is expressed in the accusative has been noticed and referred to by S'ABARA in several places, from which it is obvious that any interpretation that loses sight of this fact about *dvitīyā* is bound to be wrong. And yet it must be observed that there are cases where the *dvitīyā* ending is applied to what is not *pradhāna*. Take, for example, texts like *'Srucaṁ sammārṣṭi'* and *'Agnim sammārṣṭi'*. Here the *pūrva-pakṣin* argues that *sammārjana is adṛṣṭārtha* and hence *pradhāna*[34] But the *siddhānta* view is that these are *guṇa-karmas*. Here it is argued that because the *dravya* viz. *sruc* or *agni* stands in the accusative, therefore, it must be *pradhāna*, which ultimately shows that the *karma* must be *gauṇa*.[35] The *pūrva-pakṣin*, however, cites texts like *'Sak-*

---

33 ननु षड्विंशती इत्यभिधाने प्रथमा न प्राप्नोति । उच्यते । यदा षड्विंशतिगुणः प्राधान्येन विवक्षितो भवति तद्विशेषणार्थं संख्येयमुच्चार्यते तदा प्रथमान्तेनापि लक्षणया संख्या विशेष्यते ।——————यथा देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तविष्णुमित्राः पर्षदिति । एवं षड्विंशती वंक्रय इति ।————————सत्यमुपपद्यत एवं वचनं षड्विंशती वङ्क्रय इति । संख्याप्रधानस्त्वेवं निर्देशः कृतो भवति । षड्विंशतिगुणः प्राधान्येन विवक्षितः । तद्विशेषणत्वेन वङ्क्रीणामुच्चारणम् वङ्क्रयः पुनः स्मृतौ प्रधानं, न संख्या । [SB. on IX. 4.12-13, p. 1772 f.]

34 कार्यमात्रमेवं जातीयकमपर्याप्तं यत्प्रयोजनस्य तद्धर्ममात्रमिति ब्रूमः । तत्र प्रधानकर्मत्वं स्यात् । [SB. on II. 1.9, p. 408]

35 द्वितीया विभक्तिः कर्तुरीप्सिततमे स्मर्यते । सा चेह द्वितीया विभक्तिः । तत एव तदीप्सिततममिति गम्यते। तच्चेदीप्सिततमं कर्म गुणभूतम् । यद्यपि प्रत्यक्षादिभिर्गुणभावो न गम्यते प्रमाणान्तरेण शब्देन गम्यते । तस्माद्गुणभूतमेवंजातीयकमिति । [SB. on II. 1.10, p 408 f.]

tūn juhoti', *'Mārutam-juhoti'*, *'Ekakapālam juhoti'* in all of which the *homa-kriyā* is acceptedly *pradhāna* inspite of the *dvitīyā* ending of *saktus, mārutas* and *ekakapālas,* which then can't but be *guṇa-bhūta.*[36] Nor will it do to argue that such texts are to be explained away on the analogy of the *laukika vākyas* like *'Taṇḍulān odanam pacati'* where *dvitīyā* ending is applied to *taṇḍulas* which admittedly are *guṇa-bhūta.* For in *laukika vākyas* the sense has to be perceived according to the intention of the speaker, which, however, is not the case with the *vaidika vākya.* There the *s'abda* is the sole authority, so that what is expressed by *dvitīyā* must be accepted as being *pradhāna.*[37] This view, however, has been refuted by the *siddhāntin* who shows that even in the *Veda* sometimes we have to take *dvitīyā* as standing for *tṛtīyā* and *vice versa.* Thus in the text *'Saktūñ juhoti'* it is not possible to take *homa* as being *saktvartha,* for *saktūs* by themselves would thus be *niṣprayojana,* which again would render the *homa* also *niṣprayojana.* If, therefore, this *niṣprayojanatva* is to be avoided we must take the *saktus* as serving the ultimate purpose by helping to perform the *homa.* The *apūrva,* it must be noted, will accrue from *homa* only and not from *saktūs* inspite of their being in the *dvitīyā.* For as we have seen above if *homa* is taken as being

---

36 इति चेत्पश्यसि द्वितीयादर्शनात्प्रधानभूतमत्र द्रव्यमिति । गुणभूतेऽपि द्वितीया भवति । तथा हि दृश्यते सक्तू जुहोति मारुतं जुहोति एककपालं जुहोति । [SB. on II. 1.11, p. 409]

37 न गुणभूतेऽपि द्वितीया । एवं ह्यभियुक्ता उपदिशन्ति कर्मणि द्वितीया कर्तुरीप्सिततमं कर्मेति । न च लोके गुणभूते कश्चिद्द्वितीयां पश्यामः । यदपि च तण्डुलानोदनं पचति ओदनार्थं तण्डुलान्संस्कुर्विति ईप्सिततमा एव तण्डुलाः । बल्वजान् शिखण्डकान्कुर्विति बल्वजा एव तेनाकारेण संबद्धा ईप्सिता इत्यभिप्रायः । लौकिकश्च प्रयोगः शब्दार्थपरिच्छेदे हेतुर्न वैदिकः । यत्तु लौकिके जुहोतीति प्रयोगे द्वितीया, शक्यते तत्र वक्तुमीप्सिततम एव स प्रयोग इति । तण्डुलानय जुहुधि तण्डुलानय होमेन संबन्धयेति । लोके भवति हि बहुप्रकारा विवक्षा । अन्यादथाने-कार्थत्वम् । तेन प्रधानभावेन सिद्धा सती द्वितीया गुणभावेन कल्प्येत । वेदे तु कथं द्वितीयानिर्दिष्टे गुणभावः । इति । द्वितीयानिर्देशात्प्राधान्यमेवावगच्छामः । [SB. on II. 1.12, pp. 409-410]

saktvartha both the *saktūs* as well as the homa would be *nisprayojana* and thus the text would be rendered *anarthaka.* Hence we have to conclude that *dvitīyā* here only serves to bring about the *sambandha* between *saktūs* and *homa.* And as the rule goes whenever there is a *sambandha* between a *dravya* and a *karma,* the former shall always be *guṇabhūta* to the latter. Hence here the *saktus* inspite of the *dvitīyā* ending have to be accepted as being *guṇabhūta* to *homa.* But ordinarily it is the *tṛtīyā* that is used to express the idea of *guṇabhūtatva.* Hence we say that in the texts under consideration we have TṚTĪYĀYĀḤ STHĀNE DVITĪYĀ.[38]

11. There is another text *'Saha s'ākhayā prastaraṁ praharati'* where the main question is as to whether *s'ākhāharaṇa* is *pratipatti-karma* or *artha-karma.* If *s'ākhā-haraṇa* is the main point of the text then it shall be *pratipatti-karma,* but otherwise it shall be *artha-karma.* Now as the *kāla* of *the prastara-haraṇa* is known its mention serves to enjoin the *kāla* of *s'ākhā-haraṇa* which is not known. This shows that the *s'ākhā-haraṇa* with regard to its *kāla* is the main point of the text while the other is only subordinate being used to serve its purpose. But gramatically we find that *s'ākhā* is in the *tṛtīyā* while the *prastara* is in the *dvitīyā,* which seems to show the *guṇabhāva* and the *pradhānabhāva* of the *s'ākhā* and the *prastara* respectively. Here, again we have to conclude that the *dvitīyā* and the *tṛtīyā* in the text stand for *tṛtīyā* and *dvitīyā* respectively for *sāmarthya* or purposefulness is stronger than *vibhakti.*[39]

---

38 एवमवगते प्राधान्ये बलीयसा हेतुना नास्ति प्राधान्यमित्यवगम्यते। कुतः। न होमस्य केनचित्प्रकारेण सक्त्वर्थताऽवकल्पते।———स एष द्वितीयान्तः सक्तूनां होमस्य च संबन्धं करोति। संबन्धे च सति द्रव्याणां कर्मसंयोगे गुणत्वेनाभिसंबंध इति। भूतत्वात्। गुणभावे च तृतीया। तेनोच्यते तृतीयायाः स्थाने द्वितीयेति। तेन तदर्थत्वाद्धोमार्थत्वात्सक्तूनां न प्राधान्यं द्वितीयासंयोगेऽपि। एव सत्यर्थवद्वचनम्। न चार्थवत्त्वे सत्यानर्थक्यमित्युच्यते। [SB. on II. 1.12, pp. 410-12]

39 प्रतिपत्तिर्वा शाखाहरणम्।———द्वितीयाश्रवणात्।———तुल्ययोगे सहशब्दोऽयम्। यदि प्रस्तरः प्रहरणे प्रधानं शाखापि प्रस्तरविशेषणं तर्हि तुल्ययोगः।

This very point again is explained by ŚABARA in slightly different expressions while commenting on MS. VI. 5. 44,[40] and XI. 2. 65.[41] There is one more circumstance under which *dvitīyā* stands for *tṛtīyā*. In texts like '*Sauryaṁ caruṁ nirvaped brahmavarcasakāmaḥ*' we know that *phala* is the *pradhāna* and that *karma* is *guṇabhūta* to *phala*. Hence we paraphrase such texts by '*Sauryayāgena apūrvam kṛtvā brahmavarcasaṁ sādhayet brahmavrcasakāmaḥ*'.[42]...*Thus we find that* DVITĪYĀ *stands for* TṚTĪYĀ (1) *in texts like 'Saktūñ juhoti' where the* ĀKHYĀTA *denotes the* PRADHĀNA KARMA, so that the *dravya* that is connected with it is bound to be *apradhāna;* or (2) in texts like '*Saha s'ākhayā prastaraṁ praharati*' *where two acts are mentioned together with the* help of SAHA; but one of these is *nirjñātakāla* (i.e. *nirjñātaguṇavis'eṣa*) and hence subordinate, being *kāla-lakṣaṇārtha*

तस्माद्यः प्रस्तरे द्वितीयार्थः स शाखायामपि । अतः शाखा प्रधानम् ।-----तस्मात्प्रतिपत्तिर्न्याय्या । आह । ननु तृतीयाश्रवणात्परार्थेन शाखोच्चारणेन भवितुं न्याय्यम् । उच्यते । भवेदेतन्न्याय्यम् यदि निर्ज्ञातकाला शाखा स्यात् । ततः प्रस्तरस्य कालपरिच्छेदाय कीर्त्यमाना परार्थोच्चार्येत । इह पुनरेतद्विपरीतम् । निर्ज्ञातकालः प्रस्तरोऽनिर्ज्ञातकाला शाखा । तस्मात्सत्यपि तृतीयाश्रवणे प्रस्तर एव शाखायाः कालं परिच्छेत्स्यति । यथा द्वितीयानिर्दिष्टस्तथा शाखा द्रष्टव्या, यथा तृतीयानिर्दिष्टा तथा प्रस्तरः। सामर्थ्यं हि बलवत्तरम् । [SB. on IV. 2-11 pp. 1233 f.]

40 प्रस्तरस्याङ्गभूता शाखा । कुतः । सह शाखया प्रस्तरं प्रहरतीति । सहयुक्तेऽप्रधाने तृतीयाविभक्तिर्भवति । सा च शाखायां तृतीया । तस्मात्प्रस्तरस्य शाखा गुणभूता । प्रस्तरे च द्वितीया । सहयोगे च तृतीया । तृतीया गुणतो, द्वितीया प्रधानतः । [SB. on VI. 4-43]; ननु तृतीयाऽप्रधाने भवति, सा च शाखायाम् । अत्रोच्यते । यासौ शाखायां तृतीया सा द्वितीयार्थे, या च प्रस्तरे द्वितीया सा तृतीयार्थे । कथमवगम्यते । सहयोगे एकस्मिन्काले उभयमपि प्रहर्तव्यमिति । अत्र यस्य निर्ज्ञातः कालस्तस्यानुवादः । यस्य त्वनिर्ज्ञातस्तस्य विधिः । शाखायाश्चानिर्ज्ञातः, प्रस्तरस्य निर्ज्ञातः । तस्य पुनरुच्चारणमनिर्ज्ञातार्थम् । तदप्रधानम् । इतरस्योच्चारणं प्रधानम् । प्राधान्यं च द्वितीयार्थः तत्र तृतीया । पारार्थ्यमपि तृतीयार्थः तत्र द्वितीया । तस्मादयथार्थं विभक्तिवचनम् । [SB. on VI. 4.44, p. 1455 f.]

41 अर्थकर्मणा ह्यस्य गुणभूतस्य संयोगो विज्ञायते तृतीयासामर्थ्यात् । प्रतिपत्तौ हि द्रव्यप्राधान्याद द्वितीयया निरदेक्ष्येत । SB. on XI. 2-65. p. 2163 f.

42 cf. SB. on MS VII. 4-1.

(i.e., *guṇaviśeṣalakṣaṇārtha*), to the other which is *anirjñātakāla i.e., anirjñātaguṇaviśeṣa, and lastly* (3) in texts like '*Sauryaṁ caruṁ nirvaped brahmavarcasakāmaḥ*' *or Agnihotraṁ juhoti*' i.e., in a *phala-vidhi* or rather the ADHIKĀRA VIDHI *where the* KARMA *is subordinate to* PHALA

12. In texts like '*Maitrāvaruṇāya daṇḍam prayacchati*' we find the accusative and the dative coming together in one text; and we ask which of these is stronger and signifies the *Pradhāna,* since both cases are used to signify the *pradhāna.* The *pūrva pakṣin* counts on the above-mentioned characteristic of the *dvitīyā* and argues that *daṇḍa* which is in the *dvitīyā* is *pradhāna,* and hence that this act of giving away the *daṇḍa* is a *pratipatti-karma.* But the *siddhāntin* points out that here *the dvitīyā* is to be explained according to the *sūtra* '*Tathāyuktam cānīpsitam*' so that it does not denote what is *īpsitatama* or *pradhāna.* Again the dative denotes *saṁpradāna* which is required even by *karma* as also for further *karmas* so that *sampradāna* is *pradhāna* while the *daṇḍapradāna* is only *gauṇa.* This shows that *among the two,* DVITĪYĀ *and* CATURTHĪ *the former is weaker than the latter,*[43] *owing to the nature of the purpose in view. In such cases* DVITĪYĀ *is to be secondarily taken as* APRADHĀNAVĀCINĪ *owing to* ARTHASĀMARTHYA *i.e.,* KARTṚSAṀYOGA.

13. The last point to be noted in connection with the DVITĪYĀ is that *it can never denote* TĀDARTHYA *which is conveyed by* CATURTHĪ or by *taddhita.* Hence it follows that *dvitīyā* can never be used to enjoin a *devatā* which in other words means that *anything that stands in the* DVITĪYĀ *can't be understood to be the* DEVATĀ of the act spoken of in connection with it. This is stated by S'ABARA in his discussion on the text '*Samīdho yajati*', '*Tanūnapāaṁ yajati*'. *In*

---

43 द्वितीया च दण्डे विभक्तिस्तस्मात्प्राधान्यम् ।————अथ यदुक्तं द्वितीयाश्रवणाद्दण्डप्राधान्यमिति । उच्यते । तथायुक्तं चानीप्सितमिति द्वितीया द्रष्टव्या । कुतः । मैत्रावरुणं चतुर्थीनिर्देशात् । सम्प्रदाने हि चतुर्थी भवति । संप्रदानं च कर्मणाभिप्रेयते । तत्र दण्डादभिप्रेततरो मैत्रावरुण इति गम्यते । [SB. on IV. 2-16-17, p. 1236 f.]

such texts it is resolved that *samidhaḥ* and such other *things spoken of in the accusative shall be understood to be* KARMA-NĀMADHEYAS.[44]

14. As for TṚTĪYĀ we have already seen how in texts like '*Saha s'ākhayā prastaraṁ praharati*' TṚTĪYĀ *stands for* DVITĪYĀ *owing to* SĀMARTHYA. The next thing that we now note is that TṚTĪYĀ *usually denotes* PĀRĀRTHYA *and hence* GUṆABHŪTATVA. Thus in the text '*Iṣṭakābhir agnim cinute*' we conclude that the *iṣṭakas* are *parārtha.*[45] *Another use of tṛtīyā is to indicate a particular* KĀLA as the *aṅga* of some *karma* which is already known, as explained by S'ABARA while discussing the text '*Barhiṣā vai pūrnamāse vratam upayanti, vatsena amāvāsyāyām*' where the *tṛtīyā* ending is to be understood as being indicative of a particular *kāla.*[46] *Another use of* TṚTĪYĀ *is with the* NIPĀTA SAHA where we have to note that the *nipāta saha* sometimes denotes *tulya-yoga,* so that in such cases both *the padārthas* that are thus connected by the word *saha* are to be understood as being on an equal

---

44 नात्र समिदादयश्चोद्यन्ते देवतात्वेन । कुतः । द्वितीयानिर्देशात् । तद्धितनिर्देशेन वा देवता चोद्यते चतुर्थीनिर्देशेन वा । तत्र हि तादर्थ्यं गम्यते । तादर्थ्ये च सति देवता भवति । न देवता नाम जात्या कचित् । सैव कस्यचिद्रूपस्य देवता, सैव नान्यस्य । यस्य यां प्रति तादर्थ्यं सा तस्य देवता । द्वितीया हीप्सिततमे कारके भवति । तत्र न द्रव्यस्य तादर्थ्यं गम्यते । तस्मान्न द्वितीयान्तेन देवताविधानम् । अत्राह । तादर्थ्यं कल्पयिष्यामः । यथा विष्णुं यजति, वरुणं यजतीति । अत्र न विष्णुर्वरुणो वा यागः । नापि यागादर्थान्तरम् । यागस्य कारकं यदीप्सितं तद् द्वितीययाभिधीयते । तेन तत्र कल्प्यते तादर्थ्यम् । शब्दान्तरेण वा विहितं गम्यते । इह तु न शब्दान्तरविहितं, नचैवं शक्यं परिकल्पयितुम् । न च यागस्य कारकत्वेन संभवति । समिदादिशब्दकत्वात्तु यजीनां समिदादयः शब्दा वाचका उपपद्यन्ते । क्रियायां चेप्सितायामिष्यते द्वितीया । यथा पाकं पचतीति । तस्मात्समिधो यजतीत्ययमर्थः समिद्यजिः कर्तव्य इति । [SB. on IX. 2-60, p. 1741 f.]

45 इष्टकाभिरग्निं चिनुत इति तृतीयया विभक्त्या पारार्थ्यमिष्टकानामवगम्यते । यदि चयनमात्रमत्रोच्यते तदिष्टकासंस्कारार्थमवगम्यते । तत्र द्वितीयया विभक्त्या संयोगः स्यात् । तृतीयया संयोगो बाध्येत । [SB. on IX. 1-27, p. 1670 f.]

46 परार्थतां चास्य द्योतयति विभक्तिस्तृतीया । साधकतमे हि सा भवति । तस्मादपि कालार्थः संयोगः । [SB. on VI. 4-36, p. 1453].

footing; and if at all we have to assume *aṅgāṅgibhāva* between them we have to determine it on the strength of some such ground as the *sāmarthya* or *prayojana* of it being *nirjñāta or anirjñāta*. But in other case the rule for *saha* is that when two *padārthas* are brought together by the word *saha* that which is in *tṛtīyā* is *guṇabhūta*, while the other is *pradhāna*.[47] Lastly we may note that TṚTĪYĀ *expresses generally the* KARAṆA *or* SĀDHANA *of the act spoken of by the* ĀKHYĀTA *connected with it.* Thus in texts like *'Sūktavākena prastaraṁ praharati'* we see that *sūktavāka* is enjoined as the *karaṇa of prastaraharaṇa*.[48] The same is seen again in texts like *'Udbhidā yajeta'* where *Udbhidā* which is a *nāmadheya*, expresses *karaṇa*.[49]

15. Now we come to CATURTHĪ which as we have noticed above *denotes* TĀDARTHYA *and hence is often used for enjoining or mentioning a* SAMBANDHA *or* DEVATĀ. Thus in texts like *'Adhyūdhnīm hotre haranti'* we see that *caturthī* expresses *tādarthya*. In the text *'Tapte payasi dadhy ānayati sā vais'vadevy āmikṣā vājibhyo vājinam'* it is possible to *take vis've devāḥ* as the *devatā* on the strength of the *taddhita;* and it is also possible to take *vājinaḥ* as the *devatā* on the strength of *caturthī-saṁyoga*. But as the *taddhita-nirdes'a* is stronger than *caturthī-saṁyoga* it is concluded that the *devatā* enjoined in this text are *vis've devāḥ* and not

---

47 See n-39 and n-40 on pages 158 and 159 above.

48 उपदेशो वा प्रस्तरप्रहरणं प्रति मन्त्रस्य स्यात् । एवं श्रुतिविहितोऽथ भवति । सूक्तवाकेनेति करणविभक्तिसंयोगात् । इतरथा लक्षणा स्यात् । [SB. on III. 2-12, p. 760

49 यागेन कुर्यादिति यजेतेत्यस्यार्थः । करणं हि यागः । उद्भिदाद्यपि तृतीयानिर्देशात्करणम् । तत्रोद्भिदा यागेनेति कर्मनामधेयत्वेन सामानाधिकरण्यसामञ्जस्यम् । [SB. on I. 4-2, p. 323 f.]

50 चतुर्थी तादर्थ्ये भवति । होत्रर्था अध्यूध्नी । तया होताऽभिप्रेयते । होत्रे सा उपकरोति । सा भक्ष्यमाणा सामर्थ्यजननस्य दृष्टस्य लाभाय । यथा च यावत्या च मात्रयोपकारिणी भवति तत्र चतुर्थीश्रुतिरनुगृह्यते । इतरथा त्वदृश्यमान उपकारे चतुर्थीश्रुतिर्बाध्येत । [SB. on X. 7. 16, p. 2031].

vājinaḥ.[51] *That* DEVATĀNIRDEŚA *as well as* DEVATĀVIDHĀNA *can be made with the help of* CATURTHĪ *has been noted by* S'ABARA in several places both positively as well negatively.[52] But the more general signification of *caturthī* is SAMPRADĀNA which may be *pradhāna* or *apradhāna* with reference to the *karma* according as the latter is *arthakarma* or *pratipattikarma.* It has been, time and again, noted by S'ABARA that *sampradāna* is more *īpsita* than *karma* and hence *pradhāna* even with reference to the object.[53] This fact which generally goes by the name of the MAITRĀVARUṆA-NYĀYA has been already noticed above while discussing the text *'Maitrāvaruṇāya daṇḍaṁ prayacchati'.* When, on the other hand, *devatā-nirdes'a* is done by it it signifies an *aṅga* in the form of the *devatā.*

16. ABLATIVE is generally used to denote APĀDĀNA, but it may also be *used to indicate* KĀLASAṀYOGA. There is a text *'Yat parāñcam ukthyān nigṛhṇāti ṣoḍas'inam'.* There the question is whether *ukthyāt* goes with *parāñcam* or with *nigṛhṇāti.* The *pūrva-pakṣin* is inclined to favour the former alternative and take *ukthyāt* as *apādāna pañcamī.* The *siddhāntin,* however, points out that here the *pañcamī* denotes *kāla-saṁyoga* as in the text *'parāñcam agnyādheyāt punar ādadhāti'.* But here it must be noted that *it is only when it is found impossible to construe the* PAÑCAMĪ *as conveying the idea of apādāna that we should take it as conveying the idea of* KĀLA SAṀYOGA. In the text under consideration *pañcamī* is accepted as conveying the idea of *kāla-saṁyoga* because its construction as conveying the idea of *apādāna* leads to *kṛtsna-saṁyoge sati vikalpa-samuccayau;* for if the *ṣoḍas'ī* the whole of it is taken from *āgrayaṇa* how is it possible to take it from *ukthya* also?[54] In sentences like

51 See page 130 n- 78 above

52 See page 130, n-77 above

53 संप्रदानं च नाम कर्मणोऽपीप्सिततमादभिप्रेततरम् । [SB., p. 1237]. संप्रदानं च कर्मणाभिप्रेयते । [SB., p. 1237].

54 आग्रयणादेव वा ग्रहीतव्यः । नोक्थ्यात् । कुतः । यदाग्रयणाद् गृह्णाति षोडशिनमिति वचनाद् नं शक्य आग्रयणात्कृत्स्नो गृह्यमाण उक्थ्याद् ग्रहीतुम्

'Ghṛtād yajati' we find PAÑCAMĪ *used in the sense of* ṢAṢṬHĪ and this use, S'ABARA points out, is sanctioned by the rule *'Aprāṇinaḥ ṣaṣṭhī pañcamyarthe bhavati'*.[55]

17 SAPTAMĪ is the next *kāraka-vibhakti* that we have to note and the most general circumstance that we notice about it is that it like the *tṛtīyā* conveys *guṇabhūtatva. Tṛtīyā* conveys the idea of *karaṇa* or *sādhana* while the SAPTAMĪ conveys the idea of *ās'raya* or *ādhāra or adhikarṇa*.[56] In *laukika vākyas* like 'Svāgāre gāvo vāsyantām' or'Prāvāre kusumāni' we do find the *saptamī* ending applied to *pradhānabhūta* also. But as has been already noted a *laukika vākya* differs from a *Vaidika* vākya in this that the former deals with the *vidita arthas* and hence their sense depends upon the *vivakṣā* of the speaker; while the latter deals with *avidita arthas* and hence in their case we have to depend solely on *s'abda* Hence though in some *laukika vākyas saptamī* may be found to be used to convey the *pradhānabhūta padārthas* also, yet in *Vaidika vākyas it can't but be taken as conveying guṇabhūtatva* of the padārthas[57] that are expressed by it. While

---

इति । अगतिका ह्येषा गतिर्यत्कृत्स्नसंयोगे सति विकल्पसमुच्चयौ स्याताम् । सत्यां हि गतौ न तावाश्रयणीयौ स्तः । अस्ति चात्र गतिः । कथम् । पराक्शब्दस्य देशवाचित्वात् । दिग्देशकालवचनो हि पराक्शब्दो भवति । तथा सत्युक्थ्यात्पराञ्चमिति संबन्धो भविष्यति, न कृत्स्नसंयोगो विरोत्स्यते । यथा पराञ्चमग्न्याधेयात् पुनरादधातीति कालसंयोगे पञ्चमी, नापादाने । एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम् । [SB. on X. 5-47, 1963].

55 अप्राणिनश्च षष्ठी पञ्चम्यर्थे भवति । यथा शाकस्य देहि, शाकं देहीति । तथा क्वचित् तृतीयार्थे— घृतस्य यजति, घृतेन यजति । पञ्चम्यर्थे--घृताद्यजति, घृतस्य यजतीति । द्वितीयार्थे वा--सोमस्य पिबति, सोमं पिबति, सोमात् पिबतीति । [SB on MS. IV. 2-3, p. 1226 f.]

56 सप्तमी हि विभक्तिराधारे भवति । आधारश्च क्रियायास्तत्कारकाणां च विशिष्टानां धारणे वर्तते । तस्माद् गुणभूतः । [SB. XI. 2-68, p. 2165]

57 ननु प्रधानभूतेऽपि सप्तमी भवति । यथा स्वागारे गावो वास्यन्तां प्रावारे कुसुमानीति । भवति यत्र प्रमाणान्तरेण द्रव्यं विदितम् । यत्र तु शब्दगम्य एवार्थस्तत्र गुणभावो युक्तः । यत्कारणं कारकविभक्तिरियम् । कारकं च क्रियार्थं भूतत्वात् । भूतभव्ययोः समुच्चारणे हि भूतं भव्यार्थं भवति । दृष्टार्थत्वात् । भव्यस्य तु

discussing texts like '*Kavatīṣu stuvate*' S'ABARA has expressly stated that *kavatīs* can't be *karaṇa* of the act of *stvana, since* they are expressed by the locative. For what is *karaṇa* is always expressed by the *tṛtīyā*.[58] In cases, however, where the usual senses of *ādhāra* etc. are found to be inapplicable, the SAPTAMĪ may be unlerstood as conveying the idea of *nimitta*. This has been declared by ŚABARA in his commentary on · MS.V. 1.33.[59] Thus we have seen that *saptamī may convey the ideas of ādhāra, or kāla or nimitta.*

18 We must, however, note that there are cases where the *saptamī has to be taken as serving the purpose of mere nirdes'a*. Take, for example, sentences like '*Odane dadhi dattvā abhyavahartavyam*'. Here we find that *odana* is merely *nirdiṣṭa*, and that its *adhikaraṇatva* is not *vivakṣita*.[60] Take another sentence '*Rukmapātryāṁ samāhāryā maṇayaḥ, eko bhāgo Devadattasya, rajatapātryām suvarṇaṁ nihitam aparo bhāgo Viṣṇumitrasya.*' Here we take the sentence to mean that the shares include the *pātrīs* also which are *ādhārabhūta*. They are not *vihita*, but only *anuvāda-bhūta*. This sentence is *vibhāga-vis'eṣa-para* and hence the *saptamyartha* is understood as being *anuvāda* only. Similarly in the text '*S'ṛte carum, dadhan carum etc.*' the *saptamī* ending of the expressions *s'ṛte* and *dadhan* are to be taken as *anuvādabhūta* and hence *s'ṛta* and *dadhi* should be taken as going to the *devatā* along with the *carus* just as the *pātrīs*

भूतार्थत्वेऽदृष्टार्थता कल्प्या स्यात् । न च दृष्टे सत्यदृष्टकल्पना सम्भवति । [SB. on XI. 2-67, p. 2164 f.]

58 सप्तमीश्रुतिसंयोगो भवति कवतीषु स्तुवते, शिपिविष्टवतीषु स्तुवत इति । यदि स्तुतिः ततः कवत्यक्षरेषु आहिता, यदि प्रकाशनं ततो देवतायाम् । तत्र करणं तृतीययाऽश्रोष्यत् । न सप्तम्या । [SB. on II. 1-24, p. 428]

59 कालस्य निमित्तत्वात् । तदपायेऽश्रुतमेव सर्वं क्रियेत । निमित्तं चानुपादेयत्वेन श्रवणात् । सप्तमी आधारादिष्वसंभवान्निमित्तसप्तमी द्रष्टव्या । [SB. on V. 1-33, p. 1308]

60 यद्यपि सप्तमीनिर्दिष्टं सप्तम्यर्थस्याविधित्सितत्वान्निर्देशमात्रस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । यथौदने दधि दत्वाऽभ्यवहर्तव्यमित्योदनस्य निर्देशमात्रं विवक्ष्यते नाधिकरणत्वम् । एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम् । [SB. on IX. 4-32, p. 1786]

go to *Devadatta* and *Viṣṇumitra* along with their shares.[61] This very principle is stated by S'ABARA again at MS. VI. 5.3. and VI. 5.24.

19. Having upto now dealt with the *kāraka vibhaktis* let us now turn to *kāraka* in general. The most important point that we have to note about the *kārka* is that it is *always connected with kriyā.* For *kāraka* is required by *kriyā* only and never by a *dravya.* [62] Hence it is that any word standing in any one of *kāraka vibhaktis* i.e. from *prathamā* to *pañcamī* and *saptamī* has to be construed with the verb. In the text '*Caturo muṣṭīn nirvapati*' *caturaḥ* is to be connected not with *muṣṭīn* but with *nirvapati.*[63] Similarly in the text *Hiraṇmayau prākās'au adhvaryave dadāti*'[64] *prākās'au* goes not with *adhvaryave* but with

---

61 विभागः कर्तव्य इति । पूर्ववाक्यं वृत्तं त्रेधा तण्डुलान्विभजेदिति । तदनन्तरं विभागविशेषपरमिदं भवति वाक्यम् । ये स्थविष्ठास्तानिन्द्राय प्रदात्रे दधंश्चरुं, येऽणिष्ठास्तान् विष्णवे शिपिविष्टाय शृते चरुमिति । अत्राविशेषाद्दधिपयसोरपि द्विभागो वक्तव्यः । यदि च दधिपयसी विभक्तव्ये स्तः प्रणीतार्थेऽप्युच्येयाताम् ततो भिद्येत वाक्यम् । अतो नैतयोः प्रणीतार्थे विधानम् । अविधीयमाने च सप्तम्यर्थे प्रातिपदिकार्थो देवतया संभन्त्स्यते । वाक्यसामर्थ्यादुभे च दधिपयसी देवतया संभन्त्स्येते चरुणा सह । दधनि चरुरेको भाग इन्द्राय प्रदात्रे भवतीति । यथा विभज्यमानेषु नानाद्रव्येषु उच्येत--रुक्मपात्र्यां समाहार्या मणयः एको भागो देवदत्तस्य । रजतपात्र्यां सुवर्णं निहितम्, अपरो भागो विष्णुमित्रस्येति । सह पात्रीभ्यां द्वौ भागौ गम्येते । विभागविशेषपरत्वाद्वाक्यस्य । पात्र्योश्च विभक्तत्वात् । अनुवादश्च सप्तम्यर्थो गम्यते । एवमिहापि विभागपरत्वादेव वाक्यस्यास्य, विभक्तत्वाच्च दधिपयसोः एको भाग इति गम्यते । अर्थप्राप्तत्वाच्च सप्तम्यर्थोऽनुवादो भविष्यति । तस्मात्प्रदानार्थे दधिपयसी । [SB. on IX. 4-41, p. 1790]

62 क्रियासंबन्धे हि द्वितीया विभक्तिर्भवति । कथम् । कारकविभक्तिर्हि सा । कारकं च क्रियाया एव भवति, न द्रव्यस्य । [SB. on X. 2-65 p. 1857]; द्वितीया कारकविभक्तिः सामर्थ्यादेवाख्यातेन संबध्यते न नाम्ना । [SB. on X. 3-63 p. 1898]; कारकविभक्तिर्हि द्वितीया । साऽऽख्यातेन संबध्यते । [SB, 1930]; कारकविभक्तिरियम् । कारकं च क्रियार्थं भूतत्वात् । [SB. on XI. 2-66, p. 2164]

63 cf. SB. on X. 2-64

64 cf. SB. on X. 3-63-64.

dadāti. The same is the case with texts like '*Sauryaṁ caruṁ nirvaped brahmavarcasakāmaḥ* where *saurya* goes with *nirvapet* and not *carum*.[65] Thus though the *kāraka vibhakti* always helps the *kriyā*, yet it does not mean that all *kārakas*, because they serve only one purpose apparently, are the same. We have to recognize a distinction among them, for we find that each *kāraka* has its own way of helping the *kriyā so* that *no kāraka can be rightly said to be identical with any other kāraka*.[66] *This very principle has been* enunciated by S'ABARA in another place where he points out that though both *yajamāna* and *adhvaryu* are used as subjects of *yajate* yet what is meant by *yajate* in the case of the *yajamāna* is the performance of the *yājamāna padārthas* while in the case of the *adhvaryu* the performance of the *ādhvaryava padārthas* alone is meant by that word.[67] Thus though *kāraka* is connected with *karma* or *kriyā* it must be noted that it is connected with *karma* only but not *karmaguṇa* also.[68] We should also note that *the kārakas can't be connected with one another by vis'eṣaṇa-vis'eṣya-bhāva*. There is a text '*Apsu avabhṛthena caranti*' where the word *apsu* can't be construed with *avabhṛthena* because both the words stand in the *kāraka vibhaktis*. Hence it is that we have to construe both the words as going with the verb *caranti*[69]

---

65 cf. SB. on X. 4-25.

66 सर्वाणि च प्रधानस्योपकुर्युः, भिन्नानि च कार्याणि कुर्युः। तद्यथा कारकाणि कर्त्रादीनि सर्वाणि तावत् क्रियाया उपकुर्वन्ति, अथ च प्रतिकारकं क्रियाभेदः [SB. on XI. 1-7, p. 2105].

67 प्रतिकारकं क्रियाभेदः। याजमानानेव पदार्थान् परिक्रयादीन् कुर्वन् यजते इत्युच्यते यजमानः। आध्वर्यवानेव कुर्वन्नध्वर्युर्यजतीत्येवमुच्यते। यस्य च कारकस्य य आत्मीयो व्यापारः स एकवचने विवक्षिते एकेन कर्तव्यो भवतीति। एवं चेद्यावान् व्यापारो यजमानस्य स तावान् न संभूय कर्तव्यः। [SB. on VI. 1-17, p. 1362].

68 कारकस्य च कर्मणा संबन्धो न कर्मगुणेन। [SB. on XI. 2-2, p. 2136]

69 न ह्येतद्वचनमप्स्ववभृथ इति। कथं तर्हि। अप्सु अवभृथेनेति। द्वे अपि पदे कारकवचने। न च विशेषणविशेष्यता। उभयोश्चरन्तीति क्रियया संबन्धो न मिथश्चरन्तीति प्रयोग उच्यते। तस्मात् प्रयोगाङ्गमापः। [SB. on X. 6-25, 25, p. 1998].

20 Now we take up the text *'Saṁsava ubhe kuryāt apacitāv ubhe kuryāt'* where the question is whether *bṛhad* and *rathantara sāmans* are to be used together or severally. The *pūrva-pakṣin* takes his stand on *laukika experience* and *argues* that when we say that *Devadatta* and *Yajñadatta* are cooking we mean that one of them is doing some portion of it while the other is doing the rest. Similarly here *rathantara* may be used in some portion of the *sava* and *bṛhad* in the *rest.*[70] But the *siddhāntin* points out that when the things thus mentioned are *paraspara-savyapekṣa* we should rather take it that they help the *kriyā* together than serverally. For just as the text tells that they should help the *kriyā,* so also it tellsus that they should do it together. As for the *laukika* experience noticed above we shold note that there the two persons do the *kriyā* severally because it is impossible for them to do it together. Thus even there the text does enjoin the *sāhitya;* but it is not literally obeyed since it is impossible to do so. Hence the conclusion is that both the *sāmans* should be used together.[71].

21 The last thing that we note about the *kāraka* is the rule about the *vacana* viz. that *if the vacana is vivakṣita then* the *kāraka-vyāpāra is to be performed by one agent only and so on*

---

70 प्रधानक्रियापेक्षमनयोः साहित्यम् । तत्र व्यस्तयोरपि क्रियमाणयोः साहित्यं न विरुध्यते । यथा देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तयोः पाकेन समस्तयोरपि संयोगे उच्यमाने एकः किंचित् करोति, अपरोऽपि किञ्चित् । न यदेकेन कृतं तदेवापरः करोति । तद्वदेकं साम किञ्चित्स्तोत्रमभिनिर्वर्तयिष्यति, द्वितीयमप्यपरम् । प्रधानोपकारापेक्षं साहित्यमिति समस्तसंयोगोऽपि न विरोत्स्यते । [SB. on X. 6-25, p. 1998]

71 तत्राभिधीयते । यत्र परस्परसव्यपेक्षयोर्योगो भवति तत्रैतदेवं न्याय्यम् । येन क्रियावयवेनारम्भेण मध्येनावसानेन वा योगः तेन सहितयोः, न पृथक्शः । कुतः । यथैवानेनोपकर्तव्यमित्यवगम्यते एवमितरसहितेनेति । यत्तु लोके कारकासामस्त्ये अभिहिते भेदेन व्यापारदर्शनमिति । अर्थासम्भवादसौ । न हि उखायामधिश्रीयमाणायां भूयोऽधिश्रयणं शक्यते कर्तुमित्यर्थविरोधान्न करोति । न तु शब्देनासौ तत्र न चोदितः । यद्यत्कर्तव्यं तत्तत्सहिताभ्यामेव नान्यथा । इह तु नासम्भवः । [SB. on X.6. 25, p. 1998]

according to the vacana of the word in that kāraka-vibhakti.[72] But how is *kārakārtha* conveyed? S'ABARA declares that it is conveyed by *vibhakti*. *Vibhakti-pratyaya* conveys the *vacana* no doubt; but along with it it also conveys the *kārakārtha* so that if in some cases the *vacana* is not *vivakṣita* yet this circumstance will not lead to the *ānarthakya* of the *vibhakti;* for in such cases the *vibhakti* shall serve the purpose of conveying the *kārakārtha.*[73] Thus in the text *'Grahaṁ saṁmārṣṭi'* as we have already noted above the *ekatva* of *graham* is *avivakṣita*. But the *vibhakti* of that word is useful because it yields the *kārakārtha* and thus brings about the *samba ι dha* between the *graha* and the *mṛji-kriyā,* so that we arrive at the sense that the *mṛji-kriyā* is to be performed with reference to *graha* i.e. all *grahas* and not the *ekatvavis'iṣṭa graha.*

22. Now there remain only two *vibhaktis* which are not *kāraka-vibhaktis,* the *ṣaṣṭhī* and the *sambodhana.* Of these the former is used to convey the idea of *sambandha.* This point of distinction between *ṣaṣṭhī* on the one hand and the other *vibhaktis* on the other has been very clearly explained by S'ABARA in his commentary on MS. III. 1.12. *Kāraka-lakṣṇa vibhakti* is expressive of *kriyāsambandha* while *ṣaṣṭhī* is expressive only of *guṇa-sambandha.*[74] It is on this principle that *stotra* and *s'astra* have been declared to be *pradhāna-karmāṇi.* For we find texts like *'Indrasya nu vīryāṇi pra-vocam'* where the *ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti* is expressive of *sambandha*

---

72 यस्य च कारकस्य य आत्मीयो व्यापारः स एकवचने विवक्षिते एकेन कर्तव्यो भवतीति । [SB. on VI. 1-17, p. 1362]

73 अपि च न विभक्तेर्वचनमेवैकं प्रयोजनम् । किं तर्हि । कारकसम्बन्धोऽपि ॥ अविवक्षिते एकत्वे कारकसम्बन्धार्थमस्योच्चारणं भविष्यति । तस्मान्नानर्थकम् [SB. on III. 1-14, p. 723]

74 का पुनः क्रियासंबन्धस्य वाचिका (विभक्तिः) का वा गुणसंबन्धस्येति । कारकलक्षणा क्रियासंबन्धे विवक्षिते भवति द्वितीयादिः । अविवक्षिते पुनः कारके संबन्धमात्रविवक्षायां षष्ठी । [SB on III. 1. 12, p. 688].

between *devatā* and *stuti.*[75] While discussing the text *'Yūpasya svarum karoti'* S'ABARA points out that here the *svaru* must be construed as coming from the *yūpa-kāṣṭha* only. For if the *chedana-kriyā* were meant for both the *yūpa* as well as the *svaru* then there would be no *sambandha* between the two and then we should not have the genitive *yūpasya.* This shows that *the genitive ending must be construed as expressing sambandha.*[76] Another peculiarity that S'ABARA has noticed about the *ṣaṣṭhī* is that *when applied to a word meaning an inanimate object it may convey the sense of the dvitīyā, tṛtīyā, or even pañcamī. 'S'ākasya dehi', 'Ghṛtasya yajati'*, and *'Somasya pibati'* may serve as illustrations in point.[77]

23 As regards the *sambodhana* it is needless to note that it is used for *anuvacana* or *sambodhana.* But it must be observed that it may also sometimes be used to convey mere *nirdes'a* also which ultimately would convey *stuti.*[78]

---

75 अपि वा प्रधानकर्मणी स्तोत्रशस्त्रे स्याताम् । कुतः । श्रुतिसंयोगात् ।—— अपि च श्रुतिसंयोगो भवति षष्ठीविभक्तिसंयोगः । यथा इन्द्रस्य नु वीर्याणि प्रवोचमिति । तेन देवताशब्दः स्तुतिसंबन्धार्थ इत्युच्यते । देवताभिधानार्थे प्रातिपदिकार्थत्वात् प्रथमा स्यात् । [SB on II.1. 24, p. 428]

76 यूपमनुनिष्पन्नो वा गृह्येत स्वरुः । तदेकदेशो हि सः । षष्ठीनिर्देशात् यूपस्य स्वरुं करोतीति । यदि हि च्छेदनमुभयार्थं स्यात् न स्वरुयूपयोः कश्चित्संबन्धो भवेत् । तत्र षष्ठी नोपपद्येत । अस्ति तु षष्ठी । तस्माद्यूपैकदेशः स्वरुः । अवयवो यूपस्य स्वरुर्नामैकदेशः कर्तव्यः यथा पुरोडाशशकलमिति । [SB. on IV.2.3, संक्षेपार्थ, p. 1228 f].

77 See n.55 above

78 यस्यापि चैष पक्षो विग्रहवानिन्द्र इति तस्यापीन्द्रशब्देनामन्त्रणं संबोधनार्थम् । संबोधनमनुवचनाय । तत्र संबद्ध इत्यवगतेऽनुवचनं न्याय्यम् । न चासौ केनचित्प्रकारेण संबद्ध इत्यवगम्यते । अनवगते संबोधनं व्यर्थम् । वचनप्रामाण्यात् संबध्यत इत्येवं गम्यत इति चेत् उक्तम् । अदृष्टकल्पनायां हस्तादिकल्पनानुपपत्तिरिति । न चासौ संबुद्ध इत्यवधार्यते । प्रमाणाभावात् । तस्मात् संबोधनवचनं न संबोधनाय, निर्देशार्थमेव । अविग्रहपक्षेऽपि तन्निर्देशार्थमेव भविष्यति । तत्रामन्त्रितविभक्तिवचनं स्तुतये । एवमिदं देवतात्वं साधयितृतमं यच्छेदनादिवत् संबुध्य

24 Our discussion regarding the *kāraka* and *vibhaktis* can't be complete if it does not include observations on the *prātipadika* and *sāmānādhikaraṇya.* As for the former we have already seen that *prātipadikārtha* is conveyed by *vibhakti which also conveys the prātipadikārtha-saṁkhyā. It is this vibhakti that brings about the sambandha between the prātipadikārtha and a kriyā if the vibhakti is a kāraka vibhakti. But if the vibhakti is ṣaṣṭhī it shows prātipadikārtha as being vis'eṣaṇa to para-padārtha as is seen in texts like 'Devasya tvā savituḥ prasave etc.*[79] We may also note that the *strī-pratyaya is vis'eṣaṇa to the prātipadika* so that it may not be connected with any other *padārtha.* For the rule is that a *vis'eṣaṇa* shall not be connected with any *padārtha* save its *vis'eṣya.*[80] The affixing of the *strī-pratyaya* may show that the *prātipadika* is intended to be feminine, but it must also be remembered that *if the prātipadika is a guṇa-vacana s'abda its gender is got at by the force of its vis'eṣya and as such can't be vivakṣita.* It should also be noted that though it is true that a *prātipadika* denoting a female takes the feminine affix, yet *it is not right to argue that because a prātipadika has taken a feminine affix, therefore it must be a dravya-vacana S'abda, i.e. a noun of the feminine gender.* It is also possible that the *prātipadika* may be only a *guṇa-vacana s'abda.* For we know that *guṇavacana s'abdas* take the *liṅga* and *vacana* of their *vis'eṣyas.'* Thus in the text *'Aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ekahāyanyā* etc.' it is not poss:ble to argue that *aruṇayā* is a *dravyavacana s'abda* and hence can easily be connected

---

साधयतीति चेतनादिवदुपचर्यमाणः संबुद्धिशब्देनामंत्र्यते । तथा संबोधनशब्देन निर्दिश्योच्यते, गृहीतवन्तो वयं तव हस्तम्, त्वदाश्रया वयमित्यर्थः । अस्माभिरिन्द्रकर्म कर्तव्यमित्येतदनेन स्मार्यते । [SB on IX.1.9, p. 1654]

79 सवित्रादयः परविशेषणं विभक्तिश्रुत्या क्रियन्ते । प्रातिपदिकार्थस्तु अव्यतिरिक्त इति गम्यते । तत्र लिङ्गं श्रुत्या बाध्यते ।———विभक्तिश्रुतिस्तु प्रातिपदिकार्थं पदार्थान्तरविशेषणं ज्ञापयति [SB on IX.1.37, p. 1682 f].

80 अपि च नैवात्र विवदितव्यम् । प्रातिपदिकविशेषणं हि स्त्रीशब्दः । स्त्रियां यत् प्रातिपदिकं वर्तते ततष्टाबादय इति । न विशेषणस्य पदान्तरेण संबंधो भवति । यथा राजपुत्रो गच्छतीति । [SB on IX.1.337, p. 1676]

with the *kraya*. We must admit *it as only guṇa-s'abda and, because it is amūrta, connect it with the kraya through the dravya-s'abda viz. ekahāyanyā which we find nearby.*[81]

25. As regards the *balābala* of the *prātipadikārtha* and the *vibhaktyartha* S'ABARA remarks that the former is *pradhāna* whereas the latter is *apradhāna*. For *vibhakti* after all denotes some particular aspect of the *prātipadikārtha;* and also because *vibhaktyartha* can't stand independently of the *prātipadikārtha*. This naturally leads us to conclude that *'Yatra prātipadikārthas tatra vibhaktyartho bhaviṣyati.*[82]

26 Coming to the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* we find S'ABARA stating that *sāmānādhikaraṇya is perceived from eka-vibhakti-nirdes'a*[83] It is hence that in texts like *'Svāhākāraṁ yajati' svāhākāra* and such other words in the *dvitīyā* are construed as being *samānādhikaraṇa* to *yāga*. And hence it is further argued that acts enjoined by such

---

81 ननु नैवायं गुणवचनः। किं तर्हि। द्रव्यवचनः। कुतः। स्त्रीलिङ्गसम्बन्धात्। द्रव्यविशेषा ह्येते स्त्री पुमान् नपुंसकमिति। स्त्रियां यत्प्रातिपदिकं वर्तते तस्मात् स्त्रीप्रत्ययो भवतीति। स्त्रीप्रत्ययं चारुणयेत्युपलभामहे। तस्माद् द्रव्यवचनोऽरुणाशब्द इति। तदपेशलम्। तदेव हि द्रव्यमरुणिम्ना परिच्छिद्यमानमरुणाशब्दाभिधानीयतां लभते। तदेवान्यगुणकं नारुणाशब्दः शक्नोत्यभिवदितुम्। अरुणिमानमेष शब्दो न व्यभिचरति। व्यभिचरति पुनर्द्रव्यम्। अव्यभिचारि च कारणं कारणवतामिष्टम्। अतोऽस्य गुणः स्वार्थ इति गम्यते। तदस्य प्रत्यक्षतो गुणवचनता गम्यते। स्त्रीप्रत्ययदर्शनात्तु नूनमरुणाप्रातिपदिकं द्रव्यवचनमित्यनुमानम्। प्रत्यक्षं चानुमानाद् बलीयः। तस्माद् गुणवचनः। कथं तर्हि स्त्रीप्रत्ययसंबन्धः। भवति हि गुणवचनस्यापि स्त्रीलिङ्गता। यथा चारुणा बुद्धिः एवमरुणेति। etc. [SB on III.1.12, pp. 681-685].

82 गुणेत्वन्यायकल्पना स्यादिति न प्रधाने। गुणश्च विभक्त्यर्थः। प्रधानः प्रातिपदिकार्थः। प्रातिपदिकार्थविशेषो विभक्त्याभिधीयते। सति प्रातिपदिकार्थे विभक्त्यर्थेन भवितव्यम्।———————तस्माद्यत्र प्रातिपदिकार्थस्तत्र विभक्त्यर्थो भविष्यति। [SB on IX.3.15, p. 1753]

83 अन्तरेणापि षष्ठीमेकविभक्तिनिर्देशात् सामानाधिकरण्यमवगमिष्यामः। यथा नीलमुत्पलमिति। [SB on III.1.12, p. 685]

texts must be accepted as being *saṁskāra karmas* and not *ārād-upakāraka karmas.*[84] *This Sāmānādhikarṇya* is also a means of stating the meanings of words. This is what can be clearly seen in stntences like *'Ayaṁ Devadattaḥ* where the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between *ayam* and *Devadattaḥ* helps us to connect the *saṁjñā viz. Devadatta* with the *saṁjñī* viz. the man himself.[85] Sometimes the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* helps us to know the *guṇa-mukhya-bhāva* also. Thus texts like *'Dars'apūrṇamāsābhyām yajeta'* we see that here is *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between *dars'apūrṇamāsau* on the one hand and the *yāga* on the other. But *tṛtīyā* shows *pārārthya* or *guṇatva* so that *yāga* being *samānādhikaraṇa* with *dars'apūrṇamāsau* has to be taken as being *parārtha.* The whole text thus means *'Dars'apūrṇamāsayāgābhyāṁ anyat kimapi kuryāt'.*[86] In texts like *'Indra āgaccha, Hariva āgaccha* etc.' the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* would make *Indra* possessed of all the qualities like *harivattā.* But secondarily this may also be construed as conveying *stuti.* This is again what we find in sentences like *'Indro Brahaspatir Devadattaḥ.*[87]

27 In all these cases we find that the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* can be directly accounted for. Such, however, is not the

---

84 यागसामानाधिकरण्यं च द्वितीयया गम्यते । तस्माद्यागवचनः स्वाहाकार-शब्दो यथा समिदादय इति । आह । यदि द्वितीयया संयोगात् तं यागवचनं मन्यसे आरादुपकारकस्तर्हि यागः । ईप्सिततमे हि द्वितीया विभक्तिर्भवति । इति । अत्रोच्यते । एवमेव प्राप्ते वदामः तन्न्यायत्वादिति । स एव न्याय इह यः स्थाण्वाहुतौ । अपि वा शेषभूतत्वात्तत्संस्कारः प्रतीयेतेति । [SB on X.1.14, p. 1810 f]

85 अतः प्रसिद्धवदाचारात्सामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनाच्च अयमस्यार्थ इति निश्चीयते । लोकेऽपि सामानाधिकरण्यप्रयोगाद्वा आचाराद्वा अर्थावसानं भवति । यथा अयं देवदत्त इति । [SB on X.6.23, p. 1997]

86 यात्र कर्मश्रुतिर्दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यामिति । सा परार्था, तृतीयायोगात् । तया सामानाधिकरण्याद्यजेतेति यजिरपि परार्थ एव । तदेतदेवमापद्यते दर्शपूर्णमासयागेनान्यत् किमपि कुर्यादिति । [SB on X.6.23]

87 अथोच्यते अस्मादेव सामानाधिकरण्यवचनादिंद्रे एते गुणा विद्यन्त इति । तन्न । अविद्यमानेष्वपि स्तुत्यास्य सामानाधिकरण्यवचनमुपपद्येत एव । यथा इंद्रो बृहस्पतिर्देवदत्त इति । [SB on IX.1.42]

case with texts like *'Somena yajeta'* where we see the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* between *soma* and *yāga*. But how can this *sāmānādhikaraṇya* be accounted for? Here we see that for want of any better alternative we have to explain the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* by resorting to *matvartha-lakṣaṇā* and paraphrase the text by *'Somavatā yāgena iṣṭaṁ bhāvayet'*. In texts like *'Udbhidā yajeta'*, however, we avoid this *matvartha-lakṣaṇā* by taking the word *Udbhid* as *karma-nāmadheya*.

28 As regards the finite verbs we find that S'ABARA has to give us good information not only about the *vidhyartha* but also regarding some other tenses and moods and also about the *padas*. But before taking up these, we note one observation that S'ABARA has made regarding the *dhātvartha* and the *pratyayārtha*. In his commentary on MS.IX.1.1 he remarks that *dhātvartha* can have no *ākāṅkṣā* for *dharmas* or vice versa. It is the *pratyayārtha* that has expectancy for *itikartavyatā*.[88] Of the tenses S'ABARA has noted only two the furture and the present. The former, he declares, can be undersood as being *prarocanārtha*. Thus we may say that a young calf will yield abundant milk and good bulls and cows just by way of praise.[89] As for the present the most important point to bear in mind is that it cant taken as enjoining an act.[90] It, therefore, naturally follows that it

---

88 न हि धात्वर्थस्य धर्माणां च परस्परेणाकांक्षा विद्यते । प्रत्ययार्थेन हीति-कर्तव्यता कांक्ष्यते, कर्तव्यं कथमिति, न यजिः कीदृश इति । [SB on IX.1.1, p. 1639]; प्रयोगवचनेनैते प्रत्ययार्थेन संबध्यन्ते । स हि साकांक्षो न धात्वर्थः । [SB, p. 1640]

89 इति चेद्भवान्मन्यते नैकहायन्यामेते समवेतानर्थानभिवदन्तीति । भवेदेत-देवं यद्येकहायन्या इमे गुणा न भवेयुः । कालान्तरे तु तस्या उपपद्यन्ते, न साण्डस्य । भविष्यत्कालवचना अप्येते प्ररोचनार्था भवन्ति । [SB on IX.1.43, p. 1691]

90 नात्र विधिर्गम्यते वर्तमानकालप्रत्ययनिर्देशात् । [SB, p. 240]; न हि विधानशब्दोऽस्ति, अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधातीति वर्तमानकालनिर्देशात् । [SB, p. 367]; वर्तमानापदेश एष, न विधायकः । [SB, p. 946]; नात्र विधिविभक्ति-र्वर्तमानापदेशोऽयम् । [SB p. 1215]

must be of the nature of an *anuvāda* or an *arthavāda*[91] Thus the texts like *'Yad āṅkte cakṣureva tad bhrātṛvyasya vṛṅkte'* can't be understood as being *phala-vidhis*. They are rather to be taken as *phalārthavādas.*[92] In texts like *'Ubhayīr dadāti'* the *vartamānakāla* is *bhūtānuvādamātra*. In texts like *'Upas'ayo yūpo bhavati'* the *vartamānakāla* is to be understood as being *lākṣaṇika,* and as referring to *guṇas* or *saṁskāras.*[94] Sometimes the present may be taken as conveying *pras'aṁsā* or *stuti* when we find that it comes into conflict with *pratyakṣa.* This is best illustrated in text like *'Yasya parṇamayī juhūrbhavati na sa pāpaṁ s'lokaṁ s'ṛṇoti'* This and such other statements containing a statement of *phala* have to be taken as *arthavādas* for want of any *vidhāyikā vibhakti.* And in *arthavāda vākyas,* as we shall see later on, *avartamāne vartamāna s'abda* can convey *pras'aṁsā* alone. This very principle is again stated by

---

91 ता उभयीर्ददातीति नात्र विधिविभक्तिरस्ति । वर्तमानापदेशोयम् । प्रमाणान्तरमादायाप्ययमर्थः प्रापितः ।———तदेतद्भूतानुवादमात्रम् । [SB on X.3.32, p. 1878 f]; नात्र वचनं यूपः कर्तव्य इति, वर्तमानापदेशोऽयम् । ननु वर्तमानापदेशोऽपि न घटते संस्काराणामभावे । उच्यते । भक्त्या भविष्यति । यथा यजमानो वै यूप इति । तत्र सादृश्यात्, इह पुनः कथमिति । उच्यते । गुणानामभिधानत्वात् ।———एवमेकदेशेनापि संस्काराणां संस्कृत इति स्तुत्याभिधीयते । [SB on VII.3.34, p. 1535 f]

92 वर्तमानापदेशोऽयम्, नचायमर्थो वर्तमानः । तस्मान्न खादिरस्रुवादिसद्भावे तत्फलं भवेत् । तदेवमापतति । असत्यपि भवति वा न वेति । खादिरादौ सति भवति तत्फलं, नापि भवति । नैवं विज्ञायते कुतस्तत्फलमिति । तस्मादेवंजातीयकेषूपचरितेषु न क्वचित्प्रवृत्तिः न कुतश्चिन्निवृत्तिरित्यानर्थक्यमक्रियार्थत्वात् । अर्थवादत्वे चावर्तमाने वर्तमानशब्दः प्रशंसार्थ उपपत्स्यते । [SB on IV.3.2, p. 1247]; अथ यदुक्तं यथा यस्य खादिरः स्रुवो भवतीत्येवमादिषु फलश्रुतिरर्थवादो भवत्येवमिहापि स्यादिति । युक्तं तत्र फलार्थवादः फलविध्यसंभवात् फलार्थवादसंभवाच्च । तदुक्तं द्रव्यसंस्कारकर्मसु परार्थत्वात्फलश्रुतिरर्थवादः स्यात् । [SB on IV.3.19, 1258].

93 See n. 91 above [SB on X.3.32, p. 1878 f]

94 See n. 91 above [SB on VII.3.34, p. 1535 f].

S'ABARA in his commentary on MS.IX.1.9. and VIII.2.6. [95] Slightly different, however, is the case with texts like '*Durvarṇosya' bhrātṛvyo bhavati*' which is discussed by S'ABARA while commenting on MS.III.4.23. In this connection S'ABARA points out that just as in the *Prajāpati vratas* we have to connect the main *vidhi* with the *phala-vākya* similarly here also we have to connect the main *vidhi* with the *phala-vākya*. For otherwise there would crop up *ānarthakya*. Thus in such texts there is *vartamānāpadeśa* no doubt; yet we resort to *vipariṇāma* and assume that the *kāla* is *avivakṣita*. [96]

29 Among the moods again we find that S'ABARA has referred to only two moods - the *loṭ* i.e. *ājñārtha* and the *liṅ* i.e. *vidhyartha*. That the *loṭ* is *prāptakālavacana* has been declared by him while discussing the text '*Agnīd agnīn vihara; barhiḥ stṛṇīhi, puroḍāś'ānalaṁkuru.*' There S'ABARA shows that by following the *pravṛtti-krama* we can understand the *loḍanta* forms in their natural signification. [97] At MS.III.8.22 S'ABARA is discussing as to whether the *kartā* of the *praiṣa* and that of the *praiṣārtha* is the same. The *pūrva-pakṣin* would like to say 'yes'. But S'ABARA declares

---

95 अपि च नैतद्वचनम्, वर्तमानकालोपदेशत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षविरोधात्स्तुतिवादोऽवधार्यते । [SB on IX.1.9,]; प्रशंसार्थोऽयं सोमशब्दे, न विध्यर्थः। विधायकस्याभावात् । [SB on VIII.2.6,]; also see n. 92 above.

96 ननु वर्तमानापदेशोयम् । सत्यमेवमेतत् । आनर्थक्यपरिहाराय फलचोदनया संबन्ध एषितव्यो भवति । अन्यस्माच्चैषितव्यादेकवाक्यत्वं तस्य विपरिणामो लघीयान् । कुतः । प्रत्यक्षा तेनैकवाक्यता, परोक्षाऽन्येन । विपरिणामश्च वर्तमानकालस्याविवक्षा । संबन्धस्य च तात्पर्याध्यवसानम् । तस्मादेवंजातीयकः प्रधानकर्मोपदेशः स्यात् । यथा प्रजापतिव्रतानां फलेन संबन्ध एतावता हैनसा वियुक्तो भवतीति एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम् । तस्मादेवंजातीयकः पुरुषधर्म इति । [SB on III.4.24, p. 955]; Also cf. SB on MS. IV.3.18, p. 1257.

97 शब्दश्च विप्रतिषिध्यते । अलङ्कुर्वित्युक्तः प्रोक्षणादीन् प्रतिपद्येत । अस्मत्पक्षे तु अलङ्कुर्वित्युक्तेऽलङ्करणमेव प्रतिपत्स्यते । तत्रालङ्करणे प्राप्तकालवचनो लोडन्तोऽनुग्रहीष्यते । तस्मादत्र प्रावृत्तिकः क्रम इति । [SB on IV.3.18, p. 1257]

that the *kartā* of the *praiṣa* must be different from that of the *praiṣārtha*. *Praiṣa* is naturally addressed never to one's own self but to some one else. Nor would it do to argue that in the *loḍanta* form which conveys only *prāptakālatva* it is immaterial whether the verb is in the first or the second or the third person. For whatever be the person, what is *prāptakāla* is *prāptakāla* after all. For even thus we are doing injustice to the *puruṣa* of the *loḍanta* form when we neglect the *yuṣmadartha* that is conveyed by it. Hence if we can find a construction where this *yuṣmadaratha* will not be neglected we should certainly prefer it. Hence it is that we accept texts like *'Prokṣaṇīr āsādaya'* as being *praiṣas* and not mere statements of *prāpta-kāla padārthas.*[98]

30. Coming next to the *vidhi liṅ* or the *vidhyartha* we notice that this is the *vibhakti* used for and has the power to convey an injunction. With a negative particle it can also convey probitions. It is thus this *liṅ* that expresses the *s'ābdī bhāvanā* which is said to urge a man on to the performance of a certain act. S'ABARA in one place [99] in his *bhāṣya* has quoted a *kārikā* wherein are enumerated all the forms of verbs which are found used in *vidhi vākyas* to enjoin an act. The *kārikā* runs: *'Kuryāt kriyeta kartavyaṁ bhavet syād iti pañcamam / Etat syāt sarvavedeṣu niyataṁ vidhilakṣaṇam /'*. From this *kārikā* it is clear that an injunction can't properly be conveyed by any other form but the potential. Thus if in some cases the *vartamāna-kāla* is found used in a *vidhi-vākya* it has to be understood as deriving its injunctive force from some *liṅ* form occurring in some other related text. Hence it is that we find S'ABARA saying that though in the text *'sa eṣa yajamānaḥ añjasā svargalokaṁ yāti'* the word yāti is not a *vidhi s'abda,* yet it can be understood as repeating the idea conveyed by the *vidhi s'abda viz. yajeta* which declares *svarga* as the fruit of

---

98 Read SB on MS. III.8.22, p. 1127 f.

99 SB on IV.3.3.

Agnihotra, as is evident from the text *'Svargakāmo yajeta'*. [100]

31 Now let us take a text like *'Dars'apūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta'*. In such texts one finds that both *yāga* as well as its result is spoken of by the words therein; and hence one is rather puzzled as to which of these is really intended to be enjoined. It is impossible that both the ideas be conveyed by *s'ruti*. Only one of these ideas can be conveyed by s'ruti while the other shall have to be taken as being conveyed by *vākya;* and that which is conveyed by *s'ruti* shall be understood as being the main point of the injunction. Hence it is concluded that all the *yāgas* such as *Āgneya* which together go to make up the bigger *yāgas* called the *Dars'a* and the *pūrṇamāsa,* shall yield the fruit not severally but conjointly. Thus we find that in the *phala-vidhis* or rather the *adhikāravidhis karma* or the *yāga* is the main point of the injunction, the *phala* being only *uddiṣṭa*.[101] One more point that we note regarding this *vibhakti* is that it is this *vidhivibhakti* that helps us to distinguish an *adhikāravidhi* from the *phalārthavāda*. Take, for example, the texts *'Dars'apūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta' and 'Yasya parṇamayī juhūr bhavati na sa pāpaṁ s'lokaṁ s'ṛṇoti'*. In both these we find that there is a statement of *phala* with reference to some act that is enjoined. But what distinguishes the one from the other is the fact that while the *vidhivibhakti* is to be found in the former, it is conspicuous by its absence in the latter. A text containing the *vidhivibhakti* declaring the fruit is called the *adhikāra-*

---

100 यदुक्तं न चैष यातीति विधिशब्दः इति । मा भूद्विधिशब्दः । स्वर्गकामो यजेतेति वचनान्तरेणावगतमनुवदिष्यते । तस्मादविरोधः । [वृत्ति., p. 72]; Also see n.96 above.

101 नात्र यागमुद्दिश्य फलं विधीयते, स्वर्गेण यागं कुर्यादिति । फलमुद्दिश्य यागो विधीयते स्वर्गं यागेन कुर्यादिति । किं कारणम् । यात्र विधायिका विभक्तिर्य-जेतेति सा यागं श्रुत्या विदधाति, फलं वाक्येन विदध्यात् । न च श्रुत्यर्थे संभवति वाक्यार्थो ग्राह्यः । श्रुत्यर्थस्य बलवत्त्वात् । [SB on XI.1.3, 2101].

vidhi; while a text which contains no such *vibhakti* is called the *phalārthavāda.* [102]

32 The last and perhaps the most important fact about the *vidhyartha* has been ntoed by S'ABARA while discussing the texts like *'Nānṛtaṁ vadet'*, or *'Tasmān na Brāhmaṇāya avaguret, na hanyāt, na lohitaṁ kuryāt'*, where the main question is whether the injunction or prohibition laid down in them is *puruṣadharma* or *kratudharma.* As for the former text there is no doubt that it contains a *pratiṣedhasya vidhiḥ.* But the *pūrva-pakṣin* is not willing to accept that it is *kratudharma.* He argues that in the verb *vadet* we find the *puruṣaprayatna* directly conveyed by *s'ruti;* while *karma-sambandha* is conveyed only indirectly by *prakaraṇa.* Thus if we take *anṛtavadana* not as *puruṣadharma* but as *kratudharma* we shall be setting aside *s'ruti* for *vākya* which is inadmissible. [103] Again we shall be setting aside the *vidhyartha* which means that the world *vadet* in this text we shall be taking to stand for *vadanam bhavati* and not for *vadanam anutiṣthet* which is its legitimate signification. Hence it is better to take this text as laying down *anṛtavadana-niṣedha* as *puruṣadharma* and not as *kratudharma.*[104] The *siddhāntin*, however demurs and points

---

102 अथ यदुक्तं यथा खादिरं वीर्यकामस्य यूपं कुर्याद् बैल्वमन्नाद्यकामस्य पालाशं ब्रह्मवर्चसकामस्येति । युक्तं तेषु । विधिविभक्तिः कुर्यादिति वीर्यखादिरसंबन्धस्य विधात्री । न च वर्तमानापदेशिनी । तस्मात्तत्राविरोध इति...विधिविभक्तिं विधायिकां लिङं मन्यमानाः श्लोकमिमं समामनन्ति । अस्ति चात्र विधिविभक्तिः । तस्मादनुपवर्णनमेतदिति [SB on IV.3.3, p. 1247]; फलार्थवादसरूपा एते शब्दाः । किं सारूप्यम् । विधिविभक्तेरभावः । [SB on IV.3.17, p. 1256]; युक्तं तत्र फलार्थवादः । फलविध्यसंभवात् फलार्थवादसंभवात् च । [SB on IV.3.19, p. 1258]

103 तस्माद्विधिः प्रतिषेधस्यायम् । आह । गृह्णीम एतद् विधिरिति । पुरुषधर्म इति तु गृह्णीमः । पुरुषप्रयत्नस्य श्रुतत्वात् । [SB on III.4.13, p. 913]; पुरुषस्यायमुपदिश्यते, न दर्शपूर्णमासयोः । कुतः । पुरुषप्रयत्नस्य श्रवणात् । वदेदिति वदनमनुतिष्ठेदिति श्रुत्या गम्यते । तस्य पुरुषसंबन्धः श्रुत्यैव । कर्मसंबन्धः प्रकरणात् । श्रुतिश्च प्रकरणाद् बलीयसी । [SB on III.4.12, p. 907 f]

104 इतरथा वदनं भवतीत्येतावदर्थे वदनमनुतिष्ठेदित्यविवक्षितस्वार्थः

out that the *ākhyāta* conveys the idea of the action only and not of the *kartā* also as the *pūrva-pakṣin* would have it. The *vacana* of the *ākhyātas'abda* conveys only the *ekatva* or the *dvitva* or the *bahutva* of the *kartā*, but not the idea of the *kartā* himself. The idea of the *kartā* we do get from the *ākhyāta* but so do we get the idea of the other several *kārakas* also; and all these we get not directly from the *ākhyātas'abda*, but through its *artha* only i.e. by implication. This shows that *kartā* and such other ideas can't be accepted as being conveyed by the *ākhyātas'abda*. And if thus the the *kartā* i.e. the *puruṣa* is not denoted by the verb then there is no ground to hold that *puruṣaprayatna* is spoken of in the text under consideration.[105] As for the *vidhivibhakti* it won't be *avivakṣitasvārtha* for it shall be useful in laying down the *anṛtavadana-niṣedha* as the *aṅga* of the main act.[106] Turning to the other text we find that according to the *pūrva-pakṣin* the *niṣedha* in that text must be accepted as being *kratudharma* and not *puruṣadharma*. Thus according to him the sense of this text would be that *avagoraṇa, hanana* and *lohitakaraṇa* in the case of a *Brāhmaṇa* shall be *avoided* during the performance of the *Dars'apūrṇamāsa* sacrifices only; but these need not be avoided under other

परार्थो विध्यर्थो भवेत् । पुरुषस्योपदेशे पुनर्विवक्षितस्वार्थ एव शब्दः । तस्मात्पुरुषस्योपदेशः । यस्य चोपदेशस्तस्यायं प्रतिषेधः । [SB on III.4.12, p. 908]

105 अत्र ब्रूमः । सर्वेष्वाख्यातेषु क्रियानुष्ठानं श्रूयते न कारकं किंचित् । कथमेतद्गम्यते । प्रत्ययात् । [See p. 116, n. 43 above]---अर्थप्राप्ता हि कर्मादयः । ते न भवन्ति शब्दस्याभिधेयभूताः । न स्वेकत्वादयोऽर्थात्प्राप्नुवन्ति । तेन ते शब्दार्थभूताः । तस्माद्यद्यपि विशेषणमेकत्वादयस्तथापि विशेषणमेवाभिधीयते । तस्मात् कर्तुरेकत्वं शब्दार्थो, न कर्ता । [SB on III.4.13, p. 913-21, 927-30]

106 यत्तु पुरुषप्रयत्नोऽनर्थको भवति कर्मधर्मपक्षे प्रयोगवचनेन कर्तव्यतावचनादिति । तदुच्यते । अङ्गं सत्प्रकरणं गृह्येत । न चाविहितमङ्गं भवति । तस्मादङ्गं स्याय विधातव्यमस्मिन्नपि पक्षे । अतो मन्यामहे प्राकरणिकस्याय निषेध इति । तस्मात्तदङ्गं यदनृतं तन्न वाच्यमिति । तेन यत्संकल्पितं तदङ्गं तदेव कर्तव्यम् । व्रीहिमयं संकल्प्य न यवमयः प्रदेयः । [SB on III.4.13, p. 940 f.]

circumstances.[107] The *sidhāntin's* view however is that the text *contains sarvāvasthasya brāhmaṇasya pratiṣedhaḥ.* The *pūrva-pakṣin* connects this *pratiṣedha* with the *dars'apūrṇa-māsa on* the strength of the *prakaraṇa;* but as the *siddhāntin* points out it has to be connected with the *yajamāna* in obedience to the *vākya.* And as *vākya* is stronger than *prakaraṇa* we have to take this *pratiṣedha* as being connected with *Brāhmaṇa* i.e. any *Brāhmaṇa* under any circumstances and not with the *dars'apūrṇamāsa* sacrifices. [108]

33 A similar text we find in *'Tasmāj jañjabhyamāno anubrūyāt mayi dakṣakratū iti prāṇāpanāv evātman dhatte'.* Here, however, the *jañjabhyamānatva* has to be taken as a *kratudharma* and not as *puruṣadharma.* The main point of distinction between this text and the one discussed just above is that here we don't get the *phalavidhāna* as we do get it in the other. The statement of *phala* we find no doubt in both. But in the last text we have the *vidhāyikā vibhakti* and we see that there is *phalavidhāna.* In the present text, however, there is no *vidhāyikā vibhakti* and hence we can't take the statement of *phala* occurring in it as a *phala-vidhāna.* [109] The *prajāpativratas* also have to be taken as being *puruṣadharma* and not *kratudharma* on this very

---

107 प्रकरणाद्दर्शपूर्णमासयोरवगोरणादिप्रतिषेधः । न दर्शपूर्णमासयोर्ब्राह्मणस्यावगोरितव्यं वधो वा कार्यो लोहितं वा प्रस्कन्दनीयम् । अन्य उपायं आस्थातव्य आनतये । तेनान्वाहार्येणानमन्ति इति प्रकरणात् प्राप्नोति । [SB on III.4.17, p. 948 f.]

108 सर्वावस्थस्य ब्राह्मणस्यायं प्रतिषेध उक्तः । दर्शपूर्णमासगतेनैव नावगोरणादि कर्तव्यमिति । ननु प्रकरणाद्दर्शपूर्णमासधर्मोऽयम् । सत्यं प्रकरणात् । एवं वाक्येनावगुरमाणस्य धर्मः । वाक्यं च प्रकरणाद् बलीयः । [SB on III.4.17, p. 950]

109 ननु जञ्जभ्यमानस्येव प्रकरणे निवेशो भवेत् । नेत्युच्यते । तत्र फलं कल्पनीयम्, इह क्लृप्तम् । अस्ति ह्यत्र विधायकविभक्तिः । शतेन यातयात् सहस्रेण यातयात् स्वर्गं लोकं प्रजानीयादिति । [SB on III.4.17, p. 950]; Also see SB on III.4.14-16.

principle.[110] From this discussion about these texts we may now draw a few general rules· (1) Generally a *vidhāyikā vibhakti* can be regarded as being *vivakṣitasvārtha* and construed as such if we take the text as laying down some *puruṣadhrama;* but if it is taken as laying down some *kratudharma,* the *vidhāyikā vibhakti* therein shall have to be understood as being *avivakṣitasvārtha* or its presence in the text will have to be explained on some other ground. (2) Again if in any text we see a statement of *phala* side by side with that of an act we should first of all see whether the statement contains a *vidhāyikā vibhakti* or not. If it contains a *vidhāyikā vibhakti* it shall be taken as laying down the act as *puruṣadharma* i.e. with reference to *puruṣa,* rather than the act as restricted by *prakaraṇa.* But if it has no such *vibhakti* it shall be taken as laying down the act as a *kratudharma* only and not as pertaining to the man. (3) The main point of distinction between the two is that in the former case (i.e. when the act enjoined is *puruṣadharma*) the injunction (as also the prohibition) is quite general and has no reference to any act or acts as restricting its scope; while in the latter it is restricted to some particular *kratu* with reference to which it may be laid down. Thus, as we shall note it below, a negation which is *puruṣadharma* is an unrestricted and general negation; while the one which is *kratudharma* is naturally a restricted negation which applies under particular conditions only.

34 And now we come to the *padas* about which also S'ABARA has to make a few observations. Thus about the *Ātmanepada* he says it can be used if the fruit resulting from the action denoted by the root to which it is applied is to accrue to the *kartā* or the agent, But if it is to accrue to some one else only *Parasmaipada* shall be used. Hence it is that in the text '*Vasante Brāhmaṇo agnīnādadhīta*' the *ādhāna* is said to be *ātmārtha* to the *brāhmaṇa.*[111] Hence

110 SB on MS. IV.1.3-6

111 कथं चात्मार्थताधानस्य गम्यत इति । कर्त्रभिप्राये हि क्रियाफले आदधीतेत्येतदात्मनेपदं संभवति । असत्यस्मिन्वचने कामश्रुतिपरिग्रहे नाधानस्यात्मार्थता भवेत् । [SB on II.3.4]

again it is that *phala* is said to be *ātmārtha* to the *kartā* and hence it is declared that *phala* is not *kratvartha* but *puruṣārtha*.[112] But let us take the text *'Vais vānaraṁ dvādas akapālaṁ nirvapet putre jāte'*. There the question is as to whether this *vais'vānareṣṭi,* that is enjoined in this text, is for the benefit of the father who performs it or for that of the son for whom it is performed. The *pūrvapakṣīn* takes his stand on the *ātmanepada* in the text enjoining the *ādhāna* and argues that since *ātmanepada* can be used only when the *phala* accrues to the *kartā,* therefore in the present case the fruit of the *vais'vānareṣṭi must* accrue to the *kartā* i.e. the father because we find the *ātmanepada* used in the *ādhānavākya.* But the *siddhāntin* quotes the *phalavākyas* like *'Yasmiñ jāte etam iṣṭiṁ nirvapati pūta eva sa tejasvī annāda indriyāvī pas'umān bhavatīti'* which are found to occur in the sequel. Then he argues that these *phalavākyas* make it quite clear that the *phala* accrues to the son and not to the father.[113] As for he *ātmanepada,* it is to be noted, the *siddhāntin* points out, that the obtainment of the *phala* by the *putra* is after all nothing short of *pituḥ ātmanaḥ prītiḥ* so that there is nothing wrong if the *ātmanepada* is used in such a text. Thus we see that the *ātmanepada* can be used not only when the fruit, resulting from the act denoted by the root, accrues directly to the *kartā* of that act, but it may also be used even if the fruit

112 फलमपि पुरुषं प्रत्युपदिश्यते । कुतः । आत्मनेपदप्रयोगात् । कर्त्रभिप्राय एतद्भवति । क्रियाफलमनुभवेत् कथं पुरुष इति यागाः प्रयुज्यते । तस्मात्फलं पुरुषार्थं यागाच्छ्रूयते, नात्मनिवृत्त्यर्थम् । तस्माच्छेषभूतम् । [SB on III.1.5, p. 662]

113 नेमानि फलदानि परस्य भवन्ति कर्माणि । कुतः । आधाने आत्मनेपदनिर्देशात् ।---तस्मादात्मनिःश्रेयसमिति । एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः । फलसंयोगो न स्यात्पितुः । फलवचनं शेषभूतं पुत्रस्य, न पितुः । कथम् । एवं श्रूयते । वैश्वानरं द्वादशकपालं निर्वपेत्पुत्रे जाते, यदष्टाकपालो भवति गायत्र्यैवैनं ब्रह्मवर्चसेन पुनाति । यस्मिञ्जात एतामिष्टिं निर्वपति पूत एव स तेजस्वी अन्नाद इन्द्रियावी पशुमान् भवतीति । यो जातस्तस्य फलं श्रूयते । नास्ति वचनस्यातिभारः । तस्मात्पुत्रस्य फलमिति । [SB on IV.3.38, p. 1266]

is directly accruing to some one else provided that the *kartā* must have ultimately the feeling of satisfaction as he has when he does some act and its fruit accrues to his son. [114] This principle is very often referred to as the JĀTEṢṬI NYĀYA or the VAIS'VĀNARĪYEṢṬI-NYĀYA.

35 The *parasmaipada* shows that the *phala* of the action enjoined by the root accrues not to the *kartā* but to some one else. That is why texts like *'Tam abhyanakti'* and *'s'areṣīkayānakti'* are construed to mean *'Anyo yajamānasyābhyañjanaṁ karoti'* [115], while texts like *'Kes'as'mas'rū vapate'* are taken as laying down an act which the *yajamāna* himself has to perform.[116] It may be interesting to note that S'ABARA has referred to the rules laid down by PĀṆINI regarding the *pada* of some roots when preceded by some prepositions as yielding a particular sense. Thus at MS. VI.3.34-36 while discussing the text *'Vasante brāhmaṇamupanayīta, grīṣme rājanyaṁ, varṣāsu vais'yam'* S'ABARA declares that it lays down *adhyayana* with reference to the different castes; for he argues that here we find the word *upanayīta*, a from of the root *nī* with *upa* which according to PĀṆINI denotes *ācārya-karaṇam*. This shows that *adhyayana* must be accomplished at the hands of *ācārya*, so that it will not do to say that a *S'ūdra* may learn the *Veda* by himself without the aid of any *ācārya* and may thus be a *vidvān* and hence entitled to perform the *yāgas* laid down in *s'ruti*.[117] The other reference

---

114 यदुक्तं न परस्य फलदान्यंतानि कर्माणीति । तदुच्यते । यत्पुत्रस्य फलं सा आत्मनः प्रीतिः । तस्मादात्मनेपदं न विरुध्यते । एतामेवात्मनः प्रीतिमभिप्रेत्य भवति वचनम्, आत्मा वै पुत्र इति । [SB on IV.3.38, p. 1266]

115 परस्मैपदव्यपदेशश्च भवति । तमभ्यनक्ति शरेषीकयानक्तीति च । अन्यो यजमानस्याभ्यञ्जनं करोतीति गम्यते । [SB on III.8.5, p. 1113]

116 यजमानेन वा कर्तव्याः । कुतः । पुरुषप्रधानत्वात् । कथं पुरुषप्राधान्यम् । कर्त्रभिप्रायं क्रियाफलं गम्यते । तस्मात्पुरुषस्य कर्मकरणसामर्थ्यमुपजनयन्ति । न च कश्चिद्येन कर्मकरणेन सामर्थ्यमुपजन्यते तदर्थं पुरुषान् क्रीणातीति । ईप्सितेभ्यः पदार्थेभ्यः क्रीणाति । येन यस्य सामर्थ्यं भवति तत्तेनैव कर्तव्यम् । कर्मवत् । यथा प्रधानकर्माणि पुरुषार्थानि यजमानस्य भवन्ति एवमेतदपीति ।[SB on III.8.4, 1113]

117. गुणेनाध्ययनेनार्थी शूद्रोऽनुपनीतः स्वयमुपेत्याध्येष्यते । तथास्य सामर्थ्यं

to PĀṆINI'S *sūtra* occurs in the discussion about the text '*Pṛṣṭhair upatiṣṭhante*' which according to him means '*Pṛṣṭhair abhidadhāti*'. Naturally the *pūrva-pakṣin* asks as to how this word viz. *upatiṣṭhante* which has the power to denote *upasthāna* can be taken to denote *abhidhāna*. It is in reply to this question that S'ABARA quotes the *sūtra* '*Upān mantrakaraṇe*' and declares that the root *sthā* with *upa* when used in the *ātmanepada* denotes *mantrakaraṇa* i.e. an act that can be accomplished with the help of *mantra* or of which *mantra* is the *karaṇa*. And evidently *mantra* can be the *karaṇa* of *abhidhāna* only and not of *upasthāna* which is to be performed with the help of *s'arīra* or *manas*.[118]

36 We have thus considered the *pada* from various points of view and have also seen what observations JAIMINI and S'ABARA have to make with reference to it. We have also referred to various texts and discussions about them as done by S'ABARA and have ultimately noted down all the general rules which have been explicitly or implicitly used and stated by JAIMINI as well as S'ABARA, so far as the interpretation of a *pada* in all its aspects is concerned. A similar investigation we have now to carry on in connection with the *vākya* which we shall proceed to do in what follows.

जनयिष्यत इति। उच्यते। विद्यायामेवैषा पुरुषश्रुतिः। उपनयनस्य संस्कारस्य तदर्थत्वात्। विद्यार्थमुपाध्यायस्य समीपमानीयते, नादृष्टार्थं, कुड्य वा कर्तुम्। सैषा विद्यायां पुरुषश्रुतिः। कथमवगम्यते। आचार्यकरणमेतदभिधीयते। कुतः। आत्मनेपददर्शनात्। नयतिराचार्यकरणे वर्तते। तदर्थसंबन्धादुपनयनमाचार्यकरणप्रयुक्तम्। वेदाध्यापनेन चाचार्यो भवति। तस्माद्वेदाध्ययने ब्राह्मणादयः श्रुताः। शूद्रस्य न श्रुतं वेदाध्ययनम्। अतोऽवेदत्वादसमर्थः शूद्रो नाधिक्रियते। [SB on VI.1.34-35, p. 1380]

118 न चैतदेवं कर्मणः पृष्ठशब्द इति। किं तर्हि। द्रव्येषु पृष्ठशब्दः स्यात्। ऋग्द्रव्येषु अभि त्वा शूर नोनुम इत्येवमादीनामृचां वाचकः। कुतः। अभिधानोपदेशात्। अभिधानोपदेशोऽयं पृष्ठैरुपतिष्ठंत इति। पृष्ठैरभिदधातीत्यर्थः। कथं पुनरयमुपस्थानवचनोऽभिधानार्थः शक्यते विज्ञातुम्। उच्यते। उपप्रहविशेषान्मन्त्रकरणे उपतिष्ठतेरात्मनेपदं भवति। मन्त्रस्तु अभिधानस्य करणं, नोपस्थानस्य। उपस्थानं शरीरेण क्रियते मनसा वा। तस्मादभिधानार्थः। [SB on VII.3.36, p. 1567]

WHAT IS VĀKYA ?

1. Having thus far seen what JAIMINI and S'ABARA have to say about *s'abda* in general from various points of view, we now pass on to the next important section of our inquiry. It is but well-known that though JAIMINI and S'ABARA have incidentally and often expressed distinct and clear ideas regarding *s'abda* and its interpretation, their main concern is not *s'abda* which forms the main theme of grammar which on that account is by common consent called the *pada-s'āstra* as opposed to *Mīmāṁsā* which is called *vākya-s'astra.* They are always more concerned with the task of interpreting the sentences in the Scriptural texts. It is the Vedic *vākyas* that they are handling and interpreting; and while doing that they are following certain principles which they have only occasionally cared to set out in clear terms. We have now to see what these principles are and how they have been applied by JAIMINI and S'ABARA to the material on which they are working. This we proceed to do by trying to find out what they have to say about the nature of *vākya.*

2 And we find Jaiminī defining a *vākya* at MS.II.1.46 in the wods: *'So long as a* single *purpose is served by a number of words which on being separated are found to be wanting i.e. incapable of effecting their purpose, they form one sentence'.*[1] In the preceding *sūtras* he has classified the *mantras* into *ṛk, sāman,* and *yajus* including the *nigadas,*[2] the main purpose of these all being the *prakās'ana* of the *Devatā* &c. at the proper moment.[3] Of these there can be

1 अर्थैकत्वादेकं वाक्यं साकाङ्क्षं चेद्विभागे स्यात् ।

2 cf. तेषामृग्यत्रार्थवशेन पादव्यवस्था । गीतिषु सामाख्या । शेषे यजुःशब्दः । निगदो वा चतुर्थः स्याद्धर्मविशेषात् । व्यपदेशात् । यजूंषि वा तद्रूपत्वात् । वचनाद्धर्मविशेषः । अर्थाच्च । गुणार्थो व्यपदेशः । सर्वेषामिति चेत् । न, ऋग्व्यपदेशात् । [MS II.1.34-45]

3 कश्चिन्मन्त्रो यो विहितमर्थं प्रकाशयति प्रयोगकाले [SB., p. 321]; मन्त्रस्य ह्येतत्प्रयोजनं यत्स्मारयति क्रियां साधनं वा । असति स्मरणे न क्रिया संवर्तेत ।

no ambiguity regarding the division of the *ṛks* and the *sāmans* which are governed by metre and music respectively. But how to know where one *yajus* ends and another begins?[4] It was here that JAIMINI thought it necessary to define a *vākya* which he has done in the words quoted above. From the words '*vibhāge sākāṅkṣa*' in the definition it is clear that a *vākya* is a *samudāya* of *padas* which if separated exhibit expectancy for one another. Thus then we find that JAIMINI has by implication laid down two conditions for words to form a *vākya* : (1) *samudāya* or *samabhivyāhāra,* and (2) *ākāṅkṣā* or *sākāṅkṣatva* of the constituent *padas.* There is, however, one more important condition laid by JAIMINI in the expression *arthaikatvāt.* All the *padas* together must yield one sense i.e., they must serve one purpose. *Thus we see that according to* JAIMINI *a group of words will form a vākya if (i) the constituent words separately have expectancy for one another, (ii) are uttered or placed together, and (iii) serve one purpose or yield one signification.*

3. Let us take a concrete instance of the *mantra* '*Devasya tvā savituḥ prasave'śvinor bāhubhyām pūṣṇo hastābhyām agnaye juṣṭaṁ nirvapāmi*'. Taking up the condition of *aikārthya* one may urge that each constituent *pada* here is *ekārtha* and may, therefore, be called a *vākya.* But such an argument is too flimsy because it does not take into consideration the other condition viz. *vibhāge sākāṅkṣatva* which can't be fulfilled by the constituent *padas* taken singly. But, it may be urged, if the *padārthas* are taken together they are bound to be *aneka.* How can the condition of *aikārthya* be then satisfied by the *padas* together? For whatever view you hold regarding *vākyārtha* it will be difficult to show that the constituent *padas* yield one single sense. Even this argument is, however, not sound;

[SB on IV.3.18, p. 1418 f]; एतद्धि मन्त्रपदानां दृष्टं प्रयोजनं यत्समवेतमर्थं प्रकाशयन्तीति । [SB on IX.1.36, p. 1680]

4 अथ प्रश्लिष्टपठितेषु यजुःषु कथमवगम्येतेयदेकं यजुरिति । [SB on II.1.46, p. 444]

for what is meant by the term *artha* in the definition is not *sense* but *prayojana*, a fact which has been lost sight of by the *Pūrva-pakṣin*. Applying the criterion of *aikārthya* in this sense we find that it is very well satisfied by the *mantra* in question. The one purpose served by it is the *prakās'ana* of the *vis'iṣṭa nirvāpa*. The conditions thus being fulfilled we may declare the above *pada-samuccaya* to be a *vākya*.[5] But can we not say that *'Devasya tvā savituḥ prasave nirvapāmi'* is one *vākya*; and that the above group of words i.e., the *mantra* contains two more *vākyas* which are to be completed by supplying *nirvapāmi* by ANUṢAṄGA-NYĀYA? No. For *nirvapāmi* is the *pradhāna* or the main word of the whole group and it is wrong in principle to repeat the main word for the sake of the subordinate ones. Hence we have to conclude that all the words in the group together speak of the *vis'iṣṭa nirvāpa*, the *prakās'ana* of which is the *eka artha* served by them, so that they must be declared to form one *vākya*.[6]

4. *'Bhago vāṁ vibhajatu aryamā vāṁ vibhajatu'* and *'Syonaṁ te sadanaṁ kṛṇomi ghṛtasya dhārayā sus'evaṁ kalpayāmi| Tasmin sīda amṛte pratitiṣṭha vrīhīṇāṁ medhas sumanasyamānaḥ'*. These *mantras* are quoted by S'ABARA

---

5 किमुदाहरणम् । देवस्य त्वा सवितुः प्रसवे इति । ननु पदं पदमन्यैकार्थम् । सत्यं, न तु तद्विभागे साकाङ्क्षम् । न तर्हि अर्थैकत्वमुपपद्यते । बहुत्वात्पदार्थानाम् । पदसमुदायस्य च पृथगर्थो नास्तीत्युक्तम् । भेदः संसर्गो वा वाक्यार्थ इति यद्युच्यते तथाप्यनेकार्थता स्यात् । बहुपदे संसर्गाणां भेदानां च बहुत्वात् । एकप्रयोजनत्वादुपपन्नम्, यथा तावद्देवस्य त्वेति निर्वापप्रकाशनम् । तस्य विशिष्टस्य वाचक एतावान्पदसमूहः । तद् वाक्यम् । [SB on II.1.46, p. 446 f.]

6 नन्वत्र देवस्य त्वा सवितुः प्रसवे निर्वपामीत्येकं वाक्यम्, अश्विनोर्बाहुभ्यां निर्वपामीत्यपरं, एवं बहूनि वाक्यानि । यदि निर्वपामीत्यनुषङ्गस्ततो बहूनि वाक्यानि । न त्वेवमनुषङ्गो भवति । यदि गुणभूतो निर्वपामीति तदा प्रतिप्रधानं भिद्येत । न च निर्वापो देवस्य त्वेत्येवमादीनामर्थेनोच्यते । साधनप्राधान्ये हि अदृष्टार्थता वचनस्य स्यात् । निर्वापे पुनः प्रधाने दृष्टं कार्यं निर्वापप्रकाशनम् । तत्सर्वविशेषणैर्विशिष्टमुच्यते । तस्मादविरोधः । यथा च पदं पदेन विशेष्यते तथोक्तं तद्भूतानामिति । तस्मादेकं वाक्यमिति । [SB on II.1.46, p. 448]

to illustrate the necessity of putting down both the conditions viz. *arthaikatva* and *vibhāge sākāṅkṣatva* as is done by JAIMINI in his definition. In the first of the above *mantras* we find that since both the parts of that *mantra* refer to *vibhāga* there is no harm in saying that they are *ekārtha.* And if *sākāṅkṣatva* is not laid down as another condition for *ekavākyatva* the *padas* will have to be accepted as forming one *vākya* which they are not. Such *pada-samudāyas* are excluded by the other condition; for separate the group into two or more parts and you will find that they are not *sākāṅkṣa,* and as such can't form one sentence. In the other quotation the condition of *vibhāge sākāṅkṣatva* is fulfilled and yet the words can't be taken as forming one *vākya* on account of their inability to fulfil the other condition viz. *arthaikatva.* Thus we find that no definition of *vākya* can claim any accuracy unless and until it expressly lays down the two conditions as laid down by JAIMINI in his *sūtra.*[7]

5. Here it may be interesting to note what S'ABARA has said about the nature of a *vākya.* Commenting on MS. II. 1.46 he raises the question as to how one is to know the exact extent of one *yajurmantra* and answers it by declaring that one *yajurmantra* shall consist of all the *padas* with which one purpose of sacrifice is served. But how many are they? As many as are necessary for serving some useful purpose by bringing to mind the relevant *aṅga* of the sacrifice. These *padas* together are given the name of *vākya*

---

7 अथ किमर्थमुभयं सूत्रितमर्थैकत्वादिति च विभागे साकाङ्क्षत्वादिति च। उच्यते। भवति किंचिदेकार्थं वाक्यं न तु विभागे साकाङ्क्षम्। यथा भगो वां विभजतु अर्यमा वां विभजतु इति। एकार्थाः सर्वे, विभागमभिदधति। ननु भगविशिष्टाद्विभागादर्यमविशिष्टोऽन्यो विभागः। नेत्युच्यते। विभागसामान्येनास्य प्रयोजनं, न विशेषेण। सामान्ये हि दृष्टोऽर्थो भवति न विशेषे। विभागे तु न साकाङ्क्षत्वम्। तस्माद्भिन्नमिदं वाक्यं विभागे विकल्प्यते। तथा स्योनं ते सदनं कृणोमि घृतस्य धारया सुषेवं कल्पयामि। तस्मिन्सीदामृते प्रतितिष्ठ व्रीहीणां मेधः सुमनस्यमान इति विभागे साकाङ्क्षम्। द्वे तु प्रयोजने क्रियेते, सदनकरणं पुरोडाशप्रतिष्ठापनं च। तस्माद्भिन्ने वाक्ये। तस्मात्सम्यक्सूत्रितं, न सूत्रोपलम्भो भवति। [SB on II.1.46, p. 448 f.]

from the circumstance that they have to be uttered together.[8] In another place S'ABARA has only incidentally given us two more sentences describing *vākya* in answer to the question '*Atha kiṁ vākyaṁ nāma*'. They are '*Saṁhatya artham abhidadhati padāni vākyam*' and '*Ekārtham anekapadaṁ vākyam*' wherein, of course, the idea of *vibhāge sākāṅkṣatva* is implied.[9]

6. We have seen that JAIMINI has defined *vākya* in connection with the question of dividing one *yajus* from another. Hence it was that he did not think it necessary to lay down the third condition viz., that of *saṁnidhi* which in the case of the *yajus* texts was too obvious to need any special mention. Nevertheless the condition is implied in the definition of JAIMINI and is taken as such by S'ABARA also, so that *saṁnidhi*, *ākāṅkṣā*, and *aikārthya* are the three conditions which according to JAIMINI and S'ABARA every group of words must satisfy before it can be called a *vākya*.

7. Now let us examine these conditions one by one in the light of the illustrations supplied and the remarks made by S'ABARA concerning each of them. And we take *saṁnidhi* first which at one extreme includes *ānantarya* also. Now if two *padas* have *ākāṅkṣā* for each other and stand next to one another thus having *ānantarya* there is no doubt that they will form one *vākya* provided that they are *ekārtha* also. But would they be allowed to form one *vākya* if they are not *ānantara* to one another? Will it do if they merely stand near one another, of course separated by some other *pada* or *padas*? The question in other words is: 'What is the exact signification of the term *saṁnidhi* when it does not stand for *ānantarya*?' This point is made clear by S'ABARA by declaring that *saṁnidhi* may be said to be present as long as the two parts or *padas* remain capable of expecting one another.

---

8 अथ प्रश्लिष्टपठितेषु यजुःषु कथमवगम्यतेयदेकं यजुरिति । यावता पदसमूहेनेज्यते तावान्पदसमूह एकं यजुः । कियता चेज्यते । यावता क्रियाया उपकारः प्रकाश्यते तावद् वक्तव्यत्वाद् वाक्यमित्युच्यते । [SB on II.1.46, p. 444 ff.]

9 MS. III.3.14.

And this, he adds, can happen if there is *ānantarya* or failing that if the intervention be by *sambandhi padas* only.[10] This, of course, has been laid down by S'ABARA in connection with the principle of *anuṣaṅga;* but what he has stated in that connection is also true of the constituent *padas* of a *vākya* in general. It is thus now clear that for a group of words to form a *vākya* the first requisite is *saṁnidhi* which means immediate sequence or immediate sequence marred at the most by the interception of relevant padas only. This requisite can be briefly stated in the negative by saying that *saṁnidhi* or proximity is undisturbed so long as there is no interception of any disconnected or irrelevant *pada* or *padas.* The moment any such come in, this *saṁnidhi* is lost. But how? It is self-evident that two or more *padas* can be connected with one another owing to *ānantarya* only if they are *sākāṅkṣa* for one another· This point we shall discuss in full in a subsequent paragraph. But if this *ākāṅkṣā or yogyatā* is wanting the *padas* can't combine into a *vākya* inspite of their *ānantarya.* This in other words means that *saṁnidhi* presupposes *ākāṅkṣā* and will, therefore, continue to operate as long as this *ākāṅkṣā* can be realised. The moment this *ākāṅkṣā* is gone *saṁnidhi* loses its scope and is, therefore, said to be lost. Now experience tells us that this *ākāṅkṣā* continues to stay on even if any relevant *padas* intervene. Hence it is that the requisite of *saṁnidhi* is understood to be fulfilled as much by *sambandhipadavyavahita padas* as by *ānantarya-yukta padas.*[11]

---

10 कियांस्तु खलु कालः संनिधिरिति। उच्यते। यावति शक्नोत्युभावपेक्षितुम्। कश्चासौ। आनन्तर्यं संबन्धिपदव्यवायो वा। तावति हि शक्नोत्युभावप्यपेक्षितुम्। [SB on II.1.48, p. 455]

11 संबन्धिपदव्यवाये हि संबन्धादेव पूर्वसंस्कारो नापैति। यत्राप्यपरेण साकाङ्क्षेण व्यवायस्तत्राप्यस्ति संबन्धः। द्वयोरपि हि कार्यं वक्तव्यमिति। परः पूर्वमपेक्षते। अनपेक्षमाणेऽन्यतरः प्रमादपाठः स्यात्। शक्यते चासावपेक्षितुम्। तस्माद्यथैवायमेकस्य संनिधावेवमपरस्य। द्वयोरप्यसंबद्धैः पदैरव्यवहितत्वात्। द्वयोरप्याकाङ्क्षतोरेतावच्च वाक्यशेषसंबन्धे कारणम्। नानन्तर्यम् अव्यवधाने विच्छेदेऽपि भवति संबन्धः। तस्मादनुषङ्गः [SB on II.1.48, p. 445 f.]

8. Another type of *samnidhi* also has to be noticed in this connection. Sometimes there may be no *pada* at all actually mentioned; and yet the *padas* that we actually have before us may combine with that other *pada* which is not actually before us. This would happen if the *pada* or its *artha* is still lingering in our mind. In such cases we see that the *pada* (or *padas*) is *buddhau samnihita.*[12] The first two types of *samnidhi* need no illustration. The last type, however, can't be clearly understood in the absence of an illustration; and hence we shall take the following case. There is a text *Dars'apūrṇamās'ābhyām yajeta'*. Th's text is evidently incomplete since it has as yet the expectancy for *itikartavyatā.* Hence it is that this *pada-samudāya* combines with the *agnyanvādhānādi-vidhāna kāṇḍa which is budhi-samnihita,* and thus forming itself into one *vākya* at last yields one complete sense.[13] *'Daṇdo manoharo ramaṇīyas' ca praharānena s'īghram'* can very well illustrate the second variety of *samnidhi;* for though the word *daṇḍa* is separated from the words *prahara s'īghram,* yet we find that it gets connected with them and forms one *vākya.*[14]

9. But why is it that in the absence of *samnidhi* there can be no *ekavākyatā*? What harm is there if we take a group of *vyavahita padas* as forming one *vākya*? This

---

12 अपूर्णं यद्वाक्यं तत्परिपूरणसमर्थेनावयवेन बुद्धौ संनिहितेनैकवाक्यतां याति । [SB on VIII.1.2, p. 1584]; न च बुद्धावसंनिहितेनैकवाक्यता भवति । द्वाभ्यां हि बद्धाभ्यां पदार्थाभ्यां वाक्यार्थः संजन्यते । नान्यतरेण । [SB on III.1.21, p. 734] तेन बुद्धौ संनिहितेन शक्यते साकांक्षः शब्दः संबन्धयितुम् । [SB , p. 690]

13 यथा दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेतेति विध्यादिः कथमिति विध्यन्तापेक्षः अग्न्यन्वाधानादिविधानकाण्डेन पाठाद् बुद्धौ संनिहितेनैकवाक्यतां याति, दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेतेत्थमिति । एवं विध्यन्तापेक्षो यो वैकृतो विध्यादिः सोऽपि वैदिकेन विध्यन्तेनानुमानाद् बुद्धौ संनिहितेनैकवाक्यतां यास्यति । [SB on VIII.1.2, p. 1584 f.]

14 संनिहितत्वाच्च पदान्तरैः संबध्यते । यथा दण्डो मनोहरो रमणीयश्च प्रहर शीघ्रमिति । रमणीयमनोहरसंबन्धेऽपि सति संनिहितत्वात् प्रहर शीघ्रमित्येतैः पदैः संबध्यते । एवमिष्टशब्दोऽपि संनिहितत्वात्संबध्यते । [SB on IX.3.9, p. 1748]

point has been discussed by S'ABARA while commenting on MS. III. 1. 21. The question there is with regard to the *sāmidhenī-vākya* occurring in the 7th and the 8th *anuvākas* of a *Brāhmaṇa;* and the text *'Upavyayate devalakṣmam eva tat kurute'* occurring in the 11th *anuvāka* of the same *Brāhmaṇa.* If the latter is taken as forming one *vākya* with the former then it will refer to *sāmidhenīs* only; but if this *ekavākyatā* is not admissible and if the text is taken as forming a separate *vākya,* the *yajñopavīta* will be connected with the whole *prakaraṇa.* The *Pūrva-pakṣin* takes his stand on the last type of *saṁnidhi* discussed above and argues that *sāmidhenīs* are still *buddhau saṁnihita* and there is nothing wrong if we take the text in question as forming one *vākya* along with the *sāmidhenī* section. The text does arouse the expectancy as to when the *upavīta* is to be worn; and it is but natural that it should look to the *sāmidhenī-vākya* which is still lingering in our mind for its satisfaction.[15] The fact of this case, however, is just the reverse, though the principle put forth by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* is quite all right. For here we find that the *sāmidhenī prakraṇa* and the *upavīta vākya* are separated by the *nivida-vākya* which shows that the topic of the *sāmidhenī* has ended. Here *saṁnidhi* is broken by *asambaddha-pada-vyavāya* which makes it impossible for the *ākāṅkṣā* to continue and thus locks the doors to *eka vākyatā.* The principle of a subsequent group of *padas* forming one *vākya* with some *buddhistha* and hence *saṁnihita* group of *padas* is, no doubt, sound enough. But it is admissible only so long as the *buddhistha saṁnidhi* is not marred by the intervention of some *pada* or *padas* which have no connection with it. When, however, any such irrelevant *arthāntara* comes in, the older idea ceasses to linger in our

15 सामिधेनीप्रकरणमनिवृत्तम्। तत्रोपवीतं समाम्नातमिति। कुतः। काम्यानां सामिधेनीकल्पानामानन्तर्यवचनात्। हृदयमनुविपरिवर्तमानासु सामिधेनीषूपवीतमामनन्ति। क्रतुश्च वासोविन्यासमात्रं गुणो भवत्युपवीतं नाम। किं कुर्वता तत्कर्तव्यमिति भवति तत्र पदार्थाकाङ्क्षा। तत्र बुद्धौ संनिहितेनाविप्रकृष्टेन सामिधेनीवाक्येनैव वाक्यतामुपगम्य सामिधेनीषूपवीतमुपव्ययते इत्येष शब्दो विदधातीति गम्यते। [SB on III.1.21, p. 733]

memory. Even this last type of *saṁnidhi* can't tolerate the interception of irrelevant matter. In the present case it may be seen that the idea of *sāmidhenī* is followed by that of *nivida*; and naturally, therefore, it no longer lingers in our memory. Just as *asambaddha-pada-vyavadhāna* mars *ekavākyatā*, in the same way *asambaddha-pada-vyavadhāna* in our *buddhi* mars *ekavākyatā*. Hence it is that a *pada* or a group of *padas* can't be said to combine with another *pada* or group of *padas* if it is separated from it by an *asambaddha pada* or *pada-samudāya*.[16] But can we not by meditation or some such means recall the *pūrva padārtha* and thus make it *buddhi-saṁnihita*? Will it be wrong if *ekavākyatā* is thus established between two *padas* or *pada-samudāyas* on the basis of such *saṁnidhi*? 'Certainly it will be wrong' we reply. For in that case the *artha* will be man-made and not yielded by *s'abda*. Such attempts and the sense arrived at with their help can't have the authority and the sanction of *s'abda*. For it would be just like an attempt to make a *vākya* by taking one word from one section of the Scriptures and reading it with another word in some other part thereof and thus trying to get the required sense out of the Scriptures. Hence the conclusion is that there can be no *ekavākyatā* if the *saṁnidhi*, even of last variety i.e. the *buddhistha* one, is marred by the interception of some irrelevant *pada* or *padas*.[17]

---

16 इत्येवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः। नास्मिन्संदेहे यस्त्वयोक्तः स निर्णयः। अस्मिन्संदेहे वाक्यभेद इति निर्णयः। कुतः। व्यवायात्। इह समाप्तस्य सानुबन्धस्य सामिधेनीवाक्यस्यास्य चोपव्ययत इति वचनस्य निविदां विधायकेन सामिधेनीभिरसंबद्धेन ग्रन्थेन व्यवधानं भवति। यस्य च पर्यवसितेऽपि वचने तदसंबद्धमेवार्थान्तरं प्रक्रमन्ते न तत्र बुद्धौ पूर्वः पदार्थः संनिधीयते। न च बुद्धावसंनिहितेनैकवाक्यता भवति। द्वाभ्यां हि बुद्धाभ्यां पदार्थाभ्यां वाक्यार्थः संजन्यते, नान्यतरेण। संनिधौ समाम्नातस्यैतदेव प्रयोजनं कथमुभाभ्यां पदार्थाभ्यां विशिष्टां बुद्धिमुत्पादयेयुरिति। अनन्तरावबुद्धेन सह वाक्यार्थः शक्यते कर्तुम्। असंबद्धपदोच्चारणे च नानन्तरावबुद्धो भवति। तस्माद् व्यवहितेन सह नैकवाक्यता भवति। [SB on III.1.21, p. 733 f.]

17 अथान्येन प्रकारेण ध्यानादिना पूर्वपदार्थमवगम्य वाक्यार्थं संजनयेद् अवैदिकः स पुरुषबुद्धिपूर्वको वाक्यार्थो भवेत्। यथान्यस्मादनुवाकादाख्यातपदं गृहीत्वाऽन्यस्माच्च नामपदं यो वाक्यार्थः [illegible] तद्भवेत् यत्रान्येन ध्यानादिना

10. Thus though *saṁnidhi* forms one of the main requisites of *ekavākyatā*, by itself it is incompeten to bring about *ekavākyatā* if *sākāṅkṣatva* is conspicuous by its absence. Even *ānantarya* helps to bring about *ekavākyatā* by satisfying the *ākāṅkṣā* and thus making the whole group *nirākāṅkṣa*. But if there is no *ākāṅkṣā* or in other words if the *padas* or the *pada-samudāyas* are *nirākāṅkṣa* in themselves what purpose can *saṁnidhi* or *ānantarya* serve? Surely it will have nothing to do, and hence will be of no avail if the *sākāṅkṣatva* is absent. *Sākāṅkṣatva* of the *padas* is, therefore, highly essential for *ekavākyatā*.[18]

11. This naturally leads us to discuss the second requisite; and what we notice at the outset is the fact that when JAIMINI and S'ABARA lay down *sākāṅkṣatva* as a requisite of *ekavākyatā* they imply that the *ākāṅkṣā* must be satisfied by *ekavākyatā*. This in other words means that the *padas* or the *pada-samudāyas* fulfilling the condition of *vibhāge sākāṅkṣatva* must do it in such a way that after combining to form one *vākya* they will be *nirākāṅkṣa*. But this can happen only if the *ākāṅkṣā* that they have is for one another alone. Otherwise the *padas* may be *sākāṅkṣa* and even after combining together may not cease to be so. Take for example the sentence *'Agninā siñcati'*. Both the *padas* here are *sākāṅkṣa* and yet even on combining they can't become *nirākāṅkṣā*. This shows that the *sākāṅkṣatva* that JAIMINI

पूर्वपदार्थमवगम्य वाक्यार्थं संजनयेत् । तस्मान्नासंबद्धार्थपदव्यवधानेनैकवाक्यता भवतीति निश्चीयते। [SB on III.1.21, p. 734 f.]

18 सत्यामाकाङ्क्षायामानन्तर्येण निराकाङ्क्षीकरणम् ।–न च पदार्थाकाङ्क्षायां सत्यामानन्तर्यमेकवाक्यत्वे कारणं भवति । [SB on III.1.21, p. 740 f] अर्थानां हि अर्थवत्त्वेन हेतुना व्यवहितान्यपि वचनानि संबध्यन्ते। यानि पुनरर्थतो ह्यसमर्थानि तान्यानन्तर्येऽपि सति न परस्परेण संबन्धमर्हन्ति । यथा या पिनक्षि जरद्गवमित्येवमादीनि । तस्मान्न पौरुषेयता भविष्यति । [SB on IV.3.11, p. 1254]; असत्यां ह्याकाङ्क्षायां संनिधानमकरणं भवति । यथा भार्या राज्ञः पुरुषो देवदत्तस्येति । एकवाक्यगतत्वात्तद्विशिष्टं गम्यत इति चेत् । नैतदेवम् । एकस्मिन्नपि वाक्ये तदवयवभूतस्यानपेक्षितस्य नैव भवति संबन्धः । यथा अश्वेन व्रजति श्वेतेन पटेनावृतः इति नानपेक्षितस्याश्वस्य श्वैत्यं विशेषणं भवति । [SB on VI.4.23, p. 1443]

is speaking of has also the capacity of being satisfied by the other *pada* or *padas*. This very idea has been expressed by the rhetorician more explicitly by laying down *ākāṅkṣā* and *yogyatā* as two separate requisites in addition to tht third viz. *āsatti*. Thus for *ekavākyatā* the *padas* must not only have expectancy, but in addition, must have compatibility for one another as well. This point has been very well explained by S'ABARA while commenting on MS. IV.3.11 where he writes: 'Words even if separated from one another are connected with one another on account of their being possessed of some *arthas* which are suitable for one another; but words that are not thus compatible with one another from the point of the view of their *artha* can't connect themselves with one another even if they are possessed of *ānantarya*'. Here instead of harping on the usual term *sākāṅkṣatva* S'ABARA has expressed his idea in more explicit terms showing thereby that by *ākāṅkṣā* is meant not mere expectancy but also *artha-sāmarthya*, which is only another name for *yogyatā*. By way of illustration S'ABARA quotes the followng couplet: *'Itaḥ preyasi dhāvantaṁ dūre jātaṁ vanaspatim / Tvāṁ bravīmi vis'ālākṣi yā pinakṣi jaradgavam'*;and remarks that here the words *'itaḥ pas'yasi'* go with *'jaradgavam'* in spite of the *vyavadhāna* of a number of words, simply because they are *arthataḥ samartha*. Hence he deduces a general rule to the effect that if the expectancy for the closely following or preceding *pada* is not possible the word may be connected with some other word or words with which it may be *arthataḥ samartha*. Mere *sākāṅkṣatva*, therefore, is nothing by itself; it must be aided by *yogyatā* or *artha-sāmarthya* which in simple terms means capacity to become or to make *nirākāṅkṣa*.[19]

12. This very idea is again expressed in slightly different terms by S'ABARA when taking the words *'Bhāryā rājñaḥ puruṣo devadattasya'* he points out that though the words *rājñaḥ* and *puruṣaḥ* have *ānantarya* and also *sākāṅkṣatva* they can't yet combine together. For it is evident that the word *rājñaḥ* is

---

19 cf. SB on IV.3.11

meant to be connected with the word *bhāryā*, while *puruṣaḥ* is meant for *devadattasya*. Thus if it is perceived that a particular word is meant for being connected with some other word, it is impossible that a third word would connect itself with it. For if a word is already connected with another and has thus become *nirākāṅkṣa* on what ground can it be connected with a third word?[20]

13. It will thus be seen that the requisite of *vibhāge sākāṅkṣatva* as laid down by JAIMINI and explained by S'ABARA has more implication than one. *The first implication is that each pada or group of padas must have expectancy for something i.e. the sense yielded by it must be incomplete; secondly, each must have the capacity of making the other nirākāṅkṣa by combining with it; and lastly, none of these padas or group of padas must be meant for being connected with any other pada or padas. It is these factors together that go to make up the sākāṅkṣatva as intended by* JAIMINI.

14. And as has been already noticed above this second requisite is far more important than the first viz. *saṁnidhi* or *ānantarya;* for, we find cases where *ekavākyatā* has to be accepted on the strength of *sākāṅkṣatva* in spite of the absence of *saṁnidhi;* while there are other cases where presence of *saṁnidhi*, nay even *ānantarya*, is of no avail for want of *ākāṅkṣā*. '*Agninā siñcati*' or *Udakena dahati*' clearly show that mere *saṁnidhi* without *sākāṅkṣatva* is a failure: while the couplet quoted above is fine illustration of the capacity of *sākāṅkṣatva* to bring about *ekavākyatā* even in the absence of *saṁnidhi*. It must, however, be remembered that this *vyavahita-padānām ekavākyatā* is to be accepted only as the last resort and that too for avoiding the *ānarthakya doṣa*. If, however, there be any other way out of *ānarthakya* this

---

20 यो ह्यन्येन संबन्द्धुमुच्चार्यते न तत्समीपगतोऽप्यन्यस्तेन सह संबन्द्धुमर्हति । यथा भार्या राज्ञः पुरुषो देवदत्तस्येति भार्याविशेषणार्थमुच्चार्यमाणो राजशब्दो न पुरुषेण संबध्यते ।——असत्यामाकाङ्क्षायामानन्तर्यमकारणम् । [SB on III.1.12, p. 688]

type of *ekavākyatā* is certainly to be condemned.[21] The same holds good in the case of *ekavākyatā* arrived at by combining one *pada* with many *padas,* though only as the last resort and for avoiding *ānarthakya* it may be allowed. But even here it may be remembered as a general rule that it is only the *pradhāna pada* that can thus be connected with more *padas* than one.[22] This *sākāṅkṣatva* then can be said to be the main basis of *ekavākyatā;* and we find S'ABARA in one place going even so far as to declare *sākāṅkṣatva* as the very form of *ekavākyatā.*[23] The importance of *sākāṅkṣatva* can be illustrated from the very fact that while we find some exceptions to the requisite of *saṁnidhi* as shown above and also to that of *aikārthya* as will be shown below, there can be no exception to this requisite of *sākāṅkṣatva.* Let there be no *sākāṅkṣatva* and there shall be no *ekavākyatā.* This is enough to prove the unique position that *sākāṅkṣatva* holds among the requisites of *ekavākyatā.*

15. And now we come to the *ekārthatva,* the third and the last requisite of *ekavākyatā.* Literally understood the term apparently seems to mean the state of having one sense or signafication. But there are in a sentence more words than one, and as each one of these constituent words has a separate *artha* of its own to convey, it naturally follows that the sentence made up of these *padas* can't but be *anekārtha.* How can then the condition of *aikārthya* be fulfilled? But such a view regarding *aikārthya* is to be brushed aside as being too superficial. The word *artha* in this ex-

---

21 This topic will be discussed in greater details in a subsequent chapter.

22 अपि च सर्वस्यैव पदस्य पदान्तरसंबन्धे सति च शब्दादृते तृतीयेन पदेन सत्यां गतौ संनिहितेनापि संबन्धो न युक्तः। न हि भवति भार्या राज्ञः पुरुषो देवदत्तस्येत्यत्र राजा पुरुषविशेषणम्। असत्यां तु गतावुपादेयस्यानेकस्यापि प्रधानेन संबन्धोऽवकल्पते व्यवहितेनापि। व्यवधानादर्थो बलीयानिति। [SB on VI.4.23, p. 1445]

23 भिद्यमाने (वाक्ये) एकवाक्यत्वं बाध्येत। किं तत्। साकाङ्क्षत्वम्। [SB on IX.4.18, p. 1776]

pression stands not for signification or sense, but for *prayojana* or purpose. Thus *aikārthya* means the capacity to serve one single purpose. Thus for a group of *padas* to be admissible as forming one *vākya* they all together must serve one purpose. Thus in the text *'Devasya tvā &c.'* we find that the whole text strves one purpose viz, the *prakās'ana* of the *nirvāpa* and must, therefore, be admitted as one *vākya*. This very idea is again expressed by S'ABARA while commenting on MS.II.2.27.[24] It is on the strength of the principles of *saṁnidhi* and *sākāṅkṣatva* (or *ākāṅkṣitatva*) and *aikārthya* that *arthavāda* texts are proved as forming a syntactical unit together with the *vidhi* texts and thus gaining the authentic position due to a Scriptural text.[25]

16. It is in obedience to this principle of *aikārthya* that texts like *'Etasyaiva revatīṣu vāravantīyam agniṣṭomasāma kṛtvā pas'ukāmo hy etena yajeta'* are accepted as yielding an injunction of *sarvavis'eṣaṇa-vis'iṣṭa yāga*. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* here raises an objection pointing out that the the text contains the *vidhāna* of *revatīs* and also of the *vāravantīya*, and can't be as such free from *vākya-bheda*. But in reply S'ABARA points out that *ekārthatva* means *ekaprayojanatva* so that the *padas* that serve one *prayojana* can be said to form one *vākya*. Hence in the present case also there is no harm in saying that these *padas* form one *vākya* since they together serve one purpose only.[26] Thus we see that *vis'iṣṭārthatā* is not incompatible with *aikārthya* as intended by JAIMINI. In fact we find S'ABARA in several places resorting to this idea of *vis'iṣṭārthatā* for bringing about *aikārthya*, and thus avoiding the *vākyabheda doṣa*. But this point we shall discuss in fuller details in a subsequent chapter.

---

24 तस्माद् बहुषु विधीयमानेषु नैकार्थ्यम् । अत्रोच्यते । अर्थ इति प्रयोजनमभिधीयते । यावन्ति पदान्येकं प्रयोजनमभिनिर्वर्तयन्ति तावन्त्येकं वाक्यम् । न चात्र बहूनि प्रयोजनानि । न ह्यत्रानेकस्याभिप्रेतस्यानेकं विधायकं पदमस्ति ।...... विशिष्टस्तु यजतिर्न परार्थः । तदेकमेषां पदार्थानां प्रयोजनम् । तस्मादेकवाक्यत्वम् । [SB on II.2.27, p. 559 f.]

25 This topic will be fully disucussed in a subsequent chapter.

26 cf. SB on MS. II.2.27

17. It may, however, be remembered here that this condition of *aikārthya* is not without an exception. The idea of *vis'iṣṭārthatva* which is only another form of *anekārthatva* to all appearances has been already referred to. Another case we get in texts like *'Ardhapiṣṭam bhavati ardham apiṣṭaṁ dvidevatyāya'* which has to be accepted as enjoining *peṣaṇa* and also *devatā-dharma*. Here the objection of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* on the basis of *artha-bahutva* is answered by S'ABARA by pointing out that in cases like this we must accept *artha-bahutva* also, lest we should be rendering the whole text *anarthaka*. Here S'ABARA sounds a note of warning to the effect that this is admissible only as the last resort in the absence of any other way out of the *ānarthakya prasaṅga*.[27] One more exception to *aikārthya* is to be found in sentences like *'S'veto dhāvati alambusānāṁ yātā'* which is a statement expressing two ideas. On the analogy of such *laukika vākyas* an attempt is made to interpret texts like *'Godohanena pas'ukāmasya praṇayet'* as enjoining two different ideas viz. that *godōhana* and such other acts are contingent acts, and that they are meant for the *nitya godohana* and other acts. But such a construction is not admissible for the simple reason that in these texts we have the word *Kāma* in the expression *pas'ukāmasya which shows* that *godohana* is to be connected with *kāma* only and not with the verb, so that this *godohana* spoken of in this text becomes a *naimittika* act and has nothing to do with the *nitya karma* bearing the same name. In the *laukika vākya* quoted above, however, there is no such deciding word; and hence it is but natural that they should be understood as express-

---

27 अथापरं यत्कारणमुक्तं नेमपिष्टमिति द्विदेवत्ये पेषणं दर्शयति अर्धपिष्टं भवत्यर्धमपिष्टं द्विदेवत्यायेति देवताधर्मं दर्शयतीति । अत्रोच्यते । एवं सति वचनमिदमप्राप्ते भवतीति । नन्वनेकार्थविधानमेकं वाक्यं प्राप्नोति । उच्यते । सति पक्षान्तरेऽनेकार्थविधिः पक्षान्तराश्रयणेन परिह्रियते । असति पुनः पक्षान्तर उच्चारणानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गपरिजिहीर्षयानेकार्थं वाक्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यं भवति । तस्मान्न द्विदेवत्ये पेषणमिति । [SB on III.3.46, p. 889]

ing two ideas. But that does not mean that a *vākya* can be *dviṣtha* or that it can have more *arthas* than one.[28]

18. Having gone through the various illustrations given and the remarks made by S'ABARA we may now sum up the *Mīmāṁsā* view of *vākya* as follows:— (1) For several words to form a *vākya* they must satisfy the three conditions viz. *saṁnidhi, ākāṅkṣā,* and *aikārthya*. (2) Of these *saṁnidhi* primarily means *ānantarya,* but *saṁnidhi* may not be marred even if this *ānantarya* is broken by the intervention of relevant *padas* only. And again this *saṁnidhi* may even be *buddhistha.* (3) Mere *saṁnidhi* in the absence of *ākāṅkṣā* can't bring about *ekavākyatā*: for *saṁnidhi* after all helps *ekavākyatā* by creating *ākāṅkṣā* so that *saṁnidhi* without *ākāṅkṣā* is nothing. (4) *Ākāṅkṣā* means mutual *ākāṅkṣā* and implies the idea of *yogyatā* or capacity of *nirākāṅṣīkaraṇa.* If this capacity is absent mere *ākāṅkṣā* can't bring about *ekavākyatā*: for *saṁnidhi* after all helps that a *vākya* may be allowed to make a *vis'iṣṭa vidhāna* provided that the constituent *padas* together serve one purpose. (6) In some cases this condition of *aikārthya* has to be relaxed, of course for want of any other alternative and to avoid the *ānarthakya prasaṅga.* (7) Of all the conditions *ākāṅkṣā* or *sākāṅkṣatva* is the most essential and can't brook any exception.

---

28 भवन्ति च द्विष्ठानि वाक्यानि यथा श्वेतो धावत्यलम्बुसानां यातेति। तस्मान्नैमित्तिकान्येव नित्यार्थे भवितुमर्हन्तीति। एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः।.......... । यत्तु श्वेतो धावतीत्येवमादि भवेत्तत्र विशेषानवगमादुभयार्थावगतिः। इह तु गम्यते विशेषः कमिपदोच्चारणम्। नेह श्रौतोऽर्थः। मन्येत यदि गोदोहनादेः क्रियासंबन्धो विवक्ष्यते कमिपदं प्रमादो भवेत्। न चायं प्रमादः। नैवावान्तरवाक्यार्थे विवक्षिते कमिपदसंबन्धोऽवकल्पते। तस्मान्न द्विष्ठं वाक्यम्। गोदोहनादिकमिसंबन्ध एवात्राभिधीयते, न नित्यकार्ये भवितुमर्हतीति। एवं सर्वत्र। [SB on IV.3.4, pp. 1248 ff.]

CHAPTER XIII

WHAT IS VĀKYĀRTHA

1. In order to establish the accuracy of the implications of his definition of *Dharma,* JAIMINI deemed it incumbent on him to show that there can be no *puruṣānupraves'a* in the case of *s'abda.* In *laukika vyavahāra* it is the *puruṣānupraves'a* that contaminates *s'abda* and thus renders it sometimes *aprāmāṇa.* But the *Vedas* are above *aprāmāṇya* or they are *pramāṇam eva* owing to the absence of this *puruṣānupraves'a* in their case. To prove the absence of this *puruṣānupraves'a* JAIMINI has first of all shown that *s'abda, artha,* and *s'abdārtha-sambandha* are all *nitya;* and as such not open to *puruṣānupraves'a.* But that is not enough. An attempt is made by the opponent to show that *puruṣānupraves'a* is possible in the case of *vākya* and *vākyārtha;* for a *vākya* is after all a *pada-saṁghāta;* and like all *pada-saṁghātas* it must be accepted as being man-made. Again the *vākyārtha* also being different from the *s'abdārthas* must be *kṛtaka* and as such open to *puruṣānupraves'a.* Such a position, however, is not acceptable to the *Mīmāṁsakas* who show that there can be no scope to *puruṣānupraves'a* on this score also. It will be interesting to follow the discussion in details and see how both the parties try to present their own side and thus ultimately get the right idea as to what it is that exactly constitutes the *vākyārtha.*

2. Take, for example, the text: *'Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ'.* We find that from this sentence we get the *artha 'Agnihotrāt svargo bhavati'.* But the question is as to how we arrive at this signification. Do we get it from any one of the *padas* constituting the sentence? Certainly not. It is, however, a fact that as soon as we hear all the three *padas* we do get at the signification. But is there any fourth word over and above the group of these three words? No. We don't perceive any. But why not say that it is the *pada-samudāya* from which we get the *artha*? Well, we can't say so because there is nothing like this *pada-samudāya* in com-

mon parlance. The words taken singly are known to be used in common parlance; and it is but proper to hold that the senses conveyed by them are *nitya*. But the *samudāya* is not thus *prayukta*; and hence we can't but conclude that the sense conveyed by the *samudāya* must be *kṛtrima* or *vyāmoha*.[1]

3. But it may be argued that a *vākya* may give rise to the perception of its signification by its very nature, and inspite of its being *aprayukta* and *asaṁbaddha*. And if the *Pūrvapakṣin* were to point out that it is not in the nature of *s'abda* to yield *artha* inspite of its being *aprayukta* so that *s'abda* will have to change its very nature if it were to justify the view of the *Siddhāntin*, the latter is ready with his reply saying that such, indeed, is the nature of *s'abda* i.e. *pada* or word, but not of a *vākya*. And further he would add, do we not find people perceiving the sense of a *vākya* even on hearing it for the first time? This shows that *vākya* differs from *s'abda* in the fact that whereas the latter can't be *artha-pratyāyaka* if it is *aprayukta*, the former can convey its sense inspite of its being *aprayukta*. But it may be argued that this view is not right. For had it been so all would have been able to perceive *vākyārtha*. But our experience is that only those who know the *padārthas* can perceive the *vākyārtha*, but not those who do not know the *padārthas*.[2] Nor would it do to say that the *padārtha-jñāna* is only an accesary means

---

1 न ह्यग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इत्यतो वाक्यादन्यतमस्मात्पदात् स्वर्गो भवतीति गम्यते। गम्यते तु पदत्रय उच्चरिते। न चात्र चतुर्थः शब्दोऽस्त्यन्यदतः पदत्रयसमुदायात्। न चायं समुदायोऽस्ति लोके यतोऽस्य व्यवहारादर्थोऽवगम्यते। पदान्यमूनि प्रयुक्तानि, तेषां नित्योऽर्थः। अप्रयुक्तश्च समुदायः। तस्मात्समुदायस्यार्थः कृत्रिमो व्यामोहो वा। [SB on I.1.24, p. 92]

2 स्यादेतत्। अप्रयुक्तादपि वाक्यादसति संबन्धे स्वभावादर्थावगम इति। यदि कल्प्येत, शब्दो धर्ममात्मीयं व्युत्क्रामेत्। न चैष शब्दधर्मो यदप्रयुक्तादपि शब्दादर्थः प्रतीयते। न हि प्रथमश्रुतात्कुतश्चिच्छब्दात्केचिदर्थं प्रतियन्ति। तदभिधीयते। पदधर्मोऽयं न वाक्यधर्मः। वाक्याद्धि प्रथमावगतादपि प्रतियन्तोऽर्थं दृश्यन्ते। नैतदेवम्। यदि प्रथमश्रुतादवगच्छेयुः अपि तर्हि सर्वेऽवगच्छेयुः पदार्थविदोऽन्ये च। न त्वपदार्थविदोऽवगच्छन्ति। तस्मान्नैतदेवम्। [SB on I.1.24, p. 93 f]

of *vākyārtha-jñāna,* and not a means of bringing about the *vākyārtha-saṁbandha,* so that just as *dvitīyādis'ravaṇa* only helps a man to perceive the *padārtha,* but does not bring about the *padārtha-sambandha* similarly *padārtha-jñāna* only helps to perceive the *vākyārtha* but can have no power to establish *vākyārtha-sambandha.* For in fact *padārtha-jñāna* can't in any way help *vākyārtha-jñāna,* for *vākyārtha* is quite different from the *padārthas* and also because what conveys the *vākyārtha* is not *padas* but the last syllable aided by the impressions left by the preceding *syllables.* This shows that *padārtha* and *vākyārtha* have nothing to do with one another, and that, therefore, *vākyārtha* must be admitted as being *kṛtrima or vyāmoha.*[3]

4. But take for example the sentence '*S'uklo gauḥ*' or '*Kṛṣṇo's'vaḥ.*' Here we find that *gauḥ* and *as'vaḥ* are *sāmānya-vāci padas*: and that *vis'eṣa-vāci padas* like *s'uklaḥ* and *kṛṣṇaḥ* find theselves in juxta-position with them. It is only when in this way the *sāmānya-vāci padas* are accompanied by *vis'eṣa-vāci padas* that we get the *vis'iṣṭārtha* which is the same as *vākyārtha.* Thus we can show that *vākyārtha* is perceived from the *padārthas.* But this explanation is not silently accepted by the *Pūrva-pakṣin.* He points out that the *sāmānya-vāci pada* gives rise to a perception extending over all *go-vyaktis* and *as'va-vyaktis.* This perception is thus *s'ruti-janita.* And it is only for the sake of *vākya* that this perception is to be retracted from certain particular sections. But *vākya* is weaker than *s'ruti* and as such has no power to accomplish its purpose in spite of *s'ruti* so that retracting our perception from certain particular sections would be impossible. This in other words means that *vākyārtha* will not be perceived in the manner shown above by the *Siddhāntin.* And if he were to argue that the

---

3 ननु पदार्थविद्भिरप्यवगच्छद्भिः कृत एव वाक्यार्थसंबन्धो भविष्यति। पदार्थवेदनेन हि संस्कृता अवगमिष्यन्ति यथा तमेव पदार्थं द्वितीयादिश्रवणेनेति। नेति ब्रूमः। यदि वाक्येऽन्त्यो वर्णः पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितः पदार्थेभ्योऽर्थान्तरं प्रत्याययति उपकारस्तु तदा न पदार्थज्ञानादवकल्पते। तस्मात् कृत्रिमो वाक्यार्थो व्यामोहो वेति। न पदार्थद्वारेण संभवति वाक्यार्थज्ञानमिति। [SB on I. 24, p. 94]

difficulty will be set aside by taking the *vis'eṣa-vāci padas* like *s'ukla* and *kṛṣṇa* to signify *itara-nivṛtti*, the *Pūrva-pakṣin* would flatly refuse to accept that view as being quite untenable. To presume that words like *s'ukla* and *kṛṣṇa* signify *itara-nivṛtti* just to save the *vākya* from being rendered *anarthaka* is also not possible: for the *anarthakatva* can be avoided in some other way also. And even if no way is found out of *anarthakatva-prasaṅga* yet it is not possible to accept the view that a word conveys a signification which in fact is not perceived from it.[4]

5. All this shows that *vākyārtha* is not the outcome of the *padārtha* and that it must as such be *kṛtrima*. That *vākya* is *kṛtrima* is also evident from the fact that a *vākya* is after all a *pada-saṁghāta;* and like all *pada-saṁghātas* it is but natural to suppose that the *vaidika pada-saṁghātas* also must be man-made.[5]

6. The view thus propounded by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* is, however, not acceptable to JAIMINI and his commentator, who hold that *vākyārtha* is perceived from *padārthas* only and that it is as such *akṛtrima* or *nitya* and hence always *pramāṇa* as regards *dharma*. If we look at any sentence we find that in it invariably some *tad-bhūta* words are used in connection with some *kriyārtha pada*. This is enough to show that the *vākyārtha* that we get comes not out of nothing, but out of the several *padas* that constitute the *vākya*.

---

4 नन्वेवं भविष्यति । सामान्यवाचिनः पदस्य गौरिति वा अश्व इति वा विशेषकं शुक्ल इति वा कृष्ण इति वा पदमन्तिकादुपनिपतति यदा तदा वाक्यार्थोऽवगम्यते । तन्न । कथमिव गौरिति वा अश्व इति वा सामान्यवाचिनः पदात्सर्वगवेषु सर्वाश्वेषु च बुद्धिरुपसर्पन्ती श्रुतिजनिता वाक्यानरोधेन कुतश्चिद्विशेषादपवर्तेत । न च शुक्ल इत्यादेर्विशेषवचनस्य कृष्णादिनिवृत्तिर्भवति शब्दार्थः । न चानर्थको मा भूदित्यर्थपरिकल्पना शक्या । [SB on I.1.24, p. 95]

5 अतो न पदार्थजनितो वाक्यार्थः । तस्मात्कृत्रिमः । पदसंघाताः खल्वेते । संघाताश्च पुरुषकृता दृश्यन्ते । यथा नीलोत्पलवनेष्वद्य चरन्तश्चारुसंरवाः नीलकौशेयसंवीताः प्रनृत्यन्तीव कादम्बाः । अतो वैदिका अपि पुरुषकृता इति । [SB on I.1.24, p. 95]

For there is nothing to prove that independently of the *padārthas* the *vākya* is endowed with some special power to convey its *artha*. For even if it is held that the last syllable of a *vākya* conveys the *vākyārtha* when aided by the impressions left by the preceding syllables and independently of the *padārthas*, yet experience shows that the sense that is ultimately conveyed is in no way different from the *padārthas*. The *vākyāntyavarṇa* has simply no power to do anything better than yielding the *padārthas* only.[6] Where is then the propriety of presuming this elaborate process for accounting for the perception of *artha* from a *vākya*? Why not hold that *vākyārtha* is obtained from *padārthas* only?

7. Perhaps here the *Pūrva-pakṣin* might invoke the aid of *arthāpatti* to prove that *vākya* has got a special power to convey its sense. It is a fact that *vākyārtha* is not exactly identical with the *padārthas* or that *vākyārtha* is different from the *padārthas*. Now if we find that we get at some *artha* which is quite distinct and separate from the *padārthas* does it not stand to reason to say that it must have been conveyed by the *vākya* with the help of something which is quite distinct and separate from the *padārthas*? Since the fact of our perceiving the *vākyārtha* from the *vākya* can't be otherwise explained, we have to presume that *vākya* has got some special power by which it conveys its *artha*. But this argument on the part of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* can be met by pointing out that since the phenomenon under consideration can be explained in another way also there is no scope for *arthāpatti* in this case. The other way, the *Siddhāntin* points out, is the *padārthas* themselves. We can very well explain how the *padārthas* can give rise to *vākyārtha*. In the sentence *'S'uklo gauḥ'*, for example, the words yield the ideas of *s'uklatva* and *gotva* and retire. But experience tells

---

6 तेष्वेव पदार्थेषु भूतानां वर्तमानानां पदानां क्रियार्थेन समुच्चारणम्। नानपेक्ष्य पदार्थान्पार्थगर्थ्येन वाक्यमर्थान्तरप्रसिद्धम्। कुतः प्रमाणाभावात्। न किंचन प्रमाणमस्ति येन प्रमिमीमहे। न ह्यनपेक्षितपदार्थस्य वाक्यान्त्यवर्णस्य पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितस्य शक्तिरस्ति पदार्थेभ्योऽर्थान्तरे वर्तितुमिति। [SB on I. 1. 25, p. 95 f.]

us that if a *guṇa* is perceived, the perception of *guṇa* can further give us the perception of the *guṇavat* also. This is also shown by the usage of our common parlance. For we find that people intending to convey the idea of the *guṇavat* individual utter only the *guṇavācaka pada* being sure that their purpose will be served by that much; and we find that their purpose is thus actually served by that much alone since from the *guṇa-vācaka pada* there does arise the perception of the *guṇavat* which in other words means that the *padārtha* yielded by the *guṇa-vācaka pada* ultimately yields a *vis'iṣṭa artha*. But is not *vis'iṣṭa artha* the same as *vākyārtha*? Does this not show that *vis'iṣṭārtha* i.e. *vākyārtha* can be perceived from *padārthas* only? And if thus the phenomenon of the perception of *vākyārtha* from *vākya* can be explained on the basis of the *padārthas* where is the necessity of admitting a special power to the *pada-samudāya*, an hither-to un-proved thing as it is?[7]

8. That *padārthas* are the *nimitta* of *vākyārtha* is also proved by *anvaya-vyatireka*. If the *padārthas* are not perceived from the *padas* that are heard, we can't catch the *vākyārtha*. But on the other hand if *s'uklatva* is perceived then we do get the idea of the *s'ukla-guṇaka* also even in the absence of the *pada*. This shows that the existence or non-existence of *vākyārtha* is co-eval with the existence or non-existence of the *padārthas*. But the same is not true of the *padas*. For we may hear the *padas* and yet may not have

---

7 नन्वर्थापत्तिरस्ति यत्पदार्थव्यतिरिक्तमर्थमवगच्छामः । न च शक्तिमन्तरेण तदवकल्पत इति । तन्न । अर्थस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् । भवेदर्थापत्तिर्यद्यसत्यामपि शक्तौ तस्य नान्यन्निमित्तमवकल्पेत । अवगम्यते तु निमित्तम् । किम् । पदार्थाः । पदानि हि स्वं स्वमर्थमभिधाय निवृत्तव्यापाराणि । अथेदानीं पदार्था अवगताः सन्तो वाक्यार्थं गमयन्ति । कथम् । यत्र हि शुक्ल इति वा कृष्ण इति वा गुणः प्रतीतो भवति, भवति खल्वसावलं गुणवति प्रत्ययमाधातुम् । तेन गुणवति प्रत्ययमिच्छन्तः केवलं गुणवचनमुच्चारयन्ति । संपत्स्यत एषां यथासंकल्पितोऽभिप्रायः भविष्यति विशिष्टार्थसंप्रत्ययः । विशिष्टार्थसंप्रत्ययश्च वाक्यार्थः । एवं चेदवगम्यते अन्यत एव वाक्यार्थः को जातुचिदहृष्टा पदसमुदायस्य शक्तिरर्थादवगम्यत इति वदिष्यति । [SB on I.1.25, p. 96 f.]

the *vākyārtha-jñana* if the *padas* have failed to yield the *padārthas;* or on the other hand we may not hear the *padas* at all and yet may have the *vākyārtha-jñāna* if by any other means the *padārthas* are conveyed to us. Thus there is no *anvaya-vyatireka* between *padas* and *vākyārtha,* as it exists between the *padārthas* and the *vākyārtha.* This shows, therefore, that *padārthas* and nothing else are the means of *vākyārtha-jñāna.*[8]

9. Having thus established that *padārthas* are the *nimitta* of *vākyārtha-jñāna* and that there is no reason why *pārthagarthya* should be presumed for the *vākya,* the *Siddhāntin* now proceeds to refute the objections raised against his position by the *Pūrva-pakṣin.* As for the objection that *vākya* being weaker than *s'ruti* has no power to restrict the general perception arising from the *padas* by *s'ruti,* the *Siddhāntin* points out that *vākya* is, indeed, weaker than *s'ruti,* but in cases where there is the danger of the whole text being rendered *anarthaka* by sticking to *s'ruti* we have to give up *s'ruti* and abide by *vākya,* only to save the text from *ānarthakya.*[9] The same remark applies to the objection that a word has no power to convey *guṇāntara-pratiṣedha*; for is it not better to save a whole text from being rendered *anarthaka* by setting aside the *vācyārtha* of one word and resorting to *lakṣaṇā*?[10]

---

8 अपि चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेतदवगम्यते । भवति हि कदाचिदियमवस्था मानसादप्याघाताद्यदुच्चरितेभ्यः .पदेभ्यो न पदार्था अवधार्यन्ते । तदानीं नियोगतो वाक्यार्थं नावगच्छेयुः यद्यस्यापार्थगर्थ्यमभविष्यत् । नियोगतस्तु नावगच्छन्ति । अपि चान्तरेणापि पदोच्चारणं यः शौक्ल्यमवगच्छति अवगच्छत्येवासौ शुक्लगुणकम् । तस्मात्पदार्थप्रत्यय एव वाक्यार्थो, नास्य पदसमुदायेन संबन्धः । [SB on I.1.25, p. 97 f.]

9 यत्तु श्रौतः पदार्थो न वाक्यानुरोधेन कुतश्चिद्विशेषादपवर्तितुमर्हतीति । सत्यमेवमेतत् । यत्र केवलः पदार्थः प्रयुज्यमानः प्रयोजनाभावादनर्थकः संजायते इत्यवगतं भवति । तत्र वाक्यार्थोऽपि तावद् भवत्विति विशिष्टार्थतावगम्यते । न सर्वत्र । [SB on I.1.25, p. 98]

10 एवं च सति गुणान्तरप्रतिषेधो न शब्दार्थ इत्येतदपि परिहृतं भवति । [SB, p. 98]

10. But even this justification is not necessary; for, we can in another way show how *vis'iṣṭārtha* i.e. *vākyārtha* can be perceived by *s'ruti* only. The fact that the sense of a *vibhakti* is modified by that of the *prātipadikārtha* shows that the *prātipadikārtha* is *vis'eṣaka.* In other words this means that we get *vis'iṣṭārtha* from the inflected word by *s'ruti.* It is this *vis'iṣṭa-s'ruti* that will set aside the *sāmānya-s'ruti*[11] and thus pave the way for the *vis'iṣṭārtha* or *vākyārtha* so that the objection raised by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* is swept off its ground altogether. Thus there is now no difficulty in holding that the *padārthas* give rise to *vākyārtha-jñāna.* As for the next objection based on the *anumāna* that *Vaidika vākyas* must be *puruṣa-kṛta* since they are after all *pada-saṁghātas* and all *pada-saṁghātas* are, as we know, man-made, no special efforts are required to refute it. For this idea we have already shown to be untenable when we discussed the *nityatva* or *akṛtakatva* of *s'abdārtha-sambandha.* We may only add that these *codanās* differ from the *laukika pada-saṁghātas* in this that while the latter deal with *anubhūta* or *upalabdha arthas,* the former deal with *arthas* which are beyond the power of man to know. It is, therefore, impossible to conceive that *Vaidika vākyas* also could be composed by man as he can compose the *laukika* ones. *Dharma* with which the *Vaidika vākyas* concern themselves is *atīndriya* and man has no power to know it unless aided by the *Veda.* And if he does not know it how can he compose sentences about it?[12] Thus there can be no scope for *puruṣānupraves'a* in this way also.

11. Unimpeachable, therefore, now emerges the conclusion out of the foregoing discussion that the sense *'Agnihotrāt svargo bhavati'* we get from the senses perceived from

---

11 अपि च प्रातिपदिकादुच्चरन्ती द्वितीयादिविभक्तिः प्रातिपदिकार्थो विशेषक इत्याह । सा च विशेषश्रुतिः सामान्यश्रुतिं बाधेत । [SB., p. 99]

12 यच्चैते पदसंघाताः पुरुषकृता दृश्यन्त इति । परिहृतं तदस्मरणादिभिः । अपि च एवंजातीयकेऽर्थे वाक्यानि संहर्तुं न किंचन पुरुषाणां बीजमस्ति । [SB, p. 99]; लौकिकेषु पुनरर्थेषु प्रत्यक्षेणार्थमुपलभ्य संनियमः संनिबन्धनम् । शक्यं तत्र संहर्तुमेवंजातीयकानि वाक्यानि नीलोत्पलवनेष्वद्येति । [SB., on I.1.26, p. 99]

the various words that constitute the sentence *'Agnihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ'*. Hence in general we declare that *words yield us the perception of their significations and from these in their turn it is that we arrive at the vākyārtha.*[13]

12. S'ABARA has, in several places, referred to this view about *vākyārtha*. Discussing the exact signification of sentences like *'Yasya parṇamayī juhūr bhavati na sa pāpaṁ s'lokaṁ s'ṛṇoti'* the *Pūrva-pakṣin* argues that such texts are *anarthaka* since they speak of results that never follow. Here in the course of his argument he points out that it won't do to say that the results will follow after some period; for there is no *pramāṇa* for such a supposition. *Pratyakṣa* and other *pramāṇas* are helpless in this matter; while *s'abda* also goes no further. For what is *vākyārtha* after all? If it is to be *pramāṇa* it must be yielded by the *padārthas*. This is what JAIMINI himself has declared in the *sūtra 'Tadbhūtānām kriyārthena samāmnāyaḥ arthasya tannimittatvāt!* Hence other ways of *artha-kalpanā* such as *adhyāhāra* and *vipariṇāma* have no scope here. The *Siddhāntin* only points out that such texts are to be construed as *arthavādas* only.[14] This very view has been repeated by S'ABARA in another place also. At MS. V.1.5, however, a similar argument is put in the mouth of the *Pūrva-pakṣin*. The point at issue there is whether serial order is or is not conveyed when a number of things or acts are spoken of one after the other in one text. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* speaking against the proposition argues that *vākyārtha* is obtained from the *padas* through the *padārthas*; but from the *padas* we get only the *padārthas* and not *krama* also. It is, therefore not possible to admit that *krama* is conveyed by a *vākya*. *Krama* might have been conveyed, had *vākyārtha* been conveyed by *pada-samudāya*. But that idea has been totally disproved at MS. I. 1.25 by JAIMINI. How can *krama* be conveyed

---

13 तस्मादग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इत्येतेभ्य एव पदेभ्यो येऽर्था अवगतास्तेभ्य एवैनदवगम्यतेऽग्निहोत्रात्स्वर्गो भवतीति । पदेभ्य एव पदार्थप्रत्ययः पदार्थेभ्यो वाक्यार्थ इति । [SB on I.1.26, p. 100]

14 cf. अर्थवादाधिकरण i.e. Ms. I.2-1—8.

then[15]? The *Siddhāntin,* however, points out that because *krama* is *artha-prāpta* owing to the multiplicity of acts to be performed by one agent we use the *pāṭha-krama* for determining the *krama* of the several acts to be performed, so that the very words that convey to us the idea of the acts, convey to us their *krama* also.[16] A similar point is raised as regards the text *'Agnaye' nīkavate prātar aṣṭākapālo marudbhyaḥ sāntapanebhyo madhyandine caruḥ marudbhyo gṛhamedhibhyaḥ sāyam odanam'*. Is the same day meant? *Vākyārtha* is yielded by the *padārthas* and here we find no *pada* to yield the sense of *ekam ahaḥ* i.e. the acts are to be performed on one and the same day. The *Pūrvapakṣin,* therefore, concludes that the same day can't be meant. But the *Siddhāntin* points out that since *aṅga* and *pradhāna* are both *ekakāla,* therefore, we have to take all these acts as taking place on one and the same day.[17]

---

15 पदार्थपूर्वको वाक्यार्थः पदेभ्यश्च पदार्था एवावगम्यन्ते, न क्रमः। स्यादेतदेवं यदि पदानां समूहस्य श्रवणं प्रत्यायकमर्थस्य स्यात्। न तु समुदायः प्रत्यायक इत्युक्तं तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नाय इत्यत्र। तस्मात्क्रमस्य वाचकशब्दाभावाद् व्यामोह एष क्रमोऽवगम्यते। [SB. on V-1.5, p. 1291]

16 एकस्मिन्क्रतावेकत्वात्कर्तुरनेकस्मिन्पदार्थेऽर्थकृतत्वात्क्रमस्य। तत्रैष क्रमो नियम्येतानुमानेन। कुतः। परार्थत्वाद्वेदस्य। परार्थो हि वेदो यद्यदनेन शक्यते कर्तुं तस्मै तस्मै प्रयोजनायैष समाम्नायते। शक्यते चानेन पदार्थो विधातुं, शक्यते च क्रियाकाले प्रतिपत्तुम्। तस्माद्वेदः पदार्थांश्च विधातुमुपादेयः, क्रियाकाले च प्रतिपत्तुम्। न शक्यते विशेषो, विधातुमयं समाम्नायते न प्रतिपत्तुमिति। अगम्यमाने विशेष उभयार्थमुपादीयत इति गम्यते। प्रतिपत्तुं चानेन क्रमेण शक्यते, नान्येन। अत एव च कृत्वा पाठक्रमापचारे विनष्ट इत्युच्यते। इतरथा हि यद् यस्य प्रयोजनं तस्मिन् निर्वर्त्यमाने एव किं नष्टं स्यात्। अदृष्टं कल्प्येत। तच्चान्याय्यं दृष्टे सति। तस्मात्सशब्दः क्रमः। य एव पदार्थानां वाचकः शब्दः स एव क्रमस्यापि। [SB. on V-1-6, p. 1292]

17 अह्नः कालेषु ये पदार्था उच्यन्ते प्रातर्मध्यन्दिने सायमिति क्रमेण त एकस्मिन्नहनीति प्रतीयन्ते। यथा देवदत्तः प्रातरपूपं भक्षयति मध्यन्दिने विविधमश्नाति अपराह्णे मोदकान्भक्षयतीति एकस्मिन्नहनीति गम्यते। [SB. on V-1.20, p. 1301] ...

...ननु वाक्यादेकमहर्गम्यत इत्युक्तम्। उच्यते। पदार्थसामर्थ्यजनितो हि वाक्यार्थो

13. It may thus be seen how this view viz. that *vākyārtha* arises from the *padārthas* has been utilised to argue that we shall not read between the lines of a Scriputural text which is also the generally accepted principle of *Mīmāṁsā;* and yet we see how in some cases by the force of facts we do get some sense which can't be said to spring up directly from the *pada* or *padārthas.*

14. In another place S'ABARA has plainly stated the distinction between the *padārthas* on the one hand and the *vākyārtha* on the other; and pointed out how we get the *vākyārtha* from the *padārthas.* There is a text *Aruṇayā piṅgākṣyaikahāyanyā somaṁ krīṇāti',* and the question is whether *aruṇayā* is to be construed in this sentence with the verb *krīṇāti* without causing *vākya-bheda.* The *Pūrva-pakṣin* is not favourable to such a construction; for he thinks that it can't but lead to *vākya-bheda.* But S'ABARA points out that we must accept such a construction; and that we can do it without exposing ourselves to *vākya-bheda. Vākyārtha,* he argues, is perceived only after the *padārthas* are perceived. A *pada* denotes the *sāmānya* while a sentence denotes *vis'eṣa.* This shows that *vākyārtha* means referring to the *vis'eṣa* those *padārthas* which pertain to *sāmānya.*[18] It is this principle that has been declared by JAIMINI at MS. I. 1.25. It may thus be clear that we arrive at the *padārthas* directly by *pratyakṣādi pramāṇas;* while *vākyārtha* is always based on inference since it has to be obtained by construing the *sāmānya-vṛtti padas* as pertaining to some *vis'eṣa.* For if we do not do so a *pada* which is left merely to denote its own sense i.e. the *sāmānya* will be *anarthaka.* It is for doing away with this *ānarthakya* that a *pada* is to be construed

---

भवति । न चात्र पदार्थसामर्थ्यमस्ति येनैकमहर्गम्येत । नैतदेवम् । कस्मात् । तत्संबन्धात । एककालसंबद्धानि प्रधानान्यङ्गैः सह श्रूयन्ते । कथम् । साङ्गं हि प्रधानं प्रातःकाले श्रूयते । तथा मध्यन्दिने, सायं च । नाङ्गानि प्रातःकालादिषु । तत्रान्यकालेष्वङ्गेषु अन्यकालेषु च प्रधानेषु न साङ्गं तेषु कालेषु कृतं स्यात् । तस्मात् सद्यस्काला एवैता विकृतय इति । अपि च द्व्यहं साकमेधैरिति श्रूयते । तत्सद्यस्कालासूपपद्यत । [SB. on V-1.21-22, p. 1301]

with some other *pada* or *padas*, and thus arrive at the *vākyārtha*. In the present case also we find that though the word *ekahāyanyā* becomes *nirākāṅkṣa* by connecting itself with the word *krīṇāti* and as such requires no other connection, yet the word *aruṇayā* is in the danger of being rendered *anarthaka* in the absence of any connection, and has on that account to be connected with the verb *krīṇāti*. But it is not possible to connect the word *aruṇayā* directly with the verb *krīṇāti* since a *guṇa* being *amūrta* has no capacity for being connected with a *kriyā* independently of any *dravya*, so that this we can do only if we connect it with the word *ekahāyanyā*. Thus what is to be noted in the present case is that it is by being connected with other *padas* that a *sāmānya-vāci pada* gives us *vis'eṣa artha* which is only another name for *vakyārtha*."[18]

15. From this discussion we thus arrive at another point which has been expressly stated by S'ABARA at MS. III-2.1. There it is in clear terms declared by S'ABARA that a *padārtha*, if it is not connected with another *padārtha*, can't give rise to *vākyārtha*.[19] This is obviously so because in the absence of any such connection the *pada* by itself will yield only the *sāmānya* which is its signification, and not *vis'eṣa* which is the *vākyārtha*, since there is no reason why it should do so. For as we have already seen above it is only to avoid *ānarthakya-prasaṅga* that a *sāmānya-vāci pada* is made to yield some *vis'eṣa artha;* while as long as the word stands by itself there is no such *prasaṅga* at all.

16. We may now bring this section to a close by summing up the views of S'ABARA (and also of JAIMINI) on *vākyā-*

---

18 सामान्यवृत्ति हि पदं, विशेषवृत्ति वाक्यम्। सामान्येनाभिप्रवृत्तानां पदार्थानां यद्विशेषेऽवस्थापनं स वाक्यार्थः। तदेतदुक्तं तद्भूतानां क्रियार्थेन समाम्नायोऽर्थस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात्। इति। तत्र प्रत्यक्षतः पदार्थो वाक्यार्थः पुनरानुमानिकः। तदेतदवगम्यताम्। केवल स्वार्थवृत्ति पदमनुपदेशकमिति पदान्तरेण संनिहितेनैकवाक्यतामभ्युपैति, नान्यथेति।

19 न ह्यनन्वितः पदार्थो भवति वाक्यार्थः। [SB. on III-2.1, p.]

rtha in the following observations: (1) *Padārtha* is *sāmānya* while *vākyārtha* is *vis'eṣa.* (2) We get *vākyārtha* out of the *padārthas* when they are connected with one another. (3) As far as possible nothing that is not conveyed by the *padas* shall be taken as *vākyārtha.* (4) Only such *vākyārtha* as we get from the *padārthas* can be accepted as *pramāṇa.* (5) Use of *adhyāhāra* and such other modes of interpretation are not admissible as far as possible while interpreting the Scriptural texts. (6) If there is no connection between *padas* and *padas* there can be no *vākyārtha.*

17. Besides these, however, there are some other facts which we shall have to note regarding the *vākyārtha;* but these we shall consider in details in the next section when we deal with the topics of *ekavākytā* and *vākya-bheda* which are two very important principles of *Mīmāṁsā* on its interpretative side.

CHAPTER XIV

EKAVĀKYATĀ and VĀKYABHEDA.

1. Having thus far studied the nature of a *vākya* and also the prerequisites for several *padas* to form a *vākya*, we now pass on to one of the most important topics of the *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā* system of interpretation of a *vākya.* The most basic principle of this system has been very lucidly and concisely put by KUMARILA when he writes: *Sambhavaty-ekavākyatve vākyabhedas'ca neṣyate*'. From this it is quite clear that as far as possible every attempt must be made to establish *ekavākyatā* among the several *padas* as they stand; and that as long as it is possible to construe them as forming one *vākya* it is wrong to construe them as not forming one *vākya.* This latter is what is technically called the *vākya-bheda* which has been looked upon by the *Mīmāṁsaka* as a very grave draw-back which has to be avoided at any cost.

2. But let us first of all see the various factors that go to make this *vākya-bheda* as such a *doṣa.* And the most obvious factor is what has been termed by S'ABARA as *ekavākyatā-rūpa-bādha.* Let us take the text: '*Nivītaṁ manuṣyāṇāṁ prācīnāvītaṁ pitṛṇāṁ upavītaṁ devānāṁ upavyayate devalakṣmam eva tat kurute*'. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* would like to construe the text as a *vidhi;* but the *Siddhāntin* points out that in the text under consideration a *vidhi* is to be found in the words *upavyayate* &c. so that if this part is also taken as a *vidhi* there can be no *ekavākyatā* between the two parts and their *ekavākyatārūpa* would disappear. They

---

1 विधिना चैकवाक्यत्वात्। [MS. III-4-9]; ; इतश्च न विधिः। कुतः। विधिनैकवाक्यत्वात्। उपव्ययते देवलक्ष्ममेव तत्कुरुते इत्येष विधिः। अनेनास्य सहैकवाक्यता भवति। यदीतरोऽपि विधिः स्याद्वाक्यं भिद्येत। न हि विधेर्विधेश्चैकवाक्यता भवति। वचनव्यक्तिभेदात्। तत्रैकवाक्यतारूपं बाध्येत। किमेकवाक्यतारूपम्। निवीतं मनुष्याणामिति प्राप्तानुवादः। प्राप्तस्य किमर्थेन पुनर्वचनम्। स्तुत्यर्थत्वेन।—तस्मादर्थवादः। [SB., p. 894f.]

are, therefore, to be taken as being *arthavadas* and not *vidhis.*[1] Another illustration of this very factor is to be found in the text: *'Na catustriṁs'ad iti brūyāt ṣaḍviṁs'atir ity eva brūyāt'* where the latter portion is to be construed as *prāptasya anuvādaḥ* for conveying *pras'aṁsā* of the *pratiṣedha.* For otherwise there would arise the contingency of *ekavākyatārūpa-bādha.*[2]

3. Now it may be asked what harm is there if there is is *bhūyasī adṛṣṭakalpanā.* When a group of words is looked upon as forming two sentences instead of one we make it *ekavākyatā-rūpa-bādha?* The only answer to this question quired to assume not one but two *adṛṣṭas.* But *adṛṣṭa-kal-* enjoin two things instead of one and hence we shall be re- *panā* in itself as we have already seen is a *doṣa* and has to be resorted to only when there is no way out of a contingency. This being so it is certainly undesirable to go in for *bhūyasī adṛṣṭa-kalpanā* when we can do with less of it. *Bhūyasī adṛṣṭa-kalpanā* is therefore, one more factor which makes *vākya-bheda* a *doṣa.*[3]

4. Yet another factor to be noticed in this connection is the inherent *virodha* that is found in such cases. Let us, for example, take the text *'Athāto dharma-jijñāsā'.* Here the term *atha* means *vedān adhītya anantaram.* Now it is easy to see that this contains two different factors or conditions: one conveyed by *vedān adhītya* and the other by *anantaram.*

---

2 न ह्ययं षड्विंशतिशब्दो विधीयते। किं तर्हि। यथाप्राप्तिवचनमनूद्यते। कथमवगम्यते। एवकारकरणात्। यथाप्राप्ते एवकारकरणम्।—षड्विंशतिसंख्यापरेऽनेकोऽर्थो विधीयेत। षड्विंशतिसंख्यावचनं च। तत्र वाक्यं भिद्येत। भिद्यमाने एकवाक्यतारूपं बाध्येत। किं तत्। साकाङ्क्षत्वम्। चतुस्त्रिंशदिति ब्रूयात् षड्विंशतिरित्येव ब्रूयादिति। एतद्धि वचनं चतुस्त्रिंशद्वचनाभावे प्राप्तमेव सत् कर्तव्यतया प्रतिषेधं प्रशंसितुमुच्चार्यते। तदेवमेकवाक्यतारूपमापद्यते। सैकवाक्यता संख्यापरे बाधिता स्यात्। [SB. on IX 4-18, p. 1775f.]

3 भिन्नवाक्यरूपे त्वाश्रीयमाणे भूयस्यदृष्टानुमानकल्पना स्यात्। [SB. on IX 2-40, p. 1731]; अनेकार्थविधानं चान्याय्यमेकार्थविधाने संभवति। भूयसी हि तत्रादृष्टकल्पना स्यात्। [SB. on IX 4-18, p. 1776]

But it is not possible to enjoin both these conditions by the *sūtra* under consideration. For if both these conditions are to be enjoyed or emphacised there would arise the *vacana-vyakti-bheda* which is only another name for the inherent *virodha.* To enjoin the former the latter portion will have to be looked upon as an *anuvāda;* while the former would be *anuvāda* when the latter is to be enjoined.[4] Thus it may be seen that one and the same section has to be construed as being *vidhi* (or *pradhānabhūta*) and *anuvāda* (or *guṇa-bhūta*) which it is not possible to do without falling a prey to *virodha.* A similar illustration is to be found in the word *mahendra* which the *Pūrva-pakṣin* would like to interpret to mean 'pertaining to *Indra* who is *mahān*'. But S'ABARA point out the inherent *virodha* that would crop up if we accept the view of the *Pūrva-pakṣin.* In the expression as it is construed by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* it may be seen that the word *Indra* is combined in a compound with the word *mahat* on the one hand and at the same time it is connected with the *taddhita* affix on the other. Now it is well-known that for a word to be connected with a *taddhita* affix or to be combined in a compound with another word, the most essential condition is that it must be *samartha.* Now let us suppose that the word *Indra* forms a compound with the word *mahat* so that it is *samartha.* Then it may be seen that the word *Indra* has an expectancy for the word *mahat* and as such would be rendered *asamartha* as soon as and as long it is separated from the word *mahat.* This means that the word *Indra* which is *samartha* for the *samāsa* will be *asamartha* with reference to the *taddhita.* In the same way if the word is taken as being *samartha* with reference to the *taddhita* formation it will be *asamartha* for the *samāsa.* But how can one and the same word be both *samartha* and

---

4 न ह्येतदेकं वाक्यं पुरस्ताच्च वेदाध्ययनाद्धर्मजिज्ञासां प्रतिषेधिष्यति, परस्ताच्चानन्तर्यं प्रकरिष्यति। भिद्येत हि तथा वाक्यम्। अन्या हि वचनव्यक्तिरस्य पुरस्ताद्वेदाध्ययानाद्धर्मजिज्ञासां प्रतिषेधिष्यति, अन्या च परस्तादानन्तर्यमुपदिशति। वेदानधीत्येत्येकस्यां विधीयत अनूद्यानन्तर्यम्। विपरीतमन्यस्याम्। अथैवं सत्यस्य चैकवाक्यता वक्ष्यते। [SB. on I.1-1, p. 5].

asamartha at one and the same time? Hence it is concluded that the base viz. *mahendra* of the *taddhita* formation is to be looked upon as one *samartha* expression and is not further to be split up and identified with *Indra* (as qualified by the expression *mahat*).[5] Thus it may be seen that such *virōdha* arises when one and the same expression is required to be construed in two different ways which are diametrically opposed to one another.

5. And lastly we may note *agamakatva* which has been adduced by S'ABARA as a ground for rejecting a construction giving rise to *vākya-bheda*. While discussing the text '*Dars'apūrṇamāsābhyāṁ yajeta paurṇamāsyām paurṇamāsyā yajeta amāvāsyāyām amāvāsyayā yajeta / Dars'apūrṇamāsayor yajñakratvos'catvāra ṛtvija iti*'. S'ABARA discusses the comparative merits and demerits of *lakṣaṇā* and *vākya-bheda*; and concludes that the former is to be preferred to the latter, for *lakṣaṇā* although it involves *anyāyya-kalpanā* is yet *laukikī* and can as such be understood. Not so, however, the *vākya-bheda* which involves *agamakatva* owing to the *anekārthatva* which it contains.[6]

6. Having thus far seen the several factors that go to make *vākya-bheda* a grave *doṣa* we now pass on to consider the various circumstances which give rise to *vākya-bheda*. And here again in the most general terms it may be stated that *ekārthatvābhāva* or *anekārthatā* is mainly responsible for this *vākya-bheda* in more ways than one.

7. Thus in the text '*Vārtraghnī paurṇamāsyām anūcyete vṛdhanvatī amāvāsyāyām iti*', if the *vārtraghnī* and 'the *vṛdhanvatī ṛks* are understood as being enjoined with reference to the *dars'a* and the *paurṇamāsa yāgas*, we shall have to suppose that both the *dvitva* on the one hand and the *vārtraghnītva* or the *vṛdhanvattā* on the other are enjoined. And this would give rise to *vākya-bheda*. Hence to avoid this contingency it is concluded that *vārtraghnītva* and

---

5 See page 128, n. 74

6 See page 94, n. 52

vṛdhanvattā alone are enjoined with reference to the *ājya-bhāgas* (which form an *aṅga* of the *dars'a-pūrṇamāsas*) where the *dvitva* is already *prāpta.*[7] Another illustration may be found in the text *'Ekādas'a prayājān yajati ekādas'ānuyājān yajati'* where if these are taktn as other independent acts it would mean that both the *yāgas* and the *saṁkhyā* are enjoined by the text under discussion. But this would be nothing short of *anekārthatva* and would, therefore, be open to *vākya-bheda doṣa.* Hence it is concluded that these texts are to be construed as merely *guṇa-vidhis* enjoining only the *saṁkhyā.*[8] Here it may be observed that these illustrations differ from one another in this that while the two *arthas* in the former are spoken of in one *pada,* in the latter they are couched in two separate *padas.* *Artha-dvaya-vidhāna* of both these varieties can very well be illustrated in texts like *'Agniṣṭhā dve dve rasane ādāya* &c.,'[9] *'prajāpataye ghṛte carum nirvapet,*[10] and *'Yūpasyāntike' gnim mathitvā yūpāhutim juhoti'*[11] and a host of other texts which

---

7 मिथः सह द्वाभ्यामनुवाक्याभ्यां न प्रधानस्य कार्यमस्ति। यत्र तु द्वे अनुवाक्ये तत्र तयोर्वार्त्रघ्नता वृधन्वत्ता च विधीयते। प्रधाने चैकानुवाक्या। तत्र द्वित्वं वार्त्रघ्नतां च वृधन्वत्तां च विदधद्वाक्यं भिद्येत। आज्यभागयोस्तु द्वे प्राप्ते आग्नेयी सौमी च। तत्र वार्त्रघ्नतां वृधन्वत्तां च केवलां शक्ष्यति विधातुम्। [SB. on मिथश्चानर्थसम्बन्धात्। MS. III-1.23, p. 739].

8 न च शक्यते वदितुमेकादशादीन्यनूद्यन्त इति। अपूर्वाणि हि तान्यवश्यं विधातव्यानि। तानि च वाक्येन यागे। अथ यागो विधीयते यागे च संख्या तथा वाक्यं भिद्येत। तस्मादितिकर्तव्यतायां प्राप्तायां गुणविधय एत इति। [SB. on X-3.4, p. 1867]

9 अग्निष्ठा द्वे द्वे रशने आदाय द्वाभ्यां रशनाभ्यामेकैकं यूपं परिव्ययतीति। अग्नीषोमीयप्रकृतित्व एकैकरशन्यं स्यात्। अथ वचनमिदं कस्मान्न भवति अग्निष्ठा द्वे द्वे रशने आदायेत्येतदेव विधीयते। यदि रशनाद्वित्वमपि विधीयते तदा वाक्यं भिद्येत। तस्मादनूद्यते। [SB. on VIII-1-14, p. 1590].

10 तस्मिंश्चाज्ये श्रपणं श्रूयते घृते श्रपयतीति। किमतः। अत एतद्भवति। औषधविध्यन्तेन श्रपणं प्राप्यते। तत्र केवलमाज्यं विधायिष्यते। आज्यविध्यन्ते तु श्रपणमाज्यं च विधीयेयाताम्। तथा वाक्यं भिद्येत। [SB. on VIII-1.39, p. 1603].

11 आहवनीये जुहोतीत्युत्सर्गात्। सर्वहोमेष्वाहवनीयः प्राप्तः। तत्राग्निं

have been discussed by S'ABARA who has in such case shown how these may be interpreted so as to lay down *artha-dvaya* and how such an interpretation can be and has to be avoided.

8. Somewhat different is the case with the text '*Jāmi vā etad yajñasya kriyate yad anvāñcau puroḍās'au upāṁs'uyājam antarā yajati viṣṇur upāṁs'u yaṣṭavyo'jāmitvāya* &c.' This evidently is a complex sentence formed of several *avāntara vākyas.* The main injunction here is to be found in '*upāṁs'uyājam antarā yajati*' so that '*viṣṇur upāṁs'u yaṣṭavyaḥ* &c. have to be construed as *arthavādas.* For if they also are taken to be *vidhis* there would be *vidhāna* of more *vākyārthas* than one and there would crop up the *vākya-bheda.*[12] The main point here to be noted is that *vākya-bheda* in this case is caused by the assumption of *vākyārthadvaya-vidhāna.* The same is the case with the text '*Apsu tṛṇam prāsya āghārayati*' which if construed as enjoining both *apsu āghāraḥ* and *tṛṇa-prāsanam* would be open to *vākya-bheda.*[13] Thus we see that *arthadvaya-vidhāna* in

---

मथित्वेति वाच्यम् । तदपि मन्थनं प्राग्वंशे कर्मणः प्रवृत्तत्वात्प्राग्वंशे प्राप्तम् । तत्रेदमपि वक्तव्यम् । यूपस्यान्तिकेऽग्निं मथित्वेति । उभयस्मिंश्चापि विधीयमाने वाक्यभेदो मन्थनस्य स्वार्थवद्भावात् । तस्मादन्यतरदविवक्षितं मन्थनमन्तिकं वा । [SB. on XI-2.27, p. 2145]

12 न हि विधयो विष्णुरुपांशु यष्टव्य इत्येवमादयः । अर्थवादा हि ते । कथम् । अस्मिन्वाक्ये विध्यन्तरस्य भावात् । उपांशुयाजमन्तरा यजतीत्येतदस्मिन्वाक्ये विधीयते । यदीमेऽपि विधीयेरन् भिद्येत तर्हि वाक्यम् । अपि च यागस्य विष्ण्वादीनां च संबन्धोऽत्र गम्यते वाक्ये । न च यागस्य विधानम् । ननु चोपांशुयाजमन्तरा यजतीत्यत्राप्यन्तराऽसम्बन्धोऽत्र गम्यते । बाढम् । स तु विधीयते उपांशुत्वादि संबन्धः । एकं हीदं वाक्यं नानेकं विधातुमर्हति । कथम् । जामि वा एतद्यज्ञस्य क्रियत इत्येतदुपक्रम्य तद्वाक्यमजामित्वायेत्येवमन्तम् । तस्य मध्ये समाम्नातं विष्ण्वादिवाक्यम् । तेन संबध्यमानं न वाक्यान्तरं भवितुमर्हति । तस्माद्विष्णुरुपांशु यष्टव्य इत्येवमादयो न विधयः । [SB. on II-2.10, pp. 491-494]

13 लिङ्गं चैतमर्थं दर्शयति अप्सु तृणं प्रास्याघारयतीति । यद्यङ्गानामग्नौ वृत्तिः स्यादुभयं विधीयेत, अप्सु आघारयति तृणं प्रास्यतीति च । तद्वाक्यभेददोषः स्यात् । अथ यथोक्तो न्यायस्तथा अप्सु इत्यनूद्य तृणप्रासनं केवलं विधीयते इति नास्ति दोषः । [SB. on XI-2.33, p. 2148]

both its forms viz. *padārthadvaya-vidhāna* and *vākyārtha-dvaya-vidhāna* gives rise to *vākya-bheda.*

9. Let us now take the text *'Dars'apūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta'.* In this connection it has been argued that such texts must be taken as enjoining *saguṇa karma* for those who are *samartha* and at the same time *viguṇa* for those who are not so. Thus though the text is only one and occurs once only, it is endowed with the power of yielding two *arthas.* But this interpretation adopted by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* is by its very nature inadmissible. Thus we see that when one and the same word or sentence occurring once only is made to yield more *arthas* than one with reference to two different persons or situations we are sure to fall a prey to *vākya-bheda.*[14]

10. *Aneka-guṇa-vidhāna* is one more factor which results in *vākya-bheda.* Let us take some concrete examples. There is the text *'Māsam agnihotraṁ juhoti māsaṁ dars'apūrṇamā-sābhyāṁ yajate'* which may be construed in two different ways. It may be construed as a *guṇa-vidhi* laying down time (*kāla*) for the *nitya agnihotra* and *dars'apūrṇamāsa* sacrifices or on the other hand it may be construed as laying two quite distinct and separate acts bearing the names *agnihotra* and *dars'apūrṇamāsa* which are not to be confounded with the *niyata* sacrifices of the same names. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* is in favour of the former construction. But the *Siddhāntin* points out that this text comes after *'upa-sadas'caritvā'* and that the *upasads* have nothing to do with the *agnihotra* and the *dars'apūrṇamāsa* sacrifices. And if the *upasads* also are to be understood as being enjoined by this text under consideration then the text would be made to lay down more *guṇas* than one which in a *guṇavidhipara vākya* gives rise to *vākya-bheda.* Hence it is that the text under consideration must be understood as laying down not the *niyata* sacrifices named *agnihotra* and *dars'apūrṇamāsa,*

14 अथैतदेव वाक्य समर्थानां सगुणं कर्म विधास्यति असमर्थानां विगुणमिति तन्न । सकृदुच्चारण उभयशक्तिविरोधाद्वाक्यं भिद्येत । [SB. on VI-1.5, p.1357.]

but two quite different sacrifices having the same names.[15] Another illustration of this very principle is to be found in the text *Ās′vinaṁ grahaṁ gṛhītvā trivṛtā yūpam parivīya āgneyaṁ savanīyaṁ pas′um upākaroti'*, where also it is argued that the first part alone lays down the *kāla* while the latter part is to be understood as an *anuvāda*. For if both the parts are construed as laying down the *kāla* for *parivyāṇa* and the *upākaraṇa* respectively we shall be making the text enjoy more *guṇas* than one and thus courting *vākya-bheda*.[16] '*Yadāgneyo'ṣṭākapālo' māvāsyāyām paurṇamāsyām cācyuto bhavati*' &c. is yet another text where also it has been stated by S'ABARA in very clear terms that *anekaguṇa-vidhāna* by one sentence with reference to an act enjoined by some other text is neither possible nor admissible.[17] This in other words means that a *guṇavidhipara* sentence must be so interpreted as to lay down one *guṇa* and one only. And the moment it is made to yield *anekaguṇavidhāna* it would be open to *vākya-bheda*.

11. From the foregoing discussion we get one more rule in this connection viz. that *anekaguṇa-vidhāna* may be admitted in a *mukhya vidhi* i.e. a text which lays down the act itself. This rule has been explicitly stated by JAIMINI when he says *'Tadguṇās tu vidhīyeran avibhāgād vidhānārthe na ced anyena s′iṣṭāḥ'*.[18] Under this *sūtra* it has been

---

15 प्रकरणान्तरे श्रूयमानं वाक्यं यस्य प्रकरणे तस्य वाचकं भवितुमर्हति। ननु प्रत्यक्षोऽग्निहोत्रस्य दर्शपूर्णमासयोश्च गुणविधिः। नेत्युच्यते। कथम्। उपसद्भिश्चरित्वेत्युक्त्वा इदमभिधीयते। न चोपसदोऽग्निहोत्रस्य दर्शपूर्णमासयोश्च सन्ति। तस्मादशक्यस्तत्र मासविधिः। अथोच्येत उपसदोऽपि विधीयन्त इति। तथा गुणविधानार्थेऽस्मिन्वाक्येऽनेकगुणविधानाद् वाक्यं भिद्येत। [SB. on II-3.24, pp. 614–617].

16 तत्र कालानियमे प्राप्त आश्विनं ग्रहं गृहीत्वेति कालमात्रं विधीयते। त्रिवृता यूपं परिवीयोपकरोतीत्यनुवादः। इतरथा हि परिव्याणस्य कालो विधीयेत उपाकरणस्य च। तत्रानेकगुणविधानाद् वाक्यं भिद्येत। [SB. on III-6.21, p. 1046]

17 एकेनैव वाक्येनात्रानेको गुणो विधातुमिष्यते भवता। न च शब्दान्तरेण चोदिते कर्मणि अनेको गुणः परस्परसंबन्धे चासति शक्यते विधातुम्। [SB. on II-2.6, p. 485 f.]

18 cf. MS. I-4.9.

shown by S'ABARA that the expressions *āgneya, agnīṣomīya* &c. can't be taken to be *karmanāmadheyas.* The text *'Yad āgneyo'ṣṭākapālo* &c.' must be taken as laying down the main act together with the *guṇas.* In this case, of course, we have to take the *guṇas* also as being enjoined or *vihita* since they are not from any other source. Thus we see that a *mukhya-vidhi-para vākya* (i.e. an *utpatti–vidhi*) may be admitted as laying down more *guṇas* than one provided that the *guṇas* in question are not already enjoined by some other text. And this we have to admit; for if we don't do so the whole text will be in the danger of being rendered futile. If, however, the *guṇas* are found to be enjoined by some other text then such texts (i.e. the words) should be taken as *nāmadheyas* and not as *guṇa-vidhis* as in the case of the text *'Agnihotraṁ juhoti'*[19].

12. A similar discussion is made with regard to the text '*Vasante brāhmaṇo'gnīn ādadhīta, grīṣme rājanyaḥ, s'aradi vais'yaḥ*' and on the basis of this very principle it is concluded that this texts lays down the *ādhāna* with reference to *Brāhmaṇādis* and *vasantādis.* It is here that S'ABARA has raised the question as to how is *vākya-bheda* avoided in such cases; and has ultimately given the reply that in such cases we don't take the text as containing two or more *vidhis,* but interpret it as a *vis'iṣṭa-vidhi i.e.* a *vidhi* making only the *vidhāna* of the main act as characterized by the *guṇas.*[20] Thus it may be remembered that *aneka-guṇa-vidhāna* may be admitted in an *aguṇavidhipara* text where it is possible to say that we have one *vis'iṣṭavidhāna.* But the same can't be said of a *guṇavidhipara* text which merely aims at lying down some *guṇa* with reference to some act that is already laid down by some other text. Hence it is that a

19 cf. SB. on MS. I-4.9.

20 नन्वनेगुणविधानं त्वया वाक्येनाध्यवसितं भवति। नैष दोषः। अगुणविधिपरे हि वाक्ये भवत्यनेकगुणविधानमित्युक्तं तद्गुणास्तु विधीयेरन्न विभागाद्विधानार्थे न चेदन्येन शिष्टाः। इति। तस्माद ब्राह्मणादिसंयुक्ता विधायिका श्रुतिः। द्वाभ्यां तु विशेषणाभ्यां विशिष्टमेकमाधानं विधायिष्यते। तेन न भविष्यति वाक्यभेदः। [SB. on II-3-4, p. 593 f.]

guṇavidhipara text can never be so interpreted as to make it enjoin more *guṇas* than one, though an *aguṇavidhipara vākya* may be construed as such, of course, only as the last resort when no other construction is possible.

13 *'Vaṣaṭkartuḥ' prathama-bhakṣaḥ*, is another text where it is seen that two points are enjoined. And there this *anekaguṇa-vidhāna* is admitted because of the *samāsa* that is used to do it. Thus in such cases we see that a *samāsa can be* understood as *vis'iṣṭa-vidhāna* and as such be free from *vākya-bheda*[21].

14. One must, however, carefully distinguish between *vis'iṣṭavidhāna* on the one hand and *vidhīyamānasya vis'eṣa-ṇam* on the other, which to an uncritical eye would appear to be the same. But S'ABARA has in very clear terms shown how *vidhīyamānasya vis'eṣaṇam* is open to *vākya-bheda* while *vis'iṣṭa-vidhāna* as we have already seen is immune to it. Even a *vis'eṣaṇa*, S'ABARA points out, can't be recognized as such unless and until it is itself *vihita*. But as we very well know there can be no *ekavākyatā* between two *vidhīyamāna padārthas* or between a *vidhi* and a *vidhi*. Thus an attempt to construe some *padārtha* as a *vis'eṣaṇa* to something that is *vidhīyamāna* is bound to crash against the rock of *vākya-bheda*.[22] This becomes clear from the text *'Yasya havir niruptaṁ purastāccandramā abhyudeti tredhā taṇḍulān vibhajet'*. Here the *haviḥ* that is spoken of in the first part is, of course, the *pravṛttaṁ haviḥ*. Now if the expression *niruptam* is construed with *haviḥ* as its *vis'eṣaṇa* what we shall be having is not *vis'iṣṭa-vidhāna* but *vidhīyamānasya vis'eṣaṇam;* and hence such a construction is inadmissible.[23]

21 वचनमेवेदम् । न मन्तव्यमनेकगुणविधानादविवक्षितं प्राथम्यमिति । etc. [page 133, n. 85]

22 न हि विधीयमानस्य विशेषणं भवति । यत्कारणं विशेषणमप्यविधीयमानं न भवति । न च द्वयोर्विधानयोः परस्परसंबन्धो भवति । SB. onXI-1.3, p. 2 102]; also cf. n. 25 below.

23 यस्य हविरभ्युदेतीति हविर्लक्षित उदयो निमित्तं प्रवृत्तं हविर्लक्षयति, नोदासीनम् । तस्माद्धविरभ्युदेतीत्युच्यमाने प्रवृत्तं हविरभ्युदेतीति गम्यते । न हि तन्निरुप्त-

In a *vis'iṣṭa-vidhāna* we get the *vidhāna* of one *artha* (which is of course *vis'iṣṭa*) and one only [21] whereas here we get the *vidhāna* of two *arthas*, first the *vidhāna* of the *vis'eṣya* and then that of the *vis'eṣaṇa* separately. Thus *vis'iṣṭa-vidhāna* satisfying the condition of *aikārthya* as it does is always above *vākya-bheda* and as such can never be *duṣṭa*. *But vidhīyamānasya vis'eṣaṇam* which apparently is like *vis'iṣṭa-vidhāna* violates the condition of *aikārthya* and hence can never be free from *vākya-bheda.*

15. Let us now note the circumstances under which it is possible to construe a sentence as making a *vis'iṣṭa-vidhāna.* Take, for example, the sentence '*S'ōṇam ānaya*'. Here we see that it is the bringing of *s'oṇatva-vis'iṣṭa as'va* that is enjoined by this sentence. But the point to be noted here is that this *vis'iṣṭa-vidhāna* is conveyed by a *guṇa-s'abda* only without the aid of any *dravya-s'abda* or *vis'eṣya.* Literally the sentence conveys the order to bring the *guṇa s'oṇatva.* But as the bringing of a *guṇa* like *s'oṇatva* is impossible the whole sentence would be rendered *anarthaka* unless we assume that the *guṇa-s'abda* conveys not merely the *guṇa* concerned but

---

मित्येतेन शक्यं विशेषयितुम् । भिद्येत हि तदा वाक्यम् । यस्य हविर्निरुप्तं नानिरुप्तमित्येवमपेक्ष्यमाणे हविरभ्यदेतीति न शक्यते विधातुम् । [SB. on VI-5.13, p. 463 f.]

24 नात्र द्वाभ्यां वाक्याभ्यां प्रयोजनम् । यथा रक्तमश्वं योजयेति यदा गुणविधिपरं वाक्यं भवति तदा द्वाभ्यां वाक्याभ्यां प्रयोजनं गुणद्वयविधाने । etc. [See page 102, n. 14 above]; अथ कथमवाक्यभेदः । रेवतीषु ऋक्षु वारवन्तीयं साम कृत्वा पशुकामो यजेतेत्यपूर्वो यागः सर्वैर्विशेषणैर्विशिष्टो विधीयते । तत्रैकार्थत्वं विभागे च साकाङ्क्षत्वमित्येकवाक्यत्वमुपपद्यते । नन्वर्थभेदो, यागश्चैवं ह्यपूर्वः कर्तव्यो, रेवतीषु वारवन्तीयमपूर्वमिति । नेति ब्रूमः । निर्वृत्तवारवन्तीयरेवतीगुणको यागो विधीयते । न वारवन्तीयनिर्वृत्तिः । अर्थाद् रेवतीषु वारवन्तीयमभिर्वत्स्यति । शक्यते च तन्निर्वर्तयितुम् । उच्यते । रेवतीनां वारवन्तीयस्य च संबन्धो न विहितः स्यात् । तत्र रेवतीष्वन्यान्यपि सामानि भवेयुः । वारवन्तीयं चान्यास्वप्यृक्षु । नैष दोषः । कृत्वेत्यभिनिर्वृत्तः संबन्धो यागायोच्यते । तेन संबन्धो गम्यते । यथा शोणमानयेति रक्तगुणसंबद्धोऽश्वः शब्देनैवानयतो विधीयते इति न वाक्यभेदो भवति एवमिहापि द्रष्टव्यम् । [SB on II.2.27, pp. 557-559]

in addition brings in the idea of *dravya* also by *ākṣepa*. Thus it is that ultimately the text in question conveys the order to bring not merely the *s'oṇatva guṇa* but some *dravya* viz. a horse as characterized by the *s'oṇatva guṇa*. This is how in such cases we arrive at the *vis'iṣṭa-vidhāna*.[25] Here evidently this mode of interpretation has to be accepted just to avoid *ānarthakya*.

16 There is yet another circumstance calling for *vis'iṣṭa-vidhāna* which is best illustrated in texts like *'Lohitoṣṇīṣā ṛtvijaḥ pracaranti'* where the *vis'iṣṭārtha* is enjoined with the help of a *samāsa*. Similarly the expression *s'atāgniṣṭoma* being a *samāsa* can be understood as referring to *ubhaya-vis'eṣaṇa-vis'iṣṭa guṇa* and as involving neither *anekārthatva* nor *vākya-bheda*.[26]

17 *Vis'iṣṭa-vidhāna* as has been pointed out above is admissible in a *mukhya-vidhi* alone. That is why when we read *'Pas'unā yajeta'* we understand the text to enjoin *aneka-vis'eṣaṇa-vis'iṣṭaḥ yāgaḥ*.[27] This rule, it may be observed, is based on another rule that has been already discussed before, while discussing the significance of the verb. There it has been stated that when the *ākhyātārthá* is *pradhāna* the other factors all combine together and form *vis'eṣaṇa* thereof; while if it is *gauṇa* the several factors spoken of in the sentence combine with the verb only severally. Now it may be seen that the *ākhyātārtha* is *pradhāna* in a *mukhya vidhi* so that the rule noted above naturally applies to *mukhya vidhis* only. Hence we get the rule that *vis'iṣṭārthatā* in the case of *mukhya vidhis* is no *doṣa*.

---

25 नन्वेवमपि बहवोऽर्थाः रेवत्यो वारवन्तीयं तत्संबन्धो यागः पशुकामश्चेति । नैष दोषः । बहवः श्रूयन्ते, एकोऽत्र विधीयते यागो विशिष्टः । ननु रेवत्योऽपि विधीयन्ते वारवन्तीयमपि । etc. [See page 102 n. 15 above].

26 यत्तु अनेकार्थमिति । नानेकार्थं भविष्यति । गणचोदनया प्राप्तानामह्नां पञ्चानां संस्थामात्रं विधीयते । शताग्निष्टोममित्यपि समास उभयविशेषणविशिष्टं गणमाह । स एक एवार्थः । यथा लोहितोष्णीषा ऋत्विजः प्रचरन्तीति [SB on VIII.8.9, p. 1617].

27 नात्र जातिर्द्रव्यस्य लक्षणत्वेन श्रूयते । etc.[See page 145; n. 4].

18 But, it may be asked, what harm is there if we do not accept such a text as containing a *vis'iṣṭa vidhi*. Can we not construe it as containing two independent *vidhis* pure and simple? 'No, certainly not' is our reply. For in that case we shall have to repeat the *ākhyātārtha* with each one of the details spoken of in the text. But since in such texts the *ākhyātārtha* is *pradhāna* and the other details are *gauṇa*, the proposed construction would mean that we repeat the *pradhāna* for the sake of the *gauṇa*. This, however is not right. Hence we must avoid the contingency of repeating the *pradhāna* for the sake of the *gauṇa*. And if it is to be avoided we must catch hold of as many details from the text as we possibly can along with the *ākhyātārtha* only. The best illustration of this rule is to be found in the text '*Aruṇayā piṅgākṣyaikahāyanyā somaṁ krīṇāti*' where we have to conclude that the *kraya* is to be performed with the help of a ruddy, tawny-eyed, one-year-old cow.[28].

19 Some conditions giving rise to *vākya-bheda* may best be stated only negatively by saying that there can be no syntactical unity between a *vidhi* and a *vidhi*, an *uddes'ya* and an *uddes'ya*, a *guṇa* and a *guṇa* or finally between a *mantra* and a *brāhmaṇa-vākya*. These now we shall study separately one by one taking some concrete illusrations as they are supplied by S'ABARA.

20. Let us take the texts '*Dars'apūrṇamāsābhyām yajeta*' and '*Jyotiṣṭomena yajeta*'. In connection with these it has been argued that it is not possible for these texts to enjoin *dharmas* with reference to this particular *yaji* or *yāga*. For if the *dharmas* are thus enjoined the *yaji* with reference to which they are enjoined can't but be *anūdita;* while if the *yaji* is taken as being enjoined then we shall have to accept the

28 न तर्हि ब्रूमो वाक्यभेद इति । कथम् । क्रयस्य हि द्रव्यारुणिमानावुपदिश्येते । न क्रयस्तयोः । न च प्रधानं प्रतिगुणं भिद्यते, प्रतिप्रधानं हि गुणो भिद्यत इति । अस्ति चायं दृष्टान्तः समुदाये वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिरिति । यथा गर्गाः शतं दण्ड्यन्तामिति । तथा अभिषुत्य हुत्वा भक्षयन्तीति तस्मादुभयविशेषणविशिष्टः क्रयोऽभिधीयते । [SB on III.1.12, p. 697]

dharmas as being *anūdita.* This we have got to do; for, if both the *yaji* as well as the *dharmas* are accepted as being enjoined as such there can be no syntactical connection between them. For the rule is '*Na hi dvayor vidhīyamānayoḥ parasparena sambandho bhavati*'.[29] But the reason why this rule has to be acceped has been explicitly stated by S'ABARA in his *bhāṣya* on MS. VI.1.3 while discussing the exact significance of the texts like '*Dars'apūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta*'. The *Siddhānta* view in this connection is that *yāga* is *guṇa-bhūta* while *svarga* i.e. *phala* is *pradhāna-bhūta. Yāga* in these texts must be understood as being enjoined as *karaṇa* to attain the *phala* viz. *svarga* and not *per se*. For if it is so understood then the desire for *svarga* would be *niṣprayojana* since *yāga* not being taken as being a *karaṇa* to any *phala* must be said to be *niṣphala.* If on the other hand, both *yāga* as well as *svarga* are understood as being *vihita* there would crop up the *vākyabheda-prasaṅga.* Hence it is concluded that '*svargakāmapadena svārtho na vidhīyate kiṁ tarhi uddis'yate*'. The rule that we have now to note here is '*Dvayos'ca vidhīyamānayoḥ parasparenāsambaddhayor vākyabhedaprasaṅgaḥ*'.[30]

21. As a corollary to this rule we get another rule viz. that if a group of words which is connected with another group of words which is a *vidhi,* then the former can't be a *vidhi itself.* Far from being a *vidhi* it has to be construed as being *vidhi-s'eṣa* which in other words means

---

29 दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेतेत्यत्र न शक्यन्ते यागविशेषे धर्मा विधातुम । किं कारणम् । यदा यजौ धर्मा विधीयन्ते तदा यजिरनूद्यते यजेतेत्थमिति । यदि यजिर्विधीयेत न धर्मैःसंबध्येत । न हि द्वयोर्विधीयमानयोः परस्परेण संबन्धो भवति । [SB on VII.1.2, p. 1526 f.]

30 स्वर्गसंज्ञकमर्थं प्रति करणत्वेन यागो विधीयते । ननु यागः कर्तव्यतया श्रुत्या विधीयते । सत्यमेवम् । आनर्थक्यं तु तथा भवति । स्वर्गं प्रत्यविहिते यागे स्वर्गकामस्तस्मिन्निष्फले विधीयमानोऽपि निष्प्रयोजनः स्यात् । तत्रोपदेशवैयर्थ्यम् । द्वयोश्च विधीयमानयोः परस्परेणासंबद्धयोर्वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गः । [SB on VI.1.3, p. 1352 f.]

only an *arthavāda.* This is what has been explicitly stated by JAIMINI when he writes *Vidhinā tvekavāyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnāṁ syuḥ'.*[31] We also find JAIMINI addusing this very ground by using the term *vākyas'eṣa* at MS. 1.2.22[32] and VIII.1.7-8.[33] But at MS. 1.2.25 he in clear terms declares that if such groups of words are taken as *vidhis* then there would crop up *vākya-bheda-prasaṅga.*[34]

22. While discussing the *prāmāṇya* of the *arthavāda* texts it has been argued by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* that the injunctive portion of the text may by itself be said to yield the sense of injunction, so that nothing is left for the *arthavāda* portion of the text to do. Thus, for example , the injunctive portion *'Vāyavyaṁ s'vetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ'* may by itself be taken as enjoining the particular *ālambha;* while the *arthavāda* portion that follows viz. *'Vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā'* would be only nugatory. S'ABARA, however, points out that it is not possible for one and the same text to lay down two *sambandhas.* If, for example, the text in question were to lay down the *sambandhas* as *bhūtikāmaḥ ālabheta* (i.e. *ālambhana*) and *ālambhena ca eṣa guṇo bhavati* (i.e. *stuti*) then there would arise syntactical split. Hence it would be clear that in such cases the injunctive portion together with the *vākya-s'eṣa must* be accepted as conveying the idea of *stuti* along with that of the *kartavyatā* of the particular act.[35] What we have to note here is that *sambandha*

---

31 cf. MS. I.2.7

32 उक्तं तु वाक्यशेषत्वम् ।

33 विधिरिति चेत् । न वाक्यशेषत्वात् ।

34 विधौ च वाक्यभेदः स्यात् ।

35 यदा न स्तुतिपदानि विधिशब्देनैव तदा प्ररोचना । यदा स्तुतिवचनं तदा स्तवनेन । न चैवं सति किं स्तुतिवचनेन यस्मिन्सत्यविधायकं, मा भूत्तत् । तदभावेऽपि पूर्वविधिनैव प्ररोचयिष्यत इति ।———निरपेक्षादपि विधिमवगमिष्यामः । भवत्वेवम् । नैवं सति कश्चिद्विरोधः । किन्त्वशक्यः स्तुतिपदसंबन्धे सति विध्यर्थो विवक्षितुम् । वाक्यं हि संबन्धस्य विधायकं द्वौ संबन्धौ विदध्यात् भूतिकाम आलभेत, आलम्भेन

dvaya-vidhāna by one *vākya* gives rise to *vākya-bheda.* This very principle is again expressly stated by S'ABARA in his *Bhāṣya* on MS. IX. 1.3 where he writes *'Anekasambandhe ca vākyam bhidyeta'*. This very argument is again hurled by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* when while discussing the text *'Purastād upasadaṁ saumyena caranti &c.'* he argues that if the word *upasad* is construed with *saumya* etc. on the one hand and *aurva* &c. on the other, there would be *vākya-bheda.* For as JAIMINI puts it *'Vipratiṣiddhaṁ hy ubhayam,'*[36] This very rule is again referred to by JAIMINI and stated by S'ABARA at MS. IV.3.33.[37] There the text under discussion is *'saṁsthāpya paurṇamāsīṁ vaimṛdham anunirvapanti'*. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* tries to construe the text taking the expression *anunirvapanti* as connecting *vaimṛdha* with the *dars'a* and *paurṇamāsa* sacrifices, and also with *paurṇamāsī* the *kāla;* and thus understand *vaimṛdha* as being *ubhayārtha.* i.e. subsidiary to both *dars'a* as well as *paurṇamāsa.* But this says JAIMINI is impossible. For we have only one word with which to bring about the two *sambandhas.* Here S'ABARA clearly states that *'Ekasminneva vākye na dvau sambandhau s'aknoti vidhātum. / Ekārthatvād dhi ekaṁ vākyam samadhigatam'*. / Let us take one more illustration. *'Yathācamasam anyāṁs camasāṁs' camasino bhakṣayanti./ Athaitasya hāriyojansya sarve eva lipsante'*. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* here argues that the *hāriyojana* is swallowed by the *camasinaḥ* only and not by the *grāvastut* also. Here according to him *sarve* means all the *camasinaḥ* who are already in the context. The *siddhānta* view, however, is that *sarve* here stands

चैष गुणो भवतीति भिद्येत तर्हि एवं सति वाक्यम् ।——एवमिमानि सर्वाण्येव पदानि कञ्चिदर्थं स्तुवन्ति विदधति । [SB on I.2.7, pp. 117-119]

36 विप्रतिषिद्धं ह्युभयम् । न शक्नोत्युपसदामित्येष शब्दः सौम्यादींश्च विशेष्टु-मेकस्मिन्वाक्ये पूर्वादींश्च । भिद्येत हि तथा वाक्यम् । [SB on IV.4.5, p. 1272]

37 न शब्दैकत्वात् । [MS IV.3.33]; एकः शब्द अनुनिर्वपतीति एकस्मिन्नेव वाक्ये न द्वौ संबन्धौ शक्नोति विधातुम् । वैमृधस्य दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां पौर्णमासीकालेन च । एकार्थत्वाद् ह्येकं वाक्यं समधिगतम् । [SB, p. 1263 f.]

not merely for the *camasinaḥ* but for the *grāvastut* also; and hence the *camasinaḥ* as well as the *grāvastut* partake of the *hāriyojana*. He points out that according to the interpretation of the *Pūrva-pakṣin* the expression *bhakṣayanti* will be connected with *sarve* on the one hand and *camasinaḥ* on the other. But we know that '*Dvau hi sambandhāv ekasmin vākye apūrvau na s'akyete vidhātum*'. Hence the construction should be '*Atha etasya hāriyojanasya nakevalaṁ comtsinaḥ sarve eva iti*'. It is thus that the expression *sarve* can be understood in its literal sense; and the contingency of *sambandha-dvayavidhāna be avoided*.[38]

23 Now let us take the text '*Na catustriṁs'ad iti brūyāt ṣaḍviṁs'atir ity eva brūyāt*'. If this is understood as laying down the *ṣaḍviṁs'ati saṁkhyā* then it would be laying down two arthas viz. *catustriṁs'at-pratiṣedha* and *ṣaḍviṁs'ati-saṁkhyā*. Thus there is one *pratiṣedha* and one *vidhi* which would have to be taken as being conveyed by one text. But this is nothing short of *vākya-bheda*. Hence it is concluded that the text under consideration does not lay down the *pratiṣedha saṁkhyā* but prohibits the whole of the *ṛk*, *Catustriṁs'at* &c. Here then we see that just as there can be no *ekavākyatā* between a *vidhi* and a *vidhi*, so also there can be no *ekavākyatā* between a *vidhi* and a *partiṣedha*. For a *pratiṣedha* after all is nothing but a negative *vidhi*.[39] This very rule is again referred to by S'ABARA while discussing the question whether the *kāmya karmas* are to be performed only once. The *Pūrvapakṣin* argues in favour of this view; but the

38 नैतदस्ति चमसिन एव हारियोजने लिप्सन्त इति । सर्वे तु विधीयन्ते हारियोजने । सर्वे भक्षयन्तीति । न पुनश्चमसिन इति संबन्धः शक्यते विधातुम् । तस्मादन्या वचनव्यक्तिः । का पुनरसौ । यथाचमसमन्यांश्चमसांश्चमसिनो भक्षयन्तीत्यनुवादः । चमसिनश्चमसान्भक्षयन्त्येव । ते भक्षयन्तो यथाचमसमेव । अथैतस्य हारियोजनस्य न केवलं चमसिनः, सर्व एवेति । किमेवं भविष्यति । सर्वशब्दश्च सर्वान्वदन् नैकदेशे कल्पितो भविष्यति । न च द्वौ संबन्धावपूर्वावेकस्मिन्वाक्ये भविष्यतः । [SB on III.5.30, p. 1005 f.].

39 षड्विंशतिसंख्यपरेऽनेकोऽर्थो विधीयते । etc. [See page 216, n. 2].

Siddhāntin points out that by laying this rule one would be required to adopt *pratiṣedhapara vākyas* also in the *gavādi vidhis.* Thus side by side with the *vidhis* like *'Prathamaṁ yajeran'* one will have to assume the text *'Na dvitīyaṁ yajeran'*. But this would be courting *vākya-bheda.* Hence the conclusion is that *kāmya karmas* may be performed more than once for *phalādhikya.*[40]

24 Having thus seen how *vidhāna-dvaya* causes *vākya-bheda* we may now pass on to see how the same happens in the case of *uddes'ya-dvaya.* There is the text *'Bhinne juhoti skanne juhoti'*. Here it is argued that the expression *bhinne* speaks of the *nimitta* and is as such *uddis'yamāna* and not *upādīyamāna;* for *anupādīyamānaṁ hi nimittam ityucyate.* It, therefore, follows that the *yāga* of which this is the *nimitta* cannot be *uddis'yamāna also.* For *'Dvayor uddis'yamānayoḥ sambandha eva na syāt';* and thus there would arise *vākya-bheda.* Hence the conclusion is that the *yāga* is enjoined, but not the *bhedana.*[41]

25 From all the foregoing discussion it would appear that there can be no *ekavākyatā* between two sections which are on a par with one another. And from this fact we come to one more factor which lies at the basis of *vākya-bheda.* This is what is given by JAIMINI in his *'Guṇānām ca parārthatvād asambandhaḥ samatvāt syāt'* under which S'ABARA has discussed the text *'Tasmād vāraṇo vai yajñāvacaraḥ syāt na tvetenna juhuyāt/ Vaikaṅkato vati yajñāvacaraḥ syāt juhuyād etena'/.* Now because these *vāraṇa* &c. are said to be *yajñāvacara,* therefore, they can't belong to *agnyādheya* insp'te of *prakaraṇa.* Hence according to the rule *'Pradhāne'sambha-*

---

40 यदि च नियोगतः सकृदेव कर्तव्यं भवेत् ततस्तेषां प्रथमं यजेरन्नित्येवमादि गणादिविधिषु वचनान्येतानि कल्प्येरन्, न द्वितीयं यजेरन्निति । तथा च वाक्यानि भिद्येरन् । [SB on XI.1.24, p. 2124].

41 अनुपादीयमानं हि निमित्तमित्युच्यते । यदि च यस्यापि निमित्तं सोऽप्युद्दिश्येत तत्र द्वयोरुद्दिश्यमानयोः संबन्ध एव न स्यात् । न चात्र भेदनं कुर्यादिति विधीयते । भेदने निर्वृत्ते यदन्यच्छ्रूयते तद्विधीयते । [SB on VI.4.13, p. 1435].

van padārthas tadguṇe kalpyate' they should belong to *pavamāna-havīṁṣi* which are *guṇa-bhūta* to *agnyādhāna*, in whose *prakaraṇa* they are spoken of. It is here that JAIMINI points out that *pavamāna-havīṁṣi* can't be *guṇa-bhūta* to *ādhāna;* for just as *ādhāna* is a *saṁskāra* of and as such *guṇabhūta* to *agni*, so also are the *pavamāna-havīṁṣi*. Thus we see that *samatva* is adduced as a ground for *asambandha.*[42]

26 But the principle of *sameṣu vākyabhedaḥ* has been explicitly stated by JAIMINI at MS. II.1.47 where it has been shown by S'ABARA how *'Iṣe tvā ūrje tvā'* must be construed as two different sentences and not one. It is on this very principle again that in the text *'Tapte payasi dadhy ānayati sā vais'vadevy āmikṣā vājibhyo vājinam'* the *āmikṣāguṇaka kârma* is declared to be different from the *vājina-guṇaka karma.*[43]

27 We have now to notice one more circumstance under which *ekavākyatā* is not possible. This has been stated by JAIMINI in the *Sūtra*: *'Mantreṣv avākyas'eṣatvaṁ guṇopades'ātsyāt'*. The question here is whether the text *'Vaṣaṭkāreṇa vā svāhākāreṇa vā devebhyo'nnam pradīyate'* which is *anārabhyādhīta* should be construed as being *s'eṣabhūta* to the text *'Pṛthivyai svāhā antarikṣāya svāhā vāyave svāhā'* which occurs in the *Darvihoma-prakaraṇa.* The decision is that since one of the above texts is a *Brāhmaṇa* while the other is a *mantra*, therefore, they cannot be taken as forming

---

42 उक्तमेतत् प्रधानेऽसंभवन्पदार्थस्तद्गुणे कल्प्यत इति । अग्न्याधेयप्रकरणे च समाम्नानात् पवमानहविषां तद्गुणता । तस्मात्पवमानहविःषु । इत्येवं प्राप्तम् । एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः । गुणानां समत्वात् । पवमानहविषामग्न्याधेयस्य च न परस्परेण संबन्धः । यथाधानमग्नेर्गुणः संस्कारार्थं एवं पवमानहवींषि अग्नेरेव गुणभूतानि । कस्तत्र परस्परेण संबन्ध इति । [SB on III.1.22, p. 737]

43 गुणश्चाप्रकृतेन देवताभिधानेन संबध्यमानः कर्मान्तरं विदध्यात् । समे हि तदा द्वे वाक्ये भवतः । उभे अप्यपूर्वयोर्यागयोर्विधातृणी । [SB on II.2.23, p. 532]

44 cf. MS. X.8.20.

one *vākya*. The former is *vidhāyaka* while the latter is only *abhidhāyaka;* and the rule is *'Na hi vidhāyakāvidhāyakayor ekavākyatvam bhavati'.*[45] Another illustration of this very rule is to be found in the texts *'So'nujuhoti agnaye svāhā kṛttikāyai svāhā* &c.' where the *Pūrva-pakṣin* would take the *mantra* as *vihita.* But S'ABARA points out that *'So'nujuhoti'* is a *vidhi* all right; but thereafter what we have is only the *mantra* and there we find no word which may be said to enjoin it. And since the one is a *Brāhmaṇa-vākya* and the other is only a *mantra* they have to be taken as two different sentences and not one.[46]

28 Lastly it may be noted that just as *anekārthābhidhāna* results in *vākya-bheda,* so does *vibhāge nirākāṅkṣatvam.* Discussing the texts *'Muṣṭī karoti /Vācaṁ yacchati /* &c.' it has been declared that these have to be construed as independent sentences and not as *s'eṣa* to the text *'Dīkṣitam āvedayati'* on the ground that they convey *aneka arthas* and are complete by themselves which means that they are *vibhāge nirākāṅksa.* Hence inspite of *ānantarya* there can be no *ekavākyatā* between the two portions in this particular case.[47]

29 Now it may be noticed that though *vākya-bheda* is a *doṣa* in several cases, yet there are cases where it is not to be considered a doṣa. In fact in some cases it is but legitimate, so that in such cases it would be wrong to seek to establish *ekavākyatā* among he various parts concerned. Thus, for example, it would not be right to try to establish

---

45 मन्त्रेषु वाक्यशेषत्वं न स्यात्। न हि विधायकाविधायकयोरेकवाक्यत्वं भवति। विधायकं ब्राह्मणमविधायको मन्त्रः। [SB on X.8.20, p. 2075 f.]

46 भिन्नान्येतानि वाक्यानि, सोऽनुजुहोतीति विधिवाक्यम्, अग्नये स्वाहा कृत्तिकाभ्यः स्वाहेत्येवमादीनि मन्त्रवाक्यानि। [SB on X,4.1, p. 1902]

47 आनन्तर्यमचोदना। वाक्यानां च समाप्तत्वात्। [MS. III.1.24-25]; स्वेन स्वेन पदसमूहेन परिपूर्णमेकं वाक्यं, तथापरं, तथा सर्वाणि यान्युदाहृतानि। तस्माद्द्विस्पष्टमर्थद्वयम्। विभागे च निराकाङ्क्षता। तेन वाक्यभेदः। [SB on III.1.25, p. 742].

ekavākyatā between two *vidhis,* or between a *vidhi* and a *pratiṣedha,* or between two *guṇas,* or between a *Brāhmaṇa-vākya* and a *mantra-vākya.*

30 Besides these, however, there are circumstances under which it would be wrong to seek to establish *ekavākyatā.* These have very well been stated by S'ABARA in his commentary on MS. II.i.1 when he writes: *'Tad iha ṣaḍvidhaḥ karmabhedo vakṣyate s'abdāntaram abhyāsaḥ saṁkhyā guṇaḥ prakriyā nāmadheyam iti'* /

31 Thus the text *'Somena yajeta dākṣiṇāni juhoti hiraṇyam ātreyāya dadāti'* is to be taken as containing three independent *vākyas* enjoining three different and independent acts viz. *yāga, dāna,* and *homa* respectively, because of *s'abdabheda* or *s'abdāntara.* And if it is asked why we should accept *vākya-bheda* on the basis of *s'abdāntara* the reply given by JAIMINI is couched in the expression *'kṛtānubandhatvāt'* which S'ABARA explains when he writes: *'Dadātir hi svena kārakeṇa kṛtānubandho na yāgaṁ homaṁ vā'nubandham apekṣate.*[48] The second ground for *vākya-bheda* is set forth by JAIMINI in *'Ekasyaivaṁ punaḥ s'rutir avis'eṣād anarthakaṁ hi syāt'.*[49] The illustrative texts in this connection are *'Samidho yajati Tanūnapātaṁ yajati &c.'* where the word *yajati* is repeated five times. This *abhyāsa* would be *anarthaka* if the word every time is not taken as denoting some *apūrva karma.* But how can one and the same word

---

48 शब्दान्तरे कर्मभेदः कृतानुबन्धत्वात् । [MS. II. 2.1]; शब्दान्तरं च यजतेर्ददातिः । तत्र यद्यपि परो भागो भावनावचनः सर्वेषु समानस्तथाप्येकैकस्य पूर्वोऽवयवोऽन्यः । अन्यश्च तेन समुदायः । शब्दान्तरमन्यस्मात्समुदायात् । तत्रार्थान्तरं व्यक्तम् । दद्यादिति दानेन साधयेदिति केवलमेव दानं करणं भावनायाः प्रतीयते न यागहोमौ सहायावपेक्षते । तथा जुहोतीति होमसाधनां भावनामाह । न दानयागावपेक्षते । तत्रैतावच्छब्देनावगतं दानेन केवलेन सिध्यतीति । जुहोतीति अपि होमेन केवलेन सिध्यतीति, नतु दानेन केवलेन सिध्यतीति विज्ञानं निवर्तते । ददातिर्हि स्वेन कारकग्रामेण कृतानुबन्धो न यागं होमं वाऽनुबन्धमपेक्षते । तस्माद्भिन्नानि वाक्यानि । [SB on II.2.1, p. 466].

49 cf. MS II.2.2.

convey a different sense every time even if it is repeated a hundred times? Here it may be pointed out that the word *yajati* in all these sentences is only an *anuvāda;* for we already have it in the text *'Dars'apūrṇamāsābhyām yajeta'*. But the *devatā* that is spoken of in these can't pertain to those *yāgas*. Thus the *devatā-yāga-sambandha* spoken of in these sentences would be rendered *anarthaka* if no separate *yāga is* performed. Thus every time that the word *yajati* is repeated we have to accept the idea of performing the *yāga* and this *yāga* every time has to be looked upon as a separate *karman*. Thus we see that *abhyāsa* leads to *karma-bheda* i.e. to *vākya-bheda*.[50]

32 In the *sūtra*: *'Saṁkhyayā pṛthaktvanives'āt karma-bhedaḥ syāt'*[51] JAIMINI states the third ground for *vākya-bheda*. The text discussed in this connection is *'Saptadas'a prājāpat-yān pas'ūn ālabhate* &c.' where it is concluded that seventeen diffrent *ālambhas* are enjoined by it. The main ground for such a conclusion is the number *saptadas'a*. The verb speaks of *ālambha* of one *pas'u* only, so that if seventeen *pas'us* are to be sacrificed it follows that seventeen different *ālambhas* have to be performed.[52] Here it may be remembered that where the number of *karmas* is previously fixed the *saṁkhyā* may have no power to express *karma-bheda* or *vākya-bheda;* and the requisite number of acts in such cases will have to be made up by resorting to the repetition of one or more of

---

50 एकस्यैवं पुनःश्रुतिरनर्थिका स्यात्। कर्मभेदं कुर्यादित्यर्थः। तावत्येव त्रिधीयमानेऽप्रति कस्मिंश्चिद्विशेषे पुनःश्रुतिरनर्थिका भवेत्। ननूक्तं न शक्नोत्यर्थान्तरं विधातुमिति। उच्यते। समिधो यजतीत्यपि प्रथमोऽनुवाद एव। दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेतेति यागः प्राप्त एव। तत्र देवता न शक्या विधातुम्। श्रुतिप्राप्ता हि तत्र देवता। इयं वाक्यात्प्रकरणाद्वा। तयोर्विकल्पो न न्याय्यः। स एष देवतायागसंबन्धो विधीयमानोऽक्रियमाणे यागे न शक्यः कर्तुमित्यनर्थकः स्यात्। क्रियमाणे तु शक्यते। तस्मादभ्यसितव्यो यागः। प्रत्यभ्यासं चादृष्टभेदः। [SB on II.2.2].

51 cf. MS II.2.21.

52 संख्यया कर्मभेदो भवेत्। पृथक्त्वे पशूनां सति सप्तदशसंख्या निविशेत। तच्च पशूनां पृथक्त्वं बहुषु यागेष्ववकल्पते। नैकस्मिन्। कथम्। एकादशभिरवदा-

the constituent parts to the required extent.[53] This idea as also the idea of the *pṛthaktvaniveśinītva* of *saṁkhyā* has been fully discussed while treating of numerical adjectives in one of the previous chapters.

33 The next ground for *vākya-bheda* as given by JAIMINI is *saṁjñā* or name, which has been illustrated by S'ABARA by the text *'Athaiṣa jyotiḥ athaiṣa vis'vajyotiḥ athaiṣa sarva-jyotiḥ'*. The *Pūrva-pakṣin* would take all this as one text or sentence speaking of the *prakṛta jyotiṣṭoma* and laying down some *guṇa* with reference to it. This he concludes on the strength of the expression *jyotiḥ* which is common in all the three sections, and also is to be found in the name *jyotiṣṭoma*. But the *Siddhāntin* points out that one *samudāyā* can't be said to be identical with another *samudāya* merely because of the circumstance that a section is found to be common to both. Therefore, on the strength of

---

नैरसौ यागो निर्वर्तयितव्य इत्येवं चोदकः प्रतिदिशति । तानि चैकस्मादेव पशोरवाप्यन्ते । तत्र द्वितीयादेरालम्भो नावदानसंपादनाय भवितुमर्हति । एकमालभ्यमानमन्वालभ्येरन्नदृष्टार्थायापरे । तथा सत्यतदर्थत्वान्न ते प्राजापत्या भवेयुः । तत्र प्राजापत्यानिति श्रवणमुपरुध्येत । तेनैकस्मिन्पशौ पृथक्त्वे निर्देशिनी संख्या नावकल्पेत । बहुषु यागेषु बहुभिरेवावदानगणैः प्रयोजनम् । तेन सप्तदशभ्यो यागेभ्यःसप्तदश पशूनुपाददीरन् । तत्र संख्यासामञ्जस्यं भवति । तस्मात्सप्तदश यागाः । नन्वेकस्मिन्नपि यागे सप्तदशभिरवदानगणैर्यक्ष्यते, वचनात् । नैतदेवम् । पशुषु हिंसासंख्या श्रूयते । नावदानगणेषु । अवदानानि हवींषि यागसाधनानि, न पश्वाकृतिः । सा ह्यवदानप्रकृतिद्रव्यं विशिंषन्ती (प्रकृतौ प्रधानस्योपकृतवतीनि विकृतावप्यवदानप्रकृतिद्रव्यं विशिंषन्ती) प्रधानस्योपकरिष्यति । तत्र च पशोः सप्तदशसंख्या विकारिका । नावदानगणस्य । तस्मादेकस्मा अवदानगणायैकः पशुरालब्धव्यः प्राप्नोति । तत्र सप्तदशसंख्या नोपपद्यते । एवमेवावकल्पिष्यते यदि शृङ्गाभिप्राया वर्णाभिप्राया वा रूपाभिप्राया वाभविष्यन् सप्तदश पशवः श्वेतः कृष्णो रोहित इत्येवमादयः तेषामन्यतमो गृह्यत इति, अथवा तूपराः शृङ्गिण एकशृङ्गा इत्येवमादयस्तेषामन्यतम इति । त हि श्यामास्तूपरा एकरूपाः श्रूयन्ते । तदेषु बहुषु यागेषूपपद्यते, नैकस्मिन् । तस्मात्सप्तदश यागा इति । [SB on II.2.21, pp. 524-527]

. 53 सर्वसंपाद्या संख्या कल्प्येत । etc. [See page 111, n. 36].

the direct *ekavākyatā* he concludes that these are three different acts distinct and separate from the *jyotiṣṭoma* also.[54]

34 Guṇt is the next ground for *vākya-bheda*; and *Tapte payasi dadhy ānayati sā vais'vadevy āmikṣā vājibhyo vājinam'* is the illustrative text taken by S'ABARA in this connection. Here the *Pūrva-pakṣin* would like to resort to *lakṣaṇā* and take the term *vājibhyaḥ to* signify *vis've devāḥ* only, so that the whole text would speak of only one *karma* laying down *vājina* as an additional *guṇa*. The *Siddhāntin,* however, demurs and points out that the expression *vājibhyaḥ* can't be taken to signify the *prakṛtā vis've devāḥ*. These *devatās* are *apūrva.* And when a *guṇa* is found associated in a text with some *apūrva devatās* it must be regarded as speaking of some *karmāntara* and hence a separate sentence. And if the *Pūrva-pakṣin* were to ask why it should be so, S'ABARA is ready with the reply *'Same hi tadā ete vākye bhavataḥ ubhe api apūrvayor yāgayor vidhātṛṇī'*.[55] In this connection, of course, it must be noted that whenever in the original *vidhi* the *guṇa* is not mentioned the text speaking of that *guṇa* in *that* connection should be taken as a *guṇa-vidhi* only and not as laying down a *karmāntara.* Thus the text *'Dadhnā juhoti'*

54 संज्ञा चोत्पत्तिसंयोगात् । [MS II.2.22]; संज्ञा हि तिस्रो भेदिकास्तेषां ज्योतिराद्याः । उत्पत्तिवाक्ये ह्येताः श्रूयन्ते । तासामिमाः पुनः श्रुतयः । तस्मादथैष ज्योतिरिति अपूर्वस्य कर्मणो विधायकं वाक्यम् । अनुवादे हि सत्यप्रवृत्तिविशेषकरमनर्थकं स्यात् । प्रकृतस्य च गुणविधाने विकल्पो भवेत् । तत्र पक्षे बाधः । न च ज्योतिरादयो ज्योतिष्टोमस्य वदितारः । समुदायान्तराणि ह्येतानि । न चावयवेन समानेन समुदायान्तरं तदर्थमेव भवति । यथा शालाशब्दो गृहवचनः । तत्र न शालाशब्दसामान्यान्मालशब्दादयोऽपि गृहवचना भवन्ति । यत्तु ज्योतिष्टोमस्य ज्योतिरिति प्रतीकमुपादीयत इति । प्रकरणसामर्थ्याद्धि तत्र ज्योतिष्टोमशब्देन परोक्षेणैकवाक्यता भवेत् । सा प्रत्यक्षं ज्योतिःशब्देन सहैकवाक्यतां बाधेत । न चैतन्न्याय्यम् । वाक्यं हि प्रकरणाद्बलीयः । ————तस्मान्न विश्वज्योतिः सर्वज्योतिरिति च ज्योतिष्टोमस्य वदितारौ । न चेत् ज्योतिष्टोम उच्यते, सर्वाणि कर्मान्तराणि । [SB., pp. 529-531]

55 गुणश्चापूर्वसंयोगे वाक्ययोः समत्वात् । [MS II.2.23]; and SB. thereon.

is a *guṇa-vidhi* with reference to the text '*Agnihotram juhoti*' which is a *mukhya vidhi*.[56] Similarly the text '*Dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt*' has to be construed as speaking of the same act as is laid down by the text *Agnihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*'.Here it must be noted that the two texts differ from each other in this that the *phala* in the one is *guṇa-samabhivyāhṛta* while in the other it is *karma-samabhivyāhṛta*. They being thus *atulya* need not be taken as independent sentences laying down two distinct and separate *karmas*.[57] When, however, texts speaking of *phala* are not thus *atulya* i.e. when they are *sama* they ought to be construed as two separate sentences speaking of two separate acts. This is what is illustrated by S'ABARA with the texts: '*Trivṛd agniṣṭud agniṣṭomas tasya vāyavyāsu ekaviṁs'am agniṣṭomaṁ sāma kṛtvā brahmavarcasakāmo yajeta Etasyaiva revatīṣu vāravantīyam agniṣṭoma sāma kṛtvā pas'ukāmo hy etena yajeta*'.[58]

35. The texts '*Jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*' and '*yadi rathantarasāmā somaḥ syāt aindrāvayavāgrān grahān gṛhṇīyāt yadi bṛhatsāmā s'ukrāgrān yadi jagatsāmā āgrayaṇāgrān*' should be taken as speaking of one and the same act. The expressions *rathantarasāmā* and *bṛhatsāmā* of the latter refer to the *jyotiṣṭoma* only and as such what the latter speaks of is the *grahāgratā-vis'eṣa* of the *jyotiṣṭoma* under particular

56 अगुणे तु कर्मशब्दे गुणस्तत्र प्रतीयेत । [MS II.2.24]; अथ यदुपवर्णितं यथाग्निहोत्रं जुहोतीत्युक्ते दध्ना जुहोतीत्येवमादयो गुणविधय इति। तत्रोच्यते। युक्तं यत्तत्र गुणविधानम्। न तत्राप्रकृतेन केनचिद्गुणेन संबन्धः। प्रकृतेन त्वस्ति यागेन। तस्मादनुपवर्णनमेतत्। [SB on II.2.24, p. 539].

57 फलश्रुतेस्तु कर्म स्यात् फलस्य कर्मयोगित्वात्। अतुल्यत्वात्तु वाक्ययोर्गुणे तस्य प्रतीयेत। [MS II.2..25-26]; न कर्मान्तरं, किन्तु गुणात्फलमिति। कथम्। अतुल्ये ह्येते वाक्ये। अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकाम इत्यत्र कर्मसमभिव्याहृतं फलं स्वर्गकामो होमेन कुर्यादिति। दध्नेन्द्रियकामस्य जुहुयादिति गुणसमभिव्याहृतम्। न ह्यत्र होम इन्द्रियाय कर्तव्य इति प्रतीयते। किं तर्हि। दध्ना होम इन्द्रियकामस्येति होमस्य दधिसंबंध इन्द्रियाय, न होमस्योत्पत्तिः। य इंद्रियकामः स्यात्स दध्ना होमं कुर्यादिति। [SB on II.2.26, p. 546 f.]

• 58 समेषु कर्मयुक्तं स्यात्। [MS II.2.27] and SB. thereon.

circumstances.[59] Slightly different, however, is the case with the text *'Rājā rājasūyena yajeta'* and *'Yadi brāhmaṇo yajeta bārhaspatyaṁ madhye nidhāya āhutiṁ hutvā' bhighārayet yadi rājanya aindraṁ yadi vais'yo vais'vadevam iti'*. Here we find that the *rājasūya* spoken of by the former can be performed by the *kṣatriya* alone; while the latter is speaking of an act that may be performed by men of all the three castes. Hence we must take it that these texts speak of two different acts.[60]

36 The text *'Dākṣāyaṇena prajākāmo yajeta* &c.' has been understood by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* as enjoining *karmāntaras* and as comprising several separate and independent sentences on the strength of *saṁjñās* viz. *dākṣāyaṇa, sākaṁprasthīya,* and *saṁkrama,* and also on account of some *phala* being spoken of along with each. But the *Siddhāntin* points out that these *saṁjñās* can very well apply to the *dars'a* and the *paurṇamāsa* sacrifices and that the mere mention of *phalas* along with each can't prove that they are separate and independent acts; for such a mention of *phalas* can be found being made along with *guṇas* also as in '*Dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt'*. Hence, he concludes, that the text under discussion speaks of the *dars'apūrṇamāsa* only and not of any other act so that the whole of it forms only one sentence along with the text *'Dars'apūrṇamāsābyāṁ svargakāmo yajeta'*.[61]

37 When, however, an act is mentioned along with some *dravya* and also some *devatā,* the text doing it must be looked upon as an independent sentence and the act spoken of in it as a *karmāntara.* This is illustrated by the text *'Vāyavyaṁ s'vetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ'* and *'Sauryaṁ caruṁ nirvaped brahmavarcasakāmaḥ'* which it should be noted, have nothing to do with the *ālambha* and the *nirvāpa*

---

59 एकस्य तु लिङ्गभेदात्प्रयोजनार्थमुच्येतैकत्वं गुणवाक्यत्वात् । [MS II.3.2].

60 अवेष्टौ यज्ञसंयोगात्क्रतुप्रधानमुच्यते । [MS II.3.3].

61 MS II.3.5-11, and SB. thereon.

enjoined in connection with the *dars'apūrṇamāsa yāgas* by the texts *'Iṣam ālabheta'* and *'Caturo muṣṭīr nirvapati'*.[62] But if an act is mentioned by the mere name without stating the *dravya* and the *devatā* it can't be *karmāntara.* This is illustrated by the text *'Eṣa vai haviṣā havir yajate yo'dābhyaṁ gṛhītvā somāya yajate iti'*.[63]

38 The last ground for *vākya-bheda* as given by JAIMINI is *prakriyā* or *prakaraṇa.*[64] There are the texts *'Māsam agnihotraṁ juhoti'* and *'Māsaṁ dars'apūrṇamāsābhyām yajate'* which, according to the *Pūrva-pakṣin,* lay down the *kāla* with reference to the *nitya agnihotra* and the *nitya dars'apūrṇamāsas;* for the idea of *kāla* alone seems to be fresh in this text. But here it is pointed out by S'ABARA that the texts occur in a different *prakaraṇa* and it is stated that whenever an act is mentioned in another context it must be accepted as being a *karmāntara* inspite of its having an identical name.[65] Similarly when an act is not described but the *phala* thereof is mentioned the text doing so should be understood as an independent sentence laying down an independent act. Thus the text *'Āgneyam aṣṭākapālaṁ nirvaped rukkāmaḥ* &c.' has to be understood as speaking of not the *nitya agnihotra* but of some special *kāmya karma.*[66] If, on the other hand, there is found some text describing some *karma* by the side of

---

62 यजतिस्तु द्रव्यफलभोक्तृसंयोगादेतेषां कर्मसंबन्धात् । [MS II.3.14].

63 अद्रव्यत्वात् कर्मशेषः स्यात । [MS II.3.20]

64 प्रकरणान्तरे प्रयोजनान्यत्वम् । [MS II.3.24].

65 प्रकरणान्तरे श्रूयमाणं etc. [See page 222, n. 15 above] अग्नि-न्यक्षे पुनरतन्त्रमग्निहोत्रशब्दो न कर्म विशेक्ष्यति । तेन वाक्यभेदो न भविष्यति । तस्मात्कर्मान्तरमिति सिद्धम् । [SB on II.3.24, pp. 614 ff.]

66 फलं चाकर्मसंनिधौ । [MS II.3.25] ; फलं च भेदकमकर्मनिधौ श्रूयमाणम् । कथम् । अनुवादे सति न शक्येत फलं विधातुम । विधायकस्याभावात् । न हि अविधीयमानो हि उपायो रुचो भवतीति गम्यते । अपि च रुक्कामेऽत्र विधीयमाने कामस्यानित्यत्वाद् आग्नेयादीनां नित्यत्वात्संबन्धो नावकल्पेत । तस्मात् कर्मान्तराणि । [SB., p. 618].

such a text as the one discussed just now, then such a text should be understood as laying down simply the *phala* with reference to the act described in the accompanying text. Thus *'Etayā'nnādyakāmo yājayet'* must be taken as laying down *phala* with reference to the *aveṣṭi* only which is spoken of in the adjoining text *'Āgneyo'ṣṭākapālaḥ puroḍāśo bhavati'*[67]. When, however, this latter text merely repeats the mention of an act and speaks of something else such as *phala* or *kāla* then the repetition is to be construed as a mere *arthavāda* and not as an independent text laying down a *karmāntara.*[68]

39 It may thus be observed that there are cases where it is wrong to assume a group of words as forming one sentence. In all such cases certainly we have to admit the group of words as comprising more sentences than one. But this does not mar the value of the rule stated by KUMARILA and quoted in the begining of this chapter. For even in all these cases it must be remembered *vākya-bheda* is accepted simply when it is found that it is impossible to establish *ekavākyatā.* In other cases, of course, *vākya-bheda* is decidedly a *doṣa* for the reasons already discussed at the very outset of this chapter. And yet as we have seen above again even this *doṣa is* at least not so serious as *ānarthakyam,* so that when it is found that *ānarthakya* can't be avoided by any other means one has as the last resort to accept even this *vākya-bheda* in as mild a form as possible. It is thus, indeed that in serval cases S'ABARA has told that *anekārthatva* though a *doṣa* has yet to be accepted only because there is no other go; and in such cases it is assumed that *vākya-bheda* is no *doṣa.*

---

67 संनिधौ त्वविभागात्फलार्थेन पुनःश्रुतिः । [MS II.3.26]; संनिधौ फलार्थेन पुनःश्रुतिरवेष्टेरेव । न कर्मान्तरमिति । कुतः । एतयेत्येष शब्दो न शक्नोत्यवेष्टया विभक्तं यागमन्यं वक्तुम् । संनिहितस्य प्रतिनिर्देशक एष शब्दः । तस्मादवेष्टेरेवान्नाद्यकामस्य विधीयत इति । [SB., p. 619 f.]

68 cf. MS II. 3.27-29.

Chapter XV

KINDS of SENTENCES

1 Having thus far fully discussed as to what is *vākya* and what is *vākyārtha* and also studied the principles of *ekavākatā* and *vākyabheda* we may now pass on to the next topic viz. the kinds of sentences. S'ABARA,[1] it may be observed, clasifies all the vedic texts under three heads: (1) *Vidhi*, (2) *Arthavāda*, and (3) *Mantra*. He also speaks of texts as being some of them *vidhāyaka* (injunctive) and some only *abhidhāyaka* (descriptive). Nor is he oblivious of the fact that some texts are expressive i.e. are to be taken in their literal sense while the others are only indicative i.e. to be understood figuratively; and that even among these injunctive texts some are purely injunctive in their force while others lay down a restrictive or an exclusive injunction. It may now be seen that though JAIMINI and S'ABARA have not used our modern grammatical terms they are well aware of almost all the different kinds of sentences that we can think of, and that they have given us rules for interpreting all these. These rules we shall study in details in subsequent chapters. Here we shall only consider and illustrate the various kinds of sentences that we come accross in the *Veda*.

2 Look at the following groups of Vedic texts:

A (i) *Agnithoraṁ juhoti* (ii) *Dadhnā juhoti* (iii) *Same yajeta* (iv) *Imām agṛbhṇan ras'anām ṛtasya ity as'vābhidhānīm ādatte* (v) *Agnihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* (vi) *Barhir devasadanaṁ dāmi* (vii) *Vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā* and (viii) *Ādityo yūpaḥ*.

B (i) *Nānṛtaṁ vadet* (ii) *Nodyantam ādityam īkṣeta* (iii) *Nānuyājeṣu yeyajāmahaṁ karoti* (iv) *Nātirātre ṣoḍas' inaṁ gṛhṇāti* and (v) *Na pṛthivyām agnis' cetavyo nāntarikṣe na divi.*

---

1 उक्तमस्माभिः समाम्नायस्यैदमर्थ्यम् । कश्चिदस्य भागो विधिर्योऽविदितमर्थं वेदयति यथा सोमेन यजेतेति । कश्चिदर्थवादो यः प्ररोचयन् विधिं स्तौति यथा वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवतेति । कश्चिन्मन्त्रो यो विहितमर्थं प्रयोगकाले प्रकाशयति यथा बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामीत्येवमादि । [SB on I.4.1, p. 320 f.].

Here we see that every text in group B has therein a word expressive of negation which is conspicuous by its absence in all the texts belonging to the other group. These texts, can, therefore, be named negative and positive respectively, though it may be observed that neither JAIMINI nor S'ABARA have given us any comprehensive terms which can correspond to the terms positive and negative as we use them now.

3 Among the negative texts themselves, it may be seen, the first lays down a prohibition and has to be taken quite literally. In the second and the third, however, *lakṣaṇā* has to be resorted to by construing the negative particle with the *ākhyāta* or some other word. Thus we see that the second text lays down a *vrata* or a *niyama* while the third lays down an exception. Thus though *lakṣaṇā* has to be resorted to in these texts yet they also have an injunctive force. But the last is purely figurative and is totally destitute of any injunctive force. Thus, it may be observed, that a negative text may be *expressive or indicative* (i.e. it may have to be interpreted literally or figuratively) or from another point of view it may be *injunctive* (i.e. may have injunctive force) or *purely descriptive*.

4 Positive texts also, like the negative ones, may be either expressive or indicative, and injunctive or descriptive. The first four texts of group A above are injunctive while the last four are only descriptive. The first text lays down *agnihotra* as the *sādhana* of attaining the *iṣṭa phala*. But it does nothing more than that. A text, which thus lays down merely an act-of course a principal one-as *iṣṭa-sādhana*, is according to the *Mīmāṁsā* terminology an *utpatti-vidhi* or a *mukhya vidhi*. We may call it a *principal injunctive sentence*. The second text differs from the first in this that it lays down not the act or *karma-svarūpa* but the *guṇa* or subsidiary detail of an act laid down by the *mukhya vidhi*. From it we know that the *agnihotra enjoined* by the first text is to be performed with *dadhi*. Texts or sentences like this which lay down some subsidiary detail or *guṇa* may be called *subsidiary injunctive sentences*, though in the *Mīmāṁsā* they are known as *guṇa-vidhis* or *viniyoga-vidhis*.

5 Texts iii and iv stand on a different footing though they are also endowed with injunctive force. For whereas the first two lay down something that is totally *aprāpta,* the next two speak of something that is only partially *aprāpta.* Thus when one proceeds to perform the *Yāga,* some *des'a sama* or *viṣama,* is but *artha-prāpta,* so that the text *same yajeta* can't but be taken as speaking of something which is partly *prāpta* and partly *aprāpta.* What such a text does is to lay down not so much the *des'a* as the *niyama* or restriction. Such texts are called *niyama-vidhis,* a name that we may paraphrase as *restrictive injunctions.* The next text represents what is called *parisaṁkhyā.* Even there the *as'vābhidhānīgrahaṇa* is not totally *aprāpta;* and the main purport of the text is not to lay down the *as'vābhidhānīgrahaṇa* so much as the exclusion of the *gardabha-ras'anā.* Such sentences may, therefore, be called *exclusive injunctions.*

6 Now we come to texts that have no injunctive force in them. These may be called descriptive sentences. Such sentences may be found to describe the *phala* (or the *iṣṭa* or the *sādhya*) of the act enjoined by the *mukhya vidhi,* or merely the acts or portions of acts that are performed during the main act. Thus the text '*Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*' describes with the help of the expression *svargakāmaḥ* the *phala* that is to be attained by performing *agnihotra* which is enjoined by the text '*Agnihotraṁ juhoti*'. Such texts are known as *adhikāravidhis.* But taking into consideration the fact that they describe the *phala* of the main act we may call them *descriptive sentences speaking of phala and thereby defining the adhikāra also.* '*Barhir devasadanaṁ dāmi*' represents the other variety of descriptive texts. These sentences merely state or describe acts or parts of acts that are performed during the performance of the main act and are called the *mantras.* These (i.e. the verbs in these) are merely *abhidhāyaka* and not *vidhāyaka;* and have to be understood in their literal sense.

7 The last two texts of group A have no injunctive force.

Nor are they to be taken in their literal sense. Such texts are called *arthavādas* which if taken literally would be useless and have as such to be understood only figuratively. These, it will be seen through *lakṣaṇā* convey either praise (of what is enjoined) or censure (of what is prohibited) and thereby urge a man on to what is enjoined or deter him from what is prohibited. In these we have to resort to *lakṣaṇā* not merely on some portion thereof, but on the whole text. We may, therefore, rightly describe the *arthavādas* as *indicative sentences.*

8 We may now put down our classification of the simple sentence in a tabular form as follows:—

Simple Sentence

- **Expressive**
  - **Injunctive**
    - Principal (मुख्य° or उत्पत्तिविधि)
    - Subsidiary (गुण° or विनियोगविधि)
    - Combined { (उत्पत्त्यधिकारविधि) (विशिष्टविधि)
    - Restrictive (नियमविधि)
    - Exclusive (परिसंख्याविधि)
  - **Descriptive**
    - Describing Fruit (अधिकारविधि)
    - Describing Acts etc. (मन्त्र)
- **Indicative (Descriptive)**
  - Conveying स्तुति or निन्दा (अर्थवाद)

9 But there are texts like '*Somena yajeta*' and '*Sauryaṁ caruṁ nirvaped brahmavarcasakāmaḥ*' which differ from all the sentences that we have taken up above. For they are possessed of characteristics which would make them fall under more heads or classes than one simultaneously. As a general rule every sentence must be construed as falling under one class and one only. Any construction which would make it fall under more heads than one is marred by *vākya-bheda* and hence in-admissible. Thus it is wrong for example to take the text '*Udbhidā yajeta* as enjoining the *yāga* and also *udbhid* (as a *guṇa* thereof.) Nor can this be taken as a mere *guṇa-vidhi* like '*Dadhnā juhoti*'; for there is no text which can be shown as the *utpatti-vākya* for this *yāga* enjoined here. It is, therefore, decided that *udbhid* is a *nāmadheya* i.e. the name of the main act viz. the *yāga*. The text '*Somena yajeta*' is like '*Udbhidā yajeta*' and one may be tempted to declare *soma* to be *nāmadheya*. But this is not possible. For whereas it is possible to make the name *udbhid* applicable to *yāga* by *yoga* (etymology), nothing like that can be done with reference to *soma*. *Soma*, therefore, can't be construed as *nāmadheya*, nor can the text be construed as merely a *guṇa-vidhi*. It must, therefore, be taken as enjoining the act as well as the *guṇa* thereof. But such a construction would be open to *vākya-bheda*. Hence by resorting to *matvartha-lakṣaṇā* the text is taken as a *vis'iṣṭavidhi* enjoining not merely the act, nor merely the *guṇa*, but the *guṇa-vis'iṣṭa* act. Similarly the other text quoted above has characteristics of an *utpatti-vidhi* as well as an *adhikāra-vidhi;* and for want of any better construction has to be admitted as an *utpatty-adhikāra-vidhi*. Thus it may be observed that every simple sentence must belong to only one of the several classes tabled above: but that when a text enjoins not merely the main act but also a subsidiary thereof or describes the *phala* of that act it has to be admitted as falling under two classes simultaneously and called *vis'iṣṭa-vidhi* (i.e. *guṇa-vis'iṣṭa-utpatti-vidhi*) *and utpatty-adhikāra-vidhi* respectively.

10. All these, however, are only simple sentences i.e. sentences having only one subject and one predicate. But a *mukhya-vidhi* together with all other sentences concerning the act that is enjoined by it is bound to form one bigger sentence with several subjects and several predicates. Thus, for example, the texts '*Agnihotraṁ juhoti*', *Dadhnā juhoti*', '*Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*' &c. will together form one big sentence supplying all the necessary information about the act called *agnihotra*. Such bigger sentences are known as *prayoga-vidhis* or *prayoga-vacanas, as* S'ABARA calls them. These are evidently made up of one principal clause (*utpatti-vidhi*) and one or more subordinate clauses (*guṇa-vidhi* &c.), and can, therefort, be fittingly called complex sentences.

11. The last thing that we have to note in this chapter is that a compound sentence is an impossibility in the eye of a *Mīmāṁsaka*. For a sentence to be compound it is absolutely necessary that its constituent clauses are co-ordinate (which is the same as *sama*). But *samatva* has been declared by JAIMINI as a ground for absence of *ekavākyatā* or *vākya-bheda*. Thus it is evident that according to JAIMINI if there is *ekavākyatā* there can be no *samatva*, and if there is *samatva* there can be no *ekavākyatā*. This shows how a compound sentence is an impossibility in the *Mīmāṁsā* view.